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Occasionally, a story appears in the news about an individual
who is injured while committing a crime. This fact alone is not
necessarily newsworthy, but the event becomes notable when the
criminal brings a lawsuit against the property owner, police depart-
ment, and sometimes even the victim, to recover damages.
Whether the lawsuit is brought by a teenager who is injured while
making a bomb,1 a burglar who is shot while robbing an inn,2 or a
felon who is fleeing after committing a mugging,' these cases never
fail to raise a public outcry. Many members of the public see these
lawsuits as literally adding insult to injury.4 They fail to see any
possible justification in either public policy or common sense to
permit the claims.
Despite the fact that common sense dictates criminals and
wrongdoers should be prohibited from taking advantage of the
court system to further a criminal scheme,5 current New York State
* Michael A.L. Balboni is a New York State Senator and a member of the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee. He is also of counsel to the firm of Bee, Eisman, & Ready
in Mineola, New York.
1. See Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 468 N.E.2d 39, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1984).
2. See Burglar Sues Man Who Shot Him, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Oct. 3,1985, at 1
("A Saratoga Springs man, who pleaded guilty to a charge of burglarizing the Green-
field Village Inn, has filed a suit for $1 million dollars because he was shot.").
3. See Anthony Scaduto, A $4.3 Million Bullet, NEWSDAY, Apr. 6, 1993, at 5.
4. See, e.g., Anthony Scaduto, Supreme Court Lets $4.3M Award To Mugger
Stand, NEWSDAY, Nov. 30, 1993, at 6 (McCummin's "victim, Jerome Sandusky, who
was 71 at the time of the attack, says he is 'indignant.' It is so ludicrous, and it sends
such a terrible message. It proves once again that crime does pay.").
5. This thought is perhaps best articulated in Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olin-
stead v. United States:
The court's aid is denied only when he who seeks it has violated the law in
connection with the very transaction as to which he seeks legal redress.
Then aid is denied despite the defendant's wrong. It is denied in order to
maintain respect for the law; in order to promote confidence in the adminis-
tration of justice; in order to preserve the judicial process from
contamination.
277 U.S. 438, 484 (1928).
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law permits these lawsuits.6 Furthermore, certain legislative at-
tempts by the New York State Legislature to prohibit these suits
have been thus far unsuccessful.7
Nevertheless, an examination of New York State's jurisprudence
reveals a definitive rejection of such lawsuits and, arguably, pro-
vides the foundation for declaraing a broad public policy to pro-
hibit such suits. Part I of this Article examines New York statutes
which limit criminals' rights. Part II describes state cases which
have granted, and those that have denied, recovery to wrongdoers.
Part III outlines proposed legislation which would have prevented
lawsuits filed by felonious plaintiffs, and argues why those bills
should have been passed. Finally, this Article concludes that the
state legislature must take steps to ensure that wrongdoers do not
use the court system to benefit from their crimes.
I. New York Statutory Law
New York State law is replete with examples of civil alienation
wherein convicted felons' rights and privileges are restricted. Be-
low are various examples, along with their jurisprudential interpre-
tations, which illustrate this concept.
A. Pari Delicto
In the law of contracts, under the doctrine of "Pari Delicto,"
courts will not enforce contracts which require the parties to prove
an illegal transaction in order to make out their case.8
This principle has been consistently followed by the New York
State Court of Appeals. In Spivak v. Sachs,9 the plaintiff was
barred from suing for services rendered because of an illegal con-
tract to practice law. Likewise, in McConnell v. Commonwealth
Pictures Corporation,1" the court prohibited the plaintiff from en-
forcing a legal contract because, in performing the terms of the
contract, he would have had to commit several acts of bribery.11
Likewise, a recurrent theme that runs throughout New York case law is that "[n]o
one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own
wrong, or found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own
crime." Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (1889).
6. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1411 (McKinney 1997).
7. See discussion infra Part III.
8. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1115 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Neil v. Pennsylvania
Life Ins. Co., 480 P.2d 923 (1970)).
9. 16 N.Y.2d 163, 168, 211 N.E.2d 329, 331, 263 N.Y.S.2d 953, 957 (1965).
10. 7 N.Y.2d 465, 471, 166 N.E.2d 494, 497, 199 N.Y.S.2d 483, 487 (1960).
11. See also Stone v. Freeman, 298 N.Y. 268, 82 N.E.2d 571 (1948).
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B. The "Unworthy Heir"
In 1994, the Legislature enacted Section 4-1.6 of the Estates,
Powers, and Trust Law, which prohibits the taking of funds from a
joint bank account by a wrongdoer or "unworthy heir." The "un-
worthy heir" doctrine, long the caselaw of New York, prohibits an
individual, convicted of murdering a benefactor, from profiting
from the crime.12 Though the doctrine was first enunciated in 1889
by .the New York Court of Appeals in Riggs v. Palmer,'3 the 1994
legislation marked the first time that this doctrine had been codi-
fied. The legislative intent underlying the bill was to close a loop-
hole in the law which permitted a joint tenant who murdered the
other joint tenant from taking the corpus of the account. 14 The
effect of this amendment was to disinherit an individual convicted
of murdering his testamentary benefactor.
C. Insurance Law
The general principle against criminals profiting from their
crimes is continued in the New York State Insurance Law. Section
5103 permits insurers to deny coverage to individuals if their inju-
ries were precipitated by participation in a felonious act.' 5 This
principle has been upheld by courts in this state. 6
12. Riggs, 115 N.Y. at 514, 22 N.E. at 191.
13. See id.
14. The author of this article was also the draftsman and sponsor of this bill. At
the time, the author had been appointed by the Queens County Surrogate to repre-
sent the interest of an infant beneficiary in a 1992 Queens County case. See In re
Strouse, File No. 1150-1979 (Queens Sur. Ct. 1993), wherein the son of a Testrix had
killed his mother. The murdering beneficiary petitioned the court for the proceeds of
a joint bank account. The court was unable to deny the payment of the proceeds of
such account to the beneficiary, who was a joint tenant of the account, since the joint
bank account fell outside the terms of the decedent's will. In reaching its decision, the
court deferred to the statutory provisions of the Banking Law and permitted the pay-
ment of the son's moiety, or one half of the account. The 1994 legislation was drafted
and enacted in response to this loophole. See N.Y. BANK LAW § 675 (McKinney 1971
& Supp. 1998).
15. N.Y. INS. LAW § 5103 (b)(3) (McKinney 1985). Specifically this statute states
that "[a]n insurer may exclude from coverage required by subsection (a) hereof a
person who [i]s injured while he is committing an act which would constitute a felony
16. See Jacob v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 256 A.D. 884, 884, 9 N.Y.S.2d 27,
27 (N.Y. App. Div. 1939), affd, 281 N.Y. 623, 623, 22 N.E.2d 177, 177 (1939) (denying
a beneficiary the right to collect on an insurance policy insuring the life of a benefac-
tor whom he had killed).
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D. Civil Death
Conviction of a felony renders a person unable to participate in
certain civic activities. This result is referred to by statute as "civil
death." Section 79-a of the Civil Rights Law provides that a sen-
tence of imprisonment for life renders the person "civilly dead. '17
This section embodies New York State's public policy of depriving
convicted felons of civil rights as a part of the penal scheme. 18
Furthermore, section 60.30 of the Penal Law provides that a
court may decree a forfeiture of property, suspend or cancel a li-
cense, remove a person from office, or impose any civil penalty.1 9
In addition, the law states that any appropriate order exercising
such authority may be included as part of the judgment of convic-
tion.21 Similarly, section 5-106 of the Election Law strips felons of
their voting rights.21
Convicted criminals can also lose their property. The Civil Prac-
tice Law and Rules ("CPLR") provides that the profits of a crime
are subject to forfeiture.22
These provisions evidence the New York State Legislature's in-
tent to deprive convicted criminals of certain rights, in addition to
their liberty (i.e., the right to vote, marry, obtain certain licenses, or
hold certain jobs). The provisions of the Insurance Law and Es-
tates Powers and Trusts Law cited above recognize that individuals
who participate in criminal acts should not be able to gain from
those acts. The laws in our state clearly establish that those who
choose to break the law are not entitled to its full protection. Why,
then, are convicted felons being allowed to utilize our court system
to sue their victims for injuries sustained during the commission of
a crime?
17. This section specifically refers to marriage contracts.
18. See Urbano v. News Syndicate Co., 232 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), rev'd on
other grounds, 358 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 831 (1966).
19. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.30 (McKinney 1997).
20. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.30 (McKinney 1998).
21. No person who has been convicted of a felony pursuant to the laws of this
state, shall have the right to register for or vote at any election unless he
shall have been pardoned or restored to the rights of citizenship by the gov-
ernor, or his maximum sentence of imprisonment has expired, or he has
been discharged from parole.
N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 5-106 (McKinney 1978).
22. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1311(1) (McKinney 1985) ("A civil action may be commenced
by the appropriate claiming authority against a criminal defendant to recover the
property which constitutes the proceeds of a crime .... ). This legislation has sur-
vived constitutional challenges. See Short Stop Indus. Catering Corp. v. City of New
York, 127 Misc. 2d. 363, 368, 485 N.Y.S.2d 921, 925 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
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E. A Step Backward: The Abolishment of the "Assumption
of Risk"
A significant change to New York's tort system came from the
enactment of Section 1411 of the CPLR in 1975, which adopted the
doctrine of pure comparative negligence. 23 Prior to 1975, the stan-
dard was one of contributory negligence. Under this standard,
plaintiffs were denied recovery for a cognizable tort if they had in
any way contributed to their injury. After 1975, however, negligent
plaintiffs were no longer barred from seeking compensation.
Rather, their conduct is "compared" to the conduct of the defend-
ant, and a percentage of fault is assigned. Thus, rather than pro-
hibit the criminal from getting to the courthouse, the current law
requires that the conduct of criminal plaintiffs must be compared
to that of the defendant. The law, however, fails to distinguish be-
tween plaintiffs who innocently are injured as a result of negli-
gence, and plaintiffs who place themselves in harm's way by
committing a criminal act.
In addition to abolishing the rule of contributory negligence, the
doctrine of "assumption of risk" was also abolished. This doctrine
prevented injured people from receiving compensation for their in-
juries if they had voluntarily exposed themselves to known
dangers.24
The effect of CPLR section 1411 is that there is no preclusion of
suit in New York State based on plaintiffs' actions, only a dimin-
ished recovery proportionate to the plaintiffs' percentage of fault.
23. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1411 (McKinney 1997) states:
In any action to recover damages for personal injury, injury to property, or
wrongful death, the culpable conduct attributable to the claimant or to the
decedent, including contributory negligence or the assumption of risk, shall
not bar recovery, but the amount of damages otherwise recoverable shall be
diminished in the proportion which the culpable conduct attributable to the
claimant or decedent bears to the culpable conduct which caused the
damages.
Id. Companion sections of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules sections 1401
and 1402, enacted around the same time as section 1411, also abolished the common-
law rules of contribution and permitted co-defendants to seek contribution from other
defendants based upon the degree to which each of them had contributed to the
plaintiff's injury. These sections essentially codified decisions of the Court of Appeals
that had rejected the common-law rules of contribution, on the ground that they de-
pended upon outmoded notions that served as arbitrary or artificial obstacles to fair
distribution of liability.
24. See BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 123 (6th ed. 1990). Assumption of risk is de-
fined as containing four elements: 1) the plaintiff has knowledge of facts constituting a
dangerous condition; 2) he knows the condition is dangerous; 3) he appreciates the
nature or extent of the danger; and 4) he voluntarily exposes himself to that danger.
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CPLR section 1411 fails to address those cases in which a criminal
is injured while committing a felony. This section fails to recognize
the cost, time, and effort that municipalities, businesses, and indi-
viduals must expend to defend these suits. The irony of the current
CPLR section 1411 and its failure to carve out an exception for
felonious plaintiffs is that it runs contrary to the statutory intent
referenced heretofore. The New York Court of Appeals has criti-
cized it for this very reason.25
II. Relevant Case Law
A. New York Case Law
Unlike New York's statutory law, New York's case law has con-
sistently held that a criminal suffers his or her injuries without re-
course or redress by the state's court system. In fact, the New York
Court of Appeal's declaration on this point is so clear that it estab-
lishes a mandate for this policy.2 6
1. Cases Denying Recovery
Case law, with few exceptions, has consistently prohibited an in-
dividual from taking advantage of his or her wrong. In order to
justify denial of relief to the criminal plaintiff, however, the trend
in these cases is to require that the criminal act be both serious and
the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. Recovery may be per-
mitted, however, if, at the time of injury, the plaintiff engaged in an
act which violated the law but did not proximately contribute to his
27injury.
a. Riggs v. Palmer
In Riggs v. Palmer,2 8 the Court of Appeals enunciated for the
first time the concept of an "unworthy heir."'29 Francis Palmer's
will bequeathed a large portion of his estate to his grandson, Elmer
Palmer. Elmer, who knew of the provisions in the will, wanted to
prevent his grandfather from changing these provisions in order
"to obtain the speedy enjoyment and immediate possession of his
25. See Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 468 N.E.2d 39, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1984).
26. See id.
27. See generally 74 AM. JUR. 2D Torts § 46 (1974).
28. 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889).




property."3 Thus, he poisoned his grandfather to death and then
attempted to take possession of the property.
The court acknowledged that there were no clear statutes on
point specifically prohibiting a person from profiting from his
crime. The court rejected, however, the notion that the absence of
direction signaled an intention by lawmakers to permit a murder-
ing beneficiary to profit from his crime as a result of strict adher-
ence to the terms of a will.31 The Court of Appeals held that the
grandson could not recover because he should not be allowed to
profit from his own crime.32 They reasoned that this aphorism is
dictated by public policy and has its foundation in law administered
in all civilized countries.33
b. Carr v. Hoy
Carr v. Hoy34 involved the alleged conversion by the defendant,
a sheriff, of funds that the plaintiff had collected from photogra-
phers taking pictures of nude models. In exchange for receiving
this money, the sheriff agreed not to prosecute the photographers
for violations of the penal code. The plaintiff pleaded guilty to a
charge of violating public decency. The Court of Appeals held that
the money the plaintiff sought to recover was the fruit of an admit-
ted crime and "no court should be required to serve as paymaster
of the wages of crime. ' 31
c. Reno v. D'Javid
In Reno v. D'Javid,36 plaintiff Margaret Reno, upon whom the
defendant physician had performed an abortion at her request in
1970, sought damages for injuries sustained as a result of alleged
medical malpractice, breach of warranty, and assault. The Appel-
late Division concluded that the abortion was an illegal operative
procedure on the date performed. The plaintiff was also guilty of a
30. Id. at 508, 22 N.E. at 189.
31. Mindful of the absence of any statutory authority, the court held, "The writers
of laws do not always express their intention perfectly, but either exceed it or fall
short of it, so that judges are to collect it from probable or rational conjectures only.
This is called 'rational interpretation' ..... " Id. at 509, 22 N.E. at 189.
32. See id. at 514.
33. See id. at 511, 22 N.E. at 190.
34. 2 N.Y.2d 185, 139 N.E.2d 531, 158 N.Y.S.2d 572 (1957).
35. Id. at 187, 139 N.E.2d at 533, 158 N.Y.S.2d at 574 (1957) (citing Stone v. Free-
man, 298 N.Y. 268, 271, 82 N.E.2d 571, 572 (1948)).
36. 42 N.Y.2d 1040, 369 N.E.2d 766, 399 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1977).
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crime, and having participated in an illegal act, she could not profit
therefrom. Upon review, the Court of Appeals agreed.37
d. Barker v. Kallash
In Barker v. Kallash,38 the Court of Appeals held that a fifteen-
year-old plaintiff, injured while constructing a "pipe bomb," could
not maintain an action against a nine-year-old defendant who al-
legedly sold the firecrackers from which the gun powder was
extracted.
The court stated that a plaintiff whose injuries were the direct
result of the commission of serious criminal conduct is not entitled
to recover.39 The court discussed that constructing a bomb, not just
handling firecrackers, is certainly a dangerous activity, not only to
the maker, but also to the public at large.4 0 Recovery was denied,
however, not because the plaintiff's negligence contributed to his
injury, but because the public policy of New York State generally
denies judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a
serious criminal act. 41
When the plaintiff's injury is a direct result of a knowing and
intentional participation in a criminal act, the court ruled that he
cannot then seek compensation for the loss, particularly if the crim-
inal act is judged to be of a serious nature. This rule "involves
preclusion of recovery at the very threshold of the plaintiff's appli-
cation for judicial relief." 42
The Barker court distinguished between "lawful activities regu-
lated by statute," which are in the purview of CPLR section 1411,
and "activities which are entirely prohibited by law."'43 The Court
of Appeals also specifically rejected the argument that the CPLR's
37. The Court of Appeals stated that:
[t]he more grievous violation at issue is not that of the statute prohibiting
abortions, itself the object of a changing legislative view, but of the para-
mount public policy imperative that law, whatever its content at a given time
or for however limited a period, be obeyed.
Id.
38. 63 N.Y.2d 19, 468 N.E.2d 39, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1984).
39. Id. at 26, 468 N.E.2d at 42, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 204.
40. Id.
41. The Barker court noted, however, that a complaint should not be dismissed
merely because the plaintiff's injuries are occasioned by a criminal act. Id. at 25, 468
N.E.2d at 41, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 203.
42. Id. at 26, 468 N.E.2d at 42, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 204.
43. Id. at 24, 468 N.E.2d at 41, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 202. In reference to this second
type of activity, the Barker court stated that "the courts will not entertain the suit if
the plaintiff's conduct constituted a serious violation of the law and the injury he
seeks recovery were the direct result of that violation." Id.
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comparative negligence scheme can abrogate public policy." Ac-
cording to New York case law, limiting the expanse and scope of
CPLR section 1411 is permissible as long as it is consistent with
public policy.45
e. Smith v. Guli
In Smith v. Guli,46 defendant Guli, an underage drinker, drove
an automobile in which plaintiff Smith was injured when the car hit
a tree. In addition to suing Guli, Smith also sued Ryan's Tavern in
the city of Rochester, based upon New York's Dram Shop Act.47
The tavern had served alcoholic beverages to Guli, knowing that he
was under the influence of alcohol or intoxicated.48 Guli disclosed
that he was seventeen and did not possess a driver's license at the
time of the accident.49 After drinking all evening, defendant and
his friends picked up plaintiff and proceeded to purchase and con-
sume more beer. ° They visited two more bars, the last being
Ryan's, where they consumed additional alcohol. Guli admitted
being intoxicated at the time of the accident.51
Ryan's Tavern commenced a third party action seeking contribu-
tion from the grocery store which had also sold Guli alcoholic bev-
erages. 2 The store, relying heavily on the rationale in Barker,
maintained that the tavern was precluded from maintaining the
third party action since its own wrongful and illegal conduct was in
direct violation of fundamental New York public policy.
53
The court found that the grocery store misconstrued the impact
of Barker in failing to appreciate the distinction between an action
to recover damages and an action to apportion liability among
tortfeasors.54 The court found that the grocery store's argument
44. See id. at 29, 468 N.E.2d at 43, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 206 ("[C]ourts should not lend
assistance to one who seeks compensation under the law for injuries resulting from his
own acts when they involve a substantial violation of the law.").
45. Id.
46. 106 A.D.2d 120, 484 N.Y.S.2d 740 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
47. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 11-101(1) (McKinney 1989).






54. The court held that "[plublic policy considerations, that one may not profit
from his own wrong, do not apply to third-party actions involving contribution be-
tween joint, concurrent, or successive tortfeasors." Smith, 106 A.D.2d at 122, 484
N.Y.S.2d at 742.
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was not persuasive, and held that the tavern's illegal conduct did
not preclude recovery from a contributing tortfeasor.5 5
f LaPage v. Smith
In LaPage v. Smith,56 the decedent's estate brought suit against a
driver who allegedly had bumped the decedent's car from behind,
causing the accident and the decedent's death. At trial, evidence
was presented which showed that the decedent had been intoxi-
cated and was racing the defendant's car. Witnesses at the trial
testified that both cars were traveling at over 100 miles per hour.
The Appellate Division dismissed the plaintiff's action, ruling that
the decedent's criminal conduct prohibited recovery.57
g. City of New York v. Corwen
In City of New York v. Corwen,58 the city brought an action al-
leging that landlords' payments to an employee of the city's De-
partment of General Services' Bureau of Leasing and Space
Management were bribes, and that the city was injured by these
illegal payments. 59 In this case, the court found the doctrine of
comparative negligence to be inapplicable to a complaint alleging
bribery. Because bribery is a felony, the court held, such a "serious
violation of law" renders the doctrine of comparative negligence
immaterial.60
h. Manning v. Brown
In Manning v. Brown,6' the Court of Appeals once again relied
on Barker in reaching its decision.62 This case involved two high
school students, neither one possessing a driver's license, who stole
55. See id. at 123, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 743.
56. 166 A.D.2d 831, 563 N.Y.S.2d 174 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
57. See id. at 833, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 175 ("In our view, such hazardous illegal con-
duct falls clearly within the ambit of the rules as outlined in Barker v. Kallash .. .
58. 164 A.D.2d 212, 565 N.Y.S.2d 457 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
59. See id.
60. See id. at 217, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 459. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that
"contributory negligence was not available as defense to landlords who had commit-
ted intentional tort." Id. at 212, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 457. Interestingly, the court also
found that the landlords who had paid bribes to the city's employee may be able to
use an extortion defense as an affirmative defense in the event that they are able to
establish they were victims of the city employee's extortion. See id. at 218, 565
N.Y.S.2d at 460. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 155.05, subd.2(e)(viii), 200.05 (McKinney
1997), which states that "[o]ne who is victimized by extortion will not be held civilly
liable for amounts of payment."
61. 91 N.Y.2d 116, 689 N.E.2d 1382, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336 (1997).
62. See id. at 121, 689 N.E.2d 1382, 667 N.Y.S.2d at 338.
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a car and proceeded to joy-ride.63 The car in which they were driv-
ing eventually hit a pole, and one of the students was injured.64
The primary issue facing the court was whether a plaintiff who
knowingly participates in a crime is precluded from recovering for
injuries resulting from that conduct.65 The court had to determine
if the crime was of such a serious nature that recovery would be
prohibited.66 In reaching its determination, the court revisited
Barker.67 The court concluded that the crime of joy-riding was so
serious that it precluded the guilty plaintiff from recovering for his
injuries.68
2. Cases Allowing Recovery
a. Arbegast v. Board of Education
In the year following its decision in Barker, the New York Court
of Appeals stated in Arbegast v. Board of Education69 that CPLR
section 1411 does not require comparison of negligence, but rather
comparison of conduct which, for whatever reason, the law deems
blameworthy.70 The court's interpretation of CPLR section 1411
was that the culpable conduct attributable to the claimant be com-
pared with the total culpable conduct that caused the injury.7"
The Court of Appeals found that the comparative negligence
statute section 1411, leaves it "unclear whether express assumption
of risk is subject to comparison. '7 2 The Court of Appeals then con-
cluded that, "CPLR 1411 requires diminishment of damages in the
63. See id. at 119, 689 N.E.2d 1382, 667 N.Y.S.2d at 337.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 120, 689 N.E.2d 1382, 667 N.Y.S.2d at 338.
66. See id. at 120, 689 N.E.2d 1382, 667 N.Y.S.2d at 338.
67. The court had "distinguished between conduct that is regulated by statute and
activities that are entirely prohibited by law." Id. at 121, 689 N.E.2d 1382, 667
N.Y.S.2d at 338. As a matter of public policy, conduct that constitutes a serious viola-
tion of law and directly results in injury, is a bar to recovery. See id.
68. The court stated that joyriding is usually:
accompanied by reckless or excessively fast driving, posing a threat to inno-
cent third parties. Such criminal conduct which puts the public at grave risk
constitutes a serious violation. We therefore conclude that plaintiff's active
participation in joy-riding in the circumstances presented here are such a
serious violation of law as to preclude recovery for injuries stemming di-
rectly from the violation ....
Id.
69. 65 N.Y.2d 161, 480 N.E.2d 365, 490 N.Y.S.2d 751 (1985).
70. See id. at 168, 480 N.E.2d at 371, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 756 ("Comparative causation
is, therefore, the more accurate description of the process, as is evident ... from the
wording of CPLR § 1411.")
71. See id.
72. Id. at 169, 480 N.E.2d at 371, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 757.
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case of an implied assumption of risk, but.., does not foreclose a
complete defense that by express consent of the injured party no
duty exists and, therefore, no recovery may be had. '7 3 The court
ultimately ruled that in cases in which serious crime has not been
committed, the comparable negligence law in CPLR section 1411
applies.74
b. Izzo v. Manhattan Medical Group
In Izzo v. Manhattan Medical Group,75 the plaintiff alleged that
the death of her husband was caused by acute drug intoxication
from his ingestion of controlled substances. Among the defendants
were seven physicians, two nurses, and twelve pharmacies, includ-
ing Glen Rock Drugs. Plaintiff alleged that the negligence of the
drug store in the filling of a single prescription caused or contrib-
uted to the decedent's addiction and, ultimately, his death. Glen
Rock Drugs had dispensed Emprin Number 3 to the decedent pur-
suant to a union prescription form, which bore the dentist's signa-
ture, alleged by the plaintiff to have been forged by the decedent.
The form did not include the mechanically imprinted name of the
prescribing practitioner. The decedent, who had allegedly become
physically dependent on drugs, died four months later.76
Glen Rock moved for summary judgment dismissing the com-
plaint, arguing that it was not negligent in filling a single prescrip-
tion. The Court determined that the appeal presented other
questions, such as whether, because of the forgery, the decedent's
estate and his survivors could avail themselves of this cause of
action.
The court recognized that the basic principle that one may not
profit from his own wrong has been extended to tort actions seek-
ing compensation for injuries resulting from the plaintiff's own
criminal activities of a serious nature. 77 However, the court con-
cluded that the principle should not be applied in the instant case
where the decedent was so addicted to drugs that he lacked the
capacity to realize that forging prescriptions was wrong.78
73. Id. at 170, 480 N.E.2d at 371-72, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 757-58.
74. See id. at 170, 480 N.E.2d at 371-72, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 757-58.
75. 164 A.D.2d 13, 560 N.Y.S.2d 644 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
76. See 560 N.Y.S. 2d 645.
77. See id. at 18, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 647.
78. See id. at 18, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 647.
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B. Survey of Other States
A review of other states' court decisions shows a mixed result:
some states strictly adhere to the doctrine of contributory negli-
gence when the plaintiff commits a criminal act, while others per-
mit the suit but apply a comparative scheme. In this latTer
treatment, however, the suit is permitted based upon other provi-
sions of that state's laws, such as the state's constitution.
1. Ashmore v. Cleanweld Products, Inc.
The issue presented in Ashmore v. Cleanweld79 was whether Or-
egon's public policy barred the plaintiff from suing a manufacturer
and retailer for injuries he sustained as a result of the premature
explosion of a bomb he was making while using defendant's prod-
uct. The Court of Appeals of Oregon, citing the Restatement Sec-
ond of Torts,80 held that the plaintiff was not barred.8' The court
acknowledged the defendant's argument that the plaintiff's activi-
ties violated public policy.82 However, the court ultimately held
that a provision in the Oregon Constitution may allow even a crim-
inal to seek damages for his personal injuries.83 The New York
State Constitution does not have a provision similar to this.
2. Siess v. Layton
The question in Siess v. Layton8 4 was whether a person under the
age of sixteen years, and thereby not qualified to obtain a motor
vehicle operator's license in Missouri, could maintain a cause of
action for injuries sustained while operating a vehicle on a public
highway. The court noted that no statute purported to make such
violation (driving without a license on a public highway) a disquali-
fication to sue for injuries sustained in the course of the violation.85
The court held that the minor was not barred since the mere failure
to have a driver's license does not establish a causal connection
between the operation of the vehicle and an injury. The court did
not address whether driving without a valid license was a serious
79. 672 P.2d 1230 (Or. 1983).
80. See id. at 1231.
81. See 66 Or. App. 65, 672 P.2d 1231.
82. See id.
83. See id. ("Barring a person who may have violated a criminal statute from seek-
ing civil damages for personal injuries may violate Article I, section 10, of the Oregon
Constitution, which provides in relevant part ... [E]very man shall have remedy by
due course of law for injury done him in his person, property or reputation.").
84. 417 S.W.2d 6 (Mo. 1967).
85. See id. at 7.
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violation. In deciding this case, the court chose to ignore the ques-
tion of "seriousness," and instead focused on causation in order to
permit recovery. 6
3. Lord v. Fogcutter Bar
In Lord v. Fogcutter Bar,87 plaintiff Lord spent several hours at
the Fogcutter Bar, where the bartender served him more than four-
teen drinks over a nine-hour period. Lord left the bar with a wo-
man whom he subsequently kidnapped, raped, and assaulted.
While serving a thirty-year sentence for those crimes, he brought
an action against the Fogcutter and its bartender, alleging viola-
tions of his federal constitutional rights and Alaska's Dram Shop
Statute.
The lower court granted Fogcutter's motion for summary judg-
ment on the ground that the suit was frivolous. The Supreme
Court of Alaska affirmed, not because the suit was frivolous, but
because Lord's criminal conduct precluded his recovery for any
cause of action based on his criminal conduct. The court held that
the dram shop statute was not intended to protect persons from the
consequences of their own intentional, criminal conduct.8
4. Adkinson v. Rossi Arms Co.
In Adkinson v. Rossi Arms Co.,89 the same Alaska court pro-
duced a similar result. It held that an assailant convicted of man-
slaughter for shooting and killing his victim with a shotgun had no
claim for relief against either the manufacturer or the seller of the
gun for direct personal loss alleged to have resulted from the
shooting.90
5. Flanagan v. Baker
In Flanagan v. Baker,9' the Appeals Court of Massachusetts was
presented with facts almost identical to those presented to the New
86. See id. at 8.
87. 813 P.2d 660 (Alaska 1991).
88. In doing so, the court stated that "[c]ourts have consistently refused to aid
those whose claims are based upon their own illegal acts. This principle is grounded
in public policy and precludes recovery at the 'very threshold of the plaintiff's applica-
tion for judicial relief."' Id. at 663 (citation omitted).
89. 659 P.2d 1236 (Alaska 1983).
90. In June 1986, the Alaska Legislature enacted a statute prohibiting a convicted
felon from suing for personal damages resulting from the commission of the felony for
which he or she had been convicted. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.030 (Michie 1997).
91. 621 N.E.2d 1190 (Mass. 1993).
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York Court of Appeals in Barker.92 However, the Flanagan court
declined to follow the opinion of the New York Court of Appeals
in Barker.
In Flanagan, a fourteen-year-old boy, was injured when the pipe
bomb, which he was making with gunpowder obtained from fire-
crackers, exploded at his friend's house. The boy brought a negli-
gence action against the friend and his parents.93 The court
examined a state statute 94 which expressly provided that the "viola-
tion of ... [a criminal] statute, ordinance or regulation shall not as
a matter of law and for that reason alone, serve to bar a plaintiff
from recovery. '' 95 The court stated that although the statute seems
to comprehend all illegal conduct, it could also be construed as al-
lowing for some exceptions.96
The court then decided not to bar the plaintiff from recovery
based merely on public policy reasons.97 This case, though on
point factually, interpreted Massachusetts statutes to provide for a
broader protection than New York law provides.
III. The Need for Legislative Reform in New York State
Every year, in what has become an annual ritual in futility, a
number of bills are introduced in the New York State Legislature
that attempt either to provide protection for "good samaritans," 98
limit the rights of criminals to sue,99 or exonerate crime victims
from tort liability. 00 Each year, these bills, which are intended to
92. See id. at 1192-93.
93. See id. at 1191.
94. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85 (1997).
95. Flanagan, 621 N.E.2d at 1192.
96. See id. at 1193.
97.
Even were we to conclude that § 85 allows actions by certain lawbreakers to
be defeated for public policy reasons, we would not preclude [plaintiff] from
recovery for his injuries on that basis. Such a preclusion would itself offend
a countervailing public policy to the extent it could also protect from possi-
ble liability those persons from whom the firecrackers were obtained.
Id. at 1193.
98. See, e.g., A. 488, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1992) (introduced by Assemblyman Kelle-
her); S. 731, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1993) (introduced by Senator Skelos).
99. See A. 2378, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1993) (introduced by Assemblyman Hikind).
100. See S. 3215-A, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1993) (introduced by Senator Skelos); A. 5490-
A, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1993) (introduced by Assemblyman Weisenberg).
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limit the access of criminals to use the justice system, die in com-
mittee or pass one house of the legislature but not the other.'1
Many of the proposed measures have a long history. In 1993,
Assemblyman Dov Hikind introduced a bill0 2 which would bar a
violent criminal perpetrator from bringing a civil damage lawsuit
against his victim when the victim's resistance to the criminal en-
counter injured the perpetrator. Similarly, in 1992, Assemblyman
Kelleher introduced a bill' 0 3 to prohibit an individual from bringing
a cause of action stemming from injuries sustained during the com-
mission of a crime. Both of these bills died in committee. The rea-
sons why are not documented.10
Lastly, a 1993 bill introduced by Senator Dean Skelos 10 5 pro-
posed to amend the CPLR to restore the concept of assumption of
risk in cases where individuals are injured during the course of a
felony for which they are subsequently convicted. Known as the
"Culpable Crime Bill," this measure received strident and adamant
criticism, such as a memorandum in opposition filed by the New
York State Trial Lawyers Association ("NYSTL") calling the legis-
lation "legally indefensible, morally repugnant, and dangerous to
society. o10 6
Essentially, the NYSTL memorandum in opposition attacks on
three points. Point one argues that this type of a bill would give
legitimacy to wrongful acts, such as setting up a spring gun or other
trap for unwary burglars. Point two contends that the bill is "dan-
gerous" because its enactment will permit police organizations to
assault criminal suspects without fear of retribution. Lastly, point
three argues that the current system of comparative negligence
permits a jury to return a defendant's verdict by reason of appor-
tionment of the culpable conduct. All three points, however, fail to
make a convincing argument that a law restricting the rights of fe-
lonious plaintiffs would be dangerous.
101. As of the date of this article, all of the above mentioned sponsors have re-
introduced these bills with the exception of Assemblyman Kelleher, who is no longer
a member of the Assembly.
102. A. 2378, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1993).
103. A. 488, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1992).
104. Records and transcripts are only provided for the debate of a bill on the floor
of the Legislature. Commentary by legislators during discussion of a bill in Commit-
tee is conducted informally without any record. See RULES OF THE N.Y.S. SENATE,
Rule VII, §§ 3-5 (1997).
105. S. 3215-A, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1993).
106. New York State Trial Lawyers Association, Inc., Memorandum in Opposition




The first argument fails to recognize that civil liability is only one
facet of the legal responsibility that any individual faces. In addi-
tion to civil liability, there is criminal liability. 10 7 Common sense
dictates that the threat of a lengthy prison term is much more of a
deterrent to a property owner than a civil lawsuit. It is difficult to
imagine that simply by eliminating the threat of a civil lawsuit, or-
dinary citizens will begin to set traps or use deadly force, even in
self-defense, recklessly or casually.
Point two fails to account for the development of federal law and
the realities of municipal indemnification. No one can argue that
police brutality should not be deterred and punished. The most
effective way to do this, however, is by criminal prosecution and
conviction, not by civil lawsuits brought in state court. Many juris-
dictions in New York State treat police brutality as falling within a
municipality's respondeat superior liability. Indeed, some jurisdic-
tions have even enacted legislation to indemnify the police officer
for punitive damage awards.1 °8 Therefore, there currently is little
or no personal financial threat against the individual police officer
wrongdoer. Furthermore, abolishing state civil suits will not immu-
nize officers from civil liability because police officers also face lia-
bility under the Federal Civil Rights Law. 109
107. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 60 & 125 (McKinney 1998).
108. See, e.g., N.Y, GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-L (McKinney 1986):
[T]he County of Nassau shall provide for the defense of any civil action or
proceeding brought against a duly appointed police fficer of the Nassau
County police department and shall indemnify and save harmless such police
officer from any judgement of a court of competent jurisdiction whenever
such action, proceeding or judgement is for damages, including punitive or
exemplary damages arising out of a negligent act or other tort of such police
officer committed while in the proper discharge of his duties and within the
scope of his employment.
Id.
109. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Section 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedings for
redress ....
Id.; see also Monnell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S.
658, 691 (1978), wherein female employees of the Department of Social Services of
New York City challenged employment policies of the department which required
pregnant women to take unpaid leave of absences before a medical reason justified a
regular leave of absence. The court held that local governments could be classified as
persons under the provisions of section 1983, and that while local governments could
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Finally, point three ignores the cost associated with trying these
cases for municipalities, insurance companies, school districts, indi-
viduals, and the medical community.
Dissimilar treatment of convicted felons in our society is consis-
tent with our penal scheme as well as society's expectation of fair-
ness,. Under the current provisions of the CPLR, however, the law
fails to provide any distinction between the non-criminal and crimi-
nal plaintiff. The ability of a felon to step outside the boundaries of
society to commit a crime, and then step back in to use the court
system to obtain damages, erodes society's confidence in the judi-
cial process. Individuals expect to be treated fairly under law. An
individual, by committing the criminal act, places himself or herself
within a separate category and therefore should not be afforded
society's protections.
New York State should carve out an exception to CPLR section
1411 and exclude plaintiffs who commit crimes of a serious nature.
The assumption of risk doctrine will act to bar the plaintiff from
recovering for an injury resulting from voluntary exposure to a
known and appreciated danger, such as the commission of a crimi-
nal act. This doctrine appears to have been consistently applied by
many different courts and laws. Re-enacting the doctrine would
save municipalities and society the financial burdens of defending
the lawsuits, as well as promote the public's perception of our judi-
cial system.
Conclusion
The foregoing survey of cases and statutes demonstrates that a
variety of jurisdictions have arrived at the same conclusion,
namely, that individuals who commit crimes forfeit certain protec-
tions of the law. In addition, civil remedies should not be available
to individuals who have been injured during the commission of
crime.
not be liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, they could be held liable
when constitutional deprivation resulting from government custom arises.
The United States Supreme Court has specifically held that section 1983 actions are
meant to punish the officer personally, so as to act as a deterrent against egregious
behavior. Therefore, elimination of state sponsored negligence actions will not abol-
ish existing deterrents. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 267,
271 (1981), wherein the Supreme Court held that a municipality and not the individ-
ual defendant, was immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 271.
The court reasoned that a deterrence to constitutional violations would adequately be
accomplished by allowing punitive damage awards directly against individuals respon-
sible for the violations. Id. at 270.
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Against the backdrop of public outrage, decisional law, logic,
and common sense, the state legislature should act to eliminate
these types of lawsuits. This common sense codification by the
New York State Legislature of the holding in Barker v. Kallash is
long overdue.
As Justice Brandeis once stated, convicted criminals should be
denied the court's aid "in order to maintain respect for the law; in
order to promote confidence in the administration of justice; in or-
der to preserve the judicial process from contamination.""'








Congress amended the Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act
('Fair Housing Act') in 1988 "to end the unnecessary exclusion of
persons with handicaps from the American mainstream."' To that
end, Congress defined prohibited housing discrimination against
people with disabilities as, among other actions, "a refusal to make
reasonable accommodation in rules, policies, practices, or services,
when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such per-
son equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling."2
As the United States Supreme Court has held, the Fair Housing
Act has a "broad and inclusive" compass requiring a "generous
construction."'3 However, many federal courts have narrowly inter-
preted the "reasonable accommodation" clause of the Fair Housing
Act in conflict with both Congressional intent and the Supreme
* Partner, Stein and Schonfeld, Garden City, New York. Member of New York
and District of Columbia Bars. B.S. 1974, Cornell University, J.D. 1977, Fordham
University. The author was the Research Editor of the Fordham Urban Law Journal,
Volume V, 1976-77. This article is a sequel to the author's three previous articles in
this journal, Robert L. Schonfeld, "Not in My Neighborhood: Legal Challenges to the
Establishment of Community Residences for the Mentally Disabled in New York State,
13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 281 (1985); Robert L. Schonfeld, "Five-Hundred-Year Flood
Plains" and Other Unconstitutional Challenges to the Establishment of Community
Residences for the Mentally Retarded, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 (1988); and Robert L.
Schonfeld and Seth P. Stein, Fighting Municipal "Tag-Team": The Federal Fair Hous-
ing Amendments Act and Its Use in Obtaining Access to Housing for Persons with
Disabilities, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 299 (1994).
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Beth Pepper and Seth P. Stein
on this article.
1. H.R. REP. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173,
2179 [hereinafter HousE REPORT]. For other articles on the Federal Fair Housing
Amendments Act, see Robert L. Schonfeld and Seth P. Stein, Fighting Municipal
"Tag-Team": The Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act and Its Use in Obtaining Ac-
cess to Housing for Persons with Disabilities, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 299 (1994);
Arlene S. Kanter, A Home of One's Own, the FHAA of 1988 and Housing Discrimi-
nation Against People With Mental Disabilities, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 925 (1994); Laurie
C. Malkin, Trouble at the Doorstep: The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and
Group Homes for Recovering Substance Abusers, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 757 (1995).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (1994).
3. City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 731 (1995).
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Court's mandate that the statute be given a "generous construc-
tion."4 Some courts have interpreted the terms "necessary" and
"equal opportunity" in a manner that nullifies the "reasonable ac-
commodation" clause of the statute.' These court decisions have
permitted landlords and municipalities to exclude people with disa-
bilities from housing.
This Article examines recent Federal court decisions interpreting
the "reasonable accommodation" clause of the Fair Housing Act
and proposes an interpretation of the clause that is consistent with
both the language of the statute and the intent of its drafters. Part
I explores the legislative history of the Fair Housing Act and, in
particular, the "reasonable accommodation" clause of the statute.
This Part also examines the 1995 United States Supreme Court de-
cision City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc. which explains how
the statute should be interpreted as well as the Supreme Court's
decision interpreting the phrase "reasonable accommodation." As
this Part demonstrates, both Congress and the Supreme Court in-
tended the statute be used to promote housing for people with dis-
abilities and not be used as a barrier to housing. In addition, they
intended that a "reasonable accommodation" be made except
where the accommodation would constitute a substantial hardship,
undue burden, or fundamental alteration of a program.
Part II examines the provisions of the Federal Fair Housing Act
and the way they are used to attack housing discrimination against
people with disabilities. This Part discusses in detail the "reason-
able accommodation" clause of the statute and explores the earlier
federal district court cases interpreting the "reasonable accommo-
dation" standard.
Part III discusses some of the issues from recent cases brought
under the "reasonable accommodation" prong of the statute. This
Part examines whether people with disabilities and housing provid-
ers must exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to litiga-
tion, as well as which parties - people with disabilities and
housing providers or municipalities and landlords - have the bur-
den of proof in a "reasonable accommodation" case. This Part
also explores the recent narrow Federal court interpretations of the
terms "reasonable," "necessity," and "equal opportunity" that
4. See, e.g., Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard County, Maryland, 124 F.3d 597
(4th Cir. 1997); Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300 (9th Cir. 1997);
Elderhaven v. City of Lubbock, 98 F.3d 175 (5th Cir. 1996); Brandt v. Village of
Chebanse, 82 F.3d 172 (7th Cir. 1996).
5. Id.
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have hindered the use of the statute to fight housing discrimination
against people with disabilities.
Part IV demonstrates how the "reasonable accommodation"
clause of the statute can be interpreted so that it comports with the
intention of its drafters and the United States Supreme Court. It
also considers an expanded use of the other prongs of the Fair
Housing Act as well as the use of the Americans With Disabilities
Act in land use disputes.
I. The History of the Fair Housing Act and
"Reasonable Accommodation"
In 1968, Congress enacted the Fair Housing Act 6 to prohibit
housing discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion and na-
tional origin7 and, in 1974, expanded the law to cover sex discrimi-
nation.8 Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act of 19739 to
prohibit discrimination against people with disabilities in federally-
funded programs.' 0 However, it was not until 1988 that Congress
enacted the Fair Housing Act1' which placed disability discrimina-
tion on the same footing as discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, national origin, and sex.12
This Part first examines the report of the Judiciary Committee of
the House of Representatives ("the Report"), especially as it re-
lates to the concept of "reasonable accommodation." This part
then explores the Supreme Court cases that have interpreted both
the Fair Housing Act and the concept of "reasonable
accommodation."
A. Report of the Judiciary Committee of the House of
Representatives
The Report supporting the Fair Housing Act enuciates a strong
policy favoring the establishment of housing for people with disa-
bilities in all residential areas. The Report states that the statute
"is a clear pronouncement of a national commitment to end the
6. Pub. L. 90-284, § 804, 82 Stat. 73, 83 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601-3619 (1994)).
7. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604 (1994).
8. Pub. L. 93-383, § 808(b)(1), 88 Stat. 633, 729 (1993).
9. Pub. L. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797 (Supp.
1997)).
10. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. 1997).
11. Pub. L. 100-430, § 6(a)-(b)(2), (e), 15, 102 Stat. 1620, 1622, 1623, 1636 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 - 3619 (1994)).
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1994).
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unnecessary exclusion of persons with handicaps from the Ameri-
can mainstream."13 The Report specifically rejects the use of gen-
eralized perceptions about disabilities and unfounded speculations
about threats to safety as grounds to exclude people with disabili-
ties from residential neighborhoods. 4
The Report recognizes several types of municipal ordinances
that exclude people with disabilities. First, health, safety, or land-
use requirements on congregate living arrangements among non-
related persons with disabilities violate the statute since such re-
quirements are not imposed on other families and non-related
groups of similar size. 15 Similarly, the statute was intended to pro-
hibit the use of special requirements through land use regulations,
restrictive covenants, and conditional or special use permits that
have the effect of limiting the ability of people with disabilities "to
live in the residence of their choice in the community."' 6 Finally,
the Report states that neutral rules and regulations on health,
safety and land-use may violate the statute whether they are based
on false or over-protective assumptions about the needs of people
with disabilities or on unfounded fears or difficulties about the
problems their residency in the community may pose.17
The Report further notes that a reasonable accommodation must
be made when necessary to permit people with disabilities to live in
a dwelling of their choice. 8 The Report states that the concept of
"reasonable accommodation" has a long history in regulations and
case law dealing with discrimination on the basis of handicap, citing
a Supreme Court decision interpreting the Rehabilitation Act of
1973."9 According to the Report, a discriminatory rule is not de-
fensible simply because it has become a tradition. The Report
notes that the "reasonable accommodation" provision of the stat-
ute requires changes to traditional rules and practices if necessary
to permit a person with disabilities an equal opportunity to use and
enjoy a dwelling.2"
As a whole, the Report expresses a policy prohibiting legal barri-
ers that inhibits people with disabilities from residing in dwellings
13. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2179.
14. See id.
15. See id. at 2185.
16. Id.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 2186.
19. Id. The HOUSE REPORT cited to Southeastern Community College v. Davis,
442 U.S. 397 (1979), and 45 C.F.R. § 84.12.
20. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2186.
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of their choice. This policy also suggests that the statute be con-
strued liberally in favor of housing for people with disabilities.
B. The Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Fair Housing Act
In City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc.21 , the Supreme Court
interpreted the Fair Housing Act. This case may indicate how that
Court will interpret future Fair Housing Act cases.
In City of Edmonds the issue for the Court was whether a munic-
ipal zoning ordinance limiting the number of unrelated people who
could be considered a "family" for zoning purposes constituted
"any reasonable local, State or Federal restrictions regarding the
maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling. 22
If the municipal ordinance was a restriction on the "maximum
number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling," the ordi-
nance would have been exempt from the Fair Housing Act. The
municipality could then have excluded a home for recovering al-
coholics and substance abusers which housed more than five unre-
lated people. 3
The United States Supreme Court held in City of Edmonds that
the ordinance was not a restriction on the "maximum number of
occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling" and thus was not ex-
empt from the Fair Housing Act.24 The Court held that the type of
restriction exempt from the statute was rules aimed at preventing
overcrowding. The exemption does not include family composition
rules aimed at limiting the number of unrelated people living to-
gether in a residential neighborhood that are not applicable to all
families.2 5
In reaching this decision, the Court noted that the statute had a
"broad and inclusive" compass requiring a "generous construc-
21. 514 U.S. 725 (1995).
22. Id. at 728, 731 (Thomas, J. dissenting) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1) (1994)).
"The Fair Housing Act exempts from coverage "any reasonable local, State or Federal
restrictions regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a
dwelling." Id.
23. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in City of Edmonds, courts were split on
the issue of whether a "family composition" ordinance was exempt under 42 U.S.C.
§ 3607(b)(1). In Elliot v. City of Athens, 960 F.2d 975 (11th Cir. 1992), the Eleventh
Circuit held that such ordinances were exempt from the Fair Housing Act. On the
other hand, the Ninth Circuit in City of Edmonds, 18 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 1994), and the
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in Oxford House, Inc. v. City of
Virginia Beach, 825 F. Supp. 1251 (E.D. Va. 1993), held that such ordinances were not
exempt from the Fair Housing Act.
24. City of Edmonds, 514 U.S. at 734-35.
25. See id.
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tion," and that the statute's exception was to be read "narrowly in
order to preserve the primary operation of the [policy]. '26 The
Court further recognized that the Fair Housing Act required rea-
sonable accommodations to afford people with disabilities an equal
opportunity to use and enjoy housing.27 The Supreme Court's de-
cision clearly comports with the intentions of the drafters of the
statute.2 8
In confirming the findings of previous decisions, the Court noted
in City of Edmonds that land use restrictions aim to prevent
problems caused by "the pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard"
and to encourage "family values, youth values, and the blessings of
26. Id. at 731 (citing Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209,
212 (1972)). While the Supreme Court does afford a "generous construction" to the
Fair Housing Act, it did not find that the municipality's code or actions were them-
selves discriminatory. City of Edmonds, 514 U.S. at 731 n.4. Instead, the Court con-
fined itself to the narrow issue before it. The decision in City of Edmonds should be
compared to the Court's previous case involving zoning an group housing for people
with disabilities. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Centers, 473 U.S. 432
(1985). There, the Supreme Court condemned the municipality's decision to zone out
a home for people with mental disabilities as being discriminatory and prejudicially
based. See id. at 450. Justice Marshall's concurrence in City of Cleburne also details
the history of discrimination against people with disabilities in the Untied States. See
also id. at 455-78. For other law review analysis of City of Edmonds, see Stephen C.
Hall, City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc: A Comment on the Continuing Vitality of
Single-Family Zoning Restrictions, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 829 (1996).
27. See City of Edmonds, 514 U.S. at 737.
28. The Supreme Court cited the HOUSE REPORT in support of its conclusion. See
City of Edmonds, 514 U.S. at 734 n.8. The Supreme Court's decision also demon-
strates the power of the Fair Housing Act and its ability to make uniform the rights of
people with disabilities throughout the country. Had the Fair Housing Act not ex-
isted, a challenge to the ordinance under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution
would have failed. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (finding that
a "family composition" ordinance did not violate Due Process Clause of the United
States Constitution). Assuming that City of Edmonds is federally funded, there
would have been a question as to whether the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 would have
applied. Compare Knutzen v. Eben Ezer Lutheran Housing Center, 815 F.2d 1343
(10th Cir. 1987) and Brecker v. Queens B'nai Brith Housing Development Fund Co.,
607 F. Supp. 428 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), affd 798 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that the
Rehabilitation Act did not require reasonable accommodation to permit housing for
people with disabilities) with City Wide Associates v. Penfield, 564 N.E.2d 1003
(Mass. 1992); Schuett Inn. Co. v. Anderson, 386 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. App. 1986) (hold-
ing that the Rehabilitation Act could require reasonable accommodation for people
with disabilities in federally funded housing) and Crossroads Apartments Associates
v. LeBoo, 152 Misc.2d 830, 578 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (N.Y. City Ct. 1991). In some states,
the ordinances involved in City of Edmonds would have been deemed to be violative
of the Due Process Clause of the Sate constitution. See City of Santa Barbara v.
Adamson, 610 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1980); Charter Township v. Dinolfo, 351 N.W.2d 831
(Mich. 1984); State v. Baker, 405 A.2d 368 (N.J. 1979); McMinn v. Town of Oyster
Bay, 66 N.Y.2d 544 (1985).
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quiet seclusion and clean air."2 9 If the housing proposal does not
constitute the proverbial pig and does not negatively impact on the
abovementioned values, seclusion, and air, the housing must be
permitted.
C. The Supreme Court's Interpretation of "Reasonable
Accommodation"
In its report, the House Judiciary Committee noted that the con-
cept of "reasonable accommodation ... has a long history in regu-
lations and case law dealing with discrimination on the basis of
handicap. 3 ° In writing this, the House cited31 to Southeastern
Community College v. Davis, 32 a Supreme Court case interpreting
the expression "reasonable modification" under a regulation en-
acted to interpret the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
Under this regulation, a school receiving federal funds was re-
quired to change its academic requirements to ensure such require-
ments do not discriminate against students on the basis of their
disabilities.33 In Davis, a student with a serious hearing disability
challenged the requirements of a college's nursing program as vio-
lative of the Rehabilitation Act. 34 The student alleged that the col-
lege was required to undertake affirmative action that would
dispense with the need for effective oral communication.3 5
The Supreme Court held that the student's request was not a
reasonable modification of the school's nursing program, and that
the school was not required to change its program.36 The Court
found that since the student was unable to function in clinical
29. City of Edmonds, 514 U.S. at 732-33.
30. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2186.
31. Id.
32. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
33. See id. at 408 n.9 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.44 (1978)). The Code of Federal Regu-
lations requires a school receiving federal funding to "make such modification to its
academic requirements as are necessary to ensure that such requirements do not dis-
criminate or have the effect of discriminating, on the basis of handicap, against a qual-
ified handicapped applicant or student." 45 C.F.R. § 84.44. While Southeastern
Community College was brought under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the substan-
tive portions of that statute do not refer to a requirement that a school make a "rea-
sonable accommodation." Southeastern Community College, 442 U.S. at 400; see also
29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. 1997). However, the "remedies and attorneys fees" portion of
the statute states that a court in fashioning a remedy "may take into account the
reasonableness of the cost of any necessary work place accommodation, and the avail-
ability of alternatives therefor or other appropriate relief in order to achieve an equi-
table an appropriate remedy." 29 U.S.C. § 794a (a)(1) (1985).
34. See Southeastern Community College, 442 U.S. at 407-09.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 410-12.
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courses without close supervision, the college could only allow her
to take academic classes and that such change would be a "funda-
mental alteration in the nature of a program," rather than a modifi-
cation of the program.37 The Court noted that in some instances,
however, changes could be made in programs without imposing un-
due financial and administrative burdens on a State. In those situa-
tions, a refusal to modify an existing program might become
unreasonable and discriminatory.38
Therefore, between City of Edmonds and Davis, the Supreme
Court has spoken on how to interpret the Fair Housing Act and the
expression "reasonable accommodation." In City of Edmonds, the
Supreme Court has said that the Fair Housing Act should be given
a generous interpretation. In Davis, the Supreme Court held that a
reasonable modification is one that does not fundamentally alter a
program or impose an undue financial and administrative burden
on a government. Additionally, in City of Edmonds, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed that the purpose of land use restrictions is to pre-
vent the "pig in the parlor" and to promote "family values."
Interpreting City of Edmonds and Davis together, housing for
people with disabilities may only fundamentally alter a zoning
scheme where it causes substantial identifiable problems for a com-
munity or somehow destroys family and youth values, seclusion,
and clean air. This interpretation is consistent with that of the
drafters of the statute as enunciated in the House Report.
II. The Elements of a Fair Housing Act Case
Courts use four tests to determine whether a violation of the
statute has occurred. Under the first test, called either "intentional
discrimination" or "discriminatory treatment," a person with a dis-
ability must prove that the alleged violator intentionally acted to
deprive people with disabilities of housing because of their disabil-
37. Id.
38. See id. The sentence in the decision stating that "such advances also may en-
able attainment of these goals without imposing undue financial and administrative
burdens upon a State," id. at 412, is the source for all subsequent cases that examined
whether a "reasonable accommodation" or "reasonable requirement" is required.
The "reasonable accommodation" requirement is also present in the Americans With
Disabilities Act. That law requires employers, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)(1995), and
public accommodation, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(2) (1995), to make reasonable ac-
commodations to people with disabilities unless they would impose "an undue hard-
ship on the operation of the business of such covered entity" or would "fundamentally
alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommo-




ity.39 The second test, a form of intentional discrimination, is called
"facial discrimination" and involves statutes and ordinances that
on their face treat people with disabilities differently from other
people. 0 The third test, known as the "disparate impact" test, re-
quires a showing that the discriminatory conduct, though seemingly
neutral, has had a "disparate impact" on a person because of their
disability.41 The fourth test is the "reasonable accommodation"
test.42
This Part first presents an overview of the elements of an "inten-
tional discrimination," "facial discrimination," and "disparate im-
pact" cases. It then discusses the elements of a "reasonable
accommodation" case in more detail and discusses some of the ear-
lier federal district court decisions that applied the "reasonable ac-
commodation" test. This Part demonstrates the significance of the
"reasonable accommodation" test in assuring that people with dis-
abilities are not excluded from the American mainstream.
A. "Intentional Discrimination," "Facial Discrimination," and
"Disparate Impact"
Intentional discrimination occurs when a municipality deprives
people with disabilities of housing because of their disabilities.
Thus, the disabilities of the residents form the basis for the
decision."3
However, as one court has held, "clever men easily conceal their
intentions."44 While occasionally cases have been won based upon
39. See, e.g., Smith & Lee Associates v. City of Taylor, 102 F.3d 781, 790 (6th Cir.
1996); United States v. Yonkers Bd. Of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1221 (2d Cir. 1987);
Epicenter of Steubenville v. City of Steubenville, 924 F. Supp., 845, 851 (S.D. Ohio
1996).
40. See, e.g., Larkin v. Michigan Dep't of Soc. Serv., 89 F.3d 285, 289 (6th Cir.
1996); Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491, 1500-01 (9th Cir. 1995); Children's
Alliance v. City of Bellevue, 950 F. Supp. 1491 (W.D. Wash. 1997); Alliance for the
Mentally Ill v. City of Naperville, 923 F. Supp. 1057 (N.D. I11. 1996); see also
Marburnak v. City of Stow, 974 F.2d 43, 47-48 (6th Cir. 1992) (applying same ration-
ale); ARC of N.J., Inc. v. State of N.J., 950 F. Supp. 637, 645 (D. N.J. 1996); Potomac
Group Home Corp. v. Montgomery County, 823 F. Supp. 1285, 1297-1300 (D. Md.
1993).
41. See, e.g., Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926,
934-36 (2d Cir.), affd 488 U.S. 15 (1988); Oxford House, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 819
F. Supp. 1179, 1182-83 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (1994). See, e.g., Hovsons v. Township of Brick, 89
F.3d 1096, 1103-06 (3d Cir. 1996); Proviso Ass'n of Retarded Citizens v. Village of
Westchester, 914 F. Supp. 1555 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
43. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
44. Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d at 934-36 (quot-
ing United States v. Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (1974)).
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discriminatory statements made by town officials,4 5 most inten-
tional discrimination cases are proven by circumstantial evidence
demonstrating that procedures or substantive criteria were
changed by a municipality in response to neighborhood opposition
for the purpose of limiting housing. In such cases, courts examine
the historical background of the municipality, the sequence of
events leading up to the challenged decision, departures from nor-
mal procedural sequences, and departures from substantive crite-
46ria. Because of the need to rely upon circumstantial evidence, an
intentional discrimination case is often difficult to prove.
Courts have considered challenges to laws placing special re-
quirements' on housing for people with disabilities to be a type of
intentional discrimination action known as a "facial discrimina-
tion" action.4" In a facial discrimination action, the burden of
proof is on the municipality to demonstrate that the special and
unique needs the individuals warrant the imposition of special
safety requirements.48 While several cases have succeeded in strik-
ing ordinances placing special safety requirements on people with
disabilities, this cause of action does not apply to neutral statutes
and ordinances challenged in many actions.49
With regard to "disparate impact" cases, a person with a disabil-
ity or a housing provider must demonstrate that the challenged
practice "actually or predictably results" in discrimination. 50 This
45. See, e.g., United States v. Borough of Audubon, 797 F. Supp. 353, 360 (D.N.J.
1991), affd, 968 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting a municipal official who said that he
wanted to "oversee a conference of the policy community ... so that we tag-team the
individual [owner of residence for people with disabilities] through the respective
Borough officials); Baxter v. City of Belleville, 720 F. Supp. 720, 732-33 (S.D. Ill.
1989) (holding that a municipal decision to exclude home for people with AIDS based
on undocumented statements about AIDS constituted intentional discrimination in
violation of statute).
46. See United States v. Yonkers Bd. Of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1221-24 (2d Cir.
1987); see also Support Ministries for Persons with AIDS, Inc. v. Village of Water-
ford, 808 F. Supp. 120, 1.33-35 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding that a village ordinance en-
acted for purpose of excluding housing for people with AIDS was a form of
intentional discrimination); Stewart B. McKinney Foundation v. Town Plan and Zon-
ing Comm'n, 790 F. Supp. 1197, 1210-16 (D. Conn. 1992) (finding intentional discrimi-
nation where municipality changed its substantive and procedural requirements in
response to neighborhood opposition to stop housing for people with AIDS).
47. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
48. See id.
49. See Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1500-01 (holding that the disparate impact and rea-
sonable accommodation tests apply to neutral ordinances and only intentional dis-
crimination and facial discrimination apply to non-neutral laws).
50. See Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934 (2d
Cir.), affd in part, 488 U.S. 15 (1988).
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means that the conduct of the alleged discriminatory party is more
harshly felt on people with handicaps than those without.51 Once a
prima facie disparate impact case has been established, a munici-
pality must demonstrate that its actions furthered, in theory and in
practice, a legitimate bona fide governmental interest and that no
alternative would serve that interest with less discriminatory
effect.52
However, some courts have limited the use of the "disparate im-
pact" test. One circuit court has held that the test cannot be ap-
plied to an individual instance of discrimination.53 As most cases
center around individual instances of discrimination, this interpre-
tation virtually eliminates the use of the test.
The Ninth Circuit has suggested that statistics are required in a
disparate impact case to demonstrate that the challenged practice
has a greater impact on people with disabilities than non-disabled
people.54 Statistics are not always available, and this requirement
makes it difficult to prove some cases involving people with
disabilities.
Regardless, to demonstrate disparate impact, the plaintiff must
show that a discriminatory practice has a greater detrimental effect
on people with disabilities than non-disabled people. That level of
evidence would appear to be considerably more than that required
under the "reasonable accommodation" test.
B. The "Reasonable Accommodation" Test and the Early
Cases Interpreting "Reasonable Accommodation
To prevail on a "reasonable accommodation" claim, a person
with a disability must demonstrate that (1) a request for an accom-
modation was made, (2) such request was either ignored or denied,
(3) the accommodation was necessary to enable the person an
equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling of that person's
choice, and (4) the accommodation was reasonable. The "rea-
sonable accommodation" test requires neither a showing of intent
or facial discrimination, nor does it require proof that a discrimina-
51. Cf. Oxford House, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 819 F. Supp. 1179, 1182 (E.D.N.Y.
1993) (citing Huntington Branch, 844 F.2d at 933).
52. See id. at 936.
53. Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard County Maryland, 911 F. Supp. 918, 931
(D. Md. 1996), affd 124 F.3d 597 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing Coe v. Yellow Freight Sys-
tems, Inc. 646 F.2d 444, 451 (10th Cir. 1981)).
54. See Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 306 (9th Cir. 1997).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (1994); see also Bryant Woods Inn, Inc., 124 F.3d at
597.
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tory practice has a greater impact on people with disabilities than
on non-disabled people. Therefore, it appears easier to prove a
case under the "reasonable accommodation" standard than under
the other standards.
In the earlier "reasonable accommodation" cases decided shortly
after the enactment of the Fair Housing Act, courts largely ex-
amined whether the proposed housing would be harmful to either
the neighborhood or the proposed residents. It is generally as-
sumed that an accommodation was necessary to enable the resi-
dents an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling of that
person's choice. 56 For example, in United States v. City of Philadel-
phia,57 the court ordered a municipality to make a reasonable ac-
commodation in its ordinance requiring that all rear yards must
have a certain specified footage. 8 The court held as such because
municipal officials admitted that the rear yard of the house in ques-
tion did provide free access to light and air, access to firefighters,
and room for recreation, and that there was no danger of substan-
tial harm to the municipality.59 The court in City of Philadelphia
also determined that a nexus was not required between the barrier
to proposed housing and the disability of the proposed residents.6 °
Similarly, in Oxford House, Inc. v. Town of Babylon,61 a court
applied the "reasonable accommodation" to enjoin a municipality
from enforcing an ordinance prohibiting transients from living in a
residential area.62 The court found that since the residence did not
have a negative impact on the area and did not cause an undue
administrative or financial hardship on the municipality, the munic-
ipality had to make a reasonable accommodation and not enforce
its ordinance.63 The court in Town of Babylon only considered
whether it was reasonable to permit the residence to continue its
56. See, e.g., United States v. City of Philadelphia, 838 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Pa.
1993), aftd, 30 F.3d 1489 (3d Cir. 1994); Oxford House, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 819
F. Supp. 1179 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
57. 838 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Pa. 1993), affd, 30 F.3d 1489 (3d Cir. 1994).
58. See id. at 228-30.
59. See id. at 228.
60. See id. at 229-30. Compare this decision to Bryant Woods Inn, 124 F.3d. at 604,
where the Fourth Circuit held that there had to be a direct linkage between the pro-
posed accommodation and the disability of the person, noting that the requirement
"has attributes of a causation requirement." See also Salute v. Stratford Greens Gar-
den Apartments, 136 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that economic discrimination
without regard to disability is not covered by the Fair Housing Act).
61. 819 F. Supp. 179 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
62. See id. at 1185-86.
63. See id. at 1186.
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operation and assumed that the accommodation was necessary.64
Other decisions have similarly considered only the "reasonable-
ness" of the housing involved in requiring municipalities to make a
"reasonable accommodation," and likewise assumed that such ac-
commodation was necessary to provide an equal opportunity.
While these decisions may appear simplistic in their analysis of
"reasonable accommodation," they are reflective of the intentions
of Congress and the decisions of the Supreme Court than later de-
cisions of several courts. If a municipal zoning law prevented hous-
ing for people with disabilities, an "accommodation" - either a
waiver of the rule or an interpretation of the rule permitting the
housing - was certainly necessary. Similarly, people with disabili-
ties will often need accommodations in local rules to permit them
to be able to live in non-traditional groups. Without such accom-
modations, people with disabilities would not have the same op-
portunities of non-disabled people to live in a residential
neighborhood of their choice.
The aim of the Fair Housing Act was to promote housing for
people with disabilities in residential neighborhoods. In looking
largely to the reasonableness of such housing and presuming right-
fully that the accommodations were necessary, the earlier "reason-
able accommodation" decisions correctly gave the Fair Housing
Act the "generous construction" endorsed by the Supreme Court
in City of Edmonds.
III. Analysis of Recent Circuit Court Decisions Interpreting the
"Reasonable Accommodation" Clause of the Fair
Housing Act
In the past several years, the majority of courts have considered
cases involving whether a "reasonable accommodation" was made
to permit housing for people with disabilities.66 Unfortunately, a
64. See id.; see also United States v. California Mobile Home Park Management
Comp., 107 F.3d 1374, 1381 n.3 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that causation should pose no
"independent hurdle" in cases where zoning ordinances are used to block housing for
people with disabilities because "the city policies directly interfere with use and en-
joyment because they prevent the housing from being built").
65. See North Shore-Chicago Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Village of Skokie, 827 F.
Supp. 497 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Horizon House Dev. Servs. Inc. v. Township of Cherry
Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450 (D.N.J. 1992); United States v. Village of Marshall, 787 F. Supp.
872 (W.D. Wis. 1991); Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield, 769 F. Supp.
1329 (D.N.J. 1991); United Sates v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 764 F. Supp. 220
(D. P.R. 1991).
66. See Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard County, Maryland, 124 F.3d 597 (4th
Cir. 1997); Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300 (9th Cir. 1997); Smith & Lee
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majority of these cases have taken a much more narrow view of the
"reasonable accommodation" test than that of the earlier
decisions.67
This Part examines and analyzes those decisions, particularly
with regard to the following questions: (1) must a party exhaust
administrative remedies before filing a court action using the "rea-
sonable accommodation" test, (2) which party has the burden of
proof in a reasonable accommodations case, (3) what evidence is
required to demonstrate that an accommodation was "reasonable"
or "unreasonable," (4) what evidence, if any, is required to
demonstrate that an accommodation is "necessary," and (5) what
evidence, if any, is required to demonstrate that an accommodation
would provide an "equal opportunity" for housing for people with
disabilities.
A. Exhaustion of Remedies
The Fair Housing Act is clear that an aggrieved party does not
need to exhaust parallel administrative remedies provided through
the United States Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD) before commencing a Federal action.6  However,
the courts are divided with regard to whether an aggrieved party
must follow local and state zoning procedures before filing a Fed-
eral action.69 It would seem logical that if an aggrieved party does
Assoc. v. City of Taylor, 102 F.3d 781 (6th Cir. 1996); Elderhaven v. City of Lubbock,
98 F.3d 175 (5th Cir. 1996); Hovsons v. Township of Brick, 89 F.3d 1096 (3d Cir.
1996); Brandt v. Chebanse, 82 F.3d 172 (7th Cir. 1996); see also United States v.
California Mobile Home Park Management Co., 107 F.3d 1374 (9th Cir 1997) (dis-
cussing whether a trailer park had to waive a parking fee for an aide serving a person
with a disability residing in the trailer park); Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, 51 F.3d 328
(2d Cir. 1995) (questioning whether an apartment complex had to make a reasonable
accommodation to provide a parking space to a person with a disability).
67. See, e.g., Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard County, Maryland, 124 F.3d 597
(4th Cir. 1997).
68. Under 42 U.S.C. § 3613(B)(2) (1994), an aggrieved person may commence a
civil action whether or not a complaint has been filed with the United States Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development. Similarly, in "pattern or practice cases,"
the United States can immediately go to court to challenge an act of discrimination.
See 42 U.S.C. § 3614(a) (1994).
69. See Bryant Woods Inn, Inc., 124 F.3d at 597 (holding that administrative reme-
dies need not be exhausted); Oxford House-C v. City of St.Louis, 77 F.3d 249 (8th Cir.
1996) (finding that in the guise of a "ripeness" analysis, administrative remedies must
be exhausted); United States v. City of Palatine, 37 F.3d 1230 (7th Cir. 1994); Hunt-
ington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 689 F.2d 391, 394 n.3 (2d Cir. 1982);
see also Oxford House v. City of Virginia Beach, 825 F. Supp. 1251 (E.D. Va. 1993)
(deciding administrative remedies must be exhausted).
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not need to exhaust HUD remedies before filing a Federal action,
he or she should not have to exhaust local remedies.
Both the Second Circuit in Huntington Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v.
Town of Huntington70 and the Fourth Circuit in Bryant Woods Inn,
Inc. v. Howard County71 correctly held that administrative reme-
dies need not be exhausted before the commencement of a Fair
Housing Act action in federal court, even where the "reasonable
accommodation" test is invoked. Both decisions note that the
drafters of the statute intended administrative remedies to be a pri-
mary and not an exclusive method for seeking redress.72
However, in two very similar cases, the Seventh and Eighth cir-
cuits under the guise of a "ripeness" theory have required housing
providers for people with disabilities to exhaust administrative
remedies before commencing a federal action. In United States v.
Village of Palatine,73 and Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis,74
municipalities had ordinances limiting the number of unrelated
people who could live in a residential neighborhood, and requiring
residences with a greater number of unrelated people to apply for a
special use permit.75 Residences for recovering alcoholics and sub-
stance abusers challenged the ordinances as being discriminatory
under the Fair Housing Act.76 The residences may have been per-
mitted in the zoning district had they applied for a special use per-
mit, but they did not apply for such permits.77
The courts in Village of Palatine78 and City of St. Louis79 dis-
missed the residences' actions, holding that the cases were not ripe
because the residences did not exhaust their administrative remedy
of seeking a special use permit. Although the Seventh and Eighth
circuits couched their decisions in terms of the doctrine of "ripe-
ness," in effect, both of these decisions required housing providers
for people with disabilities to exhaust administrative remedies
before filing a federal action.
The decisions of the Second and Fourth circuits represent the
view more consistent with the drafters of the Fair Housing Act. By
70. See Huntington Branch, NAACP, 689 F.2d at 394 n.3.
71. See Bryant Woods Inn, Inc., 124 F.3d at 599.
72. See Bryant Woods Inn, Inc., 124 F.3d at 597; Huntington Branch, 689 F.2d at
394 n.3.
73. 37 F.3d 1230 (7th Cir. 1994).
74. 77 F.3d 249 (8th Cir. 1996).
75. See Oxford House-C, 77 F.3d at 251; Village of Palatine, 37 F.3d at 1231-32.
76. See Village of Palatine, 37 F.3d at 1231-32.
77. See id.
78. 37 F.3d at 1233-34.
79. 77 F.3d at 253.
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their very nature, permit applications cause delays in access to
housing. Accordingly, homeowners may decline to sell or rent
their houses to people with disabilities if the sale or rental must
await the outcome of the permit process. Additionally, permit ap-
plications often subject the applicant to public scrutiny and thus
ultimately discourage people with disabilities from residing in
neighborhoods with permit requirements.80
Not all permit requirements are necessarily discriminatory.
However, the drafters of the Fair Housing Act intended that the
statute be used to vigorously promote access to housing for people
with disabilities in all residential neighborhoods. Therefore, as per-
mit requirements could discourage access to housing in residential
neighborhoods, it would appear that the drafters of the statute in-
tended that permit requirements be scrutinized in federal court at
the first instance.
It is not clear that the housing providers in Village of Palatine
and City of St. Louis were able to demonstrate that people with
disabilities needed to live in groups of unrelated people greater
than that permitted as of right by the municipalities for therapeutic
reasons because of their disabilities."' However, if a housing pro-
vider were able to show that its people with disabilities needed to
live in groups of unrelated people for therapeutic or financial pur-
poses, a permit requirement would clearly impede those people
with disabilities from having an opportunity to live in the commu-
nity. In such a circumstance, exhaustion should not be required as
the imposition of such a permit requirement would be discrimina-
tory per se.
80. See Horizon House Dev. Servs. v. Township of Upper Southampton, 804 F.
Supp. 683, 700 (E.D. Pa. 1992), affd, 995 F.2d 217 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that pro-
vider of housing for people with disabilities did not have to apply for variance because
procedures were too burdensome); Easter Seal Society of New Jersey v. Township of
North Bergen, 798 F. Supp. 228, 236 (D.N.J. 1992) (holding that a provider of housing
for people with disabilities did not have to apply for variance or permits before filing
action under Fair Housing Act); Stewart B. McKinney Foundation v. Town Plan and
Zoning Comm'n, 790 F. Supp. 1197, 1219-20 (D. Conn. 1992) (holding that provider
of housing for people with AIDS need not follow municipal administrative proce-
dures because of their burdensomeness and stigmatization of prospective residents).
81. Courts have noted that whether an accommodation is necessary for financial
or therapeutic reasons will be considered by a court in determining whether to require
such accommodation. See, e.g., Bryant Woods, Inn, Inc., 124 F.3d at 605; Gamble v.
City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 307 (9th Cir. 1996); Smith & Lee Associates v. City
of Taylor, 102 F.3d 781, 795 (6th Cir. 1996); Erdman v. City of Fort Atkinson, 84 F.3d




As housing discrimination against people with disabilities is now
on an equal footing with housing discrimination on other bases,
analogies can be made to these types of cases. For example, if a
law had required that members of a particular race, religion, or
national origin had to apply for a permit before residing in a com-
munity, no court would have required that a member of such par-
ticular race, religion or national origin apply for a permit before
being able to challenge such a law.82 Similarly here, exhaustion
should not be required before the commencement of a Federal
action.
B. Burden of Proof
The courts are also split as to which party should have the bur-
den of proof in a reasonable accommodation case.
In Hovsons, Inc. v. Township of Brick,83 the Third Circuit held
that the burden of proof was on the municipality to demonstrate
that it could not make a reasonable accommodation to permit
housing for people with disabilities.8 4 In reaching this conclusion,
the court followed its precedents interpreting the Rehabilitation
Act, placing the burden of proving on the defendant.85
On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit in Bryant Woods Inn, Inc.
v. Howard County held that the burden of proof in a reasonable
accommodation should be on the proponent of housing because
the burden of proof in an action is usually on a plaintiff and, in its
view, the statute's text "evidences no intent to alter normal bur-
dens. ' 86 The Fifth Circuit in Elderhaven, Inc. v. City of Lubbock, 7
had a similar view, and noted that in the Fifth Circuit, it is the
plaintiff that has the burden of proof in a case brought under the
Rehabilitation Act.88
82. See, e.g., Potomac Group Home Corp. v. Montgomery County, 823 F. Supp.
1285, 1996 (D. Md. 1993) (holding that requirement that group homes for people with
mental disabilities notify the neighborhood before their establishment was equally as
offensive as a requirement that minority persons give notice before moving into a
non-minority neighborhood). See also Epicenter of Steubenville, Inc. v. City of Steu-
benville, 924 F. Supp. 845, 851 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (noting that the municipality's impo-
sition of a moratorium constituted discriminatory intent and that it was "like the
hoods of Klansmen masking the faces of criminals" and equated a law excluding peo-
ple with disabilities with laws excluding minorities).
83. 89 F.3d 1096 (3d Cir. 1996).
84. See id. at 1103.
85. See id.
86. Id.
87. 98 F.3d 175 (5th Cir. 1996).
88. Id. at 177. As discussed in detail in the Second Circuit's decision in Borkowski
v. Valley Central School District, 63 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1995), there is a split in circuits
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Generally, burdens of proof are allocated based upon which
party has the possession of the most evidence necessary to prove
the position.89 In consideration of that principle, the decisions of
the Fourth and Fifth circuits unreasonably place housing providers
with the burden of proving that their housing would not cause and
undue burden or substantial hardship on a community or that their
housing would not fundamentally alter a neighborhood.
Remembering that a reasonable accommodation case has three
elements- reasonableness, necessity, and equality- the burden of
proof for these elements should be split between the parties. As a
proponent of housing for people with disabilities knows more
about its proposed housing than the municipality, the housing pro-
ponent should be required to demonstrate why it needs an accom-
modation from an ordinance or rule, and why such an
accommodation would provide people with disabilities with an
equal housing opportunity. On the other hand, a municipality,
which would normally have more information about its own struc-
ture and finances and its neighborhoods, should bear the burden of
proof of showing that housing for people with disabilities would
cause an undue burden or hardship on the municipality.
The model for this standard is the Second Circuit's decision in
Borkowski v. Valley Central School District,90 an employment dis-
crimination case brought under the Rehabilitation Act pursuant to
a reasonable accommodation theory. In Borkowski, the Second
Circuit placed the burden on the employee to show that she
needed an accommodation to retain her employment and that such
an accommodation existed to provide her with the opportunity to
continue her employment. 91 As for the employer, the Second Cir-
cuit placed the burden on it to demonstrate that the accommoda-
tion sought by the employee was unreasonable; i.e., that it would
create an undue hardship or substantial burden on the employer. 92
as to which party had the burden of proof in an employment action brought pursuant
to he Rehabilitation Act. See id. at 135-37.
89. See, e.g., Morgado v. Birmingham-Jefferson County Civil Defense Corps., 706
F.2d 1184, 1189 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that employer relying in Equal Pay Act
provision allowing pay differentials for reasons other than sex must prove entitlement
to provision's protection because such facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of the
employer); EEOC v. Radiator Specialty Co., 610 F.2d 178, 185 n.8 (4th Cir. 1979)
(holding that "general principle of allocation of proof to the party with the most ready
access to the relevant information" requires Title VII defendant to show in appropri-
ate of labor pool statistics).
90. 63 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1995).
91. See id. at 138-39.
92. See id.
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The Borkowski court correctly recognized both the purposes of the
Rehabilitation Act and the reality of which party would have the
most access to evidence in allocating the burden of proof in a rea-
sonable accommodation case.
C. Reasonableness
Obviously, a court must consider whether an accommodation
sought by a proponent of housing for people with disabilities is
"reasonable" under the "reasonable accommodation" test.
Adopting the "reasonableness" test used under the Rehabilitation
Act, an accommodation is reasonable if it does not cause an undue
hardship or burden on a municipality or result in the fundamental
alteration of the residential nature of an area.93
Whether an accommodation to permit a particular house in a
particular neighborhood is "reasonable" must be examined on a
case-by-case basis. The following are some of decisions that have
examined whether a particular accommodation is "reasonable."
Three courts have ruled that requested accommodations for
housing for people with disabilities were reasonable and required
the provision of such accommodations. In Shapiro v. Cadman
Towers, Inc.,9 a resident of an apartment complex needed a nearby
parking space within the building complex because of her disabil-
ity. Even though the building allocated three spaces for building
staff and another parking spot for a person that did not live in the
building, the apartment complex refused to grant her a space, and
put her on a waiting list.95
The Second Circuit ruled in favor of the resident, holding that it
would not be unreasonable to permit that person to have the spot
of one of the employees.96 The court held that permitting the resi-
dent to have a spot in spite of the waiting list would not cause an
undue hardship or substantial burden on the apartment complex.97
93. See Smith & Lee Associates v. City of Taylor, 102 F.3d 781, 795 (6th Cir.
1996); Hovsons v. Township of Brick, 89 F.3d 1096, 1104 (3d Cir. 1996); Shapiro v.
Cadman Towers, Inc., 51 F.3d 328, 334-35 (2d Cir. 1995).
94. 51 F.3d 328 (2d Cir. 1995).
95. See id. at 331.
96. See id. at 335-36.
97. See id. The Court cited both the HOUSE REPORT and Southeastern Commu-
nity College v. Davis in reaching its conclusion. See id. at 334. However, the Court,
refused to determine the issue of whether the resident with a disability could have
usurped the rights of other tenants on the ground that the Court found that the resi-
dent with a disability could be accommodated without burdening any other resident.
See id. at 336.
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In Hovsons, Inc. v. Township of Brick,98 the issue was whether a
municipality was required to permit a developer of a nursing home
for people with disabilities to build the nursing home in a residen-
tial zoning district.99 In Hovsons, the Third Circuit held that a mu-
nicipality's refusal to permit a 210-resident nursing home in a
residential neighborhood was unreasonable. 100
In ruling in favor of the nursing home, the Third Circuit noted
that granting a variance to the housing developer would not have
placed undue financial and administrative burdens on the munici-
pality, or have resulted in the imposition of an undue hardship on
the community, or have changed the resdidential character of the
area.1"1 The court noted that the residents of the nursing home
would be taxpaying members of the municipality, that the nursing
home would arrange for its own garbage collection, street mainte-
nance and snow removal, and that the nursing home would not be
using municipal emergency services to any more than area retire-
ment developments.0 2
Finally, in Smith & Lee Associates v. City of Taylor,03 the Sixth
Circuit held that requiring a municipality to permit an adult foster
care home for nine residents in a neighborhood whose zoning only
permitted adult foster care homes for six people was not unreason-
able and directed the municipality to permit an adult foster care
home for nine people. 4 The Sixth Circuit held that the addition
of three additional residents to the neighborhood would not funda-
mentally alter the nature of the single-family neighborhood. 10 5
In reaching its conclusion that the municipality was required to
accept an adult foster care home for nine residents, the Sixth Cir-
cuit engaged in a cost-benefit analysis. The Sixth Circuit weighed
the fact that three additional people would be moving into the
neighborhood with the fact that the residents would likely not
drive and cause traffic or parking problems for the
neighborhood. 10 6
98. 89 F.3d 1096 (3d Cir. 1996).
99. See id. at 1098-99.
100. See id. at 1105-06.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. 102 F.3d 781 (6th Cir. 1996).
104. See id. at 785.
105. See id. at 795-96. The Court also cited the House Report and the Supreme
Court's decision in Southeastern Community College. See id. at 795.
106. See id. at 796.
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While the decisions in Shapiro, Hovsons, and Smith & Lee Asso-
ciates all resulted in services or housing being afforded to people
with disabilities and comported with the intentions of the drafters
of the statute, it could be argued these cases discriminate against
people with disabilities. A non-disabled person can move into a
community and cause an administrative and financial burden on a
municipality. However, a non-disabled person would not be sub-
ject to court scrutiny or forced to leave a community if that person
did cause an administrative and financial burden on a municipality
or fundamentally alter a residential neighborhood provided that
said person's actions were not illegal.
On the other hand, even under the most liberal interpretations
of the Fair Housing Act, housing for people with disabilities can be
excluded if they create an administrative and financial burden on a
municipality or fundamentally alter a residential neighborhood.
Whether people with disabilities who do create an administrative
and financial burden or fundamentally alter a residential neighbor-
hood should have the same right to do so as non-disabled people
may well be the subject of future litigation.
Two cases have ruled that proposed accommodations for housing
for people with disabilities were unreasonable. °7 In Bryant Woods
Inn, Inc. v. Howard County, °8 the Fourth Circuit ruled that a re-
quest to increase housing for elderly people with disabilities from
eight to fifteen people was unreasonable because a member of the
municipal planning board observed vehicles parked "all over the
place and also in the driveway."'0 9
The Fourth Circuit's decision view of "reasonableness" in Bryant
Woods Inn is too constrained and does not comport with the inten-
tions of the drafters of the statute. 10 Even if it were observed that
there were vehicles "all over the place and also in the driveway,"
the Court's decision failed to consider how often such parking
problems occurred. Likewise, other cited problems such as mini-
mal frontage of the site and the comparison of the size of the site
with other group homes of similar size do not necessarily demon-
strate that an accommodation here would have been unreasonable.
Moreover, the court failed to address the fact that a related fam-
ily of fifteen non-disabled people could have moved into the house
107. See Bryant Woods Inn, Inc., 124 F.3d at 597; Brandt, 82 F.3d at 172.
108. See Bryant Woods Inn, Inc., 124 F.3d at 604-06.
109. Id.
110. Yet, the court does acknowledge the HOUSE REPORT and the dictates of
Southeastern Community College v. Davis. See id. at 603.
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in question. If fifteen non-disabled related people lived at the resi-
dence in spite of its minimal frontage and the size of other housing
in the community for fifteen people, then why was it unreasonable
to permit fifteen disabled people at the residence?
In Brandt v. Village of Chebanse,11a the Seventh Circuit held that
a municipality's denial of a variance to build a four-unit house in
an area zoned for single families was not unreasonable because of
the "loss of whatever tranquility single-family zoning offers to a
neighborhood.""12  However, the Court's decision failed to de-
scribe in detail how construction of the four-unit house would in-
crease the potential for noise, and did not consider that a large
family in a single family house could have the same or greater im-
pact noise.
In determining that various housing proposals for people with
disabilities were unreasonable, the courts in both Bryant Woods
Inn and Brandt made factually unsupported assumptions that hous-
ing for people with disabilities would be more deleterious for the
community than housing for non-disabled people. Such assump-
tions were in conflict with the intent of the drafters of the statute.
D. Necessity
The "reasonable accommodation" prong of the statute requires
that an accommodation sought "be necessary to afford such person
equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.""' 3 Considering
that the statute was intended to increase access to housing for peo-
ple with disabilities, the "necessary" clause should simply mean
that if it is necessary to lift a barrier to permit housing, the barrier
must be lifted." 4
For example, in Smith & Lee Associates v. City of Taylor, m5 the
Sixth Circuit found that a requested accommodation to permit nine
unrelated people with disabilities to live in a residence was "neces-
111. 82 F.3d 172 (7th Cir. 1996).
112. Id. at 175.
113. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (1994).
114. In Bryant Woods Inn, 124 F.3d at 604, the court equated this prong to a "cau-
sation requirement." However, in United States v. California Mobile Home Park
Management Company, 107 F.3d 1374, 1381 n.3 (9th Cir. 1997), the court noted that in
cases where zoning barriers impede housing for people with disabilities, "causation
poses no independent hurdle" for housing providers because "city policies directly
interfere with use and enjoyment because they prevent the housing from being built."
See also United States v. City of Philadelphia, 838 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Pa. 1993), affd,
30 F.3d 1489 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that no nexis need be demonstrated between the
barrier to the proposed housing and the disability of the residents).
115. 102 F.3d 781 (6th Cir. 1996).
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sary" because there was a demonstrated need for the housing and
that it was necessary to permit nine residents rather than the six
permitted by the ordinance for financial reasons. 1 6
However, several circuit courts have used the "necessary" clause
as a barrier to housing for people with disabilities. 7 Such an in-
terpretation of the clause conflicts with both the intention of the
drafters of the Fair Housing Act and the mandate of the Supreme
Court that the statute be given a "generous construction."
For example, in Elderhaven, Inc. v. City of Lubbock,11 8 the Fifth
Circuit held that the municipality did not have to make a reason-
able accommodation to a housing provider to permit it to house
two more residents with disabilities because the provider failed to
allege or prove that the number of people it sought to house was a
"critical number" to make housing sought economically feasible.11 9
However, unlike the Sixth Circuit in Smith & Lee, the Fifth Circuit
viewed the case from the point of view of the provider rather than
the person with a disability. Even if the number of people in
Elderhaven was not the "critical number" to make housing sought
economically feasible, the Fifth Circuit's decision allowed a munici-
pality to make housing unavailable to two people with disabilities.
For those two people, an accommodation was certainly
'"necessary."
Some courts have suggested that an accommodation is not neces-
sary when people with disabilities could live elsewhere. For exam-
ple, in Brandt 20 the Seventh Circuit held that an accommodation
to build four-unit housing for people with disabilities in a single-
family zone was not "necessary" because the developer could have
built his four-family unit elsewhere.121
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Brandt ignores the language of
the statute stating that an accommodation may be necessary to af-
ford such person equal opportunity "to use and enjoy a dwell-
116. Id. at 795-96.
117. See Bryant Woods Inn, Inc., 124 F.3d at 605; Elderhaven v. City of Lubbock, 98
F.3d 175, 178 (5th Cir. 1996); Brandt, 82 F.3d at 175.
118. 98 F.3d 175 (5th Cir. 1996).
119. See id. at 179. The court in Elderhaven seemed to be impressed by the city's
past record regarding housing for people with disabilities. See id. at 178. While a
municipality's past record with regard to housing for people with disabilities may be
relevant in an intentional discrimination case, it should have no relevance regarding
whether a particular accommodation sought is reasonable and necessary to provide an
equal opportunity.
120. 82 F.3d 172 (7th Cir. 1996).
121. Id. at 175.
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ing. "122 "To use and enjoy a dwelling" logically would mean to use
and enjoy a particular dwelling, and not some other configuration
of the dwelling or a dwelling at another location. The latter con-
cept, that a municipality could prevent housing for people with dis-
abilities in some areas by permitting such housing in other areas, is
particularly offensive. As a municipality certainly could not desig-
nate limited areas of a municipality for people of a particular race,
religion, or national origin, it should not designate a limited area of
a municipality for housing for people with disabilities. 123
Perhaps the decision on the "necessity" of an accommodation
that is most at variance with the intent of the statute's drafters and
the Supreme Court's "generous construction" of the statute is the
Fourth Circuit's recent decision in Bryant Woods Inn.124 The issue
before the Fourth Circuit there was whether the municipality
should grant a variance to permit a housing provider to expand its
residence for people with disabilities from eight to fifteen.125 The
court held that an accommodation was not "necessary" because: a)
other group homes in the municipality housed eight people; b)
there was no evidence that group homes were not financially or
therapeutically viable with only eight people; and c) there were va-
cancies in other group homes in the municipality. 26
In viewing the question of "necessity" from the point of view of
the housing provider, rather than the point of view of the person
122. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (1994).
123. In contrast, see Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield, 769 F. Supp.
1329, 1344 (D.N.J. 1991), which noted in rejecting a municipality's argument that it
could exclude a housing for people with a disability in a given area because it permit-
ted such housing in other areas that "anti-discrimination laws are designed to prevent
just such discriminatory segregation." See also Elliot v. City of Athens, 960 F.2d 975,
982-84 n.12 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that a municipality can exclude housing people
with disabilities from some areas if it permits such housing in other neighborhoods).
In Erdman v. City of Fort Atkinson, 84 F.3d 960 (7th Cir. 1996), the Seventh Circuit
again mused over whether the question as to whether the "reasonable accommoda-
tion" clause gives people a right to reside at a particular dwelling or within a particu-
lar municipality, implying that the municipality may have the right to restrict housing
for people with disabilities to certain areas. Again, the answer to this should be sim-
ple. The drafters of the Fair Housing Act intended that people with disabilities have
the right to reside in housing of their choice, and not housing in some part of the
municipality they may not choose. See also City of Edmonds v. Washington State
Bldg. Code Council, 18 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1994), affd, 514 U.S. 725 (1995); Ox-
ford House, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 819 F. Supp. 1179, 1185 n.10 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)
(citing courts that held that the Fair Housing Act gave people with disabilities right to
live in housing of their choice).
124. 124 F.3d 597 (4th Cir. 1997).




with a disability seeking to live in a particular residence,127 the
court's decision on "necessity" in Bryant Woods Inn was errone-
ous. As a result of the municipality's determination, seven people
with disabilities were prevented from living in a particular resi-
dence, regardless of whether other group homes housed eight peo-
ple, whether group homes were financially or therapeutically viable
with only eight people, or whether there were vacancies in other
group homes in municipality. Since the municipality's determina-
tion barred seven people from living in a particular group home,
the court should have determined that an accommodation was nec-
essary for those seven people, and then proceeded to determine
the reasonableness of the accommodation sought.
E. Equality
An accommodation sought must be necessary "to afford such
person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling. ' 128 As the
Sixth Circuit correctly held in Smith & Lee Associates v. City of
Taylor,129 the "equal opportunity" clause prohibits the exclusion of
people with disabilities from zoning neighborhoods or municipal
decisions "that will give disabled people less opportunity to live in
certain neighborhoods than people without disabilities.' 130 Simi-
127. The issue is not one of standing, but rather one of perception. Housing prov-
iders clearly have the right to commence actions under the Fair Housing Act. See,
e.g., Horizon House Developmental Servs., Inc. v. Township of Upper Southampton,
804 F. Supp. 683, 692-93 (E.D. Pa. 1992), affd, 995 F.2d 217 (3d Cir. 1993); Stewart B.
McKinney Foundation, Inc. v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 790 F. Supp. 1197, 1208-
09 (D. Conn. 1992).
128. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (1994).
129. 102 F.3d 781 (6th Cir. 1996).
130. Id. at 795. The court also correctly noted that the phrase "equal opportunity"
under the Fair Housing Act involves "achieving equal results, not just formal equal-
ity" and an "affirmative duty." Id. at 795; see also Oxford House, Inc. v. Town of
Babylon, 819 F. Supp. 1179, 1186 n.11 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding that the Fair Housing
Act required an affirmative action). In contrast, the Fourth Circuit in Bryant Woods
Inn, Inc. v. Howard County, Maryland, 124 F.3d 597 (4th Cir. 1997), rejected the no-
tion that the Fair Housing Act intended to require "equal results." See id. at 604. The
court cited to Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 309 (1985), where the Supreme
Court held that if a state reduced a benefit equally to both people with disabilities and
non-disabled people, such action did not violate the Rehabilitation Act even though it
had effectively had a greater impact on people with disabilities. See Bryant Woods
Inn, Inc., 124 F.3d at 605. However, the Bryant Woods Inn application of Alexander is
erroneous. See id. The decision of the municipality in Bryant Woods Inn resulted in
the exclusion of residents from the municipality, while the decision of the defendant
state in Alexander did not result in an exclusion of services or denial of access. In-
deed, the Supreme Court noted that it based its decision on the fact that there was no
denial of access or exclusion from benefits involved in its case. Alexander, 469 U.S. at
309.
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larly, the Seventh Circuit in Erdman v. City of Fort Atkinson13 1
noted that where the issue is whether a number of unrelated peo-
ple with disabilities can live in a single-family residence, "equal op-
portunity" can be demonstrated by showing that living in unrelated
groups of a particular size is therapeutic and also is the only way
most of the residents can live in a single-family home. 132
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit in Bryant Woods Inn held that a
request for a variance to expand a group home from eight to fif-
teen people would not provide an equal opportunity to the pro-
vider's residents but instead a financial advantage to the
provider. 33 Again, the Fourth Circuit wrongfully viewed the Fair
Housing Act through the eyes of the housing provider rather than
the eyes of the person with a disability. If people with disabilities
need to live in an unrelated group for therapeutic reasons, a depri-
vation of that right would deny them an equal opportunity to re-
side in a community. If fifteen related people can live in a
residence, then inequality would exist if fifteen unrelated people
could not live in the residence if they needed to live together be-
cause of their disability.
It has been argued that ordinances limiting group living such as
fraternities and sororities constitute "equality" because it is appli-
cable to both people with disabilities and non-disabled people. 34
However, non-disabled people do not need to reside in fraternities
and sororities to be able to live in a residential neighborhood,
while people with disabilities, because of their disabilities, may
need to live in a group setting in order to be able to live in a resi-
dential zone. 35
IV. Recommendations
As was the case in the earlier district court "reasonable accom-
modation" cases, the focus in a "reasonable accommodation" case
should be on whether a proposed accommodation is "reasonable."
The issues of "necessity" and "equality" should be relatively easy
to resolve in most cases. If a zoning barrier remains between a
person with a disability and the housing the person desires, an ac-
131. 84 F.3d 960 (7th Cir. 1969).
132. See id. at 963.
133. Bryant Woods Inn, Inc., 124 F.3d at 605.
134. See Elliot v. City of Athens, 960 F.2d 975, 982-84 (11th Cir. 1992).
135. See Oxford House, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 819 F. Supp. 1179, 1183 (E.D.N.Y.
1993) (holding that recovering alcoholics and substance abusers need to live in group
setting to encourage recovery).
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commodation is "necessary" to remove the barrier. If a person
with a disability, because of the disability, cannot live in housing or
an area that a person without a disability can live in, inequality of
opportunity has been proven. As the Seventh Circuit noted in
Erdman v. City of Fort Atkinson, 36 the amount of proof necessary
to show that equal opportunity does not exist "is slight," and, ordi-
narily, "inequality is fairly obvious."'1 3 7
Therefore, the key question in a "reasonable accommodation"
case should be whether a proposed accommodation is "reason-
able." Since the municipality possesses the most information
about its services, finances, and neighborhoods, it should be forced
to bear the burden of proving that a reasonable accommodation
cannot be made. Placing the burden on the housing provider to
demonstrate that the municipality would not suffer an undue hard-
ship or burden or would not substantially alter the nature of a resi-
dential neighborhood would illogically force the provider to have
to prove a negative fact. Similarly, courts should not require hous-
ing providers to exhaust administrative remedies which are gener-
ally barriers to housing that the drafters of the statute sought to
eliminate.
While some courts have placed a more cramped reading on the
"reasonable accommodation" test than necessary, they have pro-
vided a more expansive reading of the "facial discrimination" stan-
dard, as well as the provisions of the Americans With Disabilities
Act barring discrimination by zoning authorities against people
with disabilities. These readings are more consistent with inten-
tions of the drafters of the statutes, and correctly consider the im-
pact on people with disabilities, rather than the impact on housing
providers.
For example, in Larkin v. State of Michigan Department of Social
Services,'38 the Sixth Circuit considered the question of whether a
state statute placed a spacing requirement between group homes
for people with disabilities violated the Fair Housing Act.139 The
Sixth Circuit held that the statute was facially discriminatory in vio-
lation of the statute, stating that a statute could only survive a chal-
lenge if it were "warranted by the unique and specific needs and
136. 84 F.3d 960 (7th Cir. 1996).
137. Id. at 963.
138. 89 F.3d 285 (6th Cir. 1996).
139. See id. at 288-89.
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abilities of those handicapped persons."14' Similarly, the Tenth
Circuit in Bangerter v. Orem City Corporation14 1 held that an ordi-
nance requiring a certain level of supervision in residences for peo-
ple with disabilities would violate the statute unless it was
necessary to satisfy the unique and special needs of the people to
whom applied.' 42
Both the Larkin and Bangerter decisions are significant because
they considered the needs of people with disabilities in determining
the validity of statutes. Similarly, in reasonable accommodation
cases, courts should consider the needs of people with disabilities
in determining whether an accommodation is reasonable and nec-
essary to provide an equal opportunity for housing.
Finally, in Innovative Health Systems, Inc. v. City of White
Plains,43 the Second Circuit held that Title II of the Americans
With Disabilities Act applied to zoning ordinances and that a zon-
ing decision barring an alcohol and drug-dependency treatment
center violated the Act. 144 If courts continue to interpret the "rea-
sonable accommodation" prong of the Fair Housing Act in a re-
strictive fashion, housing providers should look to the Americans
With Disabilities Act for relief.
The Fair Housing Act was aimed at removing barriers to housing
for people with disabilities. The restrictive interpretation placed
upon the "reasonable accommodation" test by several courts only
creates new barriers to housing for people with disabilities not in-
tended by either the drafters of the statute or the Supreme Court.
The Court held in City of Edmonds, the statute should receive a
''generous construction" to remove unnecessary barriers to housing
for people with disabilities.
140. Id. at 290. The court also cited to the House Report. Id. at 285. The court
rejected two decisions by the Eighth Circuit: Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc. v. City of St.
Paul, 728 F. Supp. 1396 (D. Minn. 1990), affd, 923 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1991), and Oxford
House-C v. City of St. Louis, 77 F.3d 249 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that facially discrim-
inatory laws lacking a malevolent motive do not constitute intentional discrimination
and that facially discriminatory laws must be upheld if they merely are rationally re-
lated to a legitimate government objective). See Larkin, 89 F.3d at 290.
141. 46 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir. 1995).
142. See id. at 1503-05.
143. 117 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1997).
144. See id. at 49. Unlike the Fair Housing Act, a provider can prevail under the
Americans With Disabilities Act without proof of either a malevolent motive or a
facially discriminatory ordinance, or that a particular accommodation is "necessary."
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Conclusion
In enacting the Fair Housing Act, Congress intended to remove
land use barriers to housing for people with disabilities. The
Supreme Court recognized this intent when it refused to exempt a
land use restriction in City of Edmonds. However, more recent
federal cases have wrongfully interpreted the language of the stat-
ute in ways that create new barriers for housing for people with
disabilities. As the language of the statute can be easily inter-
preted in a manner which provides access to housing for people
with disabilities, the cases placing a restrictive reading on the lan-
guage of the statute wrongfully conflict with the intentions of the
drafters of the statute.
AS'
A RATIONAL DISCUSSION OF CURRENT
DRUG LAWS*
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach**
I do not want to be characterized here as an expert because I
think the experts are here as members of the panel. I am really just
speaking as a lawyer, as a citizen, and as somebody who is con-
cerned about these problems.
Thirty years ago this month the President's Crime Commission
came out with a rather extensive report.1 I had the honor to chair
that. It came at a time of increasing crime, riots, etc., back in the
late 1960s. It had as its purpose trying to promote a rational dis-
cussion of crime problems that were at that time very much on
people's minds. These were highly emotional and politically re-
warding public issues to discuss. Well, thirty years later I am still at
it. But I have learned that those involved in government and poli-
tics respond more comfortably to public views, as perhaps they
should, than simply to intellectual pleas. That was true of the
Commission's report.
The report had a major effect on professionals in law enforce-
ment and indeed one purpose of the report, one major recommen-
dation, was to increase professionalization of state and local law
enforcement and of the judiciary. That, in turn, got the Congress
and state legislatures involved, although, of course, the rhetoric
with respect to crime continued. One of the report's major points
was trying to get people to see the criminal law system as a system,
not as a bunch of separate components, but as something that
could be put on a flowchart, that you could see from the top -
police, arrested, prosecutors, courts, probation officials, prison offi-
cials - all put various ways going off to one side.
A goal was to see it in that way, and to realize that you cannot
tinker with one part of the system without affecting the other parts
* Nicholas deB. Katzenbach delivered these remarks at a public forum,
sponsored by the Waterbury, Connecticut Bar Association and the Voluntary
Committee of Lawyers, on June 5, 1997, in Waterbury Connecticut.
** A.B., Princeton University, 1945; L.L.B., Yale Law School, 1947. Assistant
Attorney General of the United States 1961-65, Attorney General of the United
States 1965-66.
1. See REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY
(1967).
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of the system, and that you have to look at it really as a system. It
emphasized for that reason the importance of alternative ap-
proaches (of weighing costs/benefits, for example) with regard to
methods of dealing with crime, juvenile courts, and with the poten-
tial of community service - ideas at that time that were new.
Even family problems. I must say the Commission discovered
the importance of policy to families before the politicians discov-
ered the importance of family values. Thirty years ago we realized
there was a very strong connection between families and crime and
I am not talking about families of organized crime.
We talked about the role of the federal government and the state
government. We saw the role of the federal government as assist-
ing the states and giving the principal responsibility to the states,
with the federal government assisting in technology and things that
could be done on a common base. And one of the major things we
dealt with was trying to improve statistics on crime to find out what
was really going on. We drew those flow charts but the flow charts
were not terribly accurate because we did not really have terribly
accurate statistics. With respect to crime in general, I think statisti-
cal information has greatly improved now through the cooperation
of agencies in the states, federal government, and cities.
We did not do a lot on drugs because that was just beginning to
be a problem. There was some talk about treatment. I do not
think we appreciated at that time the enormous political potential
of declaring the War Against Drugs. Now, as I have said, all crime
has an emotional appeal and there is a great deal of political appeal
in playing the role of the tough enforcer. Successful prosecutors
can become governors, senators, even aspiring to the Presidency as
Tom Dewey did, and the War on Drugs is an ideal vehicle for polit-
ical rhetoric.
There are a number of reasons for that. Crime in the streets has
increasingly become drug-connected. Drugs attract young people
and raise serious family concerns. Every parent has concerns
about children and drugs. Drugs mostly come from abroad so it is
easy to think of the fault being over there and not here. There is a
strong race connection with drugs and that can have a political ap-
peal to some. And it certainly has had an effect, as so many
problems in this country have, on our ability to deal with racial
problems. It also is an ideal vehicle for the federal government to
involve itself in much more directly for the simple reason that it
has some international aspects and that almost all drugs have an
CURRENT DRUG LAWS
interstate connection. And most importantly of all, it is a real
problem.
Declaring a War on Drugs is popular for all of those reasons, but
it seems to me that the term "war" may be an unfortunate one if
we are seeking answers to real problems. From the outset, presi-
dents, drug czars, and federal and state officials have always paid
lip service to the need to take a balanced approach, meaning a bal-
ance between tough enforcement and other modalities of control
such as treatment for addiction. But the balance has mostly been
attained with a very heavy hand on the scale tipping it towards
getting tough, because that is where the political appeal is. That
approach, I believe, has cost a great deal in dollars, a great deal in
justice, and even affected adversely a good deal of foreign policy
without, at least yet, achieving results comparable to those costs.
That is why I think the time has come to consider the problem as
rationally and as calmly as is possible to see if we can achieve bet-
ter results.
When I say something like that, I do not mean to toss the law
enforcement out of the window. I do not mean stop interdiction. I
simply mean look at those in flow charts, to see whether we are
putting the resources in the places that are best. Maybe we are.
But a war suggests that its us against them - whether the foreign
drug kings, or the street dealers, or the addicts, or whomever -
good guys against bad guys. And it assumes the drug problem
could be solved if only we could control the supply of drugs. Now
obviously that is an overstatement, but I do want to make Pogo's
point: we have met the enemy and it is us. Demand is the other
side of that problem and if demand increased, I do not think there
is any question about the fact that supply will increase to meet that
demand.
Let me put it this way. I do not have any problems with enforce-
ment efforts aimed at lessening supply if they are cost-effective.
Indeed, I think many are essential to a balanced approach. But I
also want to be sure we are putting our funds where we can get the
most bang for the buck. Again, wars are to be won. I would be
satisfied simply to see some steady progress reducing addiction, ac-
cepting that progress will be slow, that it will be expensive, and that
it will probably never result in any kind of total victory. But let us
go as far as we can, there simply is no magical, simple answer to the
problem of drugs.
The predominantly law enforcement approach of the past
twenty-five years has had substantial costs in terms of money and,
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of equal or maybe greater importance, I think cost to the justice
system itself. But first money. Both federal and state jails are
overcrowded. New prisons are required to be built at what I re-
gard an alarming rate. We have more people per capita incarcer-
ated in this country than in any other country in the world.2 If the
objective is to fill the prisons to capacity, then the drug laws' en-
forcement has been a smashing success. But the result has not sig-
nificantly reduced drug traffic, and its monetary cost is very
substantial, twenty to thirty thousand dollars a year to support each
person in jail.3
Unfortunately, relatively few of those convicted - and this is no
fault of law enforcement - are the big drug dealers, and almost all
of them in the drug economy can be easily replaced in the distribu-
tion scheme because of the enormous amounts of money involved.
Relatively few are also convicted of crimes of violence. Some are
themselves addicts convicted of unlawful possession. Some are not
addicts, just young people doing foolish experiments. Most are
serving quite long mandatory sentences. I think a rational ap-
proach would at least consider some alternatives to long-term in-
carceration, such as more community service, supervised
probation, parole, treatment, and so forth. All, I believe, are
cheaper.
Success and failure, and this is important, should really be moni-
tored with the understanding that failures will occur, so we have
some idea of what works and some idea of what does not work,
and under what circumstances. We should not expect perfection.
Just aiming at any kind of cost-effective improvement ought to be
politically popular. Treatment, well that is not any kind of magic
bullet either. Getting rid of addiction is tough and you can expect
frequent failures and relapses. But even a modest rate of success is
quite cost-effective. And any reduction in demand is important.
Treatment in prison is relatively cheap. Treatment for addicts
who want it, and not all do by any means, seems to me to be a
moral imperative. If we create the administrative mechanism nec-
essary to measure success and failure, we can promote a rational,
rather than emotional, approach to the drug problem. I include,
for example, methadone maintenance and treatment modalities, in
part because I think it can become a step toward being drug fee.
2. See, Fox Butterfield, Are American Jails Becoming Shelters from the Storm?,
N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1992, at D4.
3. See, Rick Skindrud, "Truth in Sentencing" Worth the Cost, WIs. ST. J., June 5,
1997, at 13A.
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Education is a difficult subject and one that is delicate because
young people are not really scared. Young people think they are
going to live forever, that is why they are such good soldiers. They
are not scared when they ought to be. And the great problem with
education and drugs is to strike a balance that makes sense to
young people so that they do not want to experiment merely be-
cause it is dangerous, merely because it is illegal. It is difficult to
develop education programs and appeals in the schools and else-
where that strike that balance fairly and effectively.
Frankly, I am more concerned with the non-monetary costs of
the drug war to our criminal justice system. There are conse-
quences to the rhetoric of toughness, the political consequences of
being soft on crime, racial problems, concepts of fairness, concepts
of the punishment fitting the crime, and I think an increasing feder-
alization of criminal law generally, all stemming out of the effort to
control drugs.
For example, mandatory sentences, stiff mandatory minimum
sentences, I suppose are aimed at deterrence on the one hand and I
think politically aimed at judges on the other. They succeed quite
well on the latter count, less on the former. Their effect, of course,
is to transfer a great deal of power from judges to prosecutors. I
think that is a cause for concern. " So, too, is the notion that one size
fits all, so seldom consistent with common sense. And finally, one
obviously unintended result is to release violent felons from over-
crowded prisons because they do not have mandatory sentence
minimums and are eligible for parole, when nonviolent drug felons
are not.
Increasing federal laws has led to making state experimentation
more difficult because federal authorities can almost always step in
if they want to. I happen to be a conservative as far as federalism
is concerned and I still think it makes sense to put responsibility for
as many matters as possible with the states. There should be a con-
straint on the part of the federal government in drug enforcement
and a more precise allocation of responsibility. To my mind, the
role of the federal government is what years ago the Crime Com-
mission though it was, and that is to provide help, not headlines.
A word on professionalization and specialization. I do not think
most federal and state judges consider themselves very expert in
drug matters. Not often do they like these cases in their courts.
One result of the increased efforts in the war has been to crowd
criminal courts of general jurisdiction with drug cases at the ex-
pense of other criminal and civil cases. More judges may be the
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answer, but I think more specialized judges may well be a better
one. That makes possible a more coordinated approach - to go
back to my flow chart - of specialists in all aspects who know
something about drugs and can communicate and talk with each
other. At the moment it is spread all over the place and it would
be helpful if the information could be focused in a computer-usable
form, so that we would have statistics, we would have information,
and we would know much more about what is going on and be able
to measure it much more accurately. Specialization permits judges
with specialized training and interest to work for the public health
with probation, with community organizations, and with others.
As I said at the outset, I do not pretend to have drug expertise,
but I do believe a rational approach to the problems of society
tends to spur them towards solutions. And most of all I think the
best of our political leaders know this, and deserve our support
when they search for solutions that may or may not work, rather
than programs that greatly appeal to our less-educated instincts.
That is why I think what is been going on in the State of Connecti-
cut is useful, what has going on here tonight is useful, being willing
to look honestly at the problems. I think the bar association here is
to be congratulated for sponsoring this program and the panelists
who are experts for participating.
JUNK SCIENCE - THE LAWYER'S ETHICAL
RESPONSIBILITIES
Dick Thornburgh*
The following offers some observations designed to advance the
cause of resolving the dilemma presented to judges and lawyers
alike by the escalating concern over "junk science" in our nation's
courtrooms.
Nowhere has this phenomenon been more starkly, or sadly, de-
scribed than in a recent New York Times review of a television doc-
umentary on women affected by breast cancer:
They are convinced that they were poisoned by their toxic envi-
ronment .... Are crops sprayed with pesticides? Well, then of
course pesticides caused breast cancer. Do we use electricity?
Well, of course electromagnetic fields caused breast cancer.
How about those plastics we use with such abandon? Once
again, the women hear, those plastics contain chemicals that can
cause breast cancer.'
The reviewer described the women interviewed as "far removed
from the universe of scientists and others who make distinctions
between hypotheses and evidence, who believe that speculation is
not proof and that when evidence fails to support a hypothesis, the
hypothesis should be abandoned."2
Broadly speaking, I hold that "junk science" in the courtroom
emanates from testimony by expert witnesses hired not for their
scientific expertise, but for their willingness, for a price, to say
whatever is needed to make the client's case. Put simply, I believe
that it is unethical lawyers who are largely to blame for introduc-
ing, or, in settlement negotiations, threatening to introduce this so-
called "expert" testimony. As one commentator noted, "lawyers
casting about for new theories to use to sue manufacturers of
* Former Attorney General of the United States; Counsel, Kirkpatrick & Lock-
hart LLP. This article is based on an address given at Fordham University School of
Law on Tuesday, October 21, 1997.
1. Gina Kolata, Seeking Something to Blame When Breast Cancer Strikes, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 1997, at El.
2. Id.
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drugs, medical devices and other products create a limitless de-
mand for junk science." '3
A recent example of this phenomenon was reported on the front
page of the New York Law Journal in September 1997.' Within
days of the withdrawal of weight reduction medications Fen-Phen
and Redux from the market, lawyers across the country were in
court seeking damages and simultaneously placing ads in newspa-
pers in search of plaintiffs.5 By mid-November, at least three na-
tionwide and more than two dozen statewide class action suits, as
well as hundreds of individual cases and a shareholder suit were
pending.6
As the litigation explosion expands in this country, junk science
is producing "junk law" that is pervading our courtrooms. The ulti-
mate victims are America's workers and consumers through the
increased costs, diminished innovation opportunities, and foregone
product availabilities imposed on enterprises engaged in scientific
research and development and product manufacturing.
As pointed out in the recent best-seller, Science on Trial, by Dr.
Marcia Angell, the Executive Editor of the New England Journal
of Medicine, breast implant litigation, threatening the existence of
breast implant manufacturers and other suppliers, is but the most
prominent of the abounding examples of this phenomenon.7 In
1992 the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") imposed a mora-
3. Joseph M. Price & Gretchen Gates Kelly, Junk Science in the Courtroom:
Causes, Effects and Controls, 19 HAMLINE L. REV. 395, 396 (1996) [hereinafter Junk
Science].
4. Daniel Wise, Tort, Securities Suits Over Diet Pills Abound - Local Lawyers
Seek Damages, Monitoring, N.Y. L.J. Sept. 29, 1997 at 1.
5. See id.
6. Mark Hansen, Fen-phenomenal Tort Battle Brewing, 84 A.B.A. J., Jan. 1998, at
24. This issue of the ABA Journal also reports on law suits by health care workers
against the latex glove industry. Mark Hansen, Wheeze, Sneeze. . . 'Scalpel, Please':
Health Care Workers Allege Latex Gloves Cause Severe Allergic Reaction, 84 A.B.A.
J., Jan. 1998, at 25. As of mid-November 1996, more than 200 lawsuits relating to
latex allergies had been filed in state and federal court and have been consolidated for
discovery purposes in United States District Court in Philadelphia. See id. The plain-
tiffs, nurses and doctors, allege that they have developed a "severe allergic reaction"
to latex due to continued exposure through use of latex gloves. Id. They further
allege that the latex glove makers were aware that continued exposure would cause
such severe allergies, yet they did nothing to make a safer glove. See id. The latest
research, an epidemiological study conducted by the National Center for Health Sta-
tistics, shows that there is no causal connection between working in the health care
industry and latex sensitivity. Id. The National Center for Health is a federal, nonpar-
tisan agency and the study is the largest epidemiological study on the subject ever
done. See id. This is yet another apparent example of junk science litigation.
7. MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL 69-89 (1996).
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torium on the sale of silicone gel breast implants and subsequently
restricted the sale and use of the implants. Deluged with lawsuits,
Dow Corning, the implant makers, entered into bankruptcy in
1995. Reliable epidemiological data, however, has since demon-
strated that silicone breast implants do not cause the maladies they
were alleged to cause in the myriad lawsuits brought by women
implanted with them.8 In her book, Dr. Angell argues that the
breast implant litigation has threatened the entire industry of medi-
cal devices, as well as an important area of medical research -
epidemiological studies. 9
The classic example of this phenomenon was the Bendectin liti-
gation.10 Faced with claims that the anti-nausea drug Bendectin
caused defects in fetuses, Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals was forced
to withdraw this drug from the market despite the lack of evidence
demonstrating such a causal connection. Indeed, although Bendec-
tin litigation had been pending in the courts for over a decade, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted:
the only review plaintiffs' experts work has received has been by
judges and juries, and the only place their theories and studies
have been published is in the pages of the federal and state re-
porters .... Despite the many years the controversy has been
brewing, no one in the scientific community - except defend-
ant's experts - has deemed these studies worthy of verification,
refutation, or even commentary. It's as if there were a tacit un-
derstanding within the scientific community that what's going on
here is not science at all, but litigation.11
Another recent target of junk science litigation is the contracep-
tive device Norplant. An avalanche of lawsuits has been brought
by many of the same lawyers who engaged the makers of silicone
breast implants. 2 In addition, many of the same medical "experts"
and laboratories that prospered from the breast implant litigation
are assisting these lawyers in bringing suits against the makers of
Norplant.13 Norplant entered the United States market in 1991,
after thirty years of development and testing, and has been used by
8. See id. at 99-103, 110, 195-96; see also Junk Science, supra note 3 at 398.
9. See id. at 84-87.
10. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
11. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1318 ( 9 1h Cir. 1995).
12. See Junk Science, supra note 3, at 399; see also Gina Kolata, Litigation: Side
Effect of Contraceptive Norplant, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 4, 1995, at G4.
13. Junk Science, supra note 3, at 399; see also, Gina Kolala, Will Lawyers Kill Off
Norplant, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1995, § 3 at 1.
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about one million American women. 14 Approximately 50,000 wo-
men have sued the company's manufacturer, alleging that it failed
adequately to warn users of side effects like headaches, weight
gain, ovarian cysts, and depression. 5 A total of 2800 lawsuits are
now pending in just one federal court in Texas. 16
The Texas Supreme Court was obliged to delay lawsuits that
were set for trial while it ruled on defendant's motion to disqualify
plaintiffs' lawyers for hiring a paralegal who used to work for the
defense and for paying an expert $10,000 to switch sides. 7 Despite
extensive litigation and media coverage, the FDA and physician
groups still insist the product is safe. Sales, nonetheless, have
dropped dramatically - from $141 million in its first full year on
the market to $3.7 million last year.'8
Junk science is made possible in part by so-called "experts" who
will testify to any theory the lawyer wants for a price. A look at
the classified section of any legal publication will produce samples
of a whole industry of "experts" advertising their abilities to pro-
vide a wide range of expert testimony. Many of them get right to
the point, highlighting jury awards or settlement amounts gained as
a result of their testimony. One of the largest expert witness refer-
ral services maintains a list of 24,000 experts in 5500 fields. Their
business is litigation, not science. Their motivation raises serious
questions about the use of expert testimony generally. Are these
experts really seeking to assist the trier of fact, or are they hired
guns aiming at a pre-determined result?
At the turn of the century, Judge Learned Hand was among the
first to raise issues regarding the role of expert testimony, question-
ing an expert's ability to give an unbiased opinion when he is being
liberally paid to defend one side to a dispute.1 9 Judge Hand also
questioned a jury's ability to decipher and resolve conflicting ex-
pert testimony. As he observed, "the whole object of the expert is
to tell the jury, not facts,... but general truths derived from his
specialized experience. But how can the jury judge between two
statements each founded upon an experience admittedly foreign in
kind to their own? It is just because they are incompetent for such




18. See id.; see also Naomi Freundlich, Science & Technology: Contraceptives, Bus.
WK., June 16, 1997, at 142.
19. See Billings Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding
Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 53-54 (1901).
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a task that the expert is necessary at all."2 No better example of
this quandary is presented than in Daubert, where the defense ex-
pert pointed out that none of the published literature examining a
potential causal relationship between prenatal ingestion of Bendec-
tin and birth defects found the product to cause birth defects. 21 In
response, plaintiffs presented eight experts who concluded that
Bendectin can cause birth defects on the basis of animal studies, in
vitro experiments, chemical structure analysis, and "re-analysis" of
previously published studies.22 How is the ordinary lay juror to
handle these diametrically opposed conclusions?
How, we might better ask, has this challenge been handled by
the courts?
I. Judicial Responses to Expert Testimony
For the most part, judicially-administered evidentiary standards
have been the only means - albeit highly imperfect ones - of
excluding junk science from the courtroom. The standard of ad-
missibility for expert testimony was first formulated over seventy
years ago in Frye v. United States.2 3 Frye was the first case to hold
that scientific evidence should be treated differently from any other
evidence.24 The case involved a criminal matter, where a defend-
ant charged with murder wanted to introduce the use of a new sys-
tolic blood pressure test to show that he was telling the truth.
25
The court excluded the evidence, finding that the expert testimony
was based on a principle not "sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it be-
longs."2 6 The Frye rule, in what has come to be known as the "gen-
eral acceptance" standard, required expert testimony based on
novel scientific evidence to have gained "general acceptance" by a
large scientific group.27
20. Id. at 54.
21. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 583-84 (1993).
22. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 583-84.
23. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
24. See Note, Improving Judicial Gatekeeping: Technical Advisors and Scientific
Evidence, 110 HARV. L. REV. 941, 942 (1997) [hereinafter Improving Judicial
Gatekeeping].
25. See Frye, 293 F. at 1013-14.
26. Id. at 1014.
27. See Nancy S. Farrell, Congressional Action to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence
702: A Mischievous Attempt to Codify Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 13 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 523, 526-27 (1997) [hereinafter Congressional Action
to Amend Rule 702].
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In 1975, Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence. 28
Rule 702 governs the admission of expert testimony and, in sharp
contrast to the Frye rule, provided that: "If scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness quali-
fied as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or other-
wise."29 The Rules do not make any specific mention of Frye, and,
in light of their more permissive attitude toward the admission of
evidence generally, courts and scholars alike questioned whether
the strict Frye test still survived.3" Under this new standard, some
courts undertook to consider whether particular expert testimony
was reliable. Others just questioned its relevance. And still others
continued to apply Frye.31 Critics complained that some judges
were imposing "no meaningful check on science in the courtroom"
and were permitting experts "to testify to almost any claim regard-
less of the weight of contrary opinion," thus, increasingly relying
on "junk science. 32
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals to resolve some of the issues re-
garding the judicial standard for admission of scientific evidence.33
As noted, the plaintiffs in this case were children who were born
with birth defects and whose mothers had taken the anti-nausea
drug Bendectin during their pregnancies. Plaintiffs sought to admit
scientific evidence to support their claim that the drug caused the
children's birth defects. The district court and the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals excluded plaintiffs' expert's testimony because it
did not satisfy the Frye test and granted summary judgment in
favor of the defendant manufacturer.34
The Supreme Court reversed and held that the general accept-
ance test in Frye was at odds with the "liberal thrust" of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, and had thus been superseded.35 Instead,
the Court explained, Rule 702 required federal trial judges to make
28. See id. at 528.
29. FED. R. EVID. 702.
30. See Congressional Action to Amend Rule 702, supra note 27, at 529-30.
31. See id.; see also Improving Judicial Gatekeeping, supra note 24, at 944; Con-
gressional Action to Amend Rule 702, supra note 27, at 529-30.
32. Improving Judicial Gatekeeping, supra note 24, at 944.
33. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 582 (1993).
34. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 576 (S.D. Cal.
1989), affd, 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
35. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588.
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a "preliminary assessment" as to both the reliability and relevance
of the scientific testimony offered.36 To satisfy the reliability prong,
the Court explained that a trial judge must find the subject of the
expert's testimony to be "scientific knowledge." The Court offered
a list of four, non-exhaustive factors or "general observations" for
the trial judge to consider in determining whether the testimony
was reliable scientific knowledge: (1) whether the theory or tech-
nique can be, or has been, tested; (2) whether it has been subjected
to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of
error; and (4) the degree to which the theory or technique is widely
accepted in the scientific community.37
On remand in Daubert, the Ninth Circuit added a further consid-
eration of its own: Was the evidence proffered by experts devel-
oped independent of the litigation, or was it developed solely for
purposes of litigation and therefore potentially biased? 38
Daubert was heralded as the case that would resolve the "junk
science" debate.39 To date, the case has been cited in at least 730
federal cases, 325 state decisions, and over 1000 law review arti-
cles. 4° A quick review of some of these materials, however, makes
it clear that the "junk science" debate, and indeed the application
of the Daubert case itself, is far from settled.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens warned of such diffi-
culties in their concurrence in Daubert.4' They agreed that Frye
had been superseded by the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, but criticized the majority for providing a list of "general
observations" to further guide district courts.42 Because the Court
was not applying these factors to decide whether any particular evi-
dence was admissible, the concurrence argued that the list would
give little more than "vague and abstract" guidelines to the district
courts.43 They also criticized the way in which the majority re-
quired that trial judges make a preliminary assessment as to
whether scientific evidence is reliable: "Questions arise simply
from reading this part of the Court's opinion, and countless more
36. See id. at 592-93.
37. Id. at 593-94.
38. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995).
39. See Anthony Z. Roisman, Emerging Law: The Expert Witness in Toxic Tort
Litigation, SB52 ALI-ABA 375, 390-91 (1997) [hereinafter Emerging Law]; see also
Jay P. Kesan, A Critical Examination of the Post Daubert Scientific Evidence Land-
scape, 52 FooD & DRUG L.J. 225, 227 (1997) [hereinafter Critical Examination].
40. See Critical Examination, supra note 39, at 227.
41. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 598.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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questions will arise when hundreds of district judges try to apply its
teaching to particular offers of expert testimony. 44
Finally, the concurrence questioned the extent to which federal
judges would now, under the dictates of Daubert, be faced with
"either the obligation or the authority to become amateur
scientists. 45
II. Review of the Law Under Daubert
Just as the Daubert concurrence predicted, federal courts have
been confronted with seemingly endless questions as they struggle
to determine what evidence is admissible under the rules articu-
lated in Daubert.46
Consider, for example, the question of whether courts should
hold hearings (under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a)) as part of
their "preliminary assessment" of the proffered evidence.47 Any
such hearing, as one commentator noted, is really a "win-win" situ-
ation for defendants since extended hearings can drain plaintiffs'
resources and result in plaintiffs' loss of a key expert.48 The Ninth
Circuit has held that district courts are not required to hold such
hearings.49 That Court also requires a party challenging scientific
evidence to make a prima facie case showing that the expert failed
to follow accepted scientific methodology or reasoning before it
will proceed with any kind of Rule 104(a) hearing.50 The Third
Circuit, on the other hand, has created something of a "cottage
44. Id. at 600.
45. Id. at 600-01.
46. See District Judge Takes Issue With Circuit Court's Application of Gatekeeping
Role, Federal Discovery News, Aug. 1997, at 4 (discussing Hon. Sam C. Pointer, Jr.'s
comments on Daubert at a July ALI-ABA conference) [hereinafter FEDERAL Dis-
COVERY NEws].
47. Federal Rule of Evidence 104 (a) provides:
Questions of admissibility generally: Preliminary questions concerning the
qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the
admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the
provisions (b). In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of
evidence except those with respect to privilege.
(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact When the relevancy of evidence depends
upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit upon it, or
subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the
fulfillment of conditions.
48. See Emerging Law, supra note 39, at 390-91.
49. See Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1124 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1082 (1995).
50. See Hopkins, 33 F.3d at 1124.
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industry" out of Daubert hearings.5" In one case, for example, a
court in that circuit scheduled most of one month and part of two
other months for the preliminary assessment alone.52
Consider, also, the extent to which judges are indeed becoming
"amateur scientists," as the Daubert concurrence predicted. Dif-
ferent circuits seem to look differently at how deeply they should
probe in determining whether an expert's testimony is admissible
under Daubert.53 Must a court, after Daubert, simply consider the
type of scientific data and methodology used by the expert? Or
must the court go further and inquire into the reliability of specific
data or procedures used by the expert? Must a court now reject
expert testimony if it finds that the data or implementation of the
methodology in that particular instance was unreliable?
The Third Circuit says yes.54 In the Paoli II litigation, where
plaintiffs who lived near a rail yard alleged that they were exposed
to and injured by PCBs55 , the district court engaged in a five-day
hearing and extensive analysis to determine the admissibility of
certain evidence. That court added three criteria in addition to the
four proposed in Daubert and left open the possibility that other
factors could be relevant.5 6 As part of its inquiry, the Third Circuit
considered whether the methodology used was scientific and
whether that methodology was used in an unobjectionable man-
ner.5 7 It excluded some testimony because it determined that cer-
51. See Emerging Law, supra note 39, at 388-89 (discussing In re Paoli R.R. Yard
PCB Litigation II, 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1190 (1995) and
subsequent district court holdings in that circuit). The author states that "in effect,
the courts in the Third Circuit now appear to be creating a second trial, complete with
witnesses and cross-examination, and lasting sometimes for weeks, just to decide the
question of whether experts should be allowed to testify at the real trial." Id. at 389.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 394-408.
54. See id.
55. PCBs is an acronym for polychlorinated biphenyls.
56. See In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 742 & n.8 (3d Cir.
1994) (ruling that district courts should take into account factors set forth in United
States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238-39 (3d Cir. 1985), in addition to factors set
forth in Daubert), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1190 (1995). The court advised that factors
deemed important by Daubert and Downing include the following:
(1) whether a method consists of a testable hypothesis; (2) whether the
method has been subject to peer review; (3) the known or potential rate of
error; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the tech-
nique's operation; (5) whether the method is generally accepted; (6) the rela-
tionship of the technique to methods which have been established to be
reliable; (7) the qualifications of the expert witness testifying based on the
methodology; (8) the non-judicial uses to which the method has been put.
Paoli, 35 F.3d at 742 n.8.
57. See id. at 777-78.
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tain protocol and quality control techniques had not been
undertaken by the laboratory.58
Other circuits would answer the question differently. The Sec-
ond Circuit, for example, has held that disputes about whether an
expert correctly employed a particular scientific methodology
should be left to the jury. 59 These disputes, and others concerning
the strength of an expert's credentials or the lack of textual author-
ity for an expert's opinion, should (according to the Second Cir-
cuit) be "explored on cross-examination" because those issues go
to the weight or credibility of the expert's testimony, not its admis-
sibility.60 The Eleventh Circuit interpreted Daubert as "loosen[ing]
the strictures of Frye and mak[ing] it easier to present legitimate
conflicting views of experts for the jury's consideration." 61
The Supreme Court recently reversed the Eleventh Circuit's de-
cision in Joiner v. General Electric Company, resolving a split in the
circuit courts of appeal regarding the appropriate standard of re-
view for expert testimony.62 In Joiner, the Eleventh Circuit over-
ruled a district court's exclusion of expert testimony and restored
plaintiff's claim that his exposure to PCBs and other chemicals
caused or helped to "promote" his lung cancer. (The plaintiff had
been a smoker for eight years, his parents had both been smokers,
and his family had a history of lung cancer.)63 Applying what it
described as "Daubert's lower threshold" and a "particularly strin-
gent" standard of review, the court emphasized the limited nature
of its "gatekeeping role."64 The circuit court explained that the
role of the gatekeeper was only to "guard the jury from considering
as proof pure speculation presented in the guise of legitimate scien-
tifically based expert opinion. It is not intended to turn judges into
jurors or surrogate scientists. ' 65 The court further opined that the
58. See id.
59. See McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038, 1043-44 (2d Cir. 1995).
60. Id. at 1043.
61. See Joiner v. General Elec. Co., 78 F.3d 524 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117
S. Ct. 1243, 137 L. Ed. 2d 325, 65 U.S.L.W. 3619 (U.S. Mar. 17, 1997) rev'd, 118 S. Ct.
512, 139 L. Ed. 2d 508, 66 U.S.L.W. 4036 (U.S. Ga. Dec. 15, 1997).
62. Six circuits apply a "manifestly erroneous" standard; four circuits apply an
abuse-of-discretion standard; and two circuits apply the "particularly stringent" stan-
dard discussed in Joiner, 78 F.3d at 529 (11th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997).
See David L. Faigman et al., 1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 1-3.5 (1997).
63. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512, 516 (1997).
64. See Joiner, 78 F.3d at 529-30.
65. Id. at 530.
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trial court should leave it to the jury "to decide the correctness of
competing expert opinions. 66
The Supreme Court reversed, applying the abuse of discretion
standard in reviewing the trial court's decision and concluding that
the trial court-did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert
testimony.67 The Court ruled that "[t]he [animal] studies were so
dissimilar to the facts presented in this litigation that it was not an
abuse of discretion for the District Court to have rejected the ex-
perts' reliance on them. ' 68 The Court also upheld the district
court's conclusion that "the four epidemiological studies on which
respondent relied were not a sufficient basis for the experts'
opinions. "69
Citing Daubert's language that the "focus ... must be solely on
principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they gen-
erate," the respondent argued that the district court erred in focus-
ing on the conclusions of the experts rather than the
methodology.70 The Court in Daubert, however, did not provide
much guidance regarding the distinction to be made between meth-
odology and conclusion. In Joiner, the Court stated,
But conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from
one another. Trained experts commonly extrapolate from ex-
isting data. But nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules
of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence
which is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the
expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too great an
analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.71
In other words, trial courts may focus on the conclusions of the
experts in determining whether the data actually supports the con-
clusion. Thus, the ambiguity in Daubert, which on the one hand
stressed the gatekeeping role of the trial judge, and on the other
hand the "liberal thrust" of the evidentiary rules and the call for
juries to resolve evidentiary disputes,7 2 was clarified in Joiner. The
Court in Joiner reemphasized the importance of the trial judge's
role as gatekeeper.
66. Id. at 533.
67. See Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 516.
68. Id. at 518.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 519 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 595
(1993)).
71. Id.
72. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588, 597.
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Presently, there are bills pending in Congress that propose
amendments to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 relating to the ad-
missibility of scientific evidence.73 These proposals would add a
presumption of inadmissibility of such evidence, and, incidentally,
would disqualify an expert witness whose compensation is contin-
gent on the outcome of the case, a most salutary suggestion.
Critics, like Judge Ralph K. Winter of the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, complain that the bills do not accurately codify
the decision in Daubert.4 Another commentator remarked that
the amendment would improperly take away the jury's responsi-
bility to decide right and wrong, scientific truth and scientific fal-
sity, and gives it "to a handful of government officials appointed
for life."'75 This critic further observed that the attempted codifica-
tion, captioned, felicitously, the "Honesty in Evidence Act," would
"be a wonderful lawyers' full employment act for lawyers paid by
the hour who will litigate for the next ten years over whether or not
Congress was codifying the Daubert opinion. ' 76  One supporter
praises the bill for ensuring "that the science that jurors and judges
hear in a courtroom is not inferior to the science that scientists and
researchers hear at their professional meetings. ' 77 He also notes
that it is unlikely that the average juror will comprehend weak-
nesses in expert testimony brought out during cross examination.78
73. See Crime Prevention Act of 1997, S. 488, 105th Cong. § 203 (1997); Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution and Settlement Encouragement Act, H.R. 903, 105th Cong.
§ 4 (1997); Civil Justice Fairness Act of 1997, S. 79, 105th Cong. § 302 (1997).
74. See H.R. 988, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.; S. 79., 105th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 10,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. Section 102 of H.R. 10, entitled Honesty in Evidence provides in
pertinent part:
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is amended ... by adding at the
end the following: (b) Adequate basis for opinion. Testimony in the form of
an opinion by a witness that is based on scientific knowledge shall be inad-
missible in evidence unless the court determines that such opinion is - (1)
based on scientifically valid reasoning; and (2) sufficiently reliable so that the
probative value of such evidence outweighs the dangers specified in rule 403.
(c) Disqualification. Testimony by a witness who is qualified as described in
subsection (a) is inadmissible in evidence if such witness is entitled to receive
any compensation contingent on the legal deposition of any claim with re-
spect to which such testimony is offered.
75. See Attorney Accountability: Hearings on H.R. 10 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts and Intellectual Property of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Repre-
sentatives, 1 04 h Cong. 146, 160 (1995) (statement of Anthony Z. Roisman).
76. Id.
77. See Attorney Accountability Hearings on H.R. 10 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts and Intellectual Property of the Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representa-
tives, 104
" Cong. 146, 155, 159 (1995) (statement of Robert Charrow).
78. See id.
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This review of the law under Daubert, and most recently Joiner,
is certainly not intended to be exhaustive, but is meant to highlight
the types of questions that courts continue to face when confronted
with proffers of expert testimony. This analysis is also to dispel any
notion that Daubert really did decide the junk science debate.
III. The Lawyer's Role
It is abundantly clear that lawyers cannot hide behind the guise
of Daubert and contend that there is no need for further thought or
debate about the proper use and role of junk science in our court-
rooms. Instead, I suggest that it is time for lawyers to confront
their own obligations in bringing this "expert" testimony to the
courts in the first place.
We have discussed the role of the expert, the jury, the judge; but
what is, or what should be, the lawyer's role? Daubert may provide
some guidance as to what expert testimony will or will not be ac-
cepted by courts, but it surely does not provide all the answers.
Consider the following example, the facts of which are taken from
an actual case in the Sixth Circuit. Plaintiff alleged that use of the
drug Ritodrine caused plaintiff's cardiomyopathy. 9  One year
before trial, plaintiff's only causation expert opined that it was
"least likely and least provable from a scientific standpoint" that
the cardiomyopathy was caused by use of Ritodrine.80 On the eve
of his testimony, however, the same expert informed plaintiff's
counsel that he had "moved up" his hypothesis to a more likely
explanation based on subsequently discovered literature. The ex-
pert informed the lawyer that he was now prepared to testify that
Ritodrine had a direct toxic effect on the plaintiff's heart
condition. 81
Should plaintiff's lawyer have proceeded with the case knowing,
up until the eve of testimony, that his own "expert" believed that it
was "least likely and least provable" that the drug caused the heart
ailments? If so, how should the lawyer have proceeded when the
expert suddenly changed his opinion? It turned out, in this (pre-
Daubert) case, that the district court and the Sixth Circuit rejected
defendant's claim that the expert's testimony was "junk science"
and, surprisingly, allowed the testimony.82 This sort of result only
79. See Tobin v. Astra Pharm. Prod., Inc., 993 F.2d 528 (6th Cir. 1993) cert. denied
sub nom., 510 U.S. 914, 114 S. Ct. 304 (1993).
80. Id. at 540.
81. See id.
82. Id. at 533-34.
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compounds the lawyer's dilemma: should he, as a zealous advocate,
simply try to introduce any evidence that would advance his cli-
ent's claims? In short, what, if any, obligation does the lawyer have
to scrutinize the expert testimony he seeks to admit?
It is clear that the lawyer does have a duty to determine whether
he believes expert testimony will be admissible before trying to in-
troduce such evidence in court.8 3 This duty arises both out of the
lawyer's ethical obligation to represent a client zealously and his
obligation to represent a client within the bounds of the law. 4 To
be an effective advocate, the lawyer must vigorously prepare for
the presentation of facts and law and, in doing so, needs to test the
accuracy and reliability of any testimony, including expert testi-
mony, he wishes to introduce. At the same time, as an officer of
the court, the lawyer has a duty to the adversarial system of justice
not to introduce frivolous or unreliable expert testimony.
As the Model Code of Professional Responsibility declares,
the advocate, by his zealous preparation and presentation of
facts and law, enables the tribunal to come to the hearing with
an open and neutral mind and to render impartial judgments.
The duty of a lawyer to his client and his duty to the legal system
are the same: to represent his client zealously within the bounds
of the law.
The partisan striving of an advocate is not compromised by a law-
yer's duty of complete candor and loyalty to the legal system. The
Supreme Court of the State of Washington recognized this notion
in stating: "Vigorous advocacy is not contingent on lawyers being
free to pursue litigation tactics that they cannot justify as legiti-
mate. The lawyer's duty to place his client's interests ahead of all
others presupposes that the lawyer will live with the rules that gov-
ern the system."'8 6 Essentially, under this court's analysis, a law-
yer's duty to scrutinize (and perhaps withhold) his own expert's
testimony goes hand-in-hand with other obligations the lawyer
owes to his client.
In this light, my thesis - that a lawyer has an ethical duty not to
introduce junk science - may not seem so controversial. Ethical
issues arise with regard to all strategic decisions made by the advo-
cate in preparing a case for trial, and in conducting a trial. Charles
83. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (1981).
84. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 7 (1981).
85. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-19 (1981).
86. Washington State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d 1054,
1084 (Wash. 1993) (en banc).
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Wolfram notes in his treatise on legal ethics that "an assumption
that underlies the adversarial system is that the mutually conten-
tious strivings of relatively equal advocates will make truth and jus-
tice apparent to the judge and, if different, the fact finder."87
But the lawyer's ethical duty is immeasurably more complex
when scientific expert testimony is at issue. The ethical rules rec-
ognize that the law is ambiguous, but require that a lawyer must
insure there is a good faith basis for the admissibility of evidence
prior to introducing such evidence.88 When scientific evidence is at
issue, the lawyer himself must first gain a comprehensive under-
standing of technical scientific data and methodology in order to
make this determination in good faith. The Supreme Court ob-
served in Daubert that, the law must "resolve disputes finally and
quickly," while "scientific conclusions are subject to perpetual revi-
sion. '"89 Science is also, as the Supreme Court recognized, fur-
thered by "broad and wide-ranging consideration of a multitude of
hypotheses." 90 Such conjectures, which are a part of the scientific
process, are of little use to a lawyer who needs to reach a relatively
quick, final decision regarding admissibility.91 In the face of this
uncertainty, a lawyer must decide, before he seeks to introduce sci-
entific testimony into evidence, that there is a good faith basis to
believe that evidence is reliable scientific evidence.
The Daubert standards do not make this job any easier. District
and circuit courts have had trouble applying the Supreme Court's
standards or "general observations" in determining what is valid,
reliable scientific knowledge. 92 The decision in Joiner has clarified
some of the ambiguities in Daubert, but it leaves the question of
admissibility up to each trial judge's discretion. This will likely lead
to varying standards of admissibility. As yet, there is certainly no
consensus among the courts as to what scientific testimony should
pass muster under Daubert. Even the Supreme Court in Daubert
admitted that, under the standard it established for admissibility,
"shaky" scientific evidence could still be admissible.93
87. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 619 (1986).
88. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 3.1 (1983).
89. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
90. Id.
91. See id. But see In re Breast Implant Cases, 942 F. Supp. 958, 960 (E.D.N.Y.,
S.D.N.Y. 1996), wherein Judge Weinstein has decided to allow plaintiffs' claims to
stay alive rather than "rush to judgment," despite the lack of scientific support, be-
cause plaintiffs' scientific evidence "may have the scintilla of plausibility that merits
reservation of judgement while evaluation goes forward."
92. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
93. See id. at 596.
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IV. The Lawyer's Obligations to the Client
Lawyers, therefore, have no clear guidelines on what will, or will
not, be deemed admissible scientific expert testimony. If the courts
set no clear standards, how, then, should a lawyer define "junk sci-
ence"? If Daubert acknowledges that "shaky" evidence may be ad-
missible, does this mean that an attorney may, under the good faith
standard embodied in the ethical rules, introduce "shaky" scientific
evidence? How much time must the lawyer spend in determining
whether the evidence constitutes junk science, and who is to be
billed for this time?
Judges have acknowledged the daunting task they behold in de-
ciding the admissibility of expert testimony. One judge bluntly
stated:
Our responsibility, then, unless we badly misread the Supreme
Court's opinion [in Daubert], is to resolve disputes among
respected, well-credentialed scientists about matters squarely
within their expertise, in areas where there is no scientific con-
sensus as to what is and what is not 'good science,' and occasion-
ally to reject such expert testimony because it was not 'derived
by the scientific method.' ' 9
4
Finally, if, as noted above, the federal courts are applying
Daubert differently, it is certain that individual attorneys will also
have different interpretations of what constitutes junk science.
Will an ethical lawyer who goes up against a less scrupulous advo-
cate be at a disadvantage? 95 If lawyers now undertake the task of
screening out junk science, will their clients be deprived of a level
playing field? In today's competitive legal market, will lawyers
hold fast to their ethical obligations at the risk of losing business? 96
Clients should not be underestimated regarding their responsive-
ness to advice with respect to the long-term costs a particular legal
tactic may produce. A relevant ethical obligation of the attorney is
to:
exert his best efforts to insure that decisions of his clients are
made only after the client has been informed of relevant consid-
erations .... In assisting his client to reach a proper decision, it is
often desirable for a lawyer to point out those factors which may
94. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995).
95. See MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 84 (1994).
96. See id.
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lead to a decision that is morally just. as well as legally
permissible.97
The report of the Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility
remarked, in 1958, that:
[tihe most effective realization of the law's aims often takes
place in the attorney's office .... Contrary to popular belief, the
compliance with the law thus brought about is not generally lip-
serving and narrow, for by reminding him of its long-run costs
the lawyer often deters his client from a course of conduct tech-
nically permissible under existing law, though inconsistent with
its underlying spirit and purpose.9"
It has often been noted that a lawyer's role as advisor to the
client is equally important as his role as advocate. The lawyer's
ethical obligation would require him or her to counsel the client
regarding the dangers of offering junk science into evidence, and
the long term costs of such a tactic both to the client's case and to
the legal system.
One retort to the proposition that a lawyer has an ethical obliga-
tion to refrain from introducing junk science is that the adversary
system is designed to weed out unreliable evidence. As noted, the
Supreme Court reiterated this observation in Daubert, in stating
that "[v]igorous cross examination, presentation of contrary evi-
dence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the tradi-
tional and appropriate means" of preventing the consideration of
junk science.99 Aren't motions in limine, objections, and cross-ex-
amination sufficient to protect the court process from junk science?
Why should the lawyer advocating the position have to do his ad-
versary's job by refraining from introducing evidence which is
questionably reliable? Similar questions have been raised by Judge
Sam Pointer, who has been charged with supervising the thousands
of nationwide silicone breast implant lawsuits. In remarking on the
judge's role as gatekeeper, Judge Pointer commented that, in the
absence of a sufficiently strong basis or argument by an objecting
party to the expert's opinion, trial judges should not be required to
97. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1980) (emphasis ad-
ded); see also ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION 144-45 (1993).
98. Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159,
1161 (1958).
99. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.
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automatically resolve issues regarding the admissibility of scientific
evidence. 100
There are certain problems with this argument in the context of a
lawyer's obligations. One major problem with relying on the pro-
tections of the adversary system is that many times discussions take
place during settlement negotiations, where the natural boundaries
of the adversary system are not present. Lawyers can gain bargain-
ing power by threatening to introduce junk science through quali-
fied expert testimony. Take the example of the breast implant
litigation. Dow Corning, the breast implant maker, agreed to a
$4.25 billion class action settlement in 1994 (including $1 billion
earmarked for lawyers) and filed for bankruptcy a year later. The
manufacturer agreed to these concessions even though there had
been no scientific evidence showing a causal connection between
immune system disorder and silicone gel implants. 10' Some say
that the settlement has fallen apart, however, because Dow Corn-
ing has been winning lawsuits in the wake of the Daubert deci-
sion."' If such is so, in the settlement context, the adversary
system is not sufficient to protect against the consideration of junk
science. A lawyer's adherence to his ethical obligations, however,
would help to prevent junk science from being improperly used as
a sword in settlement negotiations.
Another issue to consider is whether the lawyer, as a gatekeeper
of sorts, can help to prevent junk science from pervading our court-
rooms. And here we are not talking just about claims bottomed on
theories of astrology, numerology, or phrenology. Assume you are
faced with a highly qualified expert with excellent credentials who
is willing to testify in support of the proposition you are advocat-
ing. In your investigation, you discover that the vast weight of au-
thority runs contrary to your expert's testimony. You have a good
faith basis to believe it could be admissible, however, based on the
expert's qualifications. Do your ethical obligations require you to
refrain from introducing this evidence? At least one ethics expert
has said "no." Professor Geoffrey Hazard has opined that, even if
an attorney is aware that an expert's views are not respected by his
100. See FEDERAL DISCOVERY NEWS, supra note 46, at 4.
101. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 57-61, 99-103, 195-96.
102. See Paul Reidinger, They Blinded Me with Science!, 82 A.B.A. J., Sept. 1996, at
54, 60; see also Paul Connors, Science on Trial. The Clash of Medical Evidence and the
Law in the Breast Implant Case, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 251, 354 (1997) (reviewing An-
gell's Science on Trial).
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or her colleagues in the field, hiring such an expert is not
unethical.10 3
Taking this hypothetical case further, assume that the evidence is
admitted and you win the case. What if you later discover that the
"scientific expert" whose testimony you introduced was actually a
charlatan who testified to nothing more than junk science? Just as
a criminal defense lawyer who learns after a trial that his client lied
on the stand must report the perjury to the tribunal, a lawyer who
later discovers his expert was a quack should report this informa-
tion to the court.1 0 4 The disciplinary rules require that a lawyer
promptly disclose instances where "[a] person other than the [law-
yer's] client has perpetrated a fraud upon a tribunal."1 5
In this hypothetical case, an attorney's ethical obligations would
not be enough to prevent the admission of junk science. If, in addi-
tion to acting as gatekeeper, an attorney were to be held accounta-
ble for introducing evidence that later turns out to be junk science,
attorneys would be less likely to risk the introduction of junk sci-
ence. To the extent that it is discovered before the conclusion of
proceedings that certain evidence presented was, in fact, junk sci-
ence, the offering attorney could be sanctioned pursuant to Rule
11.106 In this regard, one observer goes so far as to suggest that
"[i]f the individual scientist in fact presents views that have not
103. See David Bernstein, Out of the Frying Pan and Into the Fire. The Expert Wit-
ness Problem in Toxic Tort Litigation, 10 REV. LITIG. 117, 122-23 n.34 (1990).
104. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-102(A)(6) (1981) (in his
representation of a client, a lawyer shall not "participate in the creation or preserva-
tion of evidence when he knows or it is obvious that the evidence is false"); Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.3 (1983). See also, WOLFRAM, supra note 87, at
657-60.
105. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(2)(1996).
106. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
(b) By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later
advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or un-
represented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the cir-
cumstances, -. . .(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evi-
dentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary
support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery
FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
Rule 11 only applies:
to assertions contained in papers filed with or submitted to the court. It does
not cover matters arising for the first time during oral presentations to the
court, when counsel may make statements that would not have been made if
there had been more time for study and reflection. However, a litigant's
obligations with respect to the contents of these papers are not measured
solely as of the time they are filed with or submitted to the court, but include
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been derived, shared or checked by other scientists, there is a sub-
tle but serious problem of misrepresentation.""0 7 There are bills
pending in Congress pushing amendments to Rule 11, proposing
that its sanctions be made mandatory. 108
V. Solutions
Are there other alternatives? Judge Hand, who as you may re-
call had great distrust about the jury's ability to sort through com-
plex and conflicting expert testimony,10 9 proposed that a court-
appointed board of experts or advisory tribunal hear the expert
evidence and then advise the jury. 10 A similar suggestion is made
by Dr. Marcia Angell, a non-lawyer and the author of the book
Science on Trial,"' which discusses the clash of medical evidence
and the law in the breast implant case. Judge Pointer, as part of his
supervision of the breast implant suits, has recently followed Judge
Hand's advice and has convened a panel of four independent ex-
perts to evaluate the current evidence regarding the causal connec-
tion between silicone and immune system disorder.1 2 In so doing,
Judge Pointer is seen as "turning over science decisions to the
scientists."' 1 3 Is he providing an easy out for attorneys, or does his
answer just beg the question as to the lawyer's own ethical
obligations?
Justice Stephen Breyer, in his concurring opinion in Joiner,
makes the case for this approach, citing Federal Rule of Evidence
706 and the availability of expert assistance from organizations
such as the National Academy of Sciences and the American Asso-
ciation for the Advancement of Science.
Given the current state of the law, there may be no pat answer
for today's litigators. It is no longer sufficient to cite the advice of
that great New York lawyer, Elihu Root, who once opined: About
reaffirming to the court and advocating positions contained in those plead-
ings and motions after learning that they cease to have any merit.
Id. at Rule 11 (advisory committee notes). In the case of junk science, it is arguable
that Rule 11 is violated by an attorney who files a complaint which is based entirely
on junk science.
107. Peter W. Huber and Kenneth R. Foster, 33 Science in the Courts Civil Justice
Memo (Center for Judicial Studies, The Manhattan Inst.) Sept. 1997, at 7.
108. See e.g., S. 400, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997); S. 79, 10 5th Cong. (1997).
109. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
110. See Hand, supra note 19, at 56-58.
111. See supra note 7.
112. See Thomas M. Burton, Top Judge in Breast-Implant Case Calls on Doctors to
Hear Evidence, WALL ST. J., July 22, 1997, at B6.
113. Id.
LAWYER'S ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITIES
half of the practice of the decent lawyer consists in telling would-be
clients that they are damned fools and should stop." 4 The rush of
science and technology and post-Daubert confusion in the courts
have robbed this admonition of much of its worth when it comes to
claims based on scientific evidence.
I am bold to suggest, however, that there is a workable tripartite
framework within which to approach the dilemma of the attorney
in dealing with his obligations to the court and to his client in such
cases. First, is the full recognition of the lawyer's professional obli-
gation to carefully scrutinize the integrity of his own expert's pro-
posed testimony within the limits of his capacity and resources?
Second, is the concern legitimate that his opponent will perform a
similar examination of the proposed evidence, keeping in mind the
availability of Rule 11 sanctions as an inducement to oblige that he
present only bona fide expert scientific theories in his case? Fi-
nally, as a cap to this process, the court should always reserve the
right to refer disputes over alleged "junk science" to an independ-
ent panel of experts, not to decide the question in controversy, but
to assess the quality of the expertise as required under the
"gatekeeping" regimen of Daubert.
My own view, I must admit, is more tilted toward the solutions
put forward by Judge Hand and Dr. Angell, but I recognize the
commitment, long a part of our jurisprudence, to the sanctity of the
jury, not the expert, as the ultimate finder of fact. This task is not
eased by the following notation by the Supreme Court in Daubert:
"There are important differences between the quest for truth in the
courtroom and the quest for truth in the laboratory. Scientific con-
clusions are subject to perpetual revision. Law, on the other hand,
must resolve disputes finally and quickly.' 1 5
What is required, I suggest, to best fulfill this task is that lawyers
from both sides of a particular case, the judge and the experts, be-
gin to take their obligations to juries and to the legal system, within
which they all operate, much more seriously. In an era of vast and
rapid scientific and technological advances, this is a necessary bur-
den to be borne by all involved in advancing and preserving the
rule of law.
114. PHILIP C. JESSUP, ELIHU ROOT 1845-1909 133 (1938).
115. Daubert, supra note 89.
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Executive Summary
Overview
Over the last several decades the number of not-for-profit
("NFP") organizations has grown substantially both in New York
City and throughout the nation. With the rise in the number of
NFPs has come a dramatic increase in the importance and impact
these organizations have on our lives. Responding to continuing
pressure to downsize, all levels of government have increasingly
relied on contracts with NFP organizations to deliver many of the
services that they once provided directly to their residents.
The organizations included in this report are reflective of some
of the diverse functions performed by NFPs. They include nursing
homes, child care centers, community service organizations and a
provider of legal services. The increased reliance on non- or quasi-
governmental entities to provide many essential services, particu-
larly in the health and social service fields, presents government
with important challenges. One of these is to ensure public ac-
countability regarding the expenditure of public funds by NFP or-
ganizations providing public services. Toward this end,
government must satisfy the public that the amount such organiza-
tions spend on operating costs, such as leases, purchase of supplies
and equipment, and executive compensation, is adequately
disclosed.
TO PROFIT OR NOT-TO-PROFIT
In light of the substantial increase in the number and value of
the NFP contracts entered into by City agencies, Thomas V.
Ognibene, Minority Leader of the New York City Council, re-
quested that the Council's Office of Oversight and Investigation
("O&I") examine the compensation being paid to the executive di-
rectors of NFPs doing business with New York City. In addition,
Council Member Ognibene asked O&I to review the public acces-
sibility of financial records kept by NFPs. The study that followed
had two goals:
First, Council staff sought to contrast the compensation being
paid to the executive directors of NFPs that have large contracts
with the City to provide social services with several commonly ac-
cepted measures used to determine "reasonableness." To accom-
plish this, Council staff reviewed 56 annual financial returns
representing approximately half of the NFPs that held contracts
worth $2 million or more with four City agencies in Fiscal Year
("FY") 1994. The four City agencies were the Department for the
Aging ("DFIA"), the Department of Mental Health, Mental Re-
tardation and Alcoholism Services ("DMH"), the Department of
Social Services ("DSS"), and the Human Resources Administra-
tion ("HRA"). The compensation paid to executive directors of
these NFPs, as listed on the annual financial returns, were con-
trasted with generally accepted criteria used to determine whether
or not compensation is excessive.
Second, Council staff examined the potential accessibility of an-
nual returns kept by NFPs and required to be available to the pub-
lic under Federal law. Staff telephoned all of the NFPs included in
the survey to determine whether this information would be avail-
able to members of the public from the NFPs.
Summary of Findings
O&I's detailed examination of Federal and State annual finan-
cial returns of 56 NFPs contracting with the City in FY 1994 re-
vealed the following:
Compensation Comparisons to Other Not-for-Profits1
* NFPs with less than $5 million in functional expenses paid their
executive directors a median of $70,422 - 51% more than the
national median of $46,535 for NFPs of similar size.
1. See discussion infra Part IV.A. The compensation comparisons are arranged
by the size of the NFP (functional expenses).
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" NFPs with more than $25 million in functional expenses paid
their executive directors a median of $161,141 - 22% more
than the national median of $132,392 for NFPs of similar size.
* NFPs with functional expenses between $5 million and $10 mil-
lion paid their executive directors a median of $82,390 - 3%
more than the national median of $80,000 for NFPs of similar
size. NFPs with functional expenses between $10 million and
$25 million paid their executive directors a median of $103,035
- 1% less than the national median of $103,842 for NFPs of
similar size.
Compensation Comparisons to the Public Sector2
" Over 29% of all NFPs paid their executive directors more than
the typical City Commissioner, who earned $110,000 in FY
1994.
* Sixteen percent (16%) of all NFPs paid their executive direc-
tors more than the Mayor, who earned $130,000 in FY 1994.
* Sixty-three percent (63%) of executive directors at NFPs with
functional expenses of more than $25 million were paid more
than New York City's Mayor in FY 1994.
Compensation Comparisons within the Survey Sample3
* Compensation for executive directors at NFPs with functional
expenses of less than $5 million ranged from a low of $28,284 to
a high of $169,395, a difference of $141,111 (499%).
* Compensation for executive directors at NFPs with functional
expenses between $5 million and $10 million ranged from a low
of $43,770 to a high of $103,115, a difference of $59,345 (136%).
* Compensation for executive directors at NFPs with functional
expenses between $10 million and $25 million ranged from a
low of $70,321 to a high of $166,930, a difference of $96,609
(137%).
* Compensation for executive directors at NFPs with functional
expenses of more than $25 million ranged from a low of $79,750
to a high of $245,802, a difference of $166,052 (208%).
Access to the Annual Returns of Not-for-Profits4
* Ninety-two percent (34) of the 37 NFPs which completed the
telephone access survey told callers that it was not possible to
2. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
3. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
4. See discussion infra Part V.
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write to and visit the NFP to obtain access to the organization's
annual return.
* Eight percent (3) of the 37 NFPs which completed the tele-
phone access survey told callers that it was possible to write to
and visit the NFP to obtain access to the organization's annual
return.
* Detailed profiles on each of the 56 not-for-profit organizations
included in the Council's survey can be found in Appendix A of
the originally published version of this report, on file with O&I.
In addition to containing information on the amount and type
of contract the organization held with the City, each profile
compares the NFP's executive director's compensation against
several benchmarks.
I. Introduction
A. Government and the Not-for-Profit Sector: A Changing
Landscape
The last twenty years have been a period of dramatic growth for
the nation's not-for-profit organizations (NFPs). During this pe-
riod, the not-for-profit sector has grown both in number and over-
all economic clout. The total number of the nation's NFPs
increased by 27% from 1978 to 1990. In 1990, there were more
than one million NFPs in the US.5 Concurrently, the assets of
NFPs increased in real terms by more than 150% to well more than
$1 trillion, and their revenues jumped by 225% to approximately
$560 billion per year.6 By 1994, NFPs employed more than nine
million people whose combined earnings exceeded $160 billion -
accounting for nearly 20% of the total income of the entire US
service economy.7
The number of NFPs in New York City has dramatically in-
creased as well. Growth in the NFP sector has surpassed most
other sectors in the City. In contrast to the 10% drop in the New
York's overall job base from 1984 to 1994, employment by social
5. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: IN-
FORMATION ON SELECTED TYPES OF ORGANIZATIONS 19 (February 28, 1995), avail-
able in <http://www.gao. gov.> [hereinafter TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS]. Within
this overall group, those not-for-profits organized for solely charitable purposes ex-
perienced even greater increases, jumping nearly 67%, from 293,947 in 1978 to
489,891 in 1990. See id. at 19.
6. See TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 5, at 9.
7. See Steven Werner & Gretchen Gemeinhardt, Nonprofit Organizations: What
Factors Determine Pay Levels?, COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS REVIEW, Sept. 1995, at
53.
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service NFPs jumped by 60%, from approximately 55,000 to more
than 150,000 - surpassing the number of persons employed on
Wall Street in 1994.8
Much of the expansion in the not-for-profit sector can be traced
to the increasingly common trend of government entities at all
levels to contract with NFPs to deliver many of the services that
they once provided directly. In New York City, contracts with NFP
providers have grown substantially in recent years. The total
number of contracts awarded to NFPs by all City agencies in FY
1994 was 2,646. A majority of these contracts (1,573) were
awarded by four agencies - the Department for the Aging
("DFTA"), the Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation
and Alcoholism Services ("DMH"), the Department of Social
Services ("DSS"), and the Human Resources Administration
("HRA"). 9
B. Government Oversight of Not-for-Profit Organizations
For government, the contracting out of taxpayer-funded services
can have a number of potential attractions. These include the abil-
ity to reduce the size of government bureaucracies, and the percep-
tion that such outsourcing can be less expensive than the direct
provision of services.
Unfortunately, with the expansion of the not-for-profit sector
there has also been an increase in reports of financial mismanage-
ment and abuse. In 1992, the United Way of America appeared in
newspaper headlines across the country as news of financial impro-
prieties was revealed.1" Subsequently, the media reported inci-
dents of suspected abuse involving questionable expenditures,
excessive compensation, and failure to comply with Federal filing
requirements at other not-for-profits. In New York City, addi-
tional examples of extremely generous compensation for some ex-
8. See Robin Kamen & Steve Malanga, Nonprofits: NY's New Tammany Hall,
CRAIN'S NEW YORK BUSINESS, Oct. 31, 1994, at 18.
9. Council staff obtained information on number of NFP contracts from the New
York City Financial Information Services Agency ("FISA") which is responsible for
centrally compiling and reporting financial data pertaining to the operation of New
York City government.
10. See Felicity Barringer, United Way Head is Forced Out In a Furor Over His
Lavish Style, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28,1992, at Al; Kathleen Teltsch, United Way Awaits
Inquiry on Its President's Practices, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24,1992, at A12.
476
TO PROFIT OR NOT-TO-PROFIT
ecutive directors were brought to light in the City Council's 1995
study of not-for-profit Business Improvement Districts ("BIDs"). u
As City agencies contract with not-for-profit organizations to
provide an increasingly larger portion of their mandated services,
they lose many of the control mechanisms that government tradi-
tionally employs to prevent abuses and ensure public accountabil-
ity.12 In the absence of direct administrative control of NFPs,
government oversight is often performed through enforcing Fed-
eral and State laws, regulations, and contractual provisions.
Charitable and social service organizations in New York State
enjoy tax-exempt status because of Federal and State law. Under
section 501 (c) (3) of the Federal Tax Code, organizations that are
operated exclusively for charitable, testing, educational or recrea-
tional purposes are exempted from Federal taxation. These organi-
zations also enjoy tax-free status under section 172 (9) of New
York State's Not-for-Profit Corporation Law. In return for their
tax exempt status, Federal law prohibits NFPs from using net earn-
ings to augment the personal gain or profit of any shareholder or
individual; only "reasonable compensation" is permissible. In ad-
dition, not-for-profit organizations must also file annual returns
with the government as well as make this information available to
the public. 13
In light of the number and value of the NFP contracts entered
into by City agencies, Thomas V. Ognibene, Minority Leader of
the New York City Council, requested that the Council's Office of
Oversight and Investigation ("O&I"):
" Examine the executive compensation and benefits be-
ing paid to the executive directors of NFPs doing busi-
ness with New York City;
* Contrast such executive compensation with severally
generally accepted measures used to determine "rea-
sonableness;" and
11. See STAFF REPORT TO THE NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL FINANCE COMMITTEE,
CITIES WITHIN CITIES: BUSINESS IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS AND THE EMERGENCE OF
THE MICROPOLIS (Nov. 8, 1995).
12. The phenomenon of government's increasing reliance on not-for-profit and
other non- governmental organizations has been the focus of a growing body of schol-
arly literature. For one overview, see Symposium on the Hollow State: Capacity, Con-
trol and Performance in Interorganizational Settings, 6 JOURNAL OF PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH & THEORY (April 1996).
13. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 6104 (d),(e) (West Supp. 1998); Taxpayer Bill of Rights,
Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1452 (1996). For a discussion of Federal and State
reporting requirements, see infra note 16.
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Determine the extent to which annual finan-
cial returns filed by NFPs required to be
available to the public by State and Federal
Law, were accessible.
II. Methodology
A. Survey Sample Selection
In order to draw a sample for review in this study, O&I staff
obtained a list of the total number of contracts let by the City with
NFP organizations in FY 1994 from the City's Financial Informa-
tion Services Agency ("FISA"). 14 The resulting universe of 2,646
contracts was then reduced by applying two criteria: the City
agency which let the contract and the contract's total dollar
amount. Regarding the first criteria, since recent press reports
concerned NFPs providing social, mental health and aging-related
services, the Council included in its sample any NFPs that held
contracts with the following agencies in FY 1994: the Department
for the Aging ("DFTA"), the Department of Mental Health,
Mental Retardation, and Alcoholism Services ("DMH"), the De-
partment of Social Services ("DSS"), and the Human Resources
Administration ("HRA").
These four agencies let the most contracts with not-for-profits,
totaling 1,573 contracts in FY 1994 - 59% of all contracts let that
year. With respect to the second criteria, the total dollar amount,
the Council's review only included contracts with these four agen-
cies of $2 million dollars or more.15 Application of this criteria re-
duced the number of organizations examined to 123. This selection
process is illustrated in Figure 1.
14. At the time Council staff obtained the FISA information, FY 1994 was the
most recent year for which such information was available. All information on NFPs
in this report represents FY 1994 data unless noted.
15. Contracts were included in the Council's sample based on the Revised Max
Amount as reported by FISA. Since some of the contacts span several years, the
actual amount of funding received by a NFP in a particular year may be less than the
total contract amount.
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Figure 1
Selection of Sample from Total NFP Contracts
T( F Contract:
. NFP Contracts with Four
* Selected Agencies.: "
1,573J
NFP Contracts with Four Selected
Agencies worth over $2M:
123
FY1994
Drawing not to scale
Detailed annual returns for each of these 123 organizations were
requested from the New York State Attorney General's Office of
Charities. Under Federal law, not-for-profits required to file an
annual return must report the compensation of its five highest paid
employees on the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") Form 990
Schedule A. This information, along with the IRS Form 990 which
provides basic financial information including the organization's
revenue, expenses, and compensation of officers, directors and
trustees, is required by State law to be available for public inspec-
tion at the offices of the Attorney General.1 6 Form 990 and Form
990 Schedule A are collectively referred to in this report as the
16. According to 26 U.S.C. §§ 6033(b) and 501(c)(3), organizations required to file
an annual return must furnish these key items: gross income; expenses attributable
to such income; disbursements; a balance sheet; and the compensation and other pay-
ments made during the year to highly compensated employees.
Article 7-A, section 172-b(1) of the New York State Executive Law requires that
NFPs ". . .file an annual written report with the secretary upon forms prescribed by
the secretary." Section 172-b(7) further states that "the secretary [of state] may ac-
cept a copy of a current annual report previously filed by a charitable organization
with any other governmental agency [to comply] with the provision of this article. .."
Instructions provided by the Attorney General's Office regarding compliance with
these provisions of article 7-A indicate that these reporting requirements are fulfilled
by the submission of the organization's IRS 990 annual return. In addition, section 8-
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''annual return." The Attorney General's Office supplied Form
990 and Schedule A documentation on 67 (54%) of the 123 organi-
zations for which Council staff requested information.
According to the Attorney General's Office, records were not
available for the other 56 entities because these organizations had
not submitted their annual returns, had filed a request for an ex-
tension, the entity was not required to file because it was in a cate-
gory exempted by law (such as a hospital or an organization
affiliated with a religious organization), or the annual return was
unavailable for other reasons. Of the 67 annual returns received
by the Council, 11 were dropped from further consideration be-
cause (i) data was missing (four cases), (ii) the data was illegible
(one case), (iii) it was reported that the executive director 17 re-
ceived no financial compensation (five cases), or (iv) the NFP was
not required to file (one case). 8 The remaining 56 NFPs represent
46% of all organizations which held a contract of more than $2
million with DFTA, DMH, DSS, and HRA in FY 1994, and have
contracts worth a combined total of $574,394,183.
1.4(1) of the New York State Estates, Powers and Trusts Law requires that ... reports
filed with the Attorney General shall be open to public inspection .. "
17. Throughout this report, the term "executive director" is used to signify a
NFP's principal executive. Sometimes NFPs included in the Council survey use other
terms such as "president" or "chief operating officer" to describe this individual. The
uniform term "executive director" was chosen to reduce confusion and improve the
clarity of the narrative.
18. The 11 organizations dropped from further consideration included the follow-
ing NFPs: missing data - 1 63 "d Street Improvement Council, Hartley House, La Pe-
ninsula Community Organization, St. Dominic's Home; illegible - National
Association of Family Development Centers; executive director receives no compen-
sation - Head Start Sponsoring Board, Jewish Association for Services for the Aged,
Narragansett Housing Development Fund Corp, Ryer Avenue Housing Development
Fund, St. Mary's Children and Families Foundation; not required to file according to
the Attorney general's office - Bronx Lebanon Hospital Ladies Auxiliary.
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Figure 2
Breakdown of FY 1994 Contracts Meeting Survey Criteria
56
Complete Records received: included in analysis
- Records not usable: not included in analysis
f 7 Records not received: not included in analysis
B. IRS Definition of Compensation
According to the instructions issued by the IRS for Form 990,
the term "compensation" includes "salary, fees, bonuses, and sev-
erance payments paid."'19 Also included are "current-year pay-
ments of amounts reported or reportable as deferred compensation
in any prior year."'20 Not included in this amount are all forms of
deferred compensation payments, future severance payments, con-
tributions to Contributions to Employee Benefit Plans ("CEBP")
and welfare benefit plans such as medical, dental, and life insur-
ance, and fringe benefits or expense accounts.2'
Because this study is based on official IRS Form 990 filings, it is
not possible to isolate an executive director's base salary from any
fees, bonuses or severance payments that a NFP might have paid in
a reporting year. However, several sources suggest that, in most
cases, the vast majority of what is reported in the Form 990 as
"compensation" does consist of the executive director's base sal-
ary. Both a national survey conducted by the consulting firm of
Abbott, Langer and Associates ("ALA") and anecdotal informa-
19. Internal Revenue Service, Instructions for Form 990: Return of Organization
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tion provided by the IRS support this view.22 However, since ex-
ceptions to this can and do occur, the Council study will present its
findings in terms of "compensation" as defined by the IRS.23
Data on the compensation paid to the executive director of a
not-for-profit organization is generally found in two places in an
NFP's annual filing. The amount either appears under the heading
"compensation" in part V, column C of Form 990 which requires
information to be provided for "officers, directors, trustees, and
key employees." or part I, column C of Form 990, Schedule A
which requires a listing of the five highest paid employees.24
C. Selecting Comparison Criteria
Federal law permits a deduction for "reasonable" compensation
of executives of not-for-profit organizations.2 5 However, the stat-
ute does not define what is meant by the term "reasonable." In
determining whether a particular compensation level is reasonable,
the courts have considered a variety of factors including the extent
and scope of the employee's work; the size and complexity of the
business; and the prevailing rates of compensation for comparable
positions in comparable concerns" The IRS has established a ge-
neric definition of the term "reasonable compensation" as "the
amount that would ordinarily be paid by like organizations for like
services.217 The IRS adopts a case-by-case approach to determine
whether an organization meets the reasonable compensation stan-
dard. In light of the absence of a clear single standard by which to
evaluate whether the compensation earned by NFP executive di-
22. A survey conducted by Abbott, Langer and Associates (ALA) in 1994 asked
1,832 NFP organizations nation-wide for information on both annualized base salaries
and "total annual compensation" which ALA defined as base salary plus bonuses and
or profit sharing received over the last fiscal year. A comparison of these categories
revealed that the median for "total annual compensation" was only minimally higher
(between 0-3%) than the median annualized base salary alone. See ABBOTT, LANGER
& ASSOCIATES, COMPENSATION IN NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS (1994). The notion
that, in most cases, the compensation paid to NFP executive directors is closely re-
lated to base salary was also confirmed in a telephone interview with the IRS staff.
23. For a discussion of one such exception, see infra note 54.
24. See Appendix B attached to the originally published version of this report, on
file with O&1, for examples of each of these forms.
25. 26 U.S.C. § 162 (a) (1) (1994).
26. See Mayson Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,178 F.2d 115, 119
(6th Cir. 1949); see also, B.B. Rider Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 725
F.2d 945, 952 (3d Cir. 1984).
27. See H. CARL MCCALL, STUDY OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN NOT-FOR-
PROFIT CORPORATIONS, REPORT 93-D-29 6 (Feb. 7 1994) [hereinafter STUDY OF Ex-
ECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN NFP CORPORATIONS].
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rectors was reasonable, the Council employed a combination of
several standards with which to examine executive compensation.
In this report, comparisons are often described in terms of a me-
dian value. The median provides information on the middle value
(a value with an equal number of observations above and below).
The median is often used in studies where the total number of
items being examined is relatively small and where a few extreme
values (outliers) might unduly influence a simple arithmetic
average.28
1. Comparison to Other Not-for-Profits
One method of determining whether compensation is reasonable
is to compare compensation paid by other not-for-profits of similar
size. Several surveys of executive compensation at not-for-profits
at the state and national level have been conducted. A survey con-
ducted by Abbott, Langer and Associates ("ALA"), an independ-
ent management consulting firm known for its surveys of NFPs
across the country, was chosen. The ALA survey, selected because
of its widespread use by compensation specialists and its compre-
hensive sample size, utilized data obtained from questionnaires
provided by 1,832 NFP organizations nation-wide in the Spring of
1994.29
The ALA survey provides a considerable level of disaggregated
information including analyses of average compensation by organi-
zational size. This made comparisons between the NYC sample
and the ALA findings possible.
2. Comparison to the Public Sector
To place executive compensation at the NFPs included in the
Council survey in context, the compensation paid to the executive
directors of these NFPs were also compared to the FY 1994 sala-
ries30 received by the Mayor of New York City and the commis-
28. For a more complete discussion on the use of these and other measures of
central tendency, see EDWIN MANSFIELD, BASIC STATISTICS 46 (1986). For more on
the use of medians in the specific context of evaluating not-for-profit compensation
see, NON-PROFIT COORDINATING COMMITrEE OF NEW YORK, THE NON-PROFIT SEC-
TOR IN NEW YORK (May 1992).
29. See ABBOTT, LANGER & ASSOCIATES, supra note 23.
30. Since the Mayor and City Commissioners do not receive fees, bonuses and
severance payments, their base salaries are used when. comparing the amount re-
ceived by these public officials to the compensation received by the NFP executive
directors included in the study. See supra Part II.B., for further discussion of what is
meant by the IRS definition of "compensation."
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sioners of several City agencies. 31 Comparison of not-for-profit
compensation with the compensation paid by the public and pri-
vate sector is an accepted practice as long as the function per-
formed is roughly comparable.32 The Council viewed this
comparison as appropriate since executive directors of NFPs re-
viewed in this survey and government officials such as the Mayor
and agency commissioners are all responsible for delivering public
services.
3. Comparison to the Council Sample
A third method of comparison employed contrasts the compen-
sation paid to executive directors by individual NFPs in the Coun-
cil sample to the median compensation paid to executive directors
of organizations of similar size. Additionally, a calculation of com-
pensation as a percentage of the organization's total functional ex-
penses was computed for each NFP included in the Council's
survey.
III. Survey Sample Profile
The 56 organizations included in the Council review represent a
wide range of not-for-profits. In addition to covering the distinct
fields of aging, mental health, and social services, the organizations
had annual functional expenses which ranged in size from $1.6 to
$165 million.33 This section presents descriptive profiles of the
NFPs included in the Council survey detailing the total size of the
organization's functional expenses and the amount of support re-
ceived from government sources. The survey sample was disaggre-
gated by the size of the organization's functional expenses in order
to permit an analysis of "similarly situated organizations." Infor-
mation on the percentage of support NFPs received from govern-
ment sources is also provided to illustrate the considerable
investment of public monies and the corresponding interest gov-
31. According to THE 1993-94 GREEN BOOK: THE OFFICIAL DIRECTORY OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK, the majority of City Commissioners received $110,000 per an-
num. Thus, for the purposes of this report $110,000 is considered the "typical" salary
of a City Commissioner in FY 1994.
32. See Mayson Mfg. Co., 178 F.2d at 119.
33. The figures cited are approximate, and reflect line 44 of the organization's
functional expenses as reported on Form 990 for fiscal year 1994. See Appendix B
attached to the originally published version of this report, on file with the New York
City Council, Office of Oversight and Investigation, for a sample Form 990. The time
period covered by fiscal year 1994 as reported by the 56 NFPs included in the survey
varied. The 1994 fiscal year for the government of New York City ran from July 1,
1993 to June 30, 1994.
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ernment has in ensuring compliance with Federal and State laws
concerning public disclosure of annual returns.
A. Organizational Size by Functional Expenses
All NFPs included in the study were assigned to one of four fi-
nancial categories: less than $5 million; $5 to $10 million; $10 to $25
million; and more than $25 million.34 The NFPs were placed into a
particular category based upon their total "functional expenses" as
reported in the NFP's Form 990 filed for 1994. Functional ex-
penes represent the actual amount spent by an organization during
a fiscal year. Of the 56 organizations examined, 18 (32%) reported
functional expenses of less than $5 million; 11 (20%) fell in the $5
million to $10 million category; 19 (34%) were included in the $10
million to $25 million group; and eight organizations (14%) re-
ported expenses of more than $25 million.35 This distribution is
reflected in Figure 3.
Figure 3
NFPs Included in Sample






Less than $5-$10 Million $10-$25 Million More than
$5 Million $25 Million
Annual Functional Expenses (FY 1994)
34. With the exception of "less than $5 million ," these categories were chosen to
coincide with the corresponding categories used in the ALA survey. Given the fact
that the smallest NFP included in the Council's sample had more than one and one
half million dollars in functional expenses, staff did not mirror the ALA survey treat-
ment of NFPs with less than $5 million in functional expenses which includes five
separate categories starting with "less than $250,000." To allow for comparability, the
statistics for each of these subgroups in the ALA survey were totaled to produce
statistics for a "less than $5 million" category.
35. Percentages have been rounded to the next nearest whole number.
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B. Amount of Support Received from Public Sources
Thirty-seven of the NFPs in the Council survey (66%) included
required information about the amount of government support
they received in FY 1994 in their 990 filing.36 Most of these NFPs
received a substantial portion of the funds used to pay their annual
functional expenses from the Federal, State or local government.
A majority of these 37 NFPs (57%) received more than half of
their actual total revenues from public funds in FY 1994.37 Just
slightly fewer than half (49%) of these organizations relied on gov-
ernment monies for more than 75% of their overall functional ex-
penses. Almost one third (32%) of the organizations providing this
information derived more than 90% of the funds used to pay their
functional expenses from such sources. Three organizations re-
ceived more than 97% of their total revenue from governmental
appropriations.38 The distribution of NFPs by level of government
support can be seen in Figure 4.39
Figure 4







0-25% 26-50% 51-75% 76-100%
% of Functional Expenses Funded by Government
36. Information on the total amount of government contributions or grants re-
ceived by NFPs was obtained from Question 1 C of Part I of each organization's Form
990 obtained from the Charities Bureau of the New York State Attorney General's
Office. Eighteen organizations (32%) left the question blank and one organization
reported that it received no government contributions or grants (Harlem Dowling-
West Side Center for Children and Families).
37. Data was available for 37 (66%) of the NFPs reviewed. Accordingly, the nu-
merical totals for each category are: zero to 25% (11); 25-50% (5); 51-75% (3); and
76-100% (18).
38. The three organizations are Concord Family Services (100%), Child Develop-
ment Support Corporation (98.6%), and The Miracle Makers (97.6%).
39. Percentages in the chart may not total 100% due to rounding.
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IV. Findings I: Compensation Analysis
A. Comparisons to Other Not-for-Profits
1. By Size of NFP (Functional Expenses)
" NFPs with less than $5 million in functional expenses
paid their executive directors a median of $70,422 -
51% more than the national median of $46,535 for
NFPs of similar size.
" NFPs with more than $25 million in functional ex-
penses paid their executive directors a median of
$161,141 - 22% more than the national median of
$132,392 for NFPs of similar size.
" NFPs with functional expenses between $5 million and
$10 million paid their executive directors a median of
$82,390 - 3% more than the national median of
$80,000 for NFPs of similar size. NFPs with func-
tional expenses between $10 million and $25 million
paid their executive directors a median of $103,035 -
1% less than the national median of $103,842 for
NFPs of similar size.
In two of the four size categories, compensation paid to execu-
tive directors by NFPs included in the Council survey were sub-
stantially higher than the national median for similar organizations
as reported in the ALA survey. Large disparities between the
Council and the ALA survey were found in NFPs with total annual
functional expenses of less than $5 million and those with more
than $25 million. According to the ALA survey, nation-wide not-
for-profits with expenses less than $5 million paid their executive
directors a median compensation of $46,535. By contrast, the me-
dian compensation for executive directors in similarly sized organi-
zations included in the Council survey was $70,422, a difference of
$23,887 (51%) above the national figure.
A large disparity was also found in not-for-profits with func-
tional expenses of more than $25 million. The median compensa-
tion for the top position in these organizations was $132,392
nationally. The executive directors at comparable organizations in-
cluded in the Council study had a median of $161,141 - $28,749
(22%) more than the national median.
While the median compensation paid by NFPs with functional
expenses between $5 million and $10 million included in the Coun-
cil survey exceeded the national levels reported in the ALA survey,
the difference was moderate, consisting of no more than three
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thousand dollars. Not-for-profits with functional expenses be-
tween $10 million and $25 million included in the Council survey
actually paid their executive directors a median compensation less
than that reported nationally in the ALA survey.4"
Figure 5
Median Compensation for Executive Directors
ALA vs. Council Survey
Size Category ALA Survey Council Survey $ Difference % Difference
LESS THAN $5M $46,535 $70,422 $23,887 51%
BETWEEN $5M
AND $10M $80,000 $82,390 $2,390 3%
BETWEEN $10M
AND $25M 103,842 $103,035 -$807 - 1%
OVER $25M $132,392 $161,141 $28,749 22%
2. Accounting for the Impact of Regional Differences on
Compensation Levels
One potential explanation for the existence of higher levels of
compensation at NFPs included in the Council's survey over the
national medians cited by the ALA survey, is that they reflect the
higher cost associated with living and working in New York City.
Since the IRS defines reasonable compensation in terms of com-
pensation that would ordinarily be paid by "similarly situated orga-
nizations, '"41 one would ideally want to compare the compensation
paid to executive directors by NFPs included in the Council survey
to those paid by other NFPs located in New York State and the
Northeastern region. However, such a comparison must also take
into account the size of the organization, something that the ALA
survey unfortunately does not do for state and regional level
data.42 In light of this limitation, other methods were used to ap-
proximate the degree to which the increased expenses associated
40. Percentages in the accompanying chart have been rounded to the next nearest
whole number.
41. See supra, notes 19-21.
42. The inclusion of information on the amount of a NFP's functional expenses is
needed to control for the effect that organizational size has on the compensation of
executive directors. Without this information, it is impossible to determine whether
the 107 NFPs included in the ALA survey from New York State all had functional
expenses less than $1 million, more than $100 million, or, as is likely, somewhere in
between.
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with living and working in New York City impacted the compensa-
tion paid by the NFPs included in the Council's survey.
While there is general agreement that the cost of living in New
York City is higher than the national average, there is no widely
accepted measure to quantify this difference.43 One method of es-
timating the impact of the higher cost of living on the compensa-
tion paid to executive directors of the NFPs in the Council survey
is to examine the difference found in pay levels between New York
City and the rest of the country for a range of occupations. The
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics ("BLS") regularly
monitors public and private pay levels throughout the country. Pe-
riodically BLS issues reports which express pay levels for various
metropolitan reporting areas as a percentage of the national aver-
age pay level for several vocational categories. 44 The survey col-
lects data on 14 specific white collar occupations, which are divided
into three general groups: Professional, Administrative and Techni-
cal.45 According to the 1994 BLS Compensation survey, the aver-
age pay for administrative occupations located in New York City
was 9% higher than the national average.46 The difference in the
professional occupations group was a more modest 5% above the
average pay for the country as a whole.
The relatively modest pay differential between New York City
and national pay rates for the occupations included in the BLS pay
survey has two important implications for the Council's findings.
First, it suggests that the two areas where large differences were
found between the Council and ALA surveys - NFPs with func-
43. The most commonly used measure of changes in national and regional prices is
the Consumer Price Index (CPI) compiled by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics.
However, the CPI measures the change in consumer prices rather than the actual level
of prices in a particular region or city. Because of this, the CPI can not be used to
compare relative living costs or consumer prices for different areas. However, the CPI
does show that consumer prices in the New York Metropolitan area have grown
somewhat faster between 1987 and 1997 than in the nation as a whole. According to
the CPI which tracks urban wage earners and clerical workers, the average for all US
Cities increased by 47% from January 1987 to March 1997. During this same period,
the CPI for New York City increased by 53.4%, a difference of 6.4% from the na-
tional average. It should be noted that the CPI only tracks the change in prices over
time and provides no information on the relative value of actual costs. See Consumer
Price Index: Frequently Asked Questions < http:\\www.bls.gov\cpifaq.htm>.
44. These reports are based on the annual BLS Occupational Compensation Sur-
vey. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, US DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Occupational
Pay Comparisons, United States, 1994, Summary 96-8 (May 1996).
45. This survey data is used by the US Office of Compensation Policy when deter-
mining locality pay adjustments for the Federal general service (GS) pay scales.
46. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, US DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Occupa-
tional Pay Comparisons, United States, 1994, Summary 96-7 (May 1996).
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tional expenses of less than $5 million and more than $25 million
- cannot be solely attributed to increased costs associated with
living in New York City. This is especially true with NFPs of less
than $5 million included in the Council survey. Even if the differ-
ence were discounted by 9% to control for the generally higher pay
received by administrative occupations in the City, the Council
sample was still 39% above the national median.
Second, the application of a 9% regional pay differential means
that the compensation paid to executive directors by NFPs in the
$5 to $10 million and $10 to $25 million categories are actually
lower than what one might expect. Roughly half of the NFPs sur-
veyed by the Council pay their executive directors at rates lower
than the ALA median compensation plus 9%, yet those directors
are still subject to the increased costs associated with New York.
This is the most compelling argument that the differences in pay
can not simply be attributed to the expenses associated with living
in the New York City metropolitan area.4
Figure 6
Median Compensation for Executive Directors
ADJUSTED using the BLS 9% Pay Differential
Size Category ALA Survey+9% Council Survey $ Difference % Difference
LESS THAN $5M $50,723 $70,422 $19,699 39%
BETWEEN $5M $87,200 $82,390 -$4,810 -6%
AND $10M
BETWEEN $10M $113,188 $103,035 -$10,158 -10%
AND $25M
OVER $25M $144,307 $161,141 $16,834 12%
B. Comparisons to the Public Sector
* Over 29% of all NFPs paid their executive directors
more than the typical City Commissioner, who earned
$110,000 in FY 1994.
* Sixteen percent (16%) of all NFPs paid their executive
directors more than the Mayor, who earned $130,000
in FY 1994.
" Sixty-three percent (63%) of executive directors at
NFPs with functional expenses of more than $25 mil-
lion were paid more than New York City's Mayor.
47. Percentages in the accompanying chart have been rounded to the next nearest
whole number.
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A 1994 report, issued by the New York State Comptroller, on
compensation of executive directors in nonprofit organizations
with contracts from the New York State Office of Mental Health,
noted that the amount of compensation paid to executive directors
should be limited since part of the expectation of operating a not-
for-profit is that the organization provides a public service.48
Compensation paid to executive directors at many NFPs in-
cluded in the Council survey surpassed that paid to top public offi-
cials responsible for much larger organizations which often
perform similar or related functions. The City's DMH and DSS/
HRA Commissioners49 both received a salary of $110,000 for man-
aging complex organizations with respective annual expenditures
of $245 million (270 employees) and $7.56 billion (23,203 employ-
ees) in FY 1994.50 The City's DFTA Commissioner earned less,
receiving $97,000 in 1994 for running an agency employing 336
workers and responsible for $162 million in annual expenditures.
All but one of the NFPs included in the survey fall far short of
the size and complexity of these City agencies.51 Yet, the median
compensation paid to executive directors at organizations with
more than $25 million in functional expenses was $161,141. This is
$51,141 more than the pay of the DMH and HRA commissioners
and $64,141 more than that earned by the head of DFTA.
48. See STUDY OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN NFP CORPORATIONS, supra note
27, at 15.
49. The positions of DSS Commissioner and HRA Administrator are held by the
same person. This reflects the fact that HRA was created to supervise and coordinate
DSS programs in several areas.
50. For agency expenditure data, see NEW YORK CITY COMPTROLLER, COMPRE-
HENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED, JUNE 30, 1994
105-06 (1995) [hereinafter COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR FY
1994]. For agency headcount data, see OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, THE MAYOR'S MAN-
AGEMENT REPORT, FINAL, FY 1994. Salary information was obtained from THE
1993-1994 GREEN BOOK: THE OFFICIAL DIRECTORY OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK.
51. The one exception is The Legal Aid Society which had total functional ex-
penses of approximately $165 million in FY 1994.
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Figure 7
Median Compensation for Executive Directors of NFPs
(with Functional Expenses of More than $25 Million)
Compared to that of the Mayor and City
Commissioners in FY 1994
DFTA Head ($162M) $97, 0
HRA/DMH Heads ($7B/$245M) $110,0001
Mayor ($32B+) $130,0010
I IExec. Dir., NFP's ($162M) Y $i61i, 14 [
$0 $50,000 $100,000 $150,000 $200,000
Compensation (in Dollars)
In fact, of the not-for-profits examined, 16 organizations (29%)
paid their executive directors more than that earned by a typical
city commissioner in FY 1994. An even greater contrast between
financial compensation and job responsibility becomes apparent if
executive director compensation is compared to the $130,000
earned by the Mayor of the City of New York.52 Despite the fact
that the Mayor is responsible for the administration of the nation's
largest city government with annual expenditures in excess of $32
billion, nine of the NFPs in the Council sample (16%) paid their
executive directors more than the Mayor.
52. This figure reflects the Mayor's base salary during 1994, the latest year for
which comparison data on all sources was available at the time the survey selection
was conducted. In 1995, Local Law 92 amended the City Charter to increase the
Mayor's salary to $165,000 effective July 1, 1995.
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Figure 8
Percentage of NFP Executive Directors in each Size
Category with Compensation in Excess of that Received









Less Than $5-10 Million $10-25 Million More Than
$5 Million $25 Million
C. Comparisons within the Survey Sample
1. Comparing Compensation Amounts
* Compensation for executive directors at NFPs with
functional expenses of less than $5 million ranged
from a low of $28,284 to a high of $169,395, a differ-
ence of $141,111 (499%).
" Compensation for executive directors at NFPs with
functional expenses between $5 million and $10 mil-
lion ranged from a low of $43,770 to a high of
$103,115, a difference of $59,345 (136%).
* Compensation for executive directors at NFPs with
functional expenses between $10 million and $25 mil-
lion ranged from a low of $70,321 to a high of
$166,930, a difference of $96,609 (137%).
* Compensation for executive directors at NFPs with
functional expenses of more than $25 million ranged
from a low of $79,750 to a high of $245,802, a differ-
ence of $166,052 (208%).
A third method of analysis is provided by juxtaposing how the
executive compensation paid by the individual not-for-profits ex-
amined in the Council survey compares against the median execu-
tive compensation paid by organizations of similar size included in
the Council's review. This measure, along with the ALA and pub-
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lic sector comparisons is included in the individual organizational
profiles provided for each not-for-profit included in the survey.53
The compensation paid to each of the organizations' executive
directors was compared to the median for organizations with simi-
lar functional expenditures included in the Council survey. To fa-
cilitate this comparison, dollar differences between the
compensation paid by each NFP included in the survey and the
median paid by organizations in the same size category were calcu-
lated. This information, along with a ranking of the amount of
compensation paid by each organization grouped by size, is found
in the charts on the pages 25-28.
This analysis reveals the existence of large differences between
the compensation paid to executive directors within size categories.
As was the case with other measures discussed earlier in this re-
port, the greatest disparities involved organizations with functional
expenses of less than $5 million and more than $25 million. Com-
pensation paid to executive directors at NFPs with functional ex-
penses of less than $5 million included in the survey ranged from a
low of $28,284 paid by the Association to Benefit Children, to a
high of $169,395 at Inwood House. 4 Three other organizations in
this category paid their directors $25,000 or more above the Coun-
cil survey median.
53. See Appendix A attached to the originally published version of this report, on
file with O&I, for copies of these profiles.
54. Inwood House changed executive directors during FY 1994. Thus its Form 990
filing for this year was atypical. The organization actually listed two individuals under
the title of executive director, both described as being full time employees, resulting
in a grand total of $245,152 compensation paid for this position. The Form 990 lists
one executive director, Natalia Ritter, as receiving $169,395, and the second executive
director, Antiss Agnew, as receiving $75,757. In the interests of comparability, the
protocols of the study call for the identification of the single individual most responsi-
ble for the leadership of the organization during the study time frame, FY 94. Since
Ms. Ritter served as executive director for majority of FY 94 (retiring from this posi-
tion eight months into the fiscal year), she was identified as Inwood House's executive
director for the purposes of this study. Subsequent to this decision information was
provided to the Council by Inwood House explaining that the compensation listed for
Ms. Agnew, the incoming director, included monies paid to her in her role as deputy
director under Ms. Ritter.
According to information later supplied by Inwood House, but not included in the
organization's IRS Form 990 filing, Ms. Ritter's compensation of $169,395 consisted
of a salary of $85,000, (pro-rated to Ms. Ritter's retirement on February 28, 1994 to be
$58,966); compensation for accrued vacation days in the amount of $3,099; a contribu-
tion to a tax deferred account plan of $9,500; and retirement compensation of $97,830.
According to Inwood House, the retirement compensation (a payment to Ms. Ritter
in addition to her participation in Inwood House's pension plan) and the contribution
to the tax deferred account plan, totaling $107,330, was drawn from Inwood House's
endowment fund.
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Large differences in compensation were also found in the largest
NFPs in the Council survey. The compensation for executive direc-
tors at NFPs with functional expenses of more than $25 million
ranged from a low of $79,750 paid by the Metropolitan NY Coordi-
nating Council on Jewish Poverty to a high of $245,802 at
NYSARC, a range of $166,052. NYSARC paid $84,661 above the
median compensation for NFPs larger than $25 million. The or-
ganization offering the next highest compensation in this group, the
Jewish Board of Family and Children Services, paid its executive
director $177,308 in 1994, slightly more than $16,000 above the me-
dian for the category.
2. Comparing Total Compensation: Benefits and Expenses
In addition to compensation, the IRS requires NFPs to submit
information in the 990 filing listing the amount paid to their execu-
tive directors as contributions to employee benefit plans ("CEBP")
and the amount for expenses. Many of the NFPs included in the
sample did not complete all portions of the Form 990 which re-
quests detailed information regarding the NFP's CEBP and ex-
pense account contributions.
While this factor prevented staff from using total compensation
(compensation plus CEBP and expenses) as its principal measure,
an examination of total compensation, where possible, does offer
some important advantages. By definition, an examination of total
compensation provides a more accurate depiction of the total re-
muneration paid by NFPs. By examining total compensation, it is
possible to report on organizations which may supplement com-
pensation to their executive directors with large benefits packages.
The following section of the report will briefly review the contribu-
tions made to executive directors benefits plans by those NFPs in
the Council survey which reported having such programs in place.
a. Contributions to Employee Benefit Plans
Although NFPs are required to provide information on benefits
on their Form 990, 27% (15) of the NFPs in the Council survey did
55. NFPs are required to submit information on employee benefit plans and simi-
lar benefits in Part V, Column D of Form 990. This category covers medical, dental,
life insurance and disability benefits among others. Also included in this category are
all forms of deferred compensation and future severance payments. NFPs are re-
quired to submit the amount paid to their executive directors for expenses (taxable
and non-taxable fringe benefits) in Part V, Column E of Form 990. See Internal
Revenue Service, supra note 19, at 18.
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not report this information.56 The number and value of benefits
received by executive directors of the NFPs included in the Coun-
cil's sample varied greatly. Twenty-eight of the 56 organizations
reviewed (50%) provided their executive director with some type
of CEBP benefit. Ten organizations (18%) reported that they did
not provide their executive directors with any CEBP benefits.
Figure 9
Average Value of Executive Director's CEBP








Less Than $5-$10 $10-$25 Million More Than
$5 Million Million $25 Million
Where paid, CEBP ranged from a high of $35,786 paid by the
Jewish Board of Family and Children's Services to a low of $1,080
at Concord Family Services. The average CEBP went from $8,661
at NFPs with functional expenses of less than $5 million to $13,209
for organizations with functional expenses between $5-$10 million.
This figure dipped slightly to $11,697 for NFPs with functional ex-
penses of $10-$25 million and jumps to $20,219 for organizations
with more than $25 million in annual functional expenses.
b. Expense Accounts
Even fewer NFPs provided information on whether expense ac-
counts were provided to their executive directors. Twenty-three of
the 56 organizations (41%) included in the Council survey left
blank the section of the Form 990 which asks whether the NFP
provided its executive director with money for expenses. Thirty
NFPs (54%) stated that they did not provide funds directly to their
56. In addition, three other NFPs - Graham Windham, The Legal Aid Society,
and New Alternatives for Children - did not provide specific values for CEBP.
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executive directors for expenses. The three organizations (5%)
which provided their executive directors with payment for ex-
penses included the Jewish Board of Family and Children Services
($10,249), the Miracle Makers ($4,000), and the East Side Settle-
ment House ($2,206).
3. Comparing Compensation as a Percentage of Expenses
Examining executive compensation in terms of a percentage of
the organization's overall functional expenses offers another op-
portunity to compare an individual NFP against organizations of
similar size in order to assess whether the compensation is reason-
able. One would expect that this percentage would decrease as or-
ganizations increase in overall size. Therefore, comparisons are
primarily limited to organizations within the same size category.
Of the 56 organizations in the sample, one organization, Unique
People Services, devoted an amount equivalent to over five per-
cent of its functional expenses to executive director compensation.
The greatest amount of variation in the compensation/functional
expense ratio existed among organizations with less than $5 million
in functional expenses. Unique People Services, a provider of
mental health services based in the Bronx, devoted the largest per-
centage of its functional expenses to the compensation of its execu-
tive director - 5.5%. This was more than nine times the 0.6%
spent by the Association to Benefit Children, and more than
double the average percentage (2.3%) spent by other NFPs in the
same size category.
The $5-$10 million and $10-$25 million categories show consider-
ably less variation in executive director's compensation as a per-
centage of functional expenses. The highest paying NFP in both of
these categories allocated no more than three times the amount
spent by the NFP which devoted the lowest percentage of func-
tional expenses to executive compensation. In the more than $25
million category, three organizations (including NYSARC which
paid its executive director the highest compensation of all NFPs
included in the survey) spent five times the percentage paid by The
Legal Aid Society.
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Figure 10
NFPs less than $5 million NFPs between $10 - $25 million
Organization: FE* Organization: FE
Unique People Services 5.5% South Bronx Mental Health 1.3%
Council
Inwood House 4.8%** Brooklyn Bureau of Community .9%
Service
Aging in America 3.9%*** Green Chimneys Children Services .9%
Lower East Side Family Union 3.2% Talbot Perkins Children's Services .9%
New Alternatives for Children 3.1% Lakeside Family and Children's .8%
Services
Associated YM-YWHAs of 2.9% The Richard Allen Center on Life .8%
Greater New York
East Side House Settlement 2.5% Louise Wise Services .7%
Concord Family Services 2.3% Brookwood Child Care .7%
Coalition for Hispanic Services 2.2% Abbott House .6%
Alianza Dominicana 2.0% Good Shepard Services .6%
Rena Day Care Center 1.7% Society for Seamen's Children .6%
Bedford Stuyvesant 1.6% St. Christopher's - Jennie .6%
Clarkson
George Junior Republic 1.5% Berkshire Farm Center Service for .5%
Association Youth
Community Access 1.4% The Children's Village .5%
Fort Greene Senior Citizens 1.0% Edwin Gould Services for Children .5%
Council
Friends of Crown Heights Day 1.0% Episcopal Mission Society .5%
Care
Yeled V'Yalda Early Childhood 1.0% Harlem Dowling - West Side .5%
Center
Association to Benefit Children 0.6% Sheltering Arms Children's Service .5%
The Miracle Makers .4%
NFPs between $5 - $10 million NFPs more than $25 million
Organization: FE Organization: FE
University Settlement Society of 1.7% The Children's Aid Society 0.5%
New York
Ohel Children's Home & Family 1.6% Graham - Windham 0.5%
Services
The Hudson Guild 1.4% NYSARC 0.5%
Transitional Services for New York 1.4% Self-help Community Services 0.4%
Forestdale 1.3% Leake and Watts Services 0.3%
Child Development Support 1.0% Metropolitan New York 0.3%
Corporation Coordinating Council
Central Brooklyn Coordinating 0.9% Jewish Board of Family and 0.2%
Council Children
Family Support Systems Unlimited 0.8% The Legal Aid Society 0.1%
Puerto Rican Association for 0.8%
Community Affairs
Colony South Brooklyn Houses 0.6%
Edwin Gould Academy 0.6%
* FE is an acronym for Functional Expense
** This organization's compensation/FE ratio should be viewed with caution because the
compensation amount reported in Inwood House's Form 990 includes a large severance
payment disbursed from the organization's endowment rather than the general operating
funds.
This organization's compensation/FE ratio should be viewed with caution because the
executive director of Aging in America also served as the head of an affiliated organization
Morningside Nursing Home (MNH) which contributed to his salary. However, MNH filed
its own Form 990, and thus under the protocols of this study is viewed as a separate
organization.
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V. Findings H: Public Access to NFP Annual Returns
The second major component of the Council's study of executive
compensation consisted of an examination of the potential accessi-
bility of NFP annual returns that are required to be available to
the public by Federal law.
A. The Legal Requirements of Public Access to Annual
Returns
Most organizations which are tax-exempt under section
501(c)(3) of the Federal Tax Code are required to file annual finan-
cial returns. Such returns are filed in lieu of tax returns submitted
by for profit corporations and disclose a NFP's revenue, expenses
and other financial information in some detail. Section 6104 (e) of
the Federal law requires that NFPs make their annual return avail-
able to the public. New York State law also requires that such in-
formation be filed with the State Attorney General's Office.57
Prior to 1996, members of the general public who were inter-
ested in viewing an organization's annual return were required to
either request the filing from the State58 or visit the principal office
of the organization, where a copy of the return for the three most
recent years was required to be made available for inspection.59
Under this inspection requirement NFPs were not obligated to pro-
vide the public with copies of their annual returns, but were re-
quired to make the information available for public viewing.
However, legislation passed by Congress in July of 1996 and
signed by President Clinton, the "Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2,''60 sub-
stantially modified this requirement. This measure was designed to
give the Federal government additional tools in the enforcement of
the country's tax laws to curb excessive pay and other perceived
problems at NFP organizations. The legislation, commonly known
as the "intermediate sanctions law," instituted several additional
prohibitions and controls concerning executive compensation in-
cluding considerably more rigorous public disclosure
requirements.6'
57. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 172-b (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1997-98); see also supra
note 16.
58. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 8-1.4(1) (McKinney 1992 & Supp.
1997-98); see also supra note 16.
59. See 26 U.S.C. § 6104(e) (1994) (amended 1996).
60. Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1452 (1996).
61. Harmon, Curran & Spielberg, What the 'Intermediate Sanctions' Law Means
For Non-profit Organizations <http:/www.afj.org/fai/intermed.html> [hereinafter
What the Intermediate Sanctions Law Means].
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In addition to preserving the inspection requirements under the
prior law, the new law requires that all NFPs provide a copy of (not
just access to) the organization's annual return to anyone who re-
quests it. If the request is made in person, the NFP must provide a
copy immediately. If the request is made in writing, the NFP has
thirty days to comply.6" In addition to increasing the availability of
an organization's annual returns, the new law also increased the
penalties for failing to make this information available. Under the
prior law, an organization which willfully failed to make its annual
returns available for inspection was subject to a fine of $1,000 per
application.63 The new law increased this penalty to $5,000 per
application.64
B. Public Access Survey Methodology
Between March 18, 1997 and May 13, 1997, Council staff admin-
istered a telephone survey to all 56 NFPs included in the Council's
compensation review. The aim of the survey was to assess whether
the public might be able to access information contained in the
NFP's 990 filing in person and through the mail. Callers asked
whether it would be possible to visit the NFP's office to look at the
organization's annual returns, and if the NFP would be willing to
mail the 990 filing upon request.65 The Council's survey was not
intended to be, nor should it be interpreted as, an attempt to deter-
mine compliance with the provisions of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights
2. That would have required visiting the offices of each NFP and
making a written request to each organization.
As a result of responses to staff calls by representatives of the
NFPs, each organization was assigned to one of three categories:
(1) NFPs which told the caller that it was not possible to write to
and visit the NFP to obtain access to the organization's annual re-
turns; (2) NFPs which told the caller that the public was able to
62. The new law permits NFPs to charge a "reasonable fee" to cover the expense
of copying and mailing the annual return. The law also provides for two exceptions to
the requirement that NFPs must provide copies of the annual return: (1) an organiza-
tion is not required to provide copies of these documents if the NFP has already made
the documents "widely available;" (2) an organization is not required to comply with
this requirement if it is the subject of a "harassment campaign." In both cases the
NFP can seek an exemption from the IRS. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 6104 (e) (West Supp.
1998).
63. 26 U.S.C. § 6685 (1994) (amended 1996).
64. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6685 (West Supp. 1998).
65. According to a representative from the Internal Revenue Service, the IRS is
currently considering how to treat requests for annual returns made only over the
telephone and expects to issue a statement concerning the issue this summer.
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write to or visit the NFP to obtain this information from the NFP;
and (3) NFPs for which staff was unable to obtain a definite answer
about whether the organization would provide this information.
Despite repeated attempts, staff was unable to obtain definite
answers from 19 of the 56 (34%) NFPs included in the Council
survey. In most cases where the survey was not completed, the
caller was either told to call back or they were referred to someone
who was either repeatedly unavailable or who promised to call
back and did not do so. In many cases, organizations which did not
respond were called four or five times to no avail.66 The findings
presented in this section concerning public access reflect the 37
NFPs which provided a definitive answer concerning whether the
public could obtain the requested information directly from the
NFP.
1. Survey Protocols
Staff followed standardized written protocols in which they
stated that they were interested in gaining access to the organiza-
tion's annual returns including information on the salary of the or-
ganization's executive director. In order to simulate the type of
response that would be encountered by a member of the public,
callers did not identify themselves as Council staff. Each organiza-
tion's main telephone number was called. If the call was answered
by a secretary or receptionist, staff asked to be connected to some-
one in the organization who could respond to the inquires being
made about the public's access to the NFP's annual returns. In
those cases where the caller was told that the information was con-
fidential or not available, the caller was instructed to state that he
or she believed that the information was required to be made avail-
able to the public. If the representative of the NFP continued to
insist that the information was confidential, the NFP was recorded
as indicating that they would not provide access.
C. Public Access Survey Findings
Ninety-two percent (34) of the 37 NFPs which com-
pleted the telephone access survey told callers that it
was not possible to write to and visit the NFP to ob-
tain access to the organization's annual return.
66. In order to be considered as "completing" the access survey, a representative
of a NFP had to provide the caller with a definitive answer about the availability of
the organizations annual returns and information on the executive director's salary.
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* Eight percent (3) of the 37 NFPs which completed the
telephone access survey told callers that it was possi-
ble to write to and visit the NFP to obtain access to
the organization's annual return.
Of the 37 organizations which provided a response to questions
concerning the availability of the organization's annual return 92%
(34 NFPs) told callers that they do not provide the public with ac-
cess to this information. This number included NFPs whose repre-
sentative told the caller that this information was simply
unavailable, as well as those who referred the caller to another
source such as the State Attorney General's office but stated that
the caller could not obtain this information by visiting the NFP di-
rectly or could not have such documents mailed to them. Only
three of the 37 organizations answering our request (8%) told call-
ers that they could visit the NFP's offices during business hours to
obtain the NFP's annual returns or that a copy of the appropriate
documents could be mailed to them.
1. Public Access to Annual Returns at 37 NFP Organizations
The Council's access survey provided numerous examples of
callers that were told that information about the executive direc-
tor's salary was not available. Responding to a request for infor-
mation on how to obtain information on the salary paid to the
executive director of the Society for Seamen's Children, the direc-
tor of human relations replied: "I don't think that's any of your
affair. I don't think that you need to know that information. I'm
not willing to disclose it."
Figure 11
Would Not Provide Access
Would Provide Acces
A representative from Leake and Watts Services also left a caller
with the impression that the organization's annual returns were
privileged and not available to the general public: "Our financial
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information is not available to the public. [Caller: None of your
financial information?] Not to the public. No. That's confidential
information that's only distributed to certain people. Not to the
public."
Not all of the 34 NFPs that indicated that they would not provide
access to the organization's annual returns responded to the re-
quests for information in the same manner. Of this number, 19
organizations (56%) told callers that information on the NFPs ex-
ecutive director was "not available," "confidential" or "extremely
confidential" and did not refer the caller to any other source. Fif-
teen NFPs (44%) referred callers to another source such as the
State Attorney General's Office or the IRS. However, referrals
often lacked specificity and in several cases the information was so
general so as to be of questionable use. Many of the NFPs falling
in this group only told callers that the information was available
from "the State."
On other occasions, the information provided was simply inaccu-
rate. For example, the comptrollers of several NFPs contacted in-
formed staff that information on the executive director's salary was
available under the Freedom of Information Law ("FOIL"). FOIL
requests are typically used to obtain information from governmen-
tal entities. A FOIL request is not required to examine or obtain a
NFP's Form 990.
Callers were often questioned as to why they desired this infor-
mation. A caller contacting the Ohel's Children Home and Family
Services was told he could not visit the NFP to obtain the executive
director's salary without a better reason than just "personal inter-
est." In some cases, callers were disparaged for asking whether this
information was available.
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Figure 12
Access Survey
Direct Calls to NFP Providers
NFPs Stating it Was Not Possible to Write to and Visit the NFP
to Obtain Access to the Organization's Annual Return
34 NFPs:
* Abbott House
* Associated YM-YWHAS of
Greater New York
• Association to Benefit
Children
* Bedford Stuyvesant Early
Childhood Development
Center
• Berkshire Farm Center
Service for Youth
* Brooklyn Bureau of
Community Service
" Colony South Brooklyn
Houses
• Concord Family Services
* East Side House Settlement
* Edwin Gould Services for
Children
• Episcopal Mission Society
• Jewish Board of Family and
Children's Services
• Family Support Systems
Unlimited
" Forestdale
* Fort Greene Senior Citizens
Council
* Friends of Crown Heights
Day Care
* George Junior Republic
Association
* Good Shepard Services
* Graham-Windham
" Inwood House
* Lakeside Family and
Children's Services
* Leake and Watts Services
* Lower East Side Family
Union
* Ohel Children's Home &
Family Services
* Rena Day Care Center
* Sheltering Arms Children's
Service
• Society for Seaman's
Children
* South Bronx Mental Health
Council
* St. Christopher's - Jennie
Clarkson Child Care
Services
* The Children's Aid Society
* The Children's Village
* The Richard Allen Center
on Life
* University Settlement
Society of New York
* Yeled V'Yalda Early
Childhood
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Figure 13
Access Survey
Direct Calls to NFP Providers
NFPs Stating it Was Possible to Write to and Visit the NFP to
Obtain Access to the Organization's Annual Return
3 NFPs:
* The Hudson Guild
* The Legal Aid Society
* New Alternatives for Children
Figure 14
NFPs Which Did Not Provide a Definitive Answer
Regarding Public Access
19 NFPs:
* Aging in America
* Central Brooklyn Coordinating Council
* Child Development Support Corporation
* Coalition for Hispanic Family Services
* Community Access
" Alianza Dominicana
* Edwin Gould Academy (a.k.a. The Gould Academy)
" Green Chimneys Children's Services
" Harlem Dowling - West Side Center for Children and Fam-
ily Services
" Louise Wise Services
* Metropolitan NY Coordinating Council on Jewish Poverty
* NYSARC
* Brookwood Child Care
" Puerto Rican Association For Community Affairs
* Self-help Community Services
* Talbot Perkins Children's Services
* The Miracle Makers
* Transitional Services For New York
* Unique People Service
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UNITED STATES V. O'HAGAN: THE SUPREME





In United States v. O'Hagan,1 the United States Supreme Court
held that a person who trades in securities for personal profit, using
confidential information misappropriated in breach of a fiduciary
duty to the source of the information, may be held liable for violat-
ing section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.1 Before O'Hagan, the Court had
limited the reach of section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 19343 to the text of the statute, rather than expand it for
policy reasons.4 On June 25, 1997, however, the Court looked be-
yond the plain language of section 10(b) and decided that the mis-
appropriation theory5 would properly serve the underlying purpose
* The author wishes to thank Professor Jill Fisch, Fordham University School of
Law, for her guidance, suggestions, and critiques.
1. 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
2. See id. at 2207, 2214. Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange . . . (b) [to] use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regula-
tions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1997).
Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful for:
any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality
of interstate commerce, or the mails or of any facility of any national securi-
ties exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud .... or
(c) To engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78a-7811 (1997).
4. See infra Part lI.B.
5. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207. Under the misappropriation theory, a person
commits fraud "in connection with" a securities transaction, and therefore violates
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, when he misappropriates confidential information for
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of the securities laws.6 This policy-based decision shocked and dis-
appointed the many commentators awaiting the Supreme Court's
resolution of this matter.7
Critics of the misappropriation theory argue that stretching crim-
inal liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is not the appro-
priate way of criminalizing this type of unlawful insider trading.8
Instead, Congress should enact a statute which explicitly prohibits
insider trading and trading on misappropriated information in
breach of a fiduciary duty.9 Until the legislature acts, however, sec-
tion 10(b) should be construed narrowly to ensure consistency and
fairness.10
This Note argues that the misappropriation theory is inconsistent
with the language of section 10(b) and Supreme Court precedent,
and provides no guidance for lower courts regarding the applica-
tion of liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. By holding
that "a fiduciary's undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal's in-
use in the securities market, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the informa-
tion. See id.
6. See id. at 2210 ("The misappropriation theory comports with § 10(b)'s lan-
guage ... [and] is also well-tuned to an animating purpose of the Exchange Act: to
insure honest securities markets and thereby promote investor confidence."). The
Court also held that the Securities and Exchange Commission did not exceed its
rulemaking authority in promulgating Rule 14e-3(a), but an analysis of that decision is
beyond the scope of this Note. See id. at 2214.
7. See Carol B. Swanson, Reinventing Insider Trading: The Supreme Court Misap-
propriates the Misappropriation Theory, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1157, 1158-59
(1997) (noting that the Supreme Court's endorsement of the misappropriation theory
"surprises many commentators, given the Court's twenty-year history of making se-
curities fraud litigation more restrictive."); Edward Felsenthal, Big Weapon Against
Insider Trading Is Upheld, WALL ST. J., June 26, 1997, at C1 ("The O'Hagan ruling
came as a surprise to many lawyers who had predicted the mostly conservative court
would balk at reading the law expansively.").
8. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, We Must Never Forget That It is an Inkblot We
are Expounding: Section 10(b) as Rorschach Test, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 41, 43 (1995)
(arguing that when a statute is vague, "any attempt to fashion a broader interpreta-
tion inevitably relies on the subjective and unguided preference of the judiciary rather
than the articulated guidance of the elected legislature."). Cf. Barbara Bader Aldave,
Misappropriation: A General Theory of Liability for Trading on Nonpublic Informa-
tion, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 101, 121 (1984) ("The theory that one who misappropriates
confidential information deceives the person who entrusted the information to him,
and that his trading on the information causes damage to other investors, provides a
generalized explanation of why trading on nonpublic information in an impersonal
market may violate Rule 10b-5.").
9. See infra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
10. See Grundfest, supra note 8, at 44 (arguing that the misappropriation theory is
likely to lead to inconsistent results because "[r]easonable minds can differ as to the
import of ... section 10(b) .... and honorable Justices strongly opposed to fraud in




formation to purchase or sell securities, in breach of a duty of loy-
alty and confidentiality, defrauds the principal" and violates sec-
tion 10(b), 11 the Court left many questions unanswered. Lower
courts must now grapple with the extent to which liability can be
imposed, the types of trust relationships sufficient to give rise to
liability when a breach occurs, and the level of "connection" that is
required between the fraud and the purchase or sale of securities.
This Note examines the development of the misappropriation
theory and argues that its adoption by the Supreme Court in
O'Hagan was erroneous because it cannot be reconciled with the
language of section 10(b) or previous Supreme Court decisions,
which strictly interpreted the text of the statute. Part I provides
the background and legislative intent behind section 10(b), dis-
cusses insider trading and the misappropriation theory, and exam-
ines how the lower courts have attempted to reconcile the
misappropriation theory with the language of section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5. Part II presents canons of statutory construction and
the Supreme Court's section 10(b) jurisprudence, focusing on the
O'Hagan case. Part III analyzes the misappropriation theory and
concludes that the Court's use of policy in interpreting the statute,
rather than the plain language of section 10(b), was improper be-
cause courts are not competent to make law in the securities mar-
kets and should instead defer this responsibility to Congress.
I. Section 10(b), Rule 10b-5, and the Prohibition of
Unlawful Trading
While the federal securities laws do not expressly prohibit in-
sider trading, the doctrine has evolved from Securities and Ex-
change Commission ("SEC") and judicial interpretations of the
general antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws,'12 in par-
ticular, section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 13
11. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2207 (1997).
12. See Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider
Trading Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 179, 184-85 (1991).
13. See Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 10 (1983) ("It is well settled that
traditional corporate 'insiders' - directors, officers and persons who have access to
confidential corporate information - must preserve the confidentiality of nonpublic
information that belongs to and emanates from the corporation.") (internal citations
omitted).
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A. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
After the stock market crash in 1929, and the depressed econ-
omy that followed, Congress enacted the Securities Act of 193314
("1933 Act") and the Securities and Exchange Act of 193415 ("1934
Act") to regulate the troubled securities market.1 6 The purpose of
the 1933 Act was to encourage full disclosure of information re-
garding public offerings of securities, to protect investors against
fraud, and to promote ethical standards of honesty and fair deal-
ing.' 7 Through the regulation of securities transactions, the 1934
Act was designed to protect investors against the manipulation of
stock prices, and to impose regular reporting requirements on com-
panies with stock listed on national securities exchanges.'-
Pursuant to the 1934 Act, Congress created the SEC and
equipped it with flexible enforcement powers to accomplish the
statute's goals. 19 Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, which was
designed as a catch-all clause to prevent fraudulent practices,2 °
14. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (1997).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78a-7811 (1997).
16. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194-95 (1976); see also Steve
Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42
STAN. L. REV. 385, 407-08 (1990) ("[T]he central inspiration for the Act was the com-
bination of the bull market of the 1920s and the dramatic collapse that ended it.");
Timothy J. Horman, Comment, In Defense of United States v. Bryan: Why the Misap-
propriation Theory is Indefensible, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2455, 2457 (1996) ("Insider
trading was one of the major abuses that Congress perceived as a cause of the 1929
crash.").
17. See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 195.
18. See id. Senator Fletcher, who was the sponsor of the 1934 Act and the Chair-
man of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency at the time, explained the
Act's purpose:
Manipulators who have in the past had a comparatively free hand to befud-
dle and fool the public and to extract from the public millions of dollars
through stock-exchange operations are to be curbed and deprived of the op-
portunity to grow fat on the savings of the average man and woman of
America. Under this bill the securities exchanges will not only have the ap-
pearance of an open market place for investors but will be truly open to
them, free from the hectic operations and dangerous practices which in the
past have enabled a handful of men to operate with stacked cards against the
general body of the outside investors. For example, besides forbidding
fraudulent practices and unwholesome manipulations by professional mar-
ket operators, the bill seeks to deprive corporate directors, corporate of-
ficers, and other corporate insiders of the opportunity to play the stocks of
their companies against the interests of the stockholders of their companies.
78 CONG. REC. 2271 (1934) (statement of Sen. Fletcher), quoted in Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 765 (1975).
19. See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 195.
20. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980). Notably, one of the
drafters of the provision indicated:
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empowers the SEC to make rules and regulations prohibiting the
use of any manipulative or deceptive device in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.2 The SEC promulgated Rule
10b-5 in 1942, pursuant to a grant of authority under section
10(b). 22 Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful for any person to "employ
any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud," or to engage in any act
which operates as a "fraud or deceit ... in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
23
B. Insider Trading: The Traditional Theory
The traditional theory of insider trading liability provides that
Rule 10b-5 is violated when a person buys or sells securities based
on nonpublic information if:
(1) he owes a fiduciary or similar duty to the other party to the
transaction; (2) he is an insider of the corporation in whose
shares he trades, and thus owes a fiduciary duty to the corpora-
tion's shareholders; or (3) he is a tippee who received his infor-
mation from an insider of the corporation and knows, or should
know, that the insider breached a fiduciary duty in disclosing the
information to him.
24
The failure to disclose material information when under a fiduciary
duty to do so, prior to trading, is a fraudulent omission, implicating
liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because these provi-
sions explicitly prohibit deception and fraud in securities transac-
Of course subsection (c) [section 9(c) of H.R. 7852 - later section 10(b)] is a
catch-all clause to prevent manipulative devices. I do not think there is any
objection to that kind of clause. The Commission should have the authority
to deal with new manipulative devices.
Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 before the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934), quoted in Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S.
at 202-03.
21. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 225. Section 10(b) provides that it is unlawful to
"use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors." 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1997) (emphasis added).
22. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 225.
23. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998).
24. Aldave, supra note 8, at 101-02. One commits Rule 10b-5 fraud only if he or
she "fails to disclose material information prior to the consummation of a transaction
•.. when he [or she] is under a duty to do so." Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228. This duty
"does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information," but
rather arises from "a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence" be-
tween the parties to the transaction. Id. at 235, 228.
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tions.25 Thus, the breach of the insider's duty to the shareholders
constitutes the "deceptive device" required by the traditional the-
ory of liability under section 10(b). 26
In 1961, in the seminal case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co.,2 7 the
SEC decided that a corporate insider must abstain from trading
shares of the corporation for which he works, unless he has first
disclosed all the material, inside information.28 The SEC noted
that the obligation to disclose stems, first, from the existence of a
relationship giving access to information intended to be available
only for a corporate purpose, and second, from the inherent unfair-
ness that exists when a party takes advantage of such informa-
tion.29 This case essentially created the "disclose or abstain" re-
quirement 30 which the Supreme Court subsequently followed.3 1
In Chiarella v. United States,32 the Supreme Court endorsed in-
sider trading liability. The Court decided that a person who had
access to confidential documents, and used this information to buy
the stock of companies that were about to become targets of take-
over bids, could be liable for violating section 10(b) if they failed to
disclose the information prior to trading.33 The defendant in
Chiarella, however, was a "complete stranger" to the transaction
because he worked for a financial printer and owed no fiduciary
duty to the shareholders of the target companies.34 The Court held
that the failure to disclose material information prior to the con-
summation of a transaction constitutes fraud only when a duty to
25. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 (noting that "administrative and judicial inter-
pretations have established that silence in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities may operate as a fraud actionable under § 10(b)").
26. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2207 (1997).
27. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
28. See id. at 911. In Cady, Roberts, the Board of Curtiss-Wright met to discuss,
among other things, the reduction of a quarterly dividend. See id. at 909. Upon ap-
proving the reduction, the board authorized transmission of the information to the
New York Stock Exchange. See id. However, there was a problem with the transmis-
sion which led to a delay of the announcement on the Dow Jones ticker tape. See id.
During a recess in the board meeting after the dividend decision was made, one of the
directors, J. Cheever Cowdin, contacted a selling broker and informed him of the
dividend cut. See id. The broker entered sell orders, and traded shares of the Curtiss-
Wright stock before the dividend announcement appeared on the Dow Jones tape.
See id.
29. See id. at 912.
30. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227.
31. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653-54 (1983); Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227.
32. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
33. See id. at 224, 230.
34. See id. at 224, 232-33.
512
MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
disclose exists.35 Such a duty arises, according to the Court, "when
one party has information 'that the other [party] is entitled to know
because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confi-
dence between them.' ,,36 Because the lower courts failed to iden-
tify a relationship that could give rise to such a duty, the Court
reversed the conviction in Chiarella.37
Liability under the classical theory of insider trading is based
upon the fraud that is committed when a corporate insider trades
on nonpublic information, without prior disclosure, in breach of a
duty to the corporation.38 Several years after its Chiarella decision,
the Supreme Court addressed the scope of liability under the class-
ical theory in Dirks v. SEC.39 There, the Court held that a tippee is
liable for fraud when he knows or should have known that the tip
he received constituted a breach of the insider's fiduciary duty to
the shareholders of a corporation.40 Dirks, a securities analyst, ob-
tained information about a fraud within an insurance company
from a former officer of the company.41 Upon investigating and
confirming the allegations, Dirks discussed this information with
35. See id. at 228.
36. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a)(1976)).
37. See id. at 231-32. In its brief to the Court, the United States argued in the
alternative that Chiarella should be convicted under the misappropriation theory. See
id. at 235-36. The Court did not reject this argument, but noted that "[wie need not
decide whether this theory has merit for it was not submitted to the jury." Id. at 236.
Chief Justice Burger, on the other hand, strongly objected to reversing Chiarella's
convictions.
[T]he evidence shows beyond all doubt that Chiarella, working literally in
the shadows of the warning signs in the printshop, misappropriated - stole to
put it bluntly - valuable nonpublic information entrusted to him in the ut-
most confidence. He then exploited his ill-gotten informational advantage
by purchasing securities in the market. In my view, such conduct plainly
violates section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
Id. at 245 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
38. See, e.g., David M. Brodsky & David J. Kramer, A Critique of the Misappro-
priation Theory of Insider Trading, SB93 ALI-ABA 105, 108 (1997)
Traditionally, the duty not to trade securities on the basis of material, non-
public information concerning the issuer was premised upon the common
law duty owed by a director, officer, or controlling shareholder of a corpora-
tion to the corporation's shareholders not to gain a personal advantage
through the use of nonpublic information concerning the corporation's se-
curities. Absent such a special relationship between the "insider" and the
shareholders, there was no duty to disclose the information or abstain from
trading while in possession of inside information.
Id.; see also Fisch, supra note 12 at 187-90.
39. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
40. See id. at 661-62.
41. See id. at 648-49.
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clients and investors.42 The Court, however, found that no breach
occurred because the insider did not personally benefit from his
disclosure.43
C. The Misappropriation Theory
The misappropriation theory is another way courts have applied
insider trading liability pursuant to section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
Although liability under the traditional theory tends to be limited
to corporate insiders and tippees, liability pursuant to the misap-
propriation theory has been extended to outsiders who would not
ordinarily be considered fiduciaries of the corporation in whose
stocks they trade.44 Such outsiders include lawyers, stockbrokers,
financial printers, newspaper reporters, family members, and
psychiatrists.45
Under the misappropriation theory, section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5 are violated when a person misappropriates material, nonpublic
information by breaching a duty which arises out of a relationship
of trust and confidence, and uses that information in a securities
transaction, regardless of whether he owes any duty to the share-
holders of the traded stock.46 Liability is based upon the principle
that it is unfair to trade securities using information that was im-
42. See id. at 649. The SEC learned of the fraud after the stock price fell from $26
per share to less than $15, prompting their own investigation. See id. at 650. The SEC
found that the analyst had aided and abetted violations of the securities laws, includ-
ing section 10(b). See id.
43. See id. at 667. The Dirks Court, applying the Cady, Roberts analysis, recog-
nized that the two elements for establishing a Rule 10b-5 violation are: "(i) the exist-
ence of a relationship affording access to inside information intended to be available
only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to
take advantage of that information by trading without disclosure." Id. at 653-54 (cita-
tions omitted). Although Dirks' exposure of the insurance company's fraud led to the
liquidation of more than $16 million invested in the company, because the tipper ac-
ted in order to expose the fraud, and not to benefit personally, he breached no fiduci-
ary duty, and therefore Dirks could not be held derivatively liable. Further, there was
no expectation by Dirks' sources that he would keep their information in confidence,
and Dirks did not misappropriate the information. See id. at 665.
44. See SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that the defend-
ant, who misappropriated and traded upon material information he acquired at a
bank where he was previously employed, violated section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 pursu-
ant to the misappropriation theory).
45. See United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 951 (4th Cir. 1995) (discussing the
diverse relationships the misappropriation theory has been applied to in other courts,
but ultimately rejecting the argument that convictions for securities fraud under sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 could rest on the misappropriation theory).
46. See SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 443 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding an employee lia-
ble for misappropriating nonpublic information regarding his employer's plan to ac-
quire another company).
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properly acquired or not intended to be used for personal gain.47
The focus, therefore, is on whether the insider breached a fiduciary
duty to any lawful possessor of nonpublic information, rather than
to the issuing company or its shareholders.48
Moreover, unlike liability imposed under the traditional theory
of insider trading, the misappropriation theory reaches persons
who are neither insiders of the companies whose shares are being
traded, nor tippees of such insiders.49 In fact, the misappropriation
theory does not even require that the buyer or seller of the securi-
ties be defrauded." Instead, the victim of the "deceptive device"
under section 10(b) must be a party to which the offending trader
owed a fiduciary duty.51 "Deception through nondisclosure" to
that party is what creates liability under the misappropriation
theory.52
The Supreme Court first discussed liability for misappropriating
information in Chief Justice Burger's Chiarella53 dissent when he
opined that, pursuant to section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, "a person
who has misappropriated nonpublic information has an absolute
duty to disclose that information or to refrain from trading.
54
While the Chief Justice conceded that there generally is no duty to
disclose unless the parties are in a fiduciary relationship, he argued
that a duty arises when unlawful means are used to gain an infor-
mational advantage, and that the failure to disclose thus constitutes
fraud.5
1. Reconciling the Misappropriation Theory with Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5
The underlying principle of the misappropriation theory is the
extension of section 10(b) liability to outsiders who unlawfully ben-
47. See Michael P. Kenny & Teresa D. Thebaut, Misguided Statutory Construction
to Cover the Corporate Universe: The Misappropriation Theory of Section 10(b), 59
ALB. L. REV. 139, 144 (1995) ("The emotional impulse that vibrates the misappropria-
tion theory seems to be a visceral dislike for asymmetric market information, espe-
cially if a person unfairly obtains such information.").
48. See Cherif, 933 F.2d at 409.
49. See Aldave, supra note 8, at 111-12.
50. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 566 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc).
51. See Cherif, 933 F.2d at 409.
52. See, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2209 (1997) (explaining
that.-full disclosure forecloses liability under the misappropriation theory, because
with disclosure, "there is no 'deceptive device' and thus no § 10(b) violation").
53. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
54. Id. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
55. See id. at 239-40.
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efit from material, nonpublic information, in order to protect the
source of misappropriated information, rather than the market par-
ticipants.5 6 Because the misappropriation theory is a source of lia-
bility pursuant to section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the prohibited
conduct must consist of fraud in connection with the purchase or
sale of securities. 57
a. The Fraud Requirement
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals was the first court to apply
the misappropriation theory, in United States v. Newman,58 when it
held that a securities trader may be held criminally liable for trad-
ing on a tip conveyed to him by two employees who misappropri-
ated the information from their investment banking firms.59
Although the employees owed no duty to the company whose
shares they traded, the court found the breach of fiduciary duty to
their employer was enough to support a Rule 10b-5 conviction.6 °
Despite the Supreme Court's holding that not every instance of
fraud violates section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5,61 the Newman court
held that the mere breach of an employment relationship was ade-
quate.62 Beginning with this important decision, the Second Cir-
cuit helped develop the misappropriation theory, applying it to a
variety of situations where there was some breach of trust and
confidence.63
56. See United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 944 (1995); United States v.
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 567 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc). Cf. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207
("The misappropriation theory is thus designed to 'protec[t] the integrity of the secur-
ities markets against abuses by 'outsiders' to a corporation'").
57. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
58. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
59. See id. at 16.
60. See id. at 17. The Newman court noted that it "need spend little time on the
issue of fraud and deceit" and went on to explain that "[b]y sullying the reputations"
of the investment banking firms, Newman and his cohorts "defrauded those employ-
ers as surely as if they took their money." Id.
61. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980) ("[N]ot every instance
of financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity under § 10(b)."); Santa Fe Indus.
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472-73 (1977) (holding that section 10(b) violations must be
based on manipulation or deception).
62. See Newman, 664 F.2d at 17.
63. See generally, United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 953-59 (1995). In Moss v.
Morgan Stanley, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), which involved the same defendants and
arose out of the same conduct that gave rise to the criminal convictions in Newman
but was brought by a target corporation shareholder, the court noted that "[n]othing
in our opinion in Newman suggests that an employee's duty to 'abstain or disclose'
with respect to his employer should be stretched to encompass an employee's 'duty of
disclosure' to the general public." Id. at 13. In construing Chiarella, the court found
that section 10(b) liability could not be predicated on the misappropriation of confi-
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Courts applying the misappropriation theory easily found the
section 10(b) fraud requirement fulfilled where there was a breach
of duty to an employer,64 but have extended the theory far beyond
the employment context. For example, in United States v. Willis,
65
a psychiatrist's use of information revealed by a patient was found
to be a sufficient basis for section 10(b) liability.66 In addition, the
dential information without the breach of a fiduciary duty. See id. at 12. Later, in
SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), the court addressed facts similar to those
in Chiarella, namely, that an employee at a financial printing firm learned the identity
of tender offer targets in the course of his employment and traded on such informa-
tion. Id. at 199. The court found Materia liable, holding that "one who misappropri-
ates nonpublic information in breach of a fiduciary duty and trades on that
information to his own advantage violates section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5." Id. at 203.
Materia breached the duty he owed to his employer, thereby implicating the misap-
propriation theory, whereas the Moss court ruled that such a breach was insufficient
to give rise to section 10(b) liability. See Moss, 719 F.2d at 13. The court reconciled
Materia and Moss by distinguishing between a criminal action and a private action for
damages. See Materia, 745 F.2d at 203.
The Second Circuit took the misappropriation theory even further in its decision in
United States v. Carpenter, when it held that Rule 10b-5 was violated when a newspa-
per columnist from the Wall Street Journal misappropriated securities-related infor-
mation that was scheduled to appear in the "Heard on the Street" column and traded
upon information contained in these upcoming columns. See Carpenter, 791 F.2d
1024, 1026-27, 1034 (2d Cir. 1986). The court explained that while Dirks held that
certain trading by insiders or quasi-insiders violated Rule 10b-5, that is not to say that
other forms of misconduct do not implicate the Rule. See id. at 1029. Namely, the
court established that the predicate act of fraud may be committed on the source of
the nonpublic information, even though the source may be unaffiliated with the buyer
or seller of securities. See id. at 1032. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and an
equally divided Court affirmed the conviction without an opinion. See Carpenter v.
United States, 484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987).
64. See, e.g., supra note 60 and accompanying text. See also SEC v. Clark, 915
F.2d 439, 449 (9th Cir. 1990) ("We find no linguistic reason not to apply this concep-
tion of fraud to the securities context .... [and] conclude that the misappropriation
theory fits comfortably within the meaning of 'fraud' in § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.").
65. 737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (denying a motion to dismiss an indictment
charging Dr. Willis, a psychiatrist, of violating section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by
purchasing securities based on business information confided in him by a patient for
his diagnosis and treatment).
66. See id. at 274-75. Dr. Willis' patient was the wife of a corporate executive who
confided in him about her husband's efforts to become CEO of BankAmerica. See id.
at 271. Finding it "difficult to imagine a relationship that requires a higher degree of
trust and confidence than the traditional relationship of physician and patient," the
court held that, if proven, the allegations could subject Willis to the misappropriation
theory of securities fraud. Id. at 272, 275. The court reasoned that by holding himself
out "as her physician with recognized obligations of confidentiality for his patient's
secrets," and failing to advise her of his intent to profit on this confidential informa-
tion, Willis fraudulently induced her to confide in him in connection with his securities
trading. Id. at 274. The court further found that the patient had a property interest in
her psychiatric treatment, and by jeopardizing their relationship of trust and confi-
dence, Willis put at risk the patient's financial investment in the treatment. Id.
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misappropriation theory was extended to the family relationship in
United States v. Reed,67 where the court held that a son's breach of
his father's trust may give rise to liability under section 10(b).68
While the expansion of liability under the misappropriation the-
ory in the Second Circuit was significant, courts did not find the
requisite fraud in every section 10(b) case. In United States v.
Chestman,69 for example, the breach of confidence between a hus-
band and wife was not sufficient to impose liability.70 The court
went to great lengths analyzing what constitutes a fiduciary rela-
tionship and its equivalent, noting that it must be cautious in ex-
tending the misappropriation theory to new relationships.7'
67. 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
68. See id. at 705. The court held that:
A person who receives confidential information from another and misappro-
priates it for personal benefit is deemed to hold the proceeds of the misap-
propriation in a constructive trust for the benefit of the entrusting party.
The misappropriator thus becomes the trustee ex maleficio, or quasi-fiduci-
ary, of the entrustor. In the context of the securities laws, it does not matter
for purposes of assessing liability whether the recipient of the information is
actually trading in the securities issued by the source of the information.
Rather, the duty is breached by the misappropriation and resulting profit,
and a constructive trust attaches.
Id. at 700 (citations omitted).
69. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc).
70. See id. at 571. Keith Loeb, the husband of a member of the Waldbaum family,
was told by his wife that the company was being sold and was cautioned not to tell
anyone so as not to risk ruining the sale. See id at 555. However, Loeb told his
stockbroker, Chestman, who traded on that information, knowing of Loeb's relation
to the Waldbaum corporation. See id. In the Chestman opinion, the court recognized
that it broke ranks with its Carpenter decision, since it was the first fact pattern it
considered that "is clearly beyond the pale of the traditional theory of insider trad-
ing." Id. at 566-67. In the end, the court concluded that there was not enough evi-
dence to establish a fiduciary relationship or a similar relationship of trust and
confidence between Loeb and the Waldbaum family, and therefore held that he did
not defraud them by disclosing the information to Chestman. See id. at 570-71. Be-
cause Loeb had committed no fraud, Chestman could not be held derivatively liable
as Loeb's tippee or as an aider and abettor under the misappropriation theory. See id.
at 571.
71. See id. at 567-71. In evaluating what constitutes a fiduciary relationship, the
Chestman court looked first to associations that the common law has recognized as
inherently fiduciary:
Counted among these hornbook fiduciary relations are those existing be-
tween attorney and client, executor and heir, guardian and ward, principal
and agent, trustee and trust beneficiary, and senior corporate official and
shareholder.
Id. at 568. Noting that this is not an exhaustive list, the court held that a breach of a
similar relationship of trust and confidence, which must share the same qualities of a
fiduciary relationship, also implicates the misappropriation theory. See id. at 658.
Analyzing the characteristics of a fiduciary relationship, the Chestman court found
that "'at the heart of the fiduciary relationship' lies 'reliance, and de facto control and
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b. The "In Connection With" Requirement
Not only must fraud exist for the misappropriation theory to ap-
ply, but the fraud must be "in connection with" the purchase or
sale of securities. 2 When the Supreme Court addressed this issue
with respect to traditional insider trading, it rejected the notion
that every fraud or breach of fiduciary duty by a corporate insider
to shareholders constituted securities fraud. 3 Nevertheless, when
discussing this element in United States v. Newman, 4 the Second
Circuit easily found satisfied the "in connection with" requirement
of Rule 10b-5 because Newman's fraud "touched" the securities
transaction.7 ' Generally, once courts identify fraud sufficient to
give rise to section 10(b) liability, they also find the "in connection
with" requirement satisfied due to the self-evident nexus that exists
between the two components in these cases.7 6
Although the Second Circuit has the most experience interpret-
ing section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, other circuits have addressed the
issue of whether the misappropriation theory is consistent with the
statute.7 By the time the issue reached the Supreme Court, the
Fourth and Eighth Circuits had held that criminal liability under
section 10(b) may not be predicated on the misappropriation the-
dominance."' Id. (quoting United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 125 (2d Cir.
1982).
72. See, e.g., SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 449 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 do not proscribe all frauds occurring in the business world, but only those
'in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.' In other words, the fraud
must somehow 'touch' upon securities transactions.").
73. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737-38 (1975)
(holding that defrauded investors who did not trade because of a misrepresentation
do not have standing to bring a private damage action under Rule 10b-5).
74. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
75. See id. at 18 (citing Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty
Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971)). The Newman Court improperly'characterized the "pur-
chaser or sellers" portion of the text as a mere standing requirement. See id. at 17.
76. See, e.g., Clark, 915 F.2d at 449 ("Purely as a matter of linguistic construction,
we have little trouble concluding that there is" some nexus between the misappropria-
tion and the subsequent trading); United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1032 (2d
Cir. 1986). See also SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 410 (7th Cir. 1991) ("We agree that
buying or selling securities 'in connection with' fraud perpetrated on an employer to
obtain material non-public information constitutes a violation of Rule 10b-5"); SEC v.
Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 203 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding the suggestion that the fraud was
not "in connection with" the purchase or sale of securities is "inimical to the letter
and spirit of the expansive scheme created to combat fraud in the securities markets.
The information Materia stole has no value whatsoever except 'in connection with' his
subsequent purchase of securities.").
77. See, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 615 (8th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 943 (4th Cir. 1995); Cherif, 933 F.2d at 408; Clark, 915
F.2d at 442; Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818, 822 (3d Cir. 1985).
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ory,78 while the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits held that it
could.79
II. Interpreting Section 10(b)
Statutes are typically written in general terms because they are
invariably products of political compromise. 8° As a result, it is
often up to the judiciary to determine the legislative intent and
meaning of statutes in a particular case.8' Principles of statutory
interpretation fix the limits of a statute's reach, and thus the out-
come of a particular decision depends a great deal upon which ca-
non of statutory interpretation a court employs.82
A. Canons of Construction
When courts look to a statute to determine the scope of liability,
they often use tools of statutory interpretation and construction to
ascertain the meaning of the language.83 The four main schools of
statutory interpretation are: textualism, intentionalism, purposiv-
ism, and the dynamic theory.84 While the Supreme Court has al-
most consistently interpreted section 10(b) using a textual or plain
language approach8 5 the other canons of construction are also ac-
ceptable methods of interpreting statutes. 86
1. Textualism
Textualism requires courts to rely strictly on the language of a
statute to ascertain its meaning.87 Proponents of this method con-
78. See O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 617; Bryan, 58 F.3d at 944.
79. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 566 (2d Cir. 1991); Cherif, 933
F.2d at 410; Clark, 915 F.2d at 453. The Third Circuit has also seemingly adopted the
misappropriation theory. See Rothberg, 771 F.2d at 822 (finding that one "violates the
insider trading rule when he uses insider information in violation of the fiduciary duty
owed to the corporation to which hew owes a duty of confidentiality.").
80. See Kenny & Thebaut, supra note 47, at 140.
81. See id.
82. See Steven A. Meetre, Textualist Statutory Interpretation Kills Section 10(b)
"Aiding and Abetting" Liability, 63 DEF. COUNS. J. 58, 60 (1996) ("Often it is a court's
interpretation of the [statute's] language that determines the application and effect of
legislation.").
83. See id.
84. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 10
(Harvard University Press ed. 1994). These statutory tools are not mutually exclusive.
85. See infra Part II.B.
86. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 84, at 14.
87. See Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Statutory Interpretation, Democratic Legitimacy
and Legal-System Values, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 233, 237 (1997) ("'Textualists'
contend that the only democratically legitimate source of meaning is the actual statu-
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tend that the plain meaning of the text is a reasonable indication of
the legislature's intent.88 This approach requires a court interpret-
ing a statute to confine itself to a literal reading of the text, unless
the text is ambiguous on its face, or such a reading would lead to an
"absurd" or "bizarre" result.8 9
Critics of the plain language approach to interpreting section
10(b), like Melvin Aron Eisenberg, argue that the approach is in-
tellectually incoherent because of the difficulty in identifying ca-
nonical statutory text.9° Eisenberg explains that strict textualists
do not necessarily confine the canonical text to the statutory provi-
sions at issue and, as a result, widen the text to include the entire
law or even all statutes adopted by the relevant legislature.91
Moreover, even if strict textualism were coherent, Eisenberg ar-
gues that judges have an obligation to be faithful servants of the
legislature, and using this methodology violates the obligation.92
Despite these criticisms, most courts rely on textualism in inter-
preting section 10(b).93 In addition, the Supreme Court generally
interprets all statutes based upon their plain meaning.94  The
Supreme Court has emphasized that where the language of the
statute is plain, the sole function of a court is to enforce a statute
according to its terms.95 Although the legislative history of a stat-
tory text, not any underlying ideas, intentions or purposes that have not cleared the
hurdles of democratic lawmaking."); Meetre, supra note 82, at 60 (1996).
88. See Meetre, supra note 82, at 60.
89. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Strict Textualism, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 13 (1995).
90. See id. at 14, 22.
91. See id. at 22-23. Eisenberg explains that because the particular provision at
issue is often part of a larger statute, or is in a statute that is one of a group of related
statutes, "strict textualism cannot sensibly restrict the relevant text to the statutory
provision directly at issue. Once that fateful line is crossed, however, there is no logi-
cal stopping point until the limit of the text of all law is reached." Id. He further
argues that if the relevant text is the text of all law, then strict textualism makes the
outrageous suggestion that the legislature must have had the text of all law in mind
when it enacted the particular provision. See id. at 23.
92. See id. at 37. "[I]n the domain of federal law Congress is the master and the
Court is merely a servant." Id. Accordingly, "like any servant, a court is bound to
give the instructions it receives from its master-statutes-a reasonable interpretation
.... [which] always depends on all the contextual circumstances, not just on a literal
reading of the text." Id.
93. See infra Part II.B.
94. See infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
95. See West Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98-99 (1991). In
addressing the argument that the congressional purpose of enacting a statute must
prevail over the ordinary meaning of the statutory terms, the Court held that when a
statute "contains a phrase that is unambiguous - that has a clearly accepted meaning
in both legislative and judicial practice - we do not permit it to be expanded or con-
tracted . . ."
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ute may clarify ambiguous provisions, "courts have no authority to
enforce alleged principles gleaning solely from legislative history
that has no statutory reference point."96 Thus, the Court has held
that statutory construction must always begin with the language of
the statute.97 When the language is clear, judicial inquiry into the
statute's meaning, in all but the most extraordinary circumstances,
is finished.98 According to this view, a court's limited role is simply
to apply a statute because Congress alone has the authority to
make law.99
2. Intentionalism
A second tool of statutory interpretation is intentionalism. This
method treats a statute as a static text, and "asks how the legisla-
ture originally intended the interpretive question to be answered,
or would have intended the question to be answered had it thought
about the issue when it passed the statute."'100 To ascertain intent,
the court may look beyond the text to the statute's legislative his-
tory. 10 1 Proponents of the misappropriation theory often apply in-
tentionalism, arguing that the policies underlying the theory are
consistent with the intent of the legislators who enacted section
10(b).102
96. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 474 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d
697, 699-700 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
97. See Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1922) (using textualism
to hold that forfeiture provisions of a statute apply to a worker whose employer is
neither paying compensation nor is subject to an order to pay under the statute at the
time the worker settles with a third party).
98. See id.
99. See, e.g., West Virginia Univ. Hosp., 499 U.S. at 101 ("[I]t is our role to make
sense rather than nonsense out of the corpus juris.").
100. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
1479-80 (1987).
101. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 84, at 14. Despite this inquiry into intent, the actual
legislative intent is rarely brought to light from the historical record. See id. at 16.
102. See, e.g., SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 451 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that while "it
would be disingenuous to suggest that in 1942 the SEC sanctioned or even foresaw
the use of the misappropriation theory .... its apparent understanding that Congress
empowered it to draft a rule to address unforeseen species of fraud squares with our
reading of § 10(b)'s contemporaneous legislative history."); United States v. Carpen-
ter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1030 (2d Cir. 1986) (justifying the broad-reaching legislative intent
of the 1934 Act in adopting the misappropriation theory); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d
197, 201 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting that the antifraud provision of the 1.934 Act was in-
tended to be broad in scope, and was not "aimed solely at the eradication of fraudu-
lent trading by corporate insiders.").
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3. Purposivism
Another alternative is purposivism, which allows a court to con-
sider the congressional purpose or policy behind the statute's en-
actment. 10 3 Using this approach, the purpose or objective of the
statute must first be identified, then the statutory ambiguities can
be resolved by determining which interpretation is most consistent
with that purpose or goal.10 4 Purposivism looks to Congress' in-
tent in regulating an area, rather than its intent in enacting a partic-
ular statute.10 5 As opposed to intentionalism, purposivism allows a
statute to evolve to address new issues, while maintaining a con-
nection with the original legislative expectations. 0 6 Notwithstand-
ing this broader inquiry, it remains difficult under either approach
to identify the purpose of a statute because legislatures do not al-
ways set forth the reasons for a law's enactment.10 7 Moreover, be-
cause statutes are products of compromise, legislative histories
often support divergent intentions.0 8 Finally, this method calls for
courts rather than Congress to make policy judgments, 0 9 and may
ignore the plain meaning of a statute. 1 0
4. The Dynamic Theory
The dynamic theory is a tool of statutory interpretation that has
received considerable scholarly debate in recent years.1 ' The dy-
namic theory suggests that courts should consider current policies
and societal values in rendering decisions.1 12 Proponents of this
103. See Meetre, supra note 82, at 60; see generally ESKRIDGE, supra note 84, at 25-
34.
104. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 84, at 25-26.
105. See Roger Colinvaux, What Is Law? A Search for Legal Meaning and Good
Judging Under a Textualist Lens, 72 IND. L.J. 1133 (1997). In distinguishing the ca-
nons of construction, this commentator noted:
A purposivist judge finds law by measuring a statute's language against the
statute's purpose. For the task of discerning purpose, legislative history is a
common choice. An intentionalist finds law by reconstructing congressional
intent, also frequently relying on legislative history. Intentionalism differs
from purposivism because a statute can be interpreted to have a broader
purpose beyond the one intended.
Id. at 1133.
106. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 84 at 26.
107. See id. at 27.
108. See id.
109. See Meetre, supra note 82, at 61 (noting that both purposivism and intentional-
ism enable activist judges to "'rewrite' statutes to address matters").
110. See id.
111. See generally Carlos E. Gonzalez, Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation, 74
N.C. L. REV. 585, 614-33 (1996). See also Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 87, at 234 n.1.
112. "Under dynamic theory, 'the court's role is to reach the best result, formally
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tool argue that "[i]nterpretation is not an archeological discovery,
but a dialectic creation. 11 3 Statutes should not be treated as static
texts because gaps and ambiguities always exist.114 Instead, stat-
utes should be interpreted dynamically, allowing them to evolve
with current policies and perspectives.115
B. Interpreting Section 10(b)
In interpreting the language of section 10(b), the Supreme Court
has generally employed textualism, reading the plain language of
the statute to determine the meaning of the text.'1 6 Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder17 is an exemplary case in which the Court decided
whether section 10(b) reaches negligent conduct, or whether a de-
fendant must act with an intent to deceive, manipulate, or de-
fraud." 8 Relying on the language of section 10(b), specifically the
words "manipulative or deceptive" used in conjunction with "de-
vice or contrivance," the Court held that the scope of section 10(b)
liability does not extend to negligent conduct.11 9 Accordingly, the
Court refused to consider any policy arguments in reaching its
decision. 120
unconstrained (though perhaps influenced or persuaded) by the statute's text and leg-
islative history." Meetre, supra note 82, at 61 (quoting William N. Eskridge, Jr., Poli-
tics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory
Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REv. 275 (1988)).
113. Eskridge, supra note 100, at 1482 (citation omitted).
114. See id. at 1480.
115. See id. at 1483.
116. See infra notes 117-25 and accompanying text.
117. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
118. Id. at 187-88 (1976). Ernst & Ernst involves an accounting firm charged with
negligence for allegedly failing to conduct proper audits of a company keeping fraud-
ulent escrow account. See id. at 190.
119. See id. at 197-98.
120. See id. at 198-99. Declining to entertain the policy concerns expressed by the
SEC, the Court noted that "apart from where its logic might lead, the Commission
would add a gloss to the operative language of the statute quite different from its
commonly accepted meaning." Id. On the contrary, the Court steadfastly refused to
partake in judicial legislation. The Supreme Court has echoed this sentiment several
times in the past. See, e.g., Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson,
501 U.S. 350, 367 (1991) (Stevens, J. dissenting) ("Congress, rather than the Federal
Judiciary, has the responsibility for making the policy determinations. . . "); Ernst &
Ernst, 425 U.S. at 214 ("When a statute speaks so specifically in terms of manipula-
tion and deception, and of implementing devices and contrivances-the commonly
understood terminology of intentional wrongdoing-and when its history reflects no
more expansive intent, we are quite unwilling to extend the scope of the statute to
negligent conduct."); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 748
(1975) ("[T]he Judiciary may not circumscribe a right which Congress has conferred
because of any disagreement it might have with Congress about the wisdom of creat-
ing so expansive a liability.").
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In Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,121 the Supreme Court again
employed textualism and declined to extend liability based on pol-
icy considerations because "[t]he language of § 10(b) gives no indi-
cation that Congress meant to prohibit any conduct not involving
manipulation or deception.' 12 2 Therefore, the Court held that a
breach of a fiduciary duty without any deception, misrepresenta-
tion, or nondisclosure does not give rise to liability under section
10(b) or Rule 10b-5.
Similarly, the Court strictly interpreted section 10(b) in its recent
Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver 2 3 deci-
sion. Addressing the seemingly resolved issue of whether a private
right of action for aiding and abetting could be brought pursuant to
section 10(b), l2 4 the Court held that because the statute's plain lan-
guage did not create or impose such liability, it did not exist. 25
121. 430 U.S, 462 (1977). In Santa Fe, the Court considered a section 10(b) suit
brought by minority shareholders against majority shareholders and a firm which had
appraised the value of a stock for purposes of a Delaware short-form merger. See id.
at 466-67. Because the minority shareholders could either accept the price offered or
reject it and seek appraisal in the Delaware Court of Chancery, the transaction was
neither deceptive nor manipulative and therefore did not violate section 10(b) or
Rule 10b-5. See id. at 474.
122. Id. at 473.
123. 511 U.S. 164, 173 (1994) ("With respect ... [to] the scope of conduct prohib-
ited by § 10(b), the text of the statute controls our decision.").
124. The dissenting opinion noted that "[i]n hundreds of judicial and administrative
proceedings in every Circuit in the federal system, the courts and the SEC have con-
cluded that aiders and abettors are subject to liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5."
Id. at 192 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). However, the Court was not
persuaded by the fact that all eleven courts of appeals had recognized aiding and
abetting liability. See id. Acknowledging that aiding and abetting should be actiona-
ble in certain circumstances, the Court would not budge. "The issue . . . is not
whether imposing private civil liability on aiders and abettors is good policy but
whether aiding and abetting is covered by the statute." Id. at 177. The Court de-
clared that "[p]olicy considerations cannot override our interpretation of the text and
structure of the Act, except to the extent that they may help to show that adherence
to the text and structure would lead to a result 'so bizarre' that Congress could not
have intended it." Id. at 188 (quoting Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 191
(1991)).
Similarly, when the Fourth Circuit was confronted with the policy justifications for
adopting the misappropriation theory, it responded:
[I]n securities law, as in all areas of the law, our perceptions of what is wise
or fair are ultimately of no relevance. In the end, we, as judges, no less than
anyone else, are bound by the actual prohibitions enacted by Congress. It is
adherence to this fundamental limitation on our own authority that leads us
to conclude that, as ignoble as Bryan's conduct was, it simply was not con-
duct that is prohibited by section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.
United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 959 (1995).
125. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 177. Because the language of section 10(b) does
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In all of these cases,.the Supreme Court determined the scope of
section 10(b) by analyzing the language of the statute and its rela-
tively sparse legislative history. 126 Until United States v. O'Hagan,
the Court focused solely on the plain meaning of the statute and
consistently held that fraud is the critical component of section
10(b) liability.2 7 In O'Hagan, the Court's steadfast refusal to ex-
pand the scope of the statute beyond what the language permits
ended.
C. United States v. O'Hagan
The Supreme Court directly discussed the validity of the misap-
propriation theory in O'Hagan.128 The Court decided that James
O'Hagan, a lawyer, violated section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when he
traded stocks using confidential client information he learned while
working as a partner at a law firm.129 Following an investigation by
not mention aiding and abetting, the Court held that "[i]t is inconsistent with settled
methodology in § 10(b) cases to extend liability beyond the scope of conduct prohib-
ited by the statutory text." Id. Rather, "ascertainment of congressional intent with
respect to the scope of liability created by a particular section of the Securities Act
must rest primarily on the language of that section." Id. at 175 (quoting Pinter v.
Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 653 (1988)). Based upon this straightforward analysis, the Court
found that there can be no aiding and abetting liability under section 10(b). See id. at
177. The Court went on to note that if the statute itself does not resolve the case, as it
did here, it must attempt "to infer 'how the 1934 Congress would have addressed the
issue had the 10b-5 action been included as an express provision in the 1934 Act."'
Id. at 178 (quoting Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Insurance, 508 U.S. 286,
294 (1993)).
126. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202 (1976) ("Neither the in-
tended scope of § 10(b) nor the reasons for the changes in its operative language are
revealed explicitly in the 1934 Act...").
127. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980) ("Section 10(b) is
aptly described as a catchall provision, but what it catches must be fraud."); Santa Fe
Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473 (1977) ("The language of § 10(b) gives no indica-
tion that Congress meant to prohibit any conduct not involving manipulation or
deception.").
128. 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
129. See id. at 2205. James O'Hagan was a partner at the law firm of Dorsey &
Whitney. See id. at 2205. In July 1988, Grand Metropolitan PLC ("Grand Met")
retained Dorsey & Whitney as local counsel regarding a potential tender offer for the
common stock of the Pillsbury Company, headquartered in Minneapolis, Minnesota,
a transaction which did not involve O'Hagan. See id. The firm, which was also lo-
cated in Minneapolis, severed the relationship with Grand Met in September, in light
of its policy against representing a company involved in a hostile takeover of a local
corporation. See id. In August 1988, while Dorsey & Whitney still represented Grand
Met, O'Hagan began purchasing call options for Pillsbury stock, and by the end of
September, he had gathered 2,500 Pillsbury call option contracts, and owned approxi-
mately 5000 shares of Pillsbury common stock. See id. On October 4, 1988, Grand
Met announced its tender offer for Pillsbury stock, and the price per share immedi-
ately increased from $39 to $60. See id. O'Hagan subsequently purchased the stock
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the SEC and other federal law enforcement agencies, O'Hagan was
charged and convicted of fifty-seven counts of mail fraud, securities
fraud, and money laundering, and sentenced to forty-one months'
imprisonment. 130  On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed
O'Hagan's convictions, holding that the misappropriation theory is
not a valid basis upon which to impose criminal liability under sec-
tion 10(b). 31
1. The Eighth Circuit's Analysis
The Eighth Circuit, in O'Hagan, found that the misappropriation
theory was at odds with the explicit language of section 10(b).132
Relying on the Supreme Court's prior readings of the statute, the
Eighth Circuit defined deception as the making of a material mis-
representation or nondisclosure of material information in viola-
tion of a duty to disclose.1 33 The court then decided that deception
was critical to section 10(b) liability and, therefore, the misappro-
priation theory was problematic because it did not require any mis-
representation or nondisclosure in breach of a duty.1 34 Moreover,
the court reasoned that although the misappropriation theory does
not require deception as mandated by section 10(b), even if it did,
"it renders nugatory the requirement that the 'deception' be 'in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security."" 35
at the lower price by exercising his call options, then sold all of his shares for a profit
of over $4,000,000. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 2206.
132. See United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 618 (8th Cir. 1996) ("By its very
definition . . . [the misappropriation theory] does not require either a material mis-
representation or nondisclosure."). The court borrowed heavily from the Fourth Cir-
cuit's decision, in United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995), which concluded
that "neither the language of section 10(b), Rule 10b-5, the Supreme Court authority
interpreting these provisions, nor the purposes of these securities fraud prohibitions,
will support convictions resting on the particular theory of misappropriation adopted
by our sister circuits." Id. at 944.
133. See O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 617.
134. See id. (relying on Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 470-76
(1977), the court noted that the Supreme Court had already rejected a lower court's
reading of section 10(b) which required no misrepresentation or nondisclosure); see
also Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 177
(1994), cited in O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 618 (reiterating this principle); see also supra
notes 123-25.
135. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 617. In Bryan,.the Fourth Circuit found that the misap-
propriation theory "artificially divides into two discrete requirements - a fiduciary
breach and a purchase or sale of securities - the single indivisible requirement of
deception upon the purchaser or seller of securities, or upon some other person inti-
mately linked with or affected by a securities transaction." Bryan, 58 F.3d at 950 (em-
phasis in original). Further developing this analysis, the O'Hagan court explained
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2. The Supreme Court's Analysis
The Supreme Court rejected the Eighth Circuit's argument that
the misappropriation theory did not satisfy section 10(b)'s decep-
tion requirement. The Court explained that the duty breached
under the misappropriation theory is a duty which runs to the
source of information.136 In addition, the O'Hagan Court limited
liability under the misappropriation theory by holding that full dis-
closure will foreclose the liability of someone who breaches a rela-
tionship of trust.137 If the fiduciary discloses his plans to trade on
that the misappropriation theory improperly "permits liability for a breach of duty
owed to individuals who are unconnected to and perhaps uninterested in a securities
transaction, thus rendering meaningless the 'in connection with . . . ' statutory lan-
guage." O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 618. Thus, "the Misappropriation Theory separates the
inseparable . . . [and] disregards the specific statutory requirement of deception, in
favor of a requirement of a mere fiduciary breach[.]" David Cowan Bayne, S.J., In-
sider Trading: The Demise of the Misappropriation Theory - And Thereafter, 41 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 625, 637 (1997); see also Brodsky & Kramer, supra note 38, at 138.
Brodsky and Kramer argue:
By severing the link between the fraud (breach of duty) and the securities
trade at issue, the misappropriation theory brings within its scope parties
who have no connection with issuers or their shareholders and is premised
upon breaches of duty that have nothing to do with securities markets. It
creates irrational distinctions, where some familial, employment or profes-
sional relationships creates a duty to disclose or refrain from trading,
whereas others (ones where the expectations of trust are deemed dimin-
ished) do not.
Id. However, the Supreme Court's decisions in Chiarella, Dirks and Central Bank
show that these requirements cannot be separated. The breach must be to parties in a
relationship of trust and confidence in order to give rise to section 10(b) liability. See
O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 618. In Chiarella, the Court held that a duty to disclose arises
only "from a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction."
Chiarella v. Unites States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980). Similarly, in Dirks, the Court
stated that "'[a] duty [to disclose] arises from the relationship between parties ...
and not merely from one's ability to acquire information because of his position in the
market."' Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657-58 (1983) (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at
231-32 n.14).
136. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2207 (1997). "A fiduciary who
'[pretends] loyalty to the principal while secretly converting the principal's informa-
tion for personal gain,' . . . 'dupes' or defrauds the principal." Id. at 2208 (quoting
Brief for the United States 17). The Court did not adopt the version of the theory
originally proposed by Chief Justice Burger in Chiarella, which would impose a disclo-
sure obligation to all those with whom the misappropriator trades, but rather limited
the disclosure obligation to the source of information. See id. at 2208 n.6. Under
Burger's version of the theory, "a person who has misappropriated nonpublic infor-
mation has an absolute duty to disclose that information or to refrain from trading."
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
137. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2209. The Court noted that:
full disclosure forecloses liability under the misappropriation theory: Be-
cause the deception essential to the misappropriation theory involves feign-
ing fidelity to the source of information, if the fiduciary discloses to the
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the nonpublic information to the source of. the information, then
there exists neither any purported fidelity to the source nor a "de-
ceptive device" to give rise to section 10(b) liability.138
The Supreme Court also found satisfied the requirement that the
misappropriator's deceptive use of information be "in connection
with the purchase or sale of a security," because the fraud occurs
only when securities are bought or sold in the market. 139 The
Court reasoned that if the fiduciary used the nonpublic information
in ways not involving trading on the securities market, no section
10(b) violation would exist. 4
III. O'Hagan Dissected
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Eighth Circuit's interpre-
tation that Chiarella, 4I Dirks,42 and Central Bank 43 held that sec-
tion 10(b) liability cannot be predicated on a duty owed to the
source of nonpublic information.144  Attempting to distinguish
source that he plans to trade on the nonpublic information, there is no 'de-
ceptive device' and thus no § 10(b) violation...
Id.
138. See id. at 2209. However, "the fiduciary-turned-trader may remain liable
under state law for breach of a duty of loyalty." Id.
139. Id. ("[T]he fiduciary's fraud is consummated not when [he learns the] informa-
tion, but when, without disclosure to his principal, he uses [it] to purchase or sell
securities.").
140. See id. "The theory does not catch all conceivable forms of fraud involving
confidential information; rather, it catches fraudulent means of capitalizing on such
information through securities transactions." Id. Asserting that this is another limita-
tion on the forms of fraud section 10(b) reaches, the Court gave an example of a
situation where the misappropriation theory would not apply: a person who de-
frauded a bank into giving him a loan or embezzled cash from another, and then used
the proceeds from the fraud to purchase securities would not give rise to section 10(b)
liability since "'the proceeds would have value to the malefactor apart from their use
in a securities transaction, and the fraud would be complete as soon as the money was
obtained."' Id. (quoting Brief for United States at 24 n.13, O'Hagan). The dissent
found this analysis to be very troubling. "[I]t becomes plain that the majority's expla-
nation of how the misappropriation theory supposedly satisfies the 'in connection
with' requirement is incomplete. The touchstone required for an embezzlement to be
'use[d] or employ[ed], in connection with' a securities transaction is not merely that it
'coincide' with, or be consummated by, the transaction, but that it is necessarily and
only consummated by the transaction." Id. at 2222 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis
in original). The Court concluded that the misappropriation theory squares with the
language of section 10(b) requiring deception "in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security." See id. at 2210.
141. 445 U.S. 222 (1980); see supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
142. 463 U.S. 646 (1983); see supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
143. 511 U.S. 164 (1994); see supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
144. See United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 619 (8th Cir. 1996) ("Against this
venerable body of law, the misappropriation theory, which allows the imposition of
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these cases, the Court stated that although it declined to find liabil-
ity on "so broad a theory" in Chiarella, its decision did not limit
liability to the relationship between a corporation's insiders and
shareholders.'45 Similarly, the Dirks decision did not foreclose lia-
bility under the misappropriation theory because the information
at issue was not improperly acquired or misused.146 Finally, under
its Central Bank decision, the Supreme Court held that there is no
private right of action for aiding and abetting liability under section
10(b), but cautioned that secondary actors may still be liable under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for certain conduct. 47 Accordingly,
the Court found no inconsistencies between the misappropriation
theory and its previous decisions. 48
Rather than continue to limit the reach of section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5, the O'Hagan Court extended the prohibition of trading on
material, nonpublic information. However, if the O'Hagan deci-
sion is consistent with previous cases, as the Court suggests, why is
this result so different? The answer lies in the canon of construc-
tion employed by the O'Hagan Court. The majority was persuaded
that the misappropriation theory is "well-tuned to an animating
purpose of the Exchange Act: to insure honest securities markets
and thereby promote investor confidence."' 49 The O'Hagan deci-
sion, therefore, was not reached using textualism, but rather,
purposivism:
In sum, considering the inhibiting impact on market participation
of trading on misappropriated information, and the congres-
sional purposes underlying § 10(b), it makes scant sense to hold
a lawyer like O'Hagan a § 10(b) violator if he works for a law
firm representing the target of a tender offer, but not if he works
§ 10(b) liability even though no market participant was deceived or defrauded, cannot
be defended.").
145. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2211-12 (noting that the Court declined to find the
defendant liable because the misappropriation theory had not been submitted to thejury, but in fact, four Justices found merit in it).
146. See id. at 2213; see supra note 43 and accompanying text.
147. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2213. In Central Bank, the Court stated: "Any
person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative
device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or seller
of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under 10b-5, assuming ... the
requirements for primary liability under Rule 10b-5 are met." Central Bank, 511 U.S.
at 191 (emphasis added). The O'Hagan Court explained that the Eighth Circuit im-
properly understood this passage to mean that only deceptive statements or omissions
on which purchasers, sellers, and perhaps other market participants, rely are covered
by section 10(b). O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2213.
148. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2213-14.
149. Id. at 2210.
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for a law firm representing the bidder.15°
A. The Methodology of Purposivism in O'Hagan
By the time it considered O'Hagan, the Supreme Court had ad-
dressed the scope of liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in
a number of cases using a textualist approach.'51 The O'Hagan
Court, however, rendered its decision based on policy reasons, us-
ing a purposivist approach. Although it arguably may be proper to
impose liability on those who misappropriate confidential informa-
tion, the misappropriation theory is not the proper means because
it requires an overly broad interpretation of the language of section
10(b). Moreover, when a statute is written in vague and uncertain
terms, it should be construed as narrowly as possible, to avoid in-
consistent results.152
1. Proponents of the Misappropriation Theory Advocate a
Purposivist Approach
After the Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank, 5 3 the mis-
appropriation theory received a great deal of scholarly debate, with
many judges and commentators advocating both intentionalism
and purposivism as approaches to interpreting section 10(b). 154
The misappropriation theory has gained judicial favor because our
country values so highly the securities market that courts will go to
great lengths to protect people's confidence in it.155
Proponents argue that the misappropriation theory is consistent
with the underlying purpose behind the securities laws. 56 When
150. Id. at 2210-11 (emphasis added).
151. See supra Part II.B.
152. See Grundfest, supra note 8, at 42-45.
153. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
154. See United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1029 (2d Cir. 1986) ("[W]e
think that the application of the misappropriation theory herein promotes the pur-
poses and policies underlying section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5"); Aldave supra note 8, at
122 ("The misappropriation theory... comports well with our intuition about what is
wrong with trading on nonpublic information.").
155. See Spencer Derek Klein, Note, Insider Trading, SEC Decision-Making, and
the Calculus of Investor Confidence, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 665 (1988) (discussing the
nexus between insider trading and investor confidence).
156. The securities laws were created in order to regulate the troubled securities
markets and to restore peoples confidences in them. See Thel, supra note 16, at 425;
Aldave, supra note 8, at 122-23 (stating that in order to maintain the integrity of the
securities market, it. must remain fair, as "no one likes to play a game with an oppo-
nent who has a loaded dice."). Aldave, whose analysis the Supreme Court relied on
in O'Hagan, explained that "[w]e think that those who have special access to informa-
tion, because of employment or other relationships, should be barred from using that
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Congress enacted section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange
Act, it did so for the purpose of protecting purchasers and sellers of
securities.157 Thus, proponents urge that the misappropriation the-
ory is in accord with the statute's goal, because "Congress chose to
enact a comprehensive yet open-ended statutory scheme, capable
of ongoing adaptation and refinement.' 1 58 The misappropriation
theory may also be accepted under purposivism because it ad-
vances the policy of basic fairness. 59
2. Purposivism Is Not the Appropriate Tool for Interpreting
Section 10(b)
The Supreme Court's purposivist approach in O'Hagan is not an
appropriate method of interpreting section 10(b). Instead, courts
should rely on textualism alone because liability under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 risks being expanded without limit, leaving
investors as well as the courts without a clear understanding of pro-
hibited conduct.' 60
information to gain an advantage over the rest of us." Id. Aldave concluded that
"[t]he Court's adoption of the misappropriation theory would produce results consis-
tent with our notions of fairness..." Id. at 124.
Interestingly, Rule lOb-5 itself was hastily created to address a situation where the
president of a corporation who misinformed the shareholders of the condition of the
corporation subsequently purchased the shares of the company from the shareholders
at depressed prices. The general unfairness of this event led to the drafting and adop-
tion of the rule in one day, with the Commissioner's explanation: "Well, we are
against fraud, aren't we?" See Brodsky & Kramer, supra note 38, at 110.
157. See United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 946-47 (4th Cir. 1995).
158. SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 203 (2d Cir. 1984). The repeated use of the
word "any" evidences the intention of Congress to draft the rule broadly. See Affili-
ated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972). In fact, when it passed
the Insider Trading Sanction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264, and the
Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-704, 102
Stat. 4677, Congress found the misappropriation theory to be consistent with section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5. See SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 452 (9th Cir. 1990). Section
10(b) was intended to be broad in scope, encompassing all "manipulative and decep-
tive practices which have been demonstrated to fulfill no useful function." S. REP. No.
792, at 6 (1934).
159. In United States v. Carpenter, the Second Circuit explained that "the applica-
tion of the misappropriation theory herein promotes the purposes and policies under-
lying Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5." United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1029
(2d Cir. 1986).
160. See Grundfest, supra note 8, at 41-43. Grundfest compares poorly drafted stat-
utes, particularly section 10(b), to an inkblot in a Rorschach test, which is a series of
inkblots used in psychiatric analysis, where the patient describes the images evoked
by the inkblots and the analyst interprets the patients descriptions. The inkblots
themselves have no intrinsic meaning. See id. "When a statute presents itself as an
inkblot, it should be construed as narrowly as practicable lest it become a breeding
ground for competing judicial imaginations." Id. at 42. Grundfest found the federal
MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
The Court may find it necessary to interpret the securities laws
flexibly because regulating the securities industry has become in-
creasingly difficult as technological advances and communication
systems have become more sophisticated. 161 Unfortunately, Con-
gress has not been able to keep up with new problems as they have
evolved. Thus, by using a purposivist approach to interpret section
10(b), the Court can remedy any problems by advancing the under-
lying purpose of the securities laws, which is to promote ethical
standards in the securities market and to protect investors from
fraud.1 6
2
Purposivism creates a problem, however. First, it permits courts
to legislate on a case-by-case basis without the benefit of congres-
sional hearings, or the accountability of elected legislative officials.
This, of course, offends the traditional role of the courts, which is
limited to interpreting the laws that the legislature enacts.
Although courts certainly have considerable discretion in interpret-
ing statutes, judicial activism without deference to Congress is not
appropriate.
Second, there will be no limit to the scope of liability under sec-
tion 10(b) if courts can look to merely the purpose of enacting the
securities law, and in particular section 10(b), to be extremely ambiguous, thereby
enabling judges who strongly oppose fraud in the securities markets to extend the
language of section 10(b) without limit. See id. at 44. He found the great ambiguity to
be evidenced by the number of times the Court has split 5-4 in cases interpreting
federal securities law. See id. at 45, 48-55. Grundfest criticizes the intentionalist ap-
proach to interpreting section 10(b), given the instability of congressional intent over
time. See id. at 57.
Intentionalists thus confront the uncomfortable problem that, if they look to
the intent of the Congress that in 1934 enacted section 10(b) they find no
guidance, but if they look to the intent of subsequent Congresses they can
infer sharply conflicting guidance depending on where their intentionalist
time machines stop along the way.
Id. at 58.
161. See Bevis Longstreth, The SEC After Fifty Years: An Assessment of its Past and
Future, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1593, 1610 (1983) ("The growing internationalization of
the securities markets will pose another challenge for the Commission in the coming
years. As advances in communications technology make the situs of trading in securi-
ties less important, the Commission will face increasing difficulty in ensuring that its
investor protections reach all transaction in world class securities effected by or for
the benefit of U.S. citizens."); Lewis D. Solomon & Louise Corso, The Impact of
Technology on the Trading of Securities: The Emerging Global Market and the Impli-
cations for Regulation, 24 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 299, 328 (1991) (book review) ("Ad-
vances in technology will continue to increase the globalization of the securities
markets .... [and] [t]he globalization of securities creates new challenges for securities
regulators around the world.").
162. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
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law. Given the broad purposes and goals of the 1934 Act,'1 63 it is
obvious that a purposivist approach may be overreaching. 164 Fur-
ther, interpreting the statute in such a way will have the effect of
making liability for trading securities unpredictable.
While the issue of statutory interpretation is certainly un-
resolved, it is anomalous for the Court suddenly to shift gears after
using textualism to interpret section 10(b) for over twenty years.1 65
The Court's sudden shift in its method of interpreting section 10(b)
may be explained by the fact that fairness is a particularly impor-
tant principle in securities trading, and as many tools as possible
are needed to protect the markets. The purposivist argument1 66 is
understandable when applied to the facts of O'Hagan because, if a
strict textual reading of section 10(b) would free someone as culpa-
ble as O'Hagan, then textualism must be improper. This argument
is unconvincing, however, because it enables courts, instead of
Congress, to make laws, which is a clear violation of the separation
of powers. 67
The Supreme Court should refrain from policy-making, and in-
terpret section 10(b) according to its plain language. 68 By finding
that liability under this statute may be predicated on the misappro-
priation theory, the Court contradicted its own precedent, and sub-
stituted its own policy judgments for the letter of the law.1 69
163. See id.
164. For example, under a purposivist approach, Dirks would probably have been
found guilty of violating section 10(b), despite the absence of a breach of duty, be-
cause a court would likely find that his conduct conflicted with the goal of promoting
ethical standards in the market despite his effort to expose a fraud. See Dirks v. SEC,
463 U.S. 646 (1983); supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
165. See supra Part II.B. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, the Court held that "[i]n
addressing [the question of whether negligent conduct is a basis for 10(b) liability], we
turn first to the language of § 10(b), for '[t]he starting point in every case involving
construction of a statute is the language itself."' Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 197 (1976) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,
756 (1975)).
166. See supra notes 103-110 and accompanying text.
167. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 742 (1971) ("It
would ... be utterly inconsistent with the concept of separation of powers for this
Court to use its power.., to prevent behavior that Congress has specifically declined
to prohibit.") (Marshall, J., concurring).
168. See Joseph J. Humke, Comment, The Misappropriation Theory of Insider
Trading: Outside the Lines of Section 10(b), 80 MARQ. L. REV. 819, 835 (1997) ("Sim-
ply stated, absent a well-articulated legislative record specifically addressing the pro-
vision and question at issue, which is simply not the case with respect to insider
trading under section 10(b), textualism directs judicial interpretation of the securities
laws.").
169. As proponents of the misappropriation theory suggest, Congress enacted sec-
tion 10(b) in order to proscribe a broad range of fraudulent conduct in connection
MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
B. The Misappropriation Theory is Inconsistent with Section
10(b)
The misappropriation theory, as adopted by the Supreme Court
in O'Hagan, permits liability absent the requisite "fraud" and "in
connection with" requirements of section 10(b). Despite the
Court's policy arguments, the misappropriation theory, as a matter
of law, does not satisfy the statutory requirements.
1. The Misappropriation Theory Permits Liability Absent Fraud
First, the misappropriation theory does not satisfy the fraud re-
quirement of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Many commentators
and judges suggest that the misappropriation theory does not fit
easily into a traditional fraud analysis because the breach is not
between an insider and the shareholders of a corporation. 170 While
the Supreme Court in O'Hagan found that liability under this the-
ory is limited when a fiduciary discloses the information,17' in many
cases, "early disclosure of the misappropriated information would
have only further harmed the person or entity to whom the duty
was owed. 1
72
Although many courts have adopted the misappropriation the-
ory, 73 the Eighth Circuit is not alone in its unfavorable interpreta-
with the purchase or sale of securities. It bears remembering that the language of
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not even cover traditional insider trading. See Fisch,
supra note 12, at 187-99 (arguing that the doctrine under which insider trading is regu-
lated is seriously flawed). Further, "[n]either the words of section 10(b) nor the stat-
ute's legislative history manifest any Congressional intent to have the federal judiciary
interpret section 10(b) as enabling legislation for the formulation of judicial public
policy." Kenny & Thebaut, supra note 47, at 210. The Supreme Court has declared
that the creation of a new species of fraud under section 10(b) would "depart[ ] radi-
cally from the established doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship be-
tween two parties ... [and] should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence
of congressional intent." Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980). Ascer-
tainment of legislative intent, according to the Court, must "rest primarily on the
language" of section 10(b). Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1997).
170. The "duty breached by persons found liable under the misappropriation the-
ory is different from the duty arising out of an insider's relationship to the corpora-
tion's shareholders." Brodsky & Kramer, supra note 38, at 132; see United States v.
Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 950 (4th Cir. 1995). Cf SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 410 n.5 (7th
Cir. 1991) ("There is little question that the vague term 'fraud' as used in Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 can encompass the misappropriation theory."); SEC v. Clark,
915 F.2d 439, 448-49 (9th Cir. 1990) (concluding that "the misappropriation theory fits
comfortably" within "the notoriously vague" terms of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
171. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2209 (1997).
172. Brodsky & Kramer, supra note 38, at 132. See, e.g., United States v. Willis, 737
F. Supp. 269, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (stating that disclosure violates the client-doctor
privilege).
173. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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tion of it.174 The Supreme Court itself has ordered that the concept
of fraud in the securities context not be expanded beyond what the
words of the 1934 Act permit.175 It has also established that section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not remedy every instance of undesirable
conduct involving securities,17 6 and that "[t]he language of § 10(b)
gives no indication that Congress meant to prohibit any conduct
not involving manipulation or deception.' '1 77
2. Misappropriation Theory Permits Liability Absent the "In
Connectioh With" Requirement
Generally, the courts that adopted the misappropriation theory
were also very lenient with respect to the requirement that the
fraud be committed "in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security."' 78 The Supreme Court, in O'Hagan, explained that the
fraud is complete only when the information has been used in a
securities transaction.1 79 Because the fraud is not consummated
when the fiduciary gains the confidential information, but rather,
occurs when he uses it to purchase or sell securities without disclo-
sure, the nexus is necessarily present. 8 °
This principle, however, is a radical departure from the Court's
recent strict interpretation of the language of section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 where it held that the "in connection with" requirement
was satisfied only when the fraud affects the financial marketplace
174. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. The Fourth Circuit was the first
jurisdiction to break ranks and find that the misappropriation theory is irreconcilable
with Supreme Court precedent. See Bryan, 58 F.3d at 944. The court found it troub-
lesome that the "fraud" requirement is met when a person misappropriates material,
nonpublic information in breach of some special duty, even if the source of the infor-
mation is neither a purchaser or seller of securities, nor in any way connected to the
purchase or sale of securities. See id.
175. See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164,
174 (1994).
176. See Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 16 (2d Cir. 1983) (discussing
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430
U.S. 462, 474-77 (1977)).
177. Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 473; see supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Santa Fe.
178. See, e.g., Clark, 915 F.2d at 449 ("[T]he question here is whether there is some
nexus between [the defendant's] misappropriation of ... confidential information
and any securities transaction."). For example, in United States v. Newman, even
though the fraud was not against a purchaser or seller of securities, the court held that
the "in connection with" requirement was met since Newman's "sole purpose" in mis-
appropriating the information was to purchase stock in the target companies. United
States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 18 (2d Cir. 1981); see supra notes 74-76 and accompa-
nying text.
179. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2209.
180. See id.
MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
and the victim is a defrauded purchaser or seller.'81 As the dissent
in O'Hagan pointed out, the misappropriation theory should not
cover cases involving fraud on the source of information where the
source has no connection with the other participant in a securities
transaction. 1
82
3. Congress Should Intervene with a Statute
Few would argue that James O'Hagan's behavior was not repre-
hensible and should go unpunished. 83 The misappropriation the-
ory, however, may not be so easy to accept when the conduct
amounts to no more than a breach of an employment contract, 184
breach of the psychiatrist-patient confidence, 85 failure to keep
nonpublic business information within the family, 86 or basic theft
and burglary. 87 The appeal for redress is understandable when in-
formation is misappropriated and used to trade on the securities
markets. Although there may be a need for federal standards to
protect investors against the mishandling of material, nonpublic in-
formation, the Supreme Court has instructed that such standards
"should not be supplied by judicial extension of § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 to 'cover the corporate universe.' 188
Instead, Congress should intervene to finally resolve this issue by
creating a statute which clearly and directly addresses liability for
insider trading. Professor Jill Fisch offers a unique proposal that
181. See Fisch, supra note 12, at 195 (analyzing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 755 (1975)).
182. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2223 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas
noted that O'Hagan could have done a number of things with the information he
acquired: "He could have sold it to a newspaper for publication, he could have given
or sold the information to Pillsbury itself, or he could even have kept the information
and used it solely for his personal amusement, perhaps in a fantasy stock trading
game." Id. (internal citations omitted). The fact that he chose to purchase securities
based on the information "is thus no more significant here than it is in the case of
embezzling money used to purchase securities." Id.; see supra note 140 and accompa-
nying text.
183. In addition to purchasing securities based on information he had access to
through his employment at the law firm, O'Hagan allegedly used the profits gained
through this unlawful trading to conceal his previous embezzlement and conversion of
unrelated client trust funds. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2205.
184. See SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 453 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Carpen-
ter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1026 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d
Cir. 1981).
185. See United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
186. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991); United States
v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 705 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d
Cir. 1985).
187. See SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 411 (7th Cir. 1991).
188. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 480 (1977) (internal citation omitted).
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would replace the concept of regulation based on the trader's fidu-
ciary duties with a system of regulation based on insider status.189
Specifically, Fisch's proposed statute defines two groups with in-
sider status: "primary insiders" and "secondary insiders," and re-
stricts these insiders from trading on information obtained by
virtue of their status. 190
By regulating the unlawful trading in the securities market
through explicit legislative action, Congress could respect the doc-
trine of the separation of powers. In addition, a congressional stat-
ute, such as the one proposed by Professor Fisch, can better resolve
the problems of unlawful trading because it equips the courts with
a clear standard that can easily be applied whenever there in an
allegation of unlawful trading.
The misappropriation theory, adopted by O'Hagan, shifts the fo-
cus of section 10(b) from protecting investors in the securities mar-
ket to protecting the sources of confidential information. Even the
scant evidence of legislative history makes clear that this was not
the purpose of the statute. Therefore, the misappropriation theory
not only goes beyond the text of the statute, but it also reaches
beyond the underlying purpose of the statute.
Moreover, the misappropriation theory makes potential liability
less predictable under section 10(b), 19 1 and the O'Hagan decision
does nothing to alleviate the problem. When addressed with this
problem in the past, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the
189. Fisch, supra note 12, at 238-39.
190. Primary insiders include those who have "(1) the ability to affect the content
and timing of corporate disclosure; (2) regular access to information on significant
corporate events; and (3) the ability to affect the decisionmaking process about such
events." Id. at 240-41. "Secondary insiders are those who by virtue of an employment
or other contractual relationship receive nonpublic information relating to the issuer
or its securities for the purpose of advising or rendering services to the corporation or
its management." Id. at 241. Under her proposed statute, primary insiders who, due
to their status as an insider, possess material, nonpublic information relative to any
security, are prohibited from taking advantage of that information by tipping or trad-
ing. See id. at 242. Secondary insiders are prohibited from taking advantage of mate-
rial, nonpublic information relative to any security, obtained by their relationship with
the corporation. See id. Further, "tippee trading would be regulated indirectly by
requiring tippers to be responsible for the economic consequences of tippee trading."
Id. at 247-48.
191. See Bryan, 58 F.3d at 951 ("It would be difficult to overstate the uncertainty
that has been introduced into the already uncertain law governing fraudulent securi-
ties transactions through adoption of the misappropriation theory, with its linchpin
the breach of a fiduciary duty."); see also Chestman, 947 F.2d at 567, ("Our Rule 10b-
5 precedents under the misappropriation theory ... provide little guidance with re-
spect to the question of fiduciary breach, because they involved egregious fiduciary
breaches arising solely in the context of employer/employee associations.").
MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
securities market "'demands certainty and predictability,' 1 92 and
that it is "essential ... to have a guiding principle for those whose
daily activities must be limited and instructed by the SEC's insider-
trading rules.' 93 While it is not difficult to argue that James
O'Hagan breached a fiduciary duty, in several cases where courts
have imposed liability under the misappropriation theory, the
breach has not been so clear. 194 Unlike the misappropriation the-
ory, a congressional statute would provide the certainty and pre-
dictability needed to regulate this area.
Finally, although Professor Fisch argues that insider trading
should not be criminalized, 195 civil penalties alone will not provide
sufficient deterrence for those with access to valuable market infor-
mation. If insiders are required merely to disgorge profits when
they are caught illegally taking advantage of material, nonpublic
information, it may be worth their risk to continue such unlawful
activity. Rogue investors attempting to trade on misappropriated
information will have an incentive to keep trying until they eventu-
ally are successful. Accordingly, there should be criminal penalties
for this type of unlawful insider trading, consisting of harsh fines
and imprisonment.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court should interpret section 10(b) based on its
plain language in order to respect the role of Congress as
lawmaker, and its own role as interpreter of the law. In O'Hagan,
the Court improperly extended liability under section 10(b) to
reach a culpable defendant whose conduct was not covered by the
language of the statute or the rule. The courts, however, simply are
not competent to regulate in the complicated area of securities law.
192. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 188
(1994) (quoting Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 652 (1988)).
193. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983).
194. For instance, the Second Circuit, in Chestman, struggled to define a line to
establish the necessary fiduciary relationship. See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 567-71.
O'Hagan merely condoned the theory, without directing the courts as to the limits of
its application. The Bryan Court, which championed the fight against the misappro-
priation theory, stated that "although fifteen years have passed since the theory's in-
ception, no court adopting the misappropriation theory has offered a principled basis
for distinguishing which types of fiduciary or similar relationships of trust and confi-
dence can give rise to Rule 10b-5 liability and which cannot." Bryan, 58 F.3d at 951.
195. See Fisch, supra note 12, at 237-38 (suggesting that because "insider trading
cannot readily be equated with either stealing or lying ... classifying such trading as
criminal and penalizing it with stiff prison sentences should be reconsidered."). In-
stead, Fisch suggests insider trading be enforced by civil disgorgement. See id. at 251.
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Instead, Congress alone is responsible for making laws that will
punish people like James O'Hagan. Thus, Congress should draft a
statute that will protect market participants, rather than the
sources of market information, thereby serving the underlying pur-
pose of section 10(b).
QUESTIONING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
NONSCIENTIFIC TESTIMONY AFTER
DAUBERT: THE NEED FOR INCREASED
JUDICIAL GATEKEEPING TO ENSURE




How can the jury judge between two statements each founded
upon an experience confessedly foreign in kind to their own? It
is just because they are incompetent for such a task that the ex-
pert is necessary at all.1
The use of experts in both criminal and civil trials is widespread,2
and has grown considerably in recent years. Because experts have
specialized knowledge and experience, judges and juries rely upon
them to clarify and illuminate complex issues that arise in trials.4
Indeed, a jury's ability to come to a reasoned judgment often
hinges on the testimony of an expert who, in passing on general
truths gathered from specialized experience, enables the jury to
fully comprehend the facts of a case.' Problems arise, however,
when juries must construe contradictory testimony from two peo-
ple who testify before them as "experts" on the same subject mat-
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 1999; B.A., Brown Uni-
versity, 1995. I would like to thank Professors James Kainen and Daniel Capra of
Fordham University School of Law and William Schmitz for their assistance through-
out the drafting of this Note. I also greatly appreciate the support of my family and
friends, especially my parents, Leslie and Jim Needham, whose encouragement is a
constant source of motivation.
1. Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testi-
mony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 54 (1901).
2. See L. Timothy Perrin, Expert Witness Testimony: Back To The Future, 29 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1389, 1389 (1995).
3. See Hand, supra note 1, at 42-49; Jay P. Kesan, Note, An Autopsy of Scientific
Evidence In A Post-Daubert World, 84. GEo. L.J. 1985, 2041 (1996).
4. See Michael J. Polentz, Comment, Post-Daubert Confusion With Expert Testi-
mony, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1187, 1187 (1986).
5. See Hand, supra note 1, at 54.
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ter.6 At the crux of this issue is the importance of reliable expert
testimony. i.,
The increased reliance on expert testimony in trials7 has led to a
controversy among judges and litigators regarding the admissibility
of specialized, but nonscientific, expert testimony,8 and the appro-
priate standard for ensuring reliability.9 In 1993, the United States
Supreme Court clarified the admissibility of scientific evidence in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,1° and resolved a
split among the federal circuits' by creating guidelines for apply-
ing the Federal Rules of Evidence to scientific expert testimony. 12
Scientific testimony, however, is only one type of expert testi-
mony proffered, 3 and by addressing only this type of testimony,
the Supreme Court left open significant questions regarding the ad-
missibility of testimony that is not "scientific."' 4 While the recent
6. See United States v. Amarel, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973) (stating that
juries are easily swayed by expert testimony as a result of "its aura of special reliabil-
ity and trustworthiness"); see also Polentz, supra note 2, at 1203 (stating that expert
testimony can be a powerful tool that has the potential to sway a decision one way or
another).
7. See Perrin, supra note 2, at 1391.
8. Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence addresses not only scientific testi-
mony but also that which is based on "technical or other specialized knowledge."
The rule provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EvID. 702. Nonscien-
tific testimony based upon "specialized" or "technical" knowledge comes from skilled
witnesses who are trained in a particular area or who have acquired specialized
knowledge through experience. See infra notes 32-45 and accompanying text (provid-
ing examples of skilled witnesses).
9. See Peter B. Oh, Assessing the Admissibility of Nonscientific Expert Evidence
Under Federal Evidence Rule 702, 64 DEF. COUNS. J. 556, 556 (1997) (stating that
ensuring the reliability of nonscientific testimony is "an increasingly common
problem").
10. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
11. The circuits were split over whether Rule 702 superseded the common law
"general acceptance" standard of admissibility of scientific expert testimony articu-
lated in Frye. Compare United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (1978) (stating that
Rule 702 superseded Frye) with Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106,
1110-12 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating that Rule 702 and Frye coexist). See infra note 48 and
accompanying text (discussing the circuit split). Daubert ultimately resolved this split
by developing a multi-factor test to ensure the reliability of scientific testimony. See
infra Part I.C.
12. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 (holding that Frye was no longer the applicable
standard and that Rule 702 superseded Frye).
13. See FED R. EVIo. 702 (listing specialized and technical knowledge in addition
to scientific knowledge as potential bases for admissible testimony).
14. See Jennifer Laser, Note, Inconsistent Gatekeeping in Federal Courts: Applica-
tion of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. to Nonscientific Expert Testi-
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fear of "junk science '"15 in the courtroom is primarily associated
with scientific testimony, substantial risks are created by limiting
the focus of reliable testimony in trials to scientific inquiries.16 Evi-
dentiary problems are exacerbated when courts are faced with the
elusive concept of nonscientific expert testimony.
1 7
This Note examines the impact of the Daubert decision on non-
scientific testimony and proposes a standard for determining the
admissibility of such evidence. Part I describes the various legal
standards applied to determine the admissibility of scientific testi-
mony, including the common law test,18 Federal Rule of Evidence
70219 ("Rule 702"), and the Daubert factors.20 Part II illustrates
the split in the federal circuits regarding the application of Daubert
to nonscientific testimony and shows how courts, in recent years,
have grappled to ensure the reliability of such testimony. Part III
advocates the need to scrutinize the reliability of nonscientific testi-
mony and analyzes proposals for applying Daubert to nonscientific
testimony, extending Daubert's reliability requirement, and
amending Rule 702. This Note concludes by proposing an amend-
ment to Rule 702 that provides courts with the necessary frame-
work to incorporate a reliability requirement into the decision
whether to admit nonscientific expert testimony.
mony, 30 Loy. L.A. REV. 1379, 1381 (1997) ("While resolving the Frye controversy
over the need for general acceptance of scientific expert evidence, the Daubert inter-
pretation of Rule 702 left unanswered several important questions.").
15. See PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURT-
ROOM (1991) (demonstrating the negative effect junk science has had on the legal
process). "Junk Science" refers to baseless scientific claims that scientists do not ac-
cept. See Peter Huber, Junk Science in the Courtroom, 26 VAL. U.L. REV. 723, 753
(1992); Dick Thornburgh, Junk Science - The Lawyer's Ethical Responsibilities, 25
FORDHAM URB. L.J.-, - (1998).
16. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Next Step After Daubert: Developing A Simi-
larly Epistemological Approach To Ensuring The Reliability Of Nonscientific Expert
Testimony, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2271, 2273 (1994) (stating that there are doubts
about the reliability of nonscientific expert testimony which may prove to be less solu-
ble and more troublesome than the doubts about "junk science"); Laser, supra note
14, at 1379; see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (expressing concern about how courts would apply Daubert when
faced with expert testimony based on nonscientific knowledge).
17. See Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1348 (6th Cir. 1993).
18. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
19. FED R. EVID. 702; see infra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
20. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600.
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I. Background
A. The Frye Common Law Approach
Frye v. United States"1 established the common law standard for
determining the admissibility of scientific expert testimony.22 Frye
set forth a framework for trial judges, which became known as the
"general acceptance" test,23 whereby scientific testimony was not
admissible unless the methodology used by the expert was ac-
cepted in the general community of scientists.24 Frye provided a
two-step analysis for evaluating scientific testimony in which trial
judges: (i) identified the scientific field of the testimony; and, (ii)
determined whether the principle was generally accepted by scien-
tists in the same field.
Under Frye, judges did not examine the reliability of such testi-
mony, but rather they looked to the general community of scien-
tists to see if there was substantial agreement that the methodology
the expert employed was sound.26 Thus, a judge was required to
understand only enough about a scientific principle to gauge
whether it was generally accepted within the relevant community. 27
The Frye test was overly conservative, however, because expert tes-
timony based upon a newly developed methodology was rendered
21. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
22. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585 ("In the 70 years since its formulation in the Frye
case, the 'general acceptance' test has been the dominant standard for determining
the admissibility of novel scientific evidence."). Frye involved a murder trial in which
the defendant sought to admit the result of a systolic blood pressure deception test as
exculpatory evidence. See Frye, 293 F. at 1013. The defense's theory was that "con-
scious deception or falsehood, concealment of facts, or guilt of crime, accompanied by
fear of detection when the person is under examination, raises the systolic blood pres-
sure." Id. The scientist who conducted the test was not allowed to testify nor was he
allowed to administer the test to Frye in front of the jury. See id.
23. Id. at 1014; see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585-86 (discussing the Frye test).
24. See Frye, 293 F. at 1013. Before Frye, the general rule with regard to expert
testimony was that testimony offered by a qualified witness and which was relevant to
an issue was admissible and courts left the consideration of the weight of the testi-
mony to the jury. See, e.g., Carbonero Reading Co. v. Munson, 122 F. 753, 755 (1st
Cir. 1903); Golden Reward Min. Co. v. Buxton Min. Co. 97 F. 413, 416 (8th Cir. 1899);
St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Edwards, 78 F. 745, 746 (8th Cir. 1897); Edward P. Allis Co.
v. Columbia Mill Co. 65 F. 52, 57 (8th Cir. 1894).
25. See Frye, 293 F. at 1014. Frye failed to clearly define "general acceptance,"
and thus subject the test to varied judicial interpretation. See Paul C. Gianelli, The
Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A Half-Century Later,
80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1208 (1980) (citing a series of cases applying the Frye stan-
dard and demonstrating the courts' divergence in interpreting what constituted "gen-
eral acceptance").
26. See Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
27. See Kesan, supra note 3, at 1991 (asserting that the Frye test survived for over
half a century because it was "intrinsically well-suited" to the judiciary).
1998] ADMISSIBILITY OF NONSCIENTIFIC TESTIMONY 545
inadmissible if it was not yet generally accepted. 8 Frye also was
criticized because it did not clearly define "general acceptance,"
causing courts to experience difficulty in ascertaining scientific
validity. 9
B. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Alternative Tests
The application of Frye came into question after the enactment
of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 in 1975,30 which allows judges to
admit the testimony of a qualified expert if the testimony helps the
jury understand the evidence.31 Rule 702 applies to expert testi-
mony requiring technical knowledge, specialized knowledge, and
scientific knowledge. 32 Technical knowledge is knowledge of any-
thing "pertaining to or connected with the mechanical or industrial
arts and the applied sciences. ' 33 Specialized knowledge refers to
any knowledge focused on a particular area of study, profession, or
experience. 34 Examples of the myriad of experts who base testi-
mony on technical and specialized knowledge include police of-
ficers,35  accountants,36  bankers,37  lawyers,38  economists,39
28. See Frye, 293 F. at 1014; Kesan, supra note 3, at 2017-18.
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the ex-
perimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this
twighlight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and
while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a
well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs....
United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (noting that Frye's re-
quirement that a methodology gain general acceptance hinders the admissibility of
new methods); see also Constantine J. Maletskos & Stephen J. Spielman, Introduction
of New Scientific Methods in Court, 1 LAW ENFORCEMENT SCI. & TECH. 957, 958
(1967).
29. See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1233 (3d Cir. 1985) (maintaining
that Frye was inconsistent with Rule 702). Frye did not explain how courts were to
determine "general acceptance." See Kesan, supra note 3, at 1991.
30. FED R. EVID. 702; see Daubert 509 U.S. at 587 n.5. (citing the circuit split over
whether Rule 702 superseded Frye); see also supra note 8 and accompanying text
(discussing Rule 702).
31. FED R. EvID. 702. According to Rule 702, an expert witness is qualified as an
expert by "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education." And, as such, the
expert may give testimony containing "scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge" which would be helpful to the trier of fact. Id.
32. See id.
33. RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1831 (2d ed.
1987).
34. See id.
35. See Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342 (6th Cir. 1994).
36. See Frymire-Brinati v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 2 F.3d 183 (7th Cir. 1993).
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farmers 0 mechanics," engineers,42 social psychologists,4 3 experts
in drug trafficking,4" and real estate appraisers.45
Scientific knowledge differs from technical and specialized
knowledge because it is based on the concept of "Newtonian Sci-
ence," 46 which refers to the process of formulating a hypothesis,
and then engaging in experimentation or observation to verify or
falsify that hypothesis.47 Rule 702's inclusion of scientific knowl-
edge caused a split among the federal circuits regarding the appro-
priate standard to be applied for determining the admissibility of
scientific testimony.48 Partly because the rule and its legislative his-
tory did not mention the "general acceptance test,' 49 after 1975,
some courts concluded that Rule 702 superseded Frye. ° Other
courts, however, maintained that "general acceptance" was still a
requirement for the admissibility of scientific testimony.51
37. See Den Norske Bank AS v. First N at'l Bank of Boston, 75 F.3d 49 (1st Cir.
1996).
38. See United States v. Sinclair, 74 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 1996).
39. See Marcel v. Placid Oil Co., 11 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 1994).
40. See MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 702.1, at
614 (3d ed. 1991).
41. See Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433 (11th Cir. 1997).
42. See Roback v. V.I.P. Transp. Inc., 90 F.3d 1207 (7th Cir. 1996).
43. See United States v. Hall, 974 F. Supp. 1198 (C.D. Ill. 1997).
44. See United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225 (9th Cir. 1997).
45. See F.D.I.C. v. Suni Assoc., 80 F.3d 681 (2d Cir. 1996).
46. See Imwinkelried, supra note 16, at 2276.
47. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). Justice Black-
mun referred to Newtonian Science in phrasing the admissibility standard in Daubert,
stating that a proposition supported by appropriate scientific methodology is consid-
ered scientific knowledge. See id. How conclusions were reached rather than what
the conclusions stated was the relevant inquiry. "The focus, of course, must solely be
on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate." Id. at 595;
see also ALBUREY CASTELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN PHILOSOPHY 170, 197
(2d ed. 1963).
48. Compare United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224,1.234 (3d Cir. 1985) (Frye is
inconsistent with Rule 702) with Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106,
1111 (5th Cir. 1991) (Frye and Rule 702 coexist). See supra note 11 and accompany-
ing text.
49. See FED. R. EVID. 702; Gianelli, supra'note 25, at 1999 (noting the omission of
Frye from advisory committee notes, congressional committee reports and Federal
Rules Hearings).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1234 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding
that the Frye test was inconsistent with Rule 702's broad scope of relevance); United
States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978) (stating that the Federal Rules of
Evidence superseded Frye).
51. See United States v. Christophe, 883 F.2d 1296, 1299 (9th Cir. 1987) (discussing
circuit cases requiring "general acceptance"); Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769
F.2d 1128, 1142 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that Rule 702 applies broadly).
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Several courts, in rejecting Frye, developed alternative admissi-
bility standards5" such as the "substantial acceptance" test.5 3 This
test diverged from Frye because it allowed testimony based upon a
scientific principle or technique to be admitted if it was accepted by
a substantial minority of experts in that area. 4
Courts and commentators also developed multi-factor reliability
tests.55 Such tests required the court to consider the following fac-
tors: the potential rate of error;56 the existence of standards; 57 how
clearly the technique and its results could be explained;58 any
analogous relationship with other scientific techniques usually ad-
mitted into evidence; 59 falsifiable characteristics; the experts' quali-
fications;60 general acceptance in the scientific community;61 the
novelty of the technique or principle;62 and the extent to which the
technique or principle relied on the subjective interpretation of the
expert.63 These tests suggested that trial judges play a more signifi-
cant role in evaluating the reliability of the testimony offered in
their courtrooms.64 Moreover, in providing a "gatekeeping" role
for judges, these tests were precursors to the Supreme Court's
multi-factor reliability standard presented in Daubert.65
52. See Kesan, supra note 3, at 1992.
53. United States v. Williams, 443 F. Supp. 269, 273 (S.D.N.Y 1977), affd, 583 F.
2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978). The substantial acceptance test required that the scientific
principle advanced be accepted by a "substantial section of the scientific community."
Id. at 273.
54. See id. This approach, while adhering to the notion that acceptance within the
community is the key indicator of reliability, was more liberal than the "general ac-
ceptance" test because it allowed more testimony to be heard in court. See Kesan,
supra note 3, at 1992.
55. See Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978); see also Bert Black, A Unified The-
ory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595, 641-42 (1988) (discussing various
multi-factor reliability tests); J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, 3 WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE
702 at §§ 702-18 to 702-19 (1987) (providing a list of useful factors in assessing the
validity of scientific evidence); Mark McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New
Approach to Admissibility, 67 IOWA L. REV. 879, 911 (1982) (formulating eleven fac-
tors to be considered when evaluating scientific evidence).
56. See McCormick, supra note 55 at 911; see also United States v. Williams, 583
F.2d 1194, 1198-99 (2d Cir. 1978).
57. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 55, at 702-18.
58. See McCormick, supra note 55, at 911.
59. See id.




64. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).
65. See Kesan, supra note 3, at 1996.
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C. The Daubert Decision
In order to resolve a split in the federal circuits,66 the Supreme
Court granted certiorari, in Daubert, to decide the issue of the ad-
missibility of expert testimony after Rule 702.67 In Daubert, the
Court explicitly rejected Frye and adopted a more liberal standard
for determining the admissibility of scientific testimony.6 The
Daubert Court held that Rule 702 superseded the Frye "general
acceptance" test, and found the Frye test "rigid and not comporting
with the 'liberal thrust' and 'permissive backdrop' of the Federal
Rules. "69
The Court set forth new criteria by which a court should evaluate
the admissibility of scientific testimony. The nonexclusive, nondis-
positive Daubert factors are: (i) the existence of a falsifiable meth-
odology;70 (ii) whether the theory or technique has been subject to
66. Compare United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 59-60 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (apply-
ing Frye's "general acceptance" requirement) with DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,
Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 955 (3d Cir. 1990) (refusing to apply the "general acceptance"
standard). See Paul Giannelli & Edward Imwinkelried, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 1-5,
at 10-14 (1986 & Supp. 1991).
67. 506 U.S. 914 (1992).
68. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585. Daubert involved a suit by two children, Jason
Daubert and Eric Schuller and their parents against Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
alleging that Bendectin, a drug marketed by Merrell Dow to combat morning sickness
had caused their birth defects when ingested by their mothers during pregnancy. See
id. at 579. The trial court ruled that the plaintiff's expert testimony was inadmissible
to establish causation because it failed to satisfy the "general acceptance" test from
Frye. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 727 F. Supp. 570, 572 (S.D. Cal. 1989). The
plaintiffs based causation on animal studies, the similarity in chemical structure be-
tween Bendectin and drugs which induce abnormal embryologic development, and
statistical reanalysis of previously published studies. See id. On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 951 F.2d 1128 (1991). The Ninth
Circuit noted that other courts considering the risks of Bendectin were reluctant to
admit a reanalysis of epidemiological studies that had not been published or subject to
peer review stating that the unpublished testimony proffered by the plaintiffs was
"particularly problematic in light of the massive weight of the original published stud-
ies supporting the defendant's position, all of which has undergone full scrutiny from
the scientific community." Id. at 1130.
69. Id. at 593-94. The Court stated:
Nothing in the text of this Rule establishes "general acceptance" as an abso-
lute prerequisite to admissibility. Nor does respondent present any clear in-
dication that Rule 702 of the Rules as a whole were intended to incorporate
a "general acceptance" standard. The drafting history make no mention of
Frye, and a rigid "general acceptance" requirement would be at odds with
the "liberal thrust" of the Federal Rules and their "general approach of re-
laxing the traditional barriers to 'opinion testimony."'
Id. at 588.
70. The requirement of a falsifiable methodology compels judges to look for ob-
jective standards in the expert's testimony so that it might be tested and proven. See
id. at 579.
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peer review and publication;71 (iii) the known or potential rate of
error analysis and the existence and maintenance of controls of the
technique's operation;72 and (iv) the degree to which the theory
has been generally accepted 73 in the scientific community. 74 Thus,
while "general acceptance" was still a factor in the test for admissi-
bility, it no longer was the only way scientific evidence could get
into the courtroom.75 Moreover, Daubert imposed a reliability re-
quirement in the form of a gatekeeping function for trial judges.
Pursuant to Daubert, courts were to assess the scientific validity of
scientific expert testimony by screening for unreliable evidence
rather than simply relying on "general acceptance" within the rele-
vant community. 76 The Daubert Court expressly stated that it was
only addressing the reliability of scientific expert testimony and left
open the question of nonscientific testimony.77
71. Peer review refers to the common practice of publishing scientific revelations
and subjecting conclusions to review and criticism from the scientific community. See
id.
72. This requirement ensures that the expert's methodology is employed the same
way every time and that the expert's conclusions are not based on a methodology that
has a high rate of error. See id.
73. This is the same "general acceptance" advanced in Frye. See id.; Frye, 293 F.
1013, 1013; see also supra, notes 21-29 and accompanying text (discussing Frye's "gen-
eral acceptance" test). However, the Daubert court merely listed "general accept-
ance" as one of the factors to be considered rather than the entire basis. See Daubert,
509 U.S. at 593. In addition, the Daubert court stated that courts should focus on the
expert's principles and methodology rather than the conclusions they generate. See
id. at 595. But see General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512, 518 (1997) (stating
that the trial judge might need to examine an expert's conclusions to determine
whether the data supports the conclusions which the testimony' is based on). In
Joiner, the Supreme Court addressed a split in the circuits regarding the standard of
review of the admission of scientific expert testimony. The Eleventh Circuit had ap-
plied a "particularly stringent" standard of review in reversing the district court's ex-
clusion of expert testimony, maintaining that its gatekeeping role was limited. Joiner
v. General Electric Co., 78 F.3d 523, 529-30 (11th Cir. 1996). The Eleventh Circuit
suggested that Daubert altered the standard of appellate review when it held that
Rule 702 superseded the "austere" Frye test. General Electric v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct.
512, 517 (1997). Holding that the "abuse of discretion" standard applied to the Dis-
trict Court's decision to exclude the scientific evidence, the Supreme Court reversed.
In doing so, the Court reiterated the significance of the judge's role as gatekeeper
noting that although Daubert did not address the standard of appellate review, it did
state "the fact that Rule 702 displaced the Frye test does not mean that the Rules do
not place limits on the admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence. Nor is the trial
judge disabled from screening such evidence." Id. at 516 (citing Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharm. 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993)).
74. See id. at 593-94.
75. See id. at 593.
76. See id.
77. The Court stated that Daubert "is limited to the scientific context because that
is the nature of the expertise offered here." Id. at 590 n.9. Thus, the Court did not
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In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed concerns about
the Daubert majority's interpretation of Rule 702 and its applica-
tion to other types of testimony. 78 He questioned whether Daubert
would apply to "technical or other specialized knowledge," and if
there was a distinction between this type of testimony and the sci-
entific testimony addressed in the case. 79 Indeed, the Chief Jus-
tice's statement was a harbinger of the future uncertainty that
Daubert created.
II. The Divided Circuits
The federal circuits are now split on whether Daubert should ap-
ply to nonscientific expert testimony.80 The various standards ap-
plied for admissibility of nonscientific testimony range from a
literal application of Daubertl to a restrictive approach eliminating
any use of Daubert in the area of nonscientific testimony.82
preclude the possibility of extending a reliability requirement for the evaluation of
nonscientific expert testimony.
78. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
Does all of this dicta apply to an expert seeking to testify on the basis of
technical or other specialized knowledge - the other types of expert knowl-
edge to which Rule 702 applies - or are the general observations limited
only to scientific knowledge? What is the difference between scientific
knowledge and technical knowledge?)
Id.
79. Id. Rehnquist also stated that the majority opinion failed to distinguish "scien-
tific" from "technical" knowledge. See id.
80. Compare Compton v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 82 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 117 S. Ct 611 (1996) (finding that Daubert does not apply to nonscientific testi-
mony because it is based upon experience or training rather than methodology or
technique) and Den Norske Bank AS v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 75 F.3d 49 (1st
Cir. 1996) (relying on Daubert's reliability requirement and judicial "gatekeeping"
function to assess the validity of nonscientific testimony) with Berry v. City of Detroit,
25 F.3d 1342 (6th Cir. 1994) (applying Daubert's four factors directly to nonscientific
testimony). See Laser, supra note 14, at 1388 (noting that courts are clearly in conflict
on this issue and discussing the various approaches to evaluating the scope of Daubert
and its application to nonscientific testimony).
81. See Berry, 25 F.3d at 1349. This suggests applying the four Daubert factors,
falsifiable methodology; peer review and publication; rate of error and controls; and
general acceptance, to nonscientific testimony. See infra Part III.A.2. (noting that the
nature of nonscientific testimony may preclude the application of the four Daubert
factors).
82. See, e.g., Compton v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 82 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 611 (1996); United States v. Arevalo-Gamboa, 69 F.3d 545 (9th Cir.
1995); Thomas v. Newton Int'l Enters., 42 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 1994); lacobelli Constr.,
Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Amuso, 21 F.3d.
1251 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Muldrow, 19 F.3d 1332 (10th Cir. 1994).
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A. Refusing to Extend the Application of Daubert To
Nonscientific Testimony
Several circuits hold that the application of Daubert is limited to
scientific testimony.83 In narrowing the scope of Daubert, these
courts have declared that the special concerns associated with sci-
entific testimony do not arise with expert testimony that is based
on technical or specialized knowledge or skill.84
In Compton v. Subaru,85 the Tenth Circuit emphasized that
Daubert "had little bearing" on nonscientific testimony based on
an expert's experience and training,86 and that applying Daubert
was inappropriate when the testimony was based on general princi-
ples gathered from years of experience.87 In precluding the use of
Daubert, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that the Daubert factors apply
only when an expert relies upon a particular principle or methodol-
ogy, and held that the four factors do not apply when the expert is
merely relying on experience or training.88
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit limits the application of Daubert to
the evaluation of scientific testimony.89 It maintains that Daubert
83. See, e.g., Compton v. Subaru of Am., 82 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. de-
nied, 117 S. Ct. 611 (1996); United States v. Arevalo-Gamboa, 69 F.3d 545 (9th Cir.
1995); Thomas v. Newton Int'l Enters., 42 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 1994); Iacobelli Constr.,
Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d
924 (2d Cir. 1993).
84. See McKendall v. Crown Control Corp., 122 F.3d 803, 807 (9th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 228 (9th Cir. 1997); Compton, 82 F.3d at 1519;
Thomas, 42 F.3d at 1270; lacobelli, 32 F.3d at 25.
85. 82 F. 3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 611 (1996).
86. See Compton, 82 F.3d at 1519. Compton involved a products liability action
against Subaru in which the plaintiff's engineering expert testified to the defective
design of the roof support structures in the car because they permitted excessive roof
crush. See id. at 1516. In Compton, the court maintained that it did not need to
inquire into the reliability of the testimony because it was based on general engineer-
ing principles gathered from the expert's twenty-two years of experience as an auto-
motive engineer rather than any particular methodology. See id. at 1519. The court
limited the inquiry to a strict Rule 702 analysis as to the issues of relevancy, qualifica-
tions and helpfulness to the jury. See id. at 1520.
87. See id. at 1519.
88. See id. The court found that although the trial judge erred in relying on
Daubert, the expert testimony was admissible nonetheless in that it satisfied the re-
quirements of Rule 702. See id.
89. See McKendall v. Crown Control Corp., 122 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 1997). In
reaching its conclusion that Daubert should not be applied, the McKendall court
closely associated itself with the decision in Compton, saying it found the decision
"instructive." Id. at 806. The court rejected a lower court's striking of a design expert
in a product liability case, holding that Daubert should never have been applied be-
cause the testimony proffered was not sufficiently scientific in nature. See id. at 807.
The court maintained that the expert's experience, training and knowledge of forklifts
made his testimony admissible under Rule 702 and that was the appropriate standard
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does not apply to nonscientific evidence, such as modus operandi
testimony,90 because it is based on specialized, rather than scien-
tific, knowledge. 91
The Second Circuit also has refused to apply Daubert to non-
scientific testimony, finding that reliance on Daubert is "mis-
placed" when the expert testimony does not "present the kind of
junk science problem that Daubert meant to address. ' 92 The Sec-
ond Circuit is reluctant to apply Daubert to nonscientific testi-
mony, such as descriptions of the operations of organized crime
families 93 and payroll review by an accountant, 94 because applying
Daubert to these types of testimony would be inconsistent with
Rule 702's inclusion of testimony based upon "knowledge, skill, ex-
perience, training or education. '95 The Second Circuit maintains
that because Rule 702 pertains to technical and specialized knowl-
edge, testimony based upon such knowledge is sufficiently ad-
dressed by the requirements of the rule.96
to be applied. See id. In a footnote, the court hinted that the reliability requirement
of Daubert may be extended to apply to all expert testimony. See id. at 806 n.1. The
court stated, "[i]f one views Daubert in a broader context, the Daubert Court is giving
strong advice to district courts: in ruling on the admissibility, trial judges are the gate-
keepers and should pay particular attention to the reliability of the expert and his or
her testimony," and "in that sense, Daubert applies to all expert testimony." Id. But
see Thomas v. Newton Int'l Enters., 42 F.3d 1266, 1270 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining
that Daubert was clearly confined to the evaluation of scientific expert testimony be-
cause the special concerns associated with scientific testimony were not at issue when
evaluating testimony based on specialized knowledge and skill).
90. Modus operandi is a term used by police and prosecutors to describe the par-
ticular method of a criminal's activity. It refers to a distinct pattern of behavior so
that separate crimes or conduct are recognized as the work of the same person. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1004 (6th ed. 1990).
91. See United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225 (9th Cir. 1997). In Cordoba, an
expert was to testify that sophisticated drug traffickers do not entrust 300 kilograms of
cocaine to someone unaware of what they are carrying. The court admitted the testi-
mony under Rule 702, rejecting the defendant's argument that it should be excluded
under Daubert, stating "Daubert applies only to the admission of scientific testi-
mony." Id. at 230.
92. lacobelli Constr., Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 25 (2d Cir. 1994) (find-
ing that Daubert could not be applied to the testimony of an underground construc-
tion consultant). But see F.D.I.C. v. Suni Assoc., 80 F.3d 681 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding a
methodology whereby an expert used direct sales comparison and income capitaliza-
tion valuations).
93. See United States v. Locasio, 6 F.3d 924, 936 (2d Cir. 1993).
94. See Tamarin v. Adam Caterers, Inc., 13 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1993).
95. See id.; Locascio, 6 F.3d at 936.
96. See Locascio, 6 F.3d at 936.; see also infra, note 118-120 and accompanying text
(noting the inconsistent logic with the Second Circuit's position because Rule 702
addresses scientific testimony, yet Daubert is applied as an extra precaution to verify
the reliability of the testimony).
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B. Applying Daubert's Reliability Requirement To
Nonscientific Testimony
The First, Third, and Fifth Circuits have imposed Daubert's
"gatekeeping" function on trial judges reviewing nonscientific ex-
pert testimony, requiring them to carefully screen both the compe-
tency of the expert and the reliability of the testimony in
question.97 In assessing the reliability of nonscientific expert testi-
mony, these courts usually determine whether the testimony in
question is based on a particular methodology. 9s If the method can
be explained, and is found to be reliable by the judge, the testi-
mony is admitted.99
In Watkins v. Telsmith,100 the Fifth Circuit recently maintained
that the Daubert factors are relevant in evaluating other types of
expert testimony for which a particular methodology cannot be
identified. 10 1 The Watkins court stated that the decision of the
97. See Den Norske Bank AS v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 75 F. 3d 49, 57-58 (1st
Cir. 1996) (applying Daubert in evaluating the reliability of testimony from a banker
who throughout his forty year career had become familiar with the types of agree-
ments in question and noting the trial court's gatekeeping function in determining the
competency of the expert and the reliability of the testimony); Habecker v. Clark
Equipment Co., 36 F.3d 278, 290 (3d Cir. 1994) (excluding the testimony of an acci-
dent simulation expert following Daubert's requirement of a preliminary assessment
of the validity of the expert's methodology, while not inquiring into the peer review,
general acceptance, testability or error rate requirements of Daubert); see also United
States v. Kayne, 90 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 1996) (finding an expert's testimony on the valua-
tion of rare coins reliable because the methods used were clearly explained); United
States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, 80 F.3d 1074 (5th Cir. 1996); Pedraza v. Jones, 71 F.3d
194 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Velasquez, 64 F.3d 844 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding
Daubert's reliability requirement helpful in the admission of handwriting testimony
because the methodology underlying handwriting analysis could be examined); Mar-
cel v. Placid Oil Co., 11 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 1994).
98. See Velasquez, 64 F.3d at 845 n.2 (finding that a handwriting expert based her
conclusions on a clear methodology).
. 99. See id.; United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, 80 F.3d 1074 (5th Cir. 1996)
(admitting the testimony of a civil engineer because the court believed the testimony
to be reliable as it was based upon a thorough inspection of the property in question
as well as maps and photographs); Marcel v. Placid Oil Co., 11 F.3d 563 (5th Cir.
1994) (excluding the testimony of an economist because the expert did not base his
conclusions on sufficient data, thereby rendering the testimony unreliable).
100. See Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984 (5th Cir. 1997).
101. The Watkins court stated that the view asserted by the Tenth Circuit, in
Compton, that Daubert is completely inapplicable to nonscientific testimony is unten-
able. See id. at 991. The court stated that this assertion leads to the proposition that,
experts who purport to rely on general engineering principles and practical
experience might escape screening by the district court simply by stating that
their conclusions were not reached by any particular method or technique.
The moral of this approach would be, the less factual support for an expert's
opinion, the better.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXV
102Tenth Circuit, in Compton, was untenable because it allows ex-
perts who rely on general principles and practical experience to
escape screening simply because their conclusions were not
reached by any particular methodology, and thus not scientific
enough to warrant a Daubert inquiry. 103 The Watkins court de-
manded judicial gatekeeping for all types of expert testimony, re-
gardless of whether the expert's conclusions rest on a methodology
or technique. 4
C. Applying Daubert Inconsistently
The Sixth,0 5 Seventh, °6 and Eighth0 7 Circuits have applied
Daubert inconsistently. Although the Sixth Circuit is the only
court to apply the Daubert test literally to nonscientific testi-
Id. Loretta Watkins brought this suit after her husband was killed when a wire rope
supporting a conveyor belt snapped and the conveyor fell on him. She sought to
admit the testimony of Marcus Dean Williams who had received a degree in civil
engineering, was a B-17 pilot in World War II and worked in an engineering and tool
design facility for Boeing. In addition, Williams taught drafting, surveying, structural
design and engineering at a junior college. See id. at 984-87. However, despite these
credentials, the court maintained that William's testimony "lacked the requisite indi-
cia of reliability to derive from scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge"
because the methodology he used to determine the existence of alternative designs.
See id. at 991. The flawed methodology included the lack of testing of any of the
proposed alternatives rendering the testimony inadmissible. See id. at 990. Thus,
while the court implemented the Daubert's reliability standard to exclude the testi-
mony, it also considered the other aspects of Daubert-like methodology and applied it
to technical, rather than strictly scientific knowledge. See id.
102. See Compton v. Subaru of Am., 82 F.3d 1513, 1519 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating
that Daubert is completely inapplicable to nonscientific testimony because it is not
based on a methodology or technique); supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
103. See Watkins, 121 F.3d at 991 ("[I]t seems exactly backwards that experts who
purport to rely on general engineering principles and practical experience might es-
cape screening by the district court simply by stating that their conclusions were not
reached by any particular method or technique.").
104. See id.
105. Compare United States v. Kremser Jones, 107 F.3d 1147 (6th Cir. 1997) (ad-
mitting testimony using only a Rule 702 analysis without any Daubert inquiry) with
Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342 (6th Cir. 1994) (excluding testimony because it
failed to meet the four Daubert factors).
106. Compare Deimer v. Cincinnati Sub-Zero Prods., Inc., 58 F.3d 341 (7th Cir.
1995) (excluding an expert witness's testimony because it lacked reliability as required
by Daubert) with United States v. Williams, 81 F. 3d 1434, 1441-42 (7th Cir. 1996)
(admitting testimony pursuant to a Rule 702 analysis without making any Daubert
inquiry as to the reliability of the testimony).
107. Compare United States v. Johnson, 28 F.3d 1487 (8th Cir. 1995) (admitting
testimony because it satisfied Rule 702 rather than making a Daubert reliability in-
quiry) with Ventura v. Titan Sports, 65 F.3d 725 (8th Cir. 1995) (applying Daubert's
reliability requirement and finding the testimony to be reliable because it was based
on a sound methodology).
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mony, °8 it also has limited the extension of the Daubert factors
when the proffered testimony was nonscientific."0 9 Similarly, the
Seventh Circuit has stated that courts should always assess the reli-
ability of an expert's methodology,' while failing to make
Daubert inquiries in several cases."' The Eighth Circuit also has
inconsistently applied Daubert to nonscientific testimony. In some
instances, it has followed only the requirements of Rule 702,12
while inquiring into the reliability of the testimony in other
cases. 113 Within each circuit, whether Daubert is applied to non-
108. See Berry, 25 F.3d at 1342. In Berry, the expert testimony came from a retired
sheriff who had a degree in sociology and four years work experience at the Depart-
ment of Justice. See id. at 1348. He was called to testify to whether a police depart-
ment's failure to discipline officers was the proximate cause of a police officer
shooting a victim. See id. The court applied Daubert, and found that the testimony
failed because there was no indication that the expert's theory had been formally
tested, published and subjected to peer review, or accepted by other experts in the
field. See id. at 1350-51. The Berry court noted that the proper foundation for a
technical expert is the demonstration of "first hand familiarity" with the subject and
that the use of empirical examples is one way to establish familiarity. Id.
109. See United States v. Kremser Jones, 107 F.3d 1147 (6th Cir. 1997). In Kremser
Jones, the court rejected a request to treat a handwriting expert's testimony as scien-
tific testimony, citing the Daubert Court's assertion that it was "quite convinced that
handwriting examiners do not concentrate on proposing and refining theoretical ex-
planations about the world, but instead use their knowledge and experience to answer
the extremely practical question of whether a signature is genuine or forged." Id. at
1157 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590). The court also noted the lack of empirical
evidence in handwriting analysis. Id. But see United States v. Velasquez, 64 F.3d 844,
845 (3d Cir. 1995) (concluding that Daubert is helpful to assist the court in evaluating
the reliability of the methodology underlying handwriting analysis). The Kremser
Jones court admitted the testimony using a Rule 702 analysis, reasoning that "Daubert
does not create a new framework" for technical or specialized testimony and that if
Daubert were extended outside the realm of scientific testimony, "many types of rele-
vant and reliable expert testimony - that derived substantially from practical experi-
ence - would be excluded." Id. at 1158.
110. See, e.g., Roback v. V.I.P. Transp. Inc., 90 F.3d 1207 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding an
engineering expert's testimony reliable because it was based upon a technique which
was subject to verification); Deimer, 58 F.3d at 343-45 (finding that a product design
expert was unreliable because he did not support his conclusions with a reliable meth-
odology); Frymire-Brinati v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 2 F.3d 183, 186-87 (7th Cir. 1993)
(stating the importance of analyzing the validity of the witness's reasoning as required
by Daubert).
111. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 81 F.3d 1434, 1441-42 (7th Cir. 1996) (af-
firming the admission of testimony by a witness familiar with a street gang's code
using a traditional Rule 702 evaluation without any reliability inquiry); United States
v. Sinclair, 74 F.3d 753, 757-58 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that Daubert's reliability re-
quirement had no relevance to the admissibility of a legal expert's testimony).
112. See Johnson, 28 F.3d at 1496-97 (admitting testimony of a drug trafficking ex-
pert on the grounds that it was helpful to the jury rather than any inquiry into the
reliability of the testimony).
113. See Ventura, 65 F.3d at 733 (admitting testimony of an expert testifying to the
market rate of royalties for licensing intellectual property on the grounds that the
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scientific testimony often rests on whether the expert has relied
upon a methodology or technique, thereby classifying the testi-
mony as more or less scientific, and more or less subject to a
Daubert inquiry.114
III. The Reliability of Nonscientific Testimony Must
Be Ensured
A. Implications of Daubert Why There Is a Need to Ensure
the Reliability of Nonscientific Testimony
Although Daubert clarified the framework for determining the
admissibility of scientific testimony, significant ambiguity remains
with respect to the standard for admitting nonscientific expert
testimony. 15
The application of Rule 702 to nonscientific testimony 16 is prob-
lematic because the rule lacks a reliability requirement.' 17 The reli-
ability of scientific testimony is protected by the Daubert
standard118 and the requirements of Rule 702,119 but no such judi-
cial standard exists to govern the admissibility of nonscientific evi-
testimony was reliable because the expert used a known methodology as well as the
helpfulness to the jury).
114. Courts are more likely to apply Daubert when the expert demonstrates a par-
ticular methodology. Compare Johnson, 28 F.3d at 1496-97 (making no reliability in-
quiry into the testimony of a drug trafficking expert whose conclusions were not
based upon any explanatory methodology) and Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131
F.3d 1433 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding that the testimony of an expert on tire failure was
not "scientific" and thus was not subject to a Daubert inquiry) with Ventura, 65 F.3d at
733 (finding that an economist's testimony regarding the market rate for licensing
royalties was admissible because the expert used a sound methodology) and
Peitzmeier v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 97 F. 3d 293 (8th Cir. 1996) (applying the Daubert
factors to exclude a design engineering expert's testimony on alternative safety de-
vices because the expert had not subjected his conclusions to testing and peer review).
See Tyus v. Urban Search Management, 102 F.3d 256 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that
Daubert's framework for assessing scientific expert testimony applies to the social
sciences in which testimony is commonly grounded in a particular methodology); infra
Part III.A. (discussing that engineering testimony is more suited to a Daubert inquiry
because it is often based on a methodology which can be falsified whereas the testi-
mony like that from legal expert or an expert on drug trafficking cannot always be
similarly falsified).
115. See supra Part II (discussing the circuit split with respect to the standard for
admission of nonscientific testimony).
116. FED. R. EvID. 702 (requiring the trial judge to simply screen for a qualified
expert who can help the jury with relevant subject matter without screening for the
reliability of the testimony); see supra Part II.B.
117. See infra Part III.C. (proposing an amendment to Rule 702 to resolve this
dilemma).
118. See supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
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dence.120  Although courts have limited the application of
Daubert,12 1 judges should not examine less rigorously the special-
ized knowledge underlying nonscientific testimony, or abdicate
their role as gatekeeper when making a Rule 702 evaluation. 122
1. Distinguishing Scientific Knowledge From Specialized and
Technical Expertise
How courts are to distinguish between the scientific knowledge
defined in Daubert'23 and technical or other specialized knowledge
mentioned in Rule 702124 remains a central question in determining
the admissibility of nonscientific testimony.1 25 Daubert did not ex-
plain how courts were to make this differentiation.1 26 Moreover,
the Supreme Court did not specify how judges would be able to
place specific areas of expertise into these "presumably distinguish-
able" categories. 7 The Daubert Court attempted to provide some
guidance on this issue by resting the key inquiry as to whether
120. See supra Part II (discussing circuit split with respect to the standard for admit-
ting nonscientific testimony).
121. See supra notes 83-96 and accompanying text (discussing the circuit courts re-
fusing to apply Daubert to nonscientific testimony).
122. See United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1042 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
("The fact that Daubert does not apply to nonscientific expertise does not suggest.that
judges are without an obligation to evaluate proffered expert testimony for reliabil-
ity."); see also United States v. Jose Farias Ochoa 116 F.3d 487 (9th Cir. 1997).
123. That is, conclusions based on testing and experimentation as defined by
"Newtonian Science." See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
125. Indeed this was Judge Rehnquist's concern in his dissent. See Daubert v. Mer-
rell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 600 (1993) (Rehnquist C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 8.
127. Diana K. Sheiness, Note and Comment, Out of the Twilight Zone: The Implica-
tions of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 69 WASH. L. REV. 481, 491
(1994) (discussing the risk that courts may develop their own criteria for applying
Daubert which will be inconsistent as some courts apply Daubert narrowly and others
may extend the standard beyond its intended reach). See also Carmichael v. Samyang
Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433, 1436. The Carmichael court provided an interpretation of
the differences between scientific and nonscientific testimony using the example of an
auto mechanic analyzing a burned out spark plug.
Given a proper foundation, a mechanic with years of experience with spark
plugs might be able to identify for a jury burns or other marks on a spark
plug that he believes disclose whether the plug burned out because of nor-
mal wear or some defect; an experienced mechanic may recognize patterns
of normal and abnormal wear on an auto part even though he has no knowl-
edge of the principles of physics or chemistry that might explain why or how
a spark plug works. Such a mechanic's testimony would be non-scientific,
while the testimony of another expert on the nature and effects of combus-
tion (applied to spark plugs) would be scientific.
Id. at 1436.
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proffered testimony was scientific on the ability to confirm the the-
ory through experimentation and testing. 128 The Daubert factors,
therefore, were tailored to suit the specific methods used in reach-
ing a scientific conclusion. 129 Moreover, any conclusions reached
in a manner other than through a particular methodology are not
considered scientific within the purview of Rule 702,130 and thus
are arguably not subject to the Daubert factors because the
Daubert Court did not address nonscientific expert testimony.' 3'
Experience is to nonscientific experts what experimentation is to
scientists.1 32 That a nonscientific expert's basis for conclusion can-
not be tested because it is based upon individual experience should
not warrant less scrutiny of the reliability of the testimony. 133 Sci-
entific testimony may be validated through duplication of the ex-
pert's methodology,3 whereas it is seldom possible to duplicate a
nonscientific expert's subjective experience. 35
For example, an expert testifying to the causation of various ail-
ments resulting from exposure to toxins may use a dose-response
128. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 ("Ordinarily, a key question to be answered in
determining whether a theory or technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the
trier of fact will be whether it can be (and has been) tested."); see also Sheiness, supra
note 127, at 490 ("If an expert derives authority from a field susceptible to testing but
offers an opinion that eludes empirical confirmation, the testimony should be ex-
cluded. However, a requirement of empirical testing for testimony whose sources are
not susceptible to verification would be too restrictive.").
129. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 (stating the factors which bear significance when
assessing the validity of scientific methodologies); see also infra notes 151-64 (discuss-
ing how the Daubert factors are better suited to assess the reliability of scientific
rather than nonscientific testimony).
130. See Laser, supra note 14 at 1405; see also Sheiness, supra note 127, at 492
(noting the potential for dilemmas for judges when they are confronted with testi-
mony based on areas of expertise that could apply scientific methods but typically do
not, and citing Hawthorne Partners v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 1398
(N.D. I11. 1993), as resolving this dilemma by presuming the validity of testimony
when others in the same field used a similar method).
131. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.8 (stating that the Court's discussion is limited
to the scientific context because that was the nature of the expertise offered in the
case).
132. See Imwinkelried, supra note 16, at 2289 (stating that the expertise of non-
scientific experts stems from their experience, rather than methodological
experimentation).
133. Sheiness, supra note 127, at 492.
134. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Comparative Law Analysis of the Standard for
Admitting Scientific Evidence: The United States Stands Alone, 42 FORENSIC SCI. INT'L
15, 23 (1989) (stating that the nature of scientific evidence adds to the accuracy of the
testimony because another scientist can replicate the scientific research).
135. Presumably, individual experts will have varying experiences throughout their
respective careers and thus, it follows that one expert may not always be able to verify
the conclusions another draws from his or her own particular experience.
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analysis in which the expert evaluates the dosage of the toxins
plaintiffs allegedly received as well as the toxin levels of the alleged
source. Another expert may obtain data from the plaintiffs and the
alleged source, and perform the same methodology to conclude
that plaintiffs had been subjected to an exposure high enough to
cause their ailments. With respect to either expert, there will be
hard data to prove or disprove the reliability of the expert's conclu-
sions. Conversely, the testimony of an expert on the modus oper-
andi of a drug dealer cannot be confirmed or refuted simply
because another witness maintains to have seen a particular type of
drug deal conducted in a dissimilar manner.136 Thus, subjective
variations can be implemented in nonscientific testimony, yielding
a greater need to ensure its reliability. 137
Today, a jury faced with nonscientific testimony must base the
analysis of an expert on his or her credibility and whether the testi-
mony appears to be sound.138 No safeguards exist, however, to en-
sure that the testimony actually is sound. Pursuant to Daubert, the
trial judge screens scientific testimony for relevance and the ex-
pert's qualifications, as well as the reliability of the expert's conclu-
sions.139 If judges do not fulfill a gatekeeping function for
determining the admissibility of nonscientific testimony, then it is
simply being presumed that experts' conclusions are reliable be-
cause the experts are qualified.140 Establishing that an expert is
136. See Cordoba, 104 F.3d at 229; Perrin, supra note 2 at 1457-58.
137. See Perrin, supra note 2 at 1455 ("[nlonscientific expert testimony deserves
even greater skepticism because there is often no ability to test the technical expert's
theories or techniques or to prove false the expert's underlying premise"). But see
Jonathan R. Schofield, Note, A Misapplication of Daubert: Compton v. Subaru of
America Opens The Gate For Unreliable and Irrelevant Expert Testimony, 1997
B.Y.U.L. REV. 489, 507-08 (stating that any expert opinion, including nonscientific
opinions, "should be logically founded upon some methodology, reasoning, or princi-
ple," and that, "otherwise the opinion would be merely unsupported speculation").
138. FED. R. EvID. 702. Judges assess the qualifications of the witness and whether
the testimony will be helpful to the jury. See id. However, absence of any reliability
requirement in Rule 702 places the burden of evaluating the reliability of the expert's
conclusions on the jury.
139. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596. Those courts which maintain that Rule 702 suffi-
ciently covers nonscientific testimony simply because the rule refers to "specialized"
and "technical" knowledge ignore the fact that Rule 702 also mentions "scientific"
knowledge, yet there is an additional reliability requirement for scientific testimony.
See also United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 936 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that testi-
mony based on specialized knowledge is sufficiently addressed by the requirements of
Rule 702).
140. See Oh, supra note 9, at 563 (arguing that an emphasis on credentials is "misdi-
rected," and that, "unlike assessing the methodologies and principles underlying a
field, examining an individual's background provides no assurance that the expert will
present valid views"); John William Strong, Language and Logic In Expert Testimony:
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well qualified does not necessarily prove a correlation between the
expert's knowledge and the matter at issue in a case.14' Conse-
quently, a uniform standard must be applied that will require that
judges ensure the reliability of all testimony. 142
2. Debunking The Notion That Nonscientific Testimony Requires
Less Scrutiny
Many courts and commentators reason that scientific testimony
requires a heightened standard of scrutiny because the nature of
such evidence is complex and beyond the comprehension of most
jurors. 143 Courts may give less scrutiny to nonscientific testimony
because they believe the cost of erroneously admitting this type of
testimony is low. 144 The jury is better able to evaluate the non-
scientific expert's credibility because the information is more com-
mon to them.145 Thus, if the risk of misinterpretation is less, then
less scrutiny is required. This argument presents two problems.
Limiting Expert Testimony By Restrictions of Function, Reliability, and Form, 71 OR.
L. REV. 349, 363 (1992) (stating that the result of the traditional approach to admit-
ting expert testimony is that the question of reliability of the testimony is "conve-
niently subsumed under the question of the qualification of the expert witness").
141. See Oh, supra note 9, at 563.
142. See Part III.B.5. (proposing a uniform standard).
143. See Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 370 (Md. 1978); Gianelli, supra note 25, at
1237 (stating that scientific evidence has a potential danger of misleading the jury
because "an aura of scientific infallibility may shroud the evidence"); Strong, supra,
note 137, at 367 (stating that a distinction is needed between scientific and other types
of experts because "propositions perceived as "scientific" by the jury possess an un-
usually high degree of persuasive power) (citing United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d
741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (noting that testimony from scientific experts may "assume a
posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of jury of laymen")).
144. See Perrin, supra note 2, at 1425 (discussing the "relationship between the
standard for admitting and excluding expert testimony and the testimony's perceived
effect on the jury").
145. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Is Science a Special Case: The Admissibility of
Scientific Evidence After Daubert v. Merrell Dow, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1779 (1995). The
argument follows that although Daubert imposed a gatekeeping requirement for sci-
entific expert testimony, other "shaky" evidence is adequately addressed by the ad-
versary system. See Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433, 1435 (11th Cir.
1997). As stated by the court in United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, 80 F.3d 1074,
1078 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1995)):
The trial court's role as gatekeepers is not intended to serve as a replace-
ment for the adversary system. Vigorous cross-examination presentation of
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the
traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible
evidence.
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First, nonscientific expert testimony is still expert testimony, im-
plying knowledge beyond the average juror.11 6 Science is often ac-
corded more scrutiny because of the disparity in expertise between
the jury and the expert. 147 That an expert has been called, how-
ever, indicates that he or she has some special knowledge that the
jury may benefit from. 148 It is no less important, therefore, that
judges guarantee the reliability of nonscientific testimony so that
the jury is not confused and does not give undue weight to unrelia-
ble testimony.1 4
9
Varying degrees of the risk of misinterpretation should not dic-
tate whether or not the testimony is reliable. 150 Nonscientific testi-
mony should be just as reliable as scientific testimony if jurors are
to make well informed decisions. Furthermore, it should not be
assumed that a jury, without judicial gatekeeping, will necessarily
have an easier task in assessing the reliability of nonscientific ex-
pert testimony simply because an expert does not use a compli-
cated methodology to reach his or her conclusion. 15' A jury may
be as confused when evaluating the testimony of an expert in bank-
ing or legal standards of care as they are when hearing DNA
testimony.1 5
2
146. By definition an expert, scientific or nonscientific, helps the jury understand
something of which they do not possess sufficient knowledge. See BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 578 (6th ed. 1990) (defining expert as "one who by reason of education or
special experience has knowledge respecting a subject matter about which persons
having no particular training are incapable of forming an accurate opinion or making
a correct deduction"). But see supra note 143 (discussing the view that scientific testi-
mony is different than technical and specialized expert testimony because of the "aura
of infallibility" surrounding scientific evidence in the eyes of the jury).
147. The argument follows that a juror is more likely to question testimony on a
familiar topic because the juror possesses sufficient knowledge to do so whereas with
complex, scientific knowledge, a juror is more likely to assume the truth of the testi-
mony. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
149. See Tyus v. Urban Search Management, 102 F.3d 256, 263 (7th Cir. 1996) (stat-
ing the obligation of the district court to ensure that it is dealing with an expert in all
cases including when the expertise is based on experience or training).
150. See id. ("A trial court is not compelled to exclude expert testimony 'just be-
cause the testimony may, to a greater or lesser degree, cover matters that are within
the average juror's comprehension.") (citing United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337, 1342
(7th Cir. 1996)).
151. See Laser, supra note 14, at 1407.
152. See id.; Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1349 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating that
the difficulties associated with the admissibility of expert testimony "are exacerbated
when courts must deal with the even more elusive concept of nonscientific testi-
mony"). The Berry court provided the example of an expert testifying how a bumble-
bee is able to fly to illustrate the differences between scientific and nonscientific
testimony and to support the view that nonscientific experts offer knowledge beyond
that of the average juror which must be as well founded as scientific testimony. Id.
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Secondly, if nonscientific testimony is subjected to a lower stan-
dard of reliability, parties will be able to mold expert testimony to
fit into a nonscientific category simply to escape Daubert's height-
ened scrutiny. 153 The circuit split has resulted partly because courts
have attempted to categorize various types of nonscientific testi-
mony as more or less suited to the four Daubert factors.'54 The
more an expert arrives at his or her conclusions through some ob-
jective standard, the closer courts examine the reliability of the tes-
timony, often applying the Daubert factors.'55 Therefore, the
reliability requirement mandated by Daubert may be circumvented
simply by stating that an expert's conclusions are based on experi-
ence or education rather than any particular methodology. 156 The
If one wanted to explain to a jury how a bumblebee is able to fly, an aero-
nautical engineer might be a helpful witness. Since flight principles have
some universality, the expert could apply general principles to the case of
the bumblebee. Conceivably, even if he had never seen a bumblebee, he still
would be familiar with its component parts. On the other hand, if one
wanted to prove that bumblebees always take off into the wind, a beekeeper
with no scientific training at all would be an acceptable expert witness if a
proper foundation were laid for his conclusions. The foundation would not
relate to his formal training, but to his firsthand observations. In other
words, the beekeeper does not know any more about flight principles than
the jurors, but he has seen a lot more bumblebees than they have.
See id. See also Imwinkelried, supra note 16, at 2279 (noting that the reliability of
nonscientific expert testimony is just as suspect as that of scientific testimony).
153. See United States v. Kremser Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1156 (6th Cir. 1997) (re-
jecting appellant's argument that handwriting analysis constitutes scientific evidence,
and therefore subject to Daubert scrutiny); United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp.
1027, 1036-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (rejecting opposing party's attempt to cast forensic
document expertise as scientific knowledge to warrant greater reliability scrutiny); see
also supra note 141 and accompanying text.
154. Real estate appraisal is a good example of nonscientific testimony that is often
admitted under Daubert because the expert is able to demonstrate a clear methodol-
ogy. See F.D.I.C. v. Suni Assoc., 80 F.3d 681, 686 (2d Cir. 1996) (admitting the testi-
mony of a real estate appraiser upon finding the testimony reliable because the expert
used sound valuation methodologies); Ventura v. Titan Sports, Inc., 65 F.3d 725, 733
(8th Cir. 1995) (same); see also Ohio v. Louis Trauth Dairy Inc., 925 F. Supp. 1247,
1252 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (applying the peer review and general acceptance Daubert
factors to an economists testimony).
155. See Compton v. Subaru of Am., 82 F.3d 1513, 1518 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding
that Daubert's reliability requirement is not necessary when an expert does base his
conclusions on a particular methodology).
156. See Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433, 1434 (11th Cir. 1997). In
Carmichael, the plaintiff-appellants argued that the district court should not have re-
lied on Daubert's heightened scrutiny to exclude a tire failure expert because the testi-
mony was not "scientific." Id. at 1434; see also Schofield, supra note 134, at 490
(stating that the Compton court, in holding that Daubert was inapplicable to an expert
who based his opinion on experience, "created a gaping loophole" by which parties
could avoid Daubert's reliability scrutiny and, "as a result opened the gate for the
admissibility of unreliable and irrelevant testimony").
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question remains, however, as to how courts are to evaluate the
reliability of nonscientific experts when such experts are "experien-
tially qualified. 157
B. Potential Standards For The Admissibility Of Nonscientific
Testimony
1. Reviving Frye
One proposed standard for the admissibility of nonscientific tes-
timony suggests reviving the Frye "general acceptance" test.'5 8 In
its application, the Frye test excludes any testimony in which the
expert arrives at his or her conclusions in a manner different than
that generally accepted by people in that area of expertise. 59
The same problems that Frye's restrictive test presented with re-
gard to scientific testimony apply to the nonscientific arena. 160
Consider the testimony of a design engineering expert who devel-
ops a cutting edge safety latch for a product.1 61 Under Frye, testi-
mony that a manufacturer could have implemented such a device
would be excluded because it is not yet generally accepted in the
relevant community. 162 This is problematic because nonscientific
experts often replace methodology with experience, 63 and non
scientific experts can rarely establish a generally accepted method-
ology because testimony based on subjective experience may not
be generally accepted by other experts who have not had the same
experience. Therefore, courts should not apply the Frye test to
nonscientific testimony.
157. Strong, supra note 137, at 368; see Imwinkelried, supra note 16, at 2292 (stating
that the reliability of a nonscientific expert increases when an expert has had substan-
tial experience in the field).
158. Frye, 293 F. at 1014; see Imwinkelried, supra note 16, at 2284; see also supra
notes 21-25 (discussing the Frye test).
159. See supra notes 21-25 and. accompanying text.
160. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
161. See Peitzmeier v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 97 F.3d 293, 297 (8th Cir. 1996) (ex-
cluding the testimony of a design engineering expert, who testified that the defendant
could have used an alternative safety device on a tire changer, because the expert had
not tested any of the proposed devices or subjected them to peer review).
162. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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2. Literal Application of the Daubert Factors to Nonscientific
Testimony
The Sixth Circuit's literal application of the Daubert test to non-
scientific testimony164 presents glaring problems because not all
nonscientific testimony can be subject to Daubert's four factors. 165
For example, the "falsifiable experimental testing"'166 and "rate of
error"167 requirements are applicable only when the expert relies
on some kind of methodology, 68 and thus have little bearing on
the reliability of an expert who is testifying on general principles
gathered from years of experience in a particular area. Moreover,
expert testimony based on personal experience cannot always be
evaluated on the basis of "peer review"169 or "general accept-
ance,"' 70 although such testimony may be as valuable to the trier of
fact as those opinions that are easily gauged in such terms. There-
fore, the Daubert factors are not tailored to suit the specific con-
cerns that arise when determining whether to admit nonscientific
expert testimony. 17 1
The first Daubert factor is perhaps the most inapplicable to non-
scientific testimony.'72 Falsifiable experimental testing is employed
to check scientific testimony for the presence of objective stan-
dards. 7 3 However, nonscientific testimony is often subjective. 174
With years of experience in a particular field that is not based on
164. See Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1350-51 (6th Cir. 1994); supra note
108 and accompanying text.
165. See Lisa M. Agrimonti, Note, The Limitations of Daubert and Its Misapplica-
tion to Quasi-Scientific Experts, A Two-Year Case Review Of Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 134, 144 (stating that applying the Daubert fac-
tors to nonscientific evidence is, "at best, absurd" and demonstrating through a hypo-
thetical situation how the Daubert factors are ill suited to assess the reliability of
nonscientific testimony); infra notes 173-187 and accompanying text (discussing that
the Daubert factors are tailored to the specific concerns associated with scientific testi-
mony and are not well suited to address the reliability of nonscientific testimony).
166. See supra note 70.
167. See supra note 72.
168. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993); supra notes 46-
47 and accompanying text (defining scientific testimony as that in which the expert's
conclusions are grounded in sound methodology); supra, note 77 and accompanying
text (noting that the Daubert court limited the discussion to the scientific context).
169. See supra note 71.
170. See supra note 73.
171. See Agrimonti, supra note 165, at 144 (demonstrating the difficulty in applying
the Daubert factors to nonscientific expert testimony).
172. See Sheiness, supra note 127, at 490 (noting that the requirement of empirical
testing for experts whose sources are not susceptible to verifications is too restrictive).
173. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 (citing C. HEMPEL, PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL
SCIENCE 49 (1966) and K. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH
OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 35 (5th ed. 1989)).
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Newtonian Science,175 an expert may be able to provide useful in-
formation without demonstrating a particular methodology, and
thus a way must be found to uniformly gauge the reliability of the
expert's testimony.176
Daubert's rate of error factor is similarly inapplicable to non-
scientific testimony. The purpose of the rate of error requirement
is to ensure that the methodology is employed the same way every
time. 177 Thus, if a consistent methodology is not applied each time
the theory is proffered, there can be no evaluation of rate of er-
174. See supra note 134-37 and accompanying text (demonstrating through a hypo-
thetical example how a nonscientific expert's testimony can be subjective).
175. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text (defining the concept of
Newtonian Science).
176. A recent Second Circuit case, Stagl v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 117 F.3d 76 (2d Cir.
1997), illustrates this principle. The Stagl court vacated the trial court's exclusion of
the testimony of a mechanical engineer whose expertise was in the area of human-
machine interaction. See id. at 82. The expert suggested that the interaction between
the baggage claim system employed by Delta and the passengers trying to claim their
baggage caused the plaintiff's injury when she was knocked to the ground, breaking
her hip, by a passenger retrieving a bag from the carousel. See id. at 78. While the
district court concluded that the expertise offered was too general, the Second Circuit
found value in the testimony despite its lack of methodology stating that, "Where, as
here, well-trained people with somewhat more general qualifications are available, it
is error to exclude them." Id. at 82. A hypothetical example of this is the FBI agent
who is called to testify to a drug dealer's modus operandi. He or she may confidently
say just by looking at a particular scenario that it is indicative of the way drug deals
are usually performed. According to the first prong of Daubert, unless the FBI
agent's theory had been tested, it would be deemed unreliable. Such was the case in
Berry, in which the Sixth Circuit applied Daubert to a police officer's testimony that
the Detroit Police Department's failure to properly discipline officers was the proxi-
mate cause of an office shooting the victim. See Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342,
1347 (6th Cir. 1994). The Berry court applied the first prong of Daubert, inquiring
whether or not the officer's discipline theory had been tested. See id. at 1350. Clearly
the court would want to make sure the officer's testimony has some basis in either
observations or calculations. However, because the officer was testifying to a behav-
ioral theory, experimental testing would not be as feasible. See Laser, supra note 14,
at 1411 (noting that it is doubtful that any single experiment could conclusively show
the effects of a failure to discipline police officers over a period of time). Accordingly,
the Sixth Circuit found that the theory had not been tested and this factor went to the
exclusion of the expert when in fact the testimony may have been reliable. See Berry,
25 F.3d at 1350.
177. See United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 353-54 (7th Cir. 1989) (considering
the expert's rate of error in assessing the reliability of spectrographic voice
identification).
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ror. 78 This is the one factor even the Berry court could not apply
to nonscientific testimony.1 79
Although the publication and peer review aspect of Daubert is
commonly applied to nonscientific testimony,'180 it is also science
specific.' 81 Peer review indicates reliability in science because it is
common practice for scientists to publish in scientific journals and
subject their research and findings to review by their peers. 82
Nonscientific experts may not always publish their theories, how-
ever, because many particularized areas of expertise usually do not
generate sufficient interest. 83
It is the job of a scientist to gather data, make calculations, and
report on any findings. Nonscientific experts, on the other hand,
usually are professionals in their field called to testify about their
particular experience and may not be as accustomed to the prac-
tices of publishing and peer review as scientists 184 as they are not as
common for nonscientific experts. 85 Finally, peer review is not al-
ways a guarantor of sound testimony. Any group espousing uncon-
ventional views can establish a journal for peer review and the lack
of quality control in such journals makes suspect any assurance of
reliability. 86
178. See Laser, supra note 14, at 1413. The Berry court found the officer's testi-
mony to be unreliable on the other Daubert factors, peer review and general accept-
ance. Although the officer claimed to have published some articles and a textbook,
there was no peer review. See Berry, 25 F.3d at 1349-50.
179. See id.; see also Laser, supra note 14, at 1413.
180. See Oh, supra note 9, at 561.
181. See Agrimonti, supra, note 165, at 144.
182. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993). The Daubert
court found peer review relevant to the inquiry of the reliability of scientific testimony
stating, "submission to the scrutiny of the scientific community is a component of
'good science' in part because it increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in
methodology will be detected." Id.
183. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 (stating that peer review is relevant but not dis-
positive in assessing the scientific validity of a particular technique or methodology on
which an opinion is premised); David F. Horrobin, The Philosophical Basis of Peer
Review and the Suppression of Innovation, 263 JAMA 1438 (1990) (stating that well-
grounded but innovative theories may not be published); see also J. ZIMAN, AN Ex-
PLORATION OF THE GROUNDS FOR BELIEF IN SCIENCE 130-33 (1978); Relman & An-
gell, How Good is Peer Review?, 321 NEW. ENG. J. MED 827 (1989).
184. See Laser, supra note 14, at 1413 ("Only in the formal, traditional sciences is
there an established practice of publication and peer review.").
185. See id.
186. See Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988) (rejecting
testimony based on "clinical ecology" because the entire field of expertise is
unreliable).
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3. Judges as Gatekeepers
Daubert's gatekeeping function for trial judges transcends any
qualitative differences between scientific and nonscientific testi-
mony.187 In a recent case, Thornton v. Caterpillar,'88 the judge
found that the Daubert factors did not apply to the proffered testi-
mony of a mechanical engineer because the test was never meant
to be applied to testimony that is nonscientific in nature. 89 The
judge emphasized the differences between admissibility and relia-
bility, and stated that admissibility is for the judge to decide while
reliability is for the jury.1 90 This notion is implausible. While juries
evaluate the relative credibility of witnesses, judges should be re-
sponsible for keeping all unreliable "junk" testimony out of their
courtrooms, not simply "junk science.' ' 9 1
The proliferation of "guns for hire"'192 in trials also makes it es-
sential that judges carefully screen nonscientific testimony. 93
Although it is illegal to compensate a lay witness with anything of
value, 94 paying an expert witness for testimony is permissible and
187. One way judges have ensured reliability to a limited extent is by scrutinizing
the qualifications of each expert to appear in his or her court. See Strong, supra note
140, at 363 ("[Tlhe question of the reliability of the general propositions utilized by
the expert is conveniently subsumed under the question of the qualification of the
expert witness.").
188. 951 F. Supp. 575 (D.S.C. 1997).
189. See id. at 577.
190. See id.
191. See United States v. Webb, 115 F.3d 711 (9th Cir. 1997) (J. Jenkins, concur-
ring). Judge Jenkins reasoned that although the Daubert factors could not be applied
to the specialized knowledge of law enforcement:
We cannot be suggesting that the district court examine less rigorously the
specialized knowledge underlying proffered nonscientific testimony, or that
the district court may abdicate its role as gatekeeper where the subject mat-
ter does not depend on the scientific method. The trial court's role as gate-
keeper concerning nonscientific "specialized knowledge" proves equally
crucial to the integrity of the trial process ....
Id. at 717.
192. "Guns for hire" is a term which portrays experts as paid employees working as
advocates to persuade the jury of the client's position. See Berry v. City of Detroit, 25
F.3d 1342, 1349 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that in the age of "experts for hire," it is not
inconceivable for a party to purchase experts with impressive credentials to testify for
the party's benefit); Laser, supra note 14, at 1409 ("In the age of 'experts for hire,' it is
not inconceivable for a party to 'purchase' persons with impressive credentials to say
what the party wants them to say."); see also Perrin, supra note 2, at 1453.
193. See Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 1991 (5th Cir.) (stating that regard-
less of what kind of testimony is proffered, the allocation of Daubert's reliability prin-
ciples is "germane to evaluating whether the expert is a hired gun or a person whose
opinion in the courtroom will withstand the same scrutiny that it would among his
professional peers").
194. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) (1988).
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indeed expected. 195 This has created a market for experts in which
lawyers purchase the expert who can best convince a jury of their
client's position, regardless of whether the expert's conclusions are
well founded. 196 It has even been noted that a "fool with a small
flair for acting and mathematics might be a more successful witness
than, say, Einstein. "197
As paid advocates, experts can be vehicles for pervasive corrup-
tion in courtrooms because they have a financial incentive to ad-
vance the case of the party who hires them.198 That experts will
begin testifying free of charge is unlikely, 99 so it is incumbent upon
the judiciary to ensure that both scientific and nonscientific expert
testimony is reliable and not prepared in anticipation of the
litigation.2 °°
4. Amending Rule 702
The extension of Daubert's gatekeeping requirement to non-
scientific testimony would be best accomplished by adopting an
amendment to Rule 702. In 1991, the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States pro-
posed an amendment to the rule. 20 1 The proposed amendment ex-
pressly added a "reasonable" reliability requirement which was
195. 18 U.S.C. § 201(d).
196. See Perrin, supra note 2, at 1415-16 ("Lawyers shop for experts, ultimately
choosing the one that talks right, looks right, has the right credentials, and will work
with the lawyer in the development of her opinions.").
197. Id. (citing GERRY SPENCE, WITH JUSTICE FOR NONE 270 (1989)).
198. See Trower v. Jones, 520 N.E.2d 297, 300 (Il. 1988) (noting that a favorable
verdict will enable the expert to establish a "track record"). Perrin, supra note 2, at
1414 (arguing that experts have an interest in advancing the case so they are retained
in the future).
199. See Perrin, supra note 2, at 1413 (acknowledging that many experts are profes-
sional experts who make a living testifying in court).
200. See Schofield, supra note 137, at 515 (stating that the Compton court should
have inquired into whether the expert's testimony was prepared solely for the litiga-
tion). See also Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Accepting Daubert's Invitation:
Defining A Role For Court-Appointed Experts In Assessing Scientific Validity, 43 Em-
ory L.J. 995, 996 (1994) (suggesting an alternative way for judges to ensure the relia-
bility of expert testimony by utilizing court-appointed experts pursuant to Federal
Rule of Evidence. 706).
201. The proposed amendment reads:
Testimony providing scientific, technical, or other specialized information, in
the form of opinion or otherwise, may be permitted only if (1) the informa-
tion is reasonably reliable and will substantially assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, and (2) the witness is
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education
to provide such testimony.
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implicitly stated in Daubert.°2 Although such a requirement prop-
erly focuses attention on the problem of reliability, the proposal
provides neither a definition of what "information is reasonably
reliable," nor guidance in applying such a reliability standard.2 °3
While the application of the Frye test is unduly limiting, this pro-
posed amendment is too broad to be very useful.
C. Proposal
Rule 702 should be amended to effectively implement a reliabil-
ity requirement and compel the judiciary to embrace its gatekeep-
ing role in the admission of both scientific and nonscientific
testimony. The amendment should address the problem of reliabil-
ity in nonscientific testimony by providing a clear standard and
framework for judges to follow, rather than requiring them to
make a case by case inquiry, determining whether the particular
testimony proffered is sufficiently scientific in nature, and thus sub-
ject to Daubert's enhanced reliability scrutiny. Taking these factors
into consideration, I propose the following amendment to Rule
702:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
substantially assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue, a witness, qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
in the form of opinion or otherwise if the testimony is shown to
be reasonably reliable.
Testimony will be considered reasonably reliable if it is based
upon sufficient facts, data, opinions, explanatory theory or rea-
soning i) which is generally accepted in the relevant specialized
community or ii) if the testimony is shown to be not generally
accepted, the party offering the testimony proves by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the testimony is otherwise reliable
including a demonstration that sound principles have been ap-
plied reliably to the facts of the case, the witness is testifying in
accordance with the same intellectual rigor applied in his or her
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53, 156 (1991).
202. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993); supra note 76
and accompanying text.
203. See Imwinkelried, supra note 16, at 2287 (noting that the proposal avoided the
challenge of developing reliability standards and thus "points up the problem but con-
tributes nothing to the solution").
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professional practice, and the field of expertise is known to
reach reliable results.20 4
204. This proposal incorporates elements of two of the many proposed amend-
ments to Rule 702, reviewed by the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of
Evidence in 1997, and one proposal recently approved to be recommended to the
Standing Committee in April, 1998.
The first reviewed proposal provides:
Testimony providing scientific, technical or other specialized information, in
the form of an opinion, or otherwise, may be permitted only if (1) the infor-
mation is based upon adequate underlying facts, data or opinions, (2) the
information is based upon an explanative theory either (a) established to
have gained widespread acceptance in the particular field to which the ex-
planative theory belongs, or (b) shown to possess particularized earmarks of
trustworthiness, (3) the witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training or education to provide such information, and (4) the
information will substantially assist the trier of fact to understand the evi-
dence or to determine a fact in issue.
MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE (4th ed. 1996). One ar-
guable problem with the proposal discussed in the Advisory Committee Reporter's
comment is the vagueness of the language "particularized earmarks of trustworthi-
ness" and "substantially assist." Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence Reporter's Comment, October, 1997 (on file with author). The amendment
proposed in this Note, including a provision entailing what judges should consider in
evaluating trustworthiness or reliability, will remedy this problem. The second re-
viewed proposal reads,
A witness may testify, in the form of an opinion or otherwise, concerning
scientific, technical, or other specialized information that will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, but only if
(1) the information is reasonably reliable, and (2) the witness is qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to provide
that testimony.
Information normally will be considered reasonably reliable if it is based on
premises, or derived from techniques, having significant support and accept-
ance within the relevant specialized community. A party seeking to object
to a witness testifying thereto must show by a preponderance of the evidence
that the information is not reasonably reliable.
Information based on premises or derived from techniques not having signif-
icant support and acceptance within the relevant specialized community will
not be considered reasonably reliable. A party seeking to have an expert
base testimony on this type of information must show by a preponderance of
the evidence that this testimony is reasonably reliable.
Alan Tamarelli, Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals: Pushing the Limits of Scientific Reliability, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1175
(1994). A problem with this proposal is that it does not specifically state how a party
might overcome a presumption of unreliability. See Advisory Committee on the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence Reporter's Comment, October, 1997 (on file with author).
The amendment proposed in this Note suggests that the additional inquiries as to
whether the witness is adhering to the same standards of intellectual rigor required in
the witness' field will provide a solution to this problem. The proposed amendment
recently approved by the Advisory Committee to be recommended to the standing
committee provides,
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
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This proposal goes further than simply suggesting a reliability
requirement because it provides a specific standard by which to
apply the reliability requirement. °5 The guideline for what is nor-
mally considered "reasonably reliable" will eliminate confusion
and inconsistent application in courts because judges will have a
clear standard which they can uniformly apply. 0 6 Moreover, the
proposal also is flexible and broad enough to ensure the reliability
of all expert testimony because the reliability requirement applies
to both scientific and nonscientific testimony.207
This proposal may seem similar to the Frye "general acceptance"
test because it states that information is reasonably reliable if it has
significant support within the relevant specialized community.20 8
The proposal does not, however, absolutely preclude theories that
are not generally accepted within the relevant community of exper-
tise.20 9 Although it is based on the assumption that general accept-
ance is the primary indicator of reliability, it provides a burden
shifting proposition, l0 which enables reliable testimony to be
heard even if it has not gained general acceptance.
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise provided that (1)
the testimony is sufficiently based upon reliable facts or data (2) the testi-
mony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness
has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence proposal approved to be rec-
ommended to the Standing Committee, April 6, 1998 (on file with author). This pro-
posal recognizes the significance of evaluating whether an expert has not only applied
a sound methodology, but that the methodology is applied appropriately to the facts
of the case. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994)
(noting the importance of a methodology being properly applied to the specific facts
of a case).
205. See supra note 200 (discussing the 1991 proposed amendment which simply
suggests a reliability requirement for all expert testimony without providing a frame-
work for how such a requirement would be implemented).
206. See Schofield, supra note 137, at 515 ("Without a uniform standard, an expert's
testimony that is likely to fail under Daubert's scientific factors could be repackaged
under the guise of technical or nonscientific evidence and avoid Daubert['s enhanced
scrutiny].").
207. The proposal applies to both scientific and nonscientific specialized or techni-
cal knowledge.
208. See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text
209. See supra note 28.
210. Initially, the party opposing the testimony bears the burden of proving it to be
unreliable and if that is accomplished, the testimony is excluded. See FED R. EvI.
702. However, this amendment proposes that once the testimony is proven to be
unreliable because it lacks general acceptance, the burden shifts back to the party
offering the testimony to show that it is indeed reliable despite the lack of general
acceptance.
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If a party opposing an expert's testimony shows the testimony is
not generally accepted, the party offering the testimony has an op-
portunity to show that the testimony is indeed reliable and over-
come the presumption of unreliability. The proposal suggests that
a way to overcome this presumption is by demonstrating that the
testimony would withstand scrutiny by other experts in the field.
The "general acceptance" in this proposal is different from that re-
quired by Frye because the proposal does not mandate that an ex-
pert use a generally accepted methodology. Rather, an expert may
establish that the reasoning which led to the conclusions advanced
would be generally accepted. Expert witnesses must establish a
similarity between their professional practice or experience and the
proffered testimony,211 which includes the inquiry into whether the
witness has employed the same reasoning 212 that other experts in
the field use to base their conclusions.213 Moreover, the proposal
suggests that part of ensuring whether a witness' methodology or
reasoning is reliable is examining whether it has been appropriately
211. See Tassin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 946 F. Supp. 1241 (M.D. La. 1996) (hold-
ing that in the context of engineering testimony, when the expert's opinions are based
on technical expertise, rigid compliance with the Daubert factors is not necessary as
long as the expert provides a reasonable link between the information and procedures
he uses and his conclusions); Imwinkelried, supra note 16, at 2292-92 (stating that the
reliability of an expert increases with the more experiences an expert has and the
similarity of those experiences to the testimony in question).
212. See Schofield, supra, note 137, at 508 (stating that although nonscientific ex-
perts may not use a complicated methodology, all experts should base their conclu-
sions on some methodology, reasoning or principle; for example, past experience
constitutes part of a methodology through which an expert might adequately base a
conclusion).
213. The additional inquiry as to whether the expert is adhering to the same stan-
dards of intellectual rigor required in the expert's field will help establish that the
expert is not a "hired gun" who has prepared the testimony solely for the litigation.
See Sheehan v. Daily Racing Form, Inc., 104 F.3d 940, 942 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting the
importance of an expert being "as careful as he would be in his regular professional
work outside his paid litigation consulting"); Braun v. Lorillard Incorporated, 84 F. 3d
230 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that the proper inquiry in evaluating the reliability of
expert testimony should be what sort of data other professionals in the same field
would require to support their conclusions); Schofield, supra note 137, at 511. Scho-
field argues:
Perhaps one of the best indicators as to whether an expert's reasoning or
methodology is reliable is whether the expert has followed the criterion es-
tablished in his profession. An expert should not be able to have his testi-
mony admitted in court on standards that are less thai what is expected in
the expert's field.
Id. The application of such an inquiry would be to require lawyers, for example, to
substantiate their legal conclusions in court with case law and statutes as they do
routinely in their professional practice. See also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. 43
F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995); Laser, supra note 14, at 1418.
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applied to the facts of the case. 14 The requirement that an expert's
field of expertise is known to reach reliable results will preclude
the possibility that an expert might be able to satisfy that he or she
has adhered to the intellectual rigor of an unreliable practice. 15
The proposal has the additional advantage of promoting judicial
efficiency by having the relevant community of expertise, rather
than the courts, determine the validity of the expert's testimony.216
The fields of scientific and nonscientific knowledge are so di-
verse 217 that it would be extremely burdensome to compel judges
to become sufficiently learned in a particular area in order to assess
the reliability of an expert testifying in that area. 218 This still may
be required in rare cases where there is either not a large enough
community of expertise to evaluate an expert's reasoning or lack of
consensus within a community regarding acceptable standards.219
However, in the majority of cases which do not present these is-
sues, the proposal will allow judges to focus on their gatekeeping
responsibilities rather than becoming "amateur experts. '220
The Tenth Circuit case, Compton v. Subaru of America, Inc., 22
best illustrates the practical application and utility of this proposal.
The Compton court held that where expert testimony is based on
general engineering principles gathered from years of experience,
rather than any particular methodology, performing a Daubert reli-
ability inquiry is not necessary.222 Although the expert's reasoning
214. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating
that "any step that renders the analysis unreliable renders the expert's testimony
inadmissible," and that this is true "whether the step completely changes a reliable
methodology or merely misapplies that methodology").
215. See Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988) (rejecting
the testimony of a "clinical ecologist" because the field is unreliable).
216. See Polentz, supra note 4, at 1189 (citing Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 371-72
(Md. 1978) (justifying the adoption of the Frye test as a means of allowing the scien-
tific community to make the determination on the validity of the testimony)).
217. See supra notes 35-45 and accompanying text (providing examples of different
kinds of expert testimony).
218. See Oh, supra note 9, at 563 ("Judges would be required to acquire sufficient
proficiency in a wide range of expertise.").
219. See id. (noting the problem of there being no consensus in a specific area re-
garding its "essential principles of knowledge").
220. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 600-01 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I do not doubt that Rule 702 confides to
the judge some gatekeeping responsibility in deciding questions of the admissibility of
proffered expert testimony. But I do not think it imposes on them either the obliga-
tion or the authority to become amateur scientists in order to perform that role.").
221. 82 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1996); see supra, note 85-88 and accompanying text.
222. See id at 1520. This decision suggested that an expert would be able to get
around a reliability inquiry by saying that no methodology was implemented to reach
the expert's conclusions and that the job of evaluating the credibility of the expert
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was unreliable, z23 the court nonetheless admitted the testimony be-
cause the expert had sufficient qualifications and testified to rele-
vant subject matter.224
Under the proposed amendment, the party offering such an ex-
pert would have to establish that his or her conclusions are based
on "adequate underlying facts, data, or opinion" and are "reason-
ably reliable," instead of focusing on the qualifications of the ex-
pert.225 If Subaru was able to demonstrate that the expert
presented unreliable testimony, the expert would have had the op-
portunity to rebut this presumption by showing that he used stan-
dard engineering principles, thereby adhering to the intellectual
rigor in his professional field.226 The application of this amend-
ment would fill the reliability gap left by a sole inquiry into the
expert's qualifications and relevance.227
Conclusion
In areas of nonscientific expertise, where testimony rarely is
based on a specific methodology, and thus is not adaptable to the
four Daubert factors, the trial judge must still ensure that the testi-
mony is reliable. While the fear of "junk science" pervading court-
rooms compels judges to scrutinize scientific testimony, it is equally
important that nonscientific testimony be grounded in well-rea-
soned and nonspeculative theory. Accordingly, Rule 702 should be
amended to require trial judges to embrace their gatekeeping role
with regard to all types of expert testimony. The proposed amend-
ment resolves the inconsistent application of Daubert by providing
a clear standard for judges to follow and affords the best solution
for ensuring the reliability of nonscientific testimony.
may be left to the jury. In addition, it is unlikely that a jury would be any better able
to assess the reliability of engineering principles than scientific principles.
223. In Compton, the experts opinion, that the plaintiff's car was defectively
designed because it allowed excessive roof crush, was "questionable and lacked relia-
bility," and the judge remarked that the expert's testimony was "more applicable to a
Sherman tank than to any vehicle which the ordinary consumer would drive."
Compton, 82 F.3d at 1516; see Schofield, supra note 137, at 490.
224. See Compton, 82 F.3d at 1518.
225. See supra, Part III.C.
226. See id.
227. See supra note 117 and accompanying text (discussing why the traditional ap-
plication of Rule 702 to nonscientific testimony is problematic).
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PROTECTING PROPERTY RIGHTS WITH
STRICT SCRUTINY: AN ARGUMENT FOR
THE "SPECIFICALLY AND UNIQUELY
ATTRIBUTABLE" STANDARD
Daniel William Russo*
The Fifth Amendment is not about property or about com-
merce. It is about individuals; it is about fairness; and it is about
freedom.'
Introduction
Consider a builder who purchases a piece of property in a small
city in order to build an apartment complex on the land. After
submitting his plan to the local government, the builder is told that
the permits to build are conditioned on whether or not he agrees to
give a percentage of his land back to the city or pay an "impact
fee."2 The government explains that a study has found that the
new complex will exacerbate the problems of overcrowded
schools3 and traffic congestion,4 and that the conditions are being
imposed to offset these implications.
The builder does not believe he should have to give any of his
land back or pay any fees, other than those normally imposed. He
alleges that the city is conditioning permits to which he is entitled,
* Fordham University School of Law, J.D. Candidiate, 1999, Hofstra University,
B.A., 1996. I would like to thank Professor William Treanor, Fordham University
School of Law, and Lindsay Feinberg for their guidance in preparing this Note. I
would also like to thank my family who has always encouraged and supported me in
my endeavors.
1. Roger Marzulla et al., Debate, Taking "Taking Rights" Seriously: A Debate On
Property Rights Legislation Before The 104th Congress, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 253, 258
(1995).
2. See Noreen A. Murphy, Note, The Viability of Impact Fees After Nollan and
Dolan, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 203, 204 (1.996) ("An impact fee, a species of the devel-
opment exaction, is a monetary charge imposed on developers as a condition of pro-
ject approval.").
3. See Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799
(11. 1961) (deciding whether an exaction of land in order to alleviate the problem of
overcrowded schools was constitutional).
4. See Northern Illinois Home Builders Ass'n v. County of DuPage, 649 N.E.2d
384 (Il1. 1995) (deciding whether the application of transportation impact fees was
constitutional).
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on whether he pays a price the city determines is fair. 5 This price,
however, is not based on any evidence or material fact, and the city
gives no guarantee that the price paid will be used to fix the poten-
tial problem(s) they are citing.6 The builder is then faced with a
dilemma: pay a fee he did not calculate into his costs and threaten
profit; reduce the size of his land by a percentage dictated by the
city; or sell his land and attempt to build elsewhere.7 The builder,
however, is not satisfied with any of the options presented by the
city, so he decides to sue the municipality, alleging that the condi-
tion imposed is an unconstitutional regulatory taking under the
Fifth Amendment.8
This scenario, while simplified, highlights some of the compli-
cated questions that arise in regulatory takings cases. It presents
the question of how a private citizen's property rights should be
protected against government action. Some scholars argue that the
takings issue is controversial because the United States Supreme
Court did not provide any guidance for many years.9 Because of
this silence, state courts developed their own standards to deter-
mine when a regulation constituted a taking.1" The state standards
are similar in that each requires some type of relationship between
the exaction imposed and the harm posed by the proposed devel-
5. See id.
6. See Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay v. City of Walnut
Creek, 484 P.2d 606 (1971) (holding that a required dedication is constitutional so
long as it results in any public benefit).
7. See Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1965). In
Jordan, the developer was presented with the options described in the accompanying
text. See id. at 443.
8. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment states "[N]or shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation." See generally Northern
Illinois Home Builders Ass'n, 649 N.E.2d 384 (Ill. 1995).
9. See Theodore C. Taub, Exactions, Linkages, and Regulatory Takings: The De-
veloper's Perspective, 20 URB. LAw. 515, 525 n.57 (1988) (discussing the Supreme
Court's lack of guidance on the takings issue and how this affected the development
of the issue).
10. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). The Court states, "Since
state courts have been dealing with this question a good deal longer than we have, we
turn to representative decisions made by them." Id. at 389. The Court further ex-
plains that, despite some variations, state courts employ one of three general stan-
dards in determining regulatory takings cases. See id. at 389-91. First is the "judicial
deference" standard, which is the least restrictive and thus favors municipalities. See
id. Second is the "rational nexus" test, considered the intermediate standard, favoring
neither municipalties nor developers. See id. at 390-91. Third is the "specifically and
uniquely attributable" test. See id. at 389-90. This standard uses the court's strictest
scrutiny in determining the validity of the exaction, and is therefore the standard most
favorable to the party on which the condition is being.imposed. See id.
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opment.11 The fundamental difference among the various stan-
dards is the degree of nexus the respective state courts require
municipalities to demonstrate in order to validate the imposition of
the exaction.' 2
In 1994, the Supreme Court decided Dolan v. City of Tigard'3
and adopted an intermediate standard of review for takings cases.
This Note argues that this intermediate test does not sufficiently
protect the property rights of individuals. Instead, this Note pro-
poses that courts reviewing required exactions use a higher stan-
dard of scrutiny, particularly the "specifically and uniquely
attributable" test adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court.
14
Part I provides a background of the Fifth Amendment's Takings
Clause and outlines three significant United States Supreme Court
takings cases: Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon;5 Nollan v. Califor-
nia Coastal Commission;16 and Dolan v. City of Tigard.17 Part II
discusses the three levels of scrutiny that states apply when decid-
ing regulatory takings cases: (1) the "judicial deference" standard;
(2) the "rational nexus" standard; and (3) the "specifically and
uniquely attributable" test. Part III analyzes the scope and appli-
cation of Nollan and Dolan, and argues that the "judicial defer-
ence" and "rational nexus" standards are inefficient in deciding
regulatory takings cases. This Note concludes that the "specifically
and uniquely attributable" test is most effective in deciding such
11. See Christopher J. St. Jeanos, Dolan v. Tigard and the Rough Proportionality
Test: Roughly Speaking, Why Isn't a Nexus Enough?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1883, 1888
(1995) (stating that "[v]irtually every state court, when faced with a challenge related
to development exactions, has required some sort of relationship between the exac-
tion and a harm indentified with the proposed development.").
12. See Nicholas V. Morosoff, Note, "'Take' My Beach Please!": Nollan v. Califor-
nia Coastal Commission and a Rational-Nexus Constitutional Analysis of Development
Exactions, 69 B.U. L. REV. 823, 864 (1989). "While every state court has embraced
this principle, they have sometimes differed on how close of a nexus the municipality
must demonstrate in order to validate the exaction." Id.
13. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
14. See Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799,
802 (Ill. 1961). In explaining the "specifically and uniquely attributable" standard, the
Court states:
If the requirement is within the statutory grant of power to the municipality
and if the burden cast upon the subdivider is specifically and uniquely attrib-
utable to his activity, then the requirement is permissible; if not, it is forbid-
den and amounts to a confiscation of private property in contravention of
the constitutional prohibitions rather than reasonable regulation under the
police power.
Id.; accord McKain v. Toledo City Plan Comm'n, 270 N.E.2d 370 (Ohio 1971).
15. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
16. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
17. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
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cases because it properly balances the protection of fundamental
private property rights with government regulations.
I. The Historic Evolution and Development of the
Takings Clause
The political philosopher, John Locke, insisted that the only rea-
son men created government was to protect the property rights of
individuals. 8 The protection of property rights, however, has
changed since the days of Locke.19 The development of the Tak-
ings Clause is a good example of the evolution of real property law.
A. The Legislative Intent
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohib-
its the government from taking private land from landowners with-
out compensation."0 In writing the Fifth Amendment, James
Madison was concerned with protecting the individual against the
government and the majority it represents.2 By including the pro-
tection of property rights, Madison provided citizens with a sphere
in which they were independent and secure in exercising other ba-
sic civil rights without government interference.22 The Takings
Clause ("Clause") was a solution to a problem Madison felt
strongly about: protecting property rights against failures in the
political process.23
18. See ELLEN FRANKEL PAUL, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EMINENT DOMAIN, 3
(Transactions Books eds., 1987).
19. See Andrew S. Yagoda, Dolan v. Tigard: Taking A New Look At An Old Tak-
ings Issue, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 351, 353 (1995), "The law of real property usually
develops in an evolutionary fashion. Change is often measured in terms of decades
and centuries rather then in months and years." (quoting Grant S. Nelson & Dale A.
Whitman, Congressional Preemption of Mortgage Due-on-Sale Law: An Analysis of
the Garn-St. Germain Act, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 241, 243 (1983)).
20. See supra note 8.
21. See D. Benjamin Barros, Defining "Property" In The Just Compensation
Clause, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1853, 1856 (1995).
22. See id. at 1856 (citing William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and Origi-
nal Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE
L.J. 694, 699 (1985)); see also Marzulla, supra note 1. "Our system of private prop-
erty is also essential to all of the other civil rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
Property rights provide citizens with the independence and security they need to exer-
cise their rights to free speech, freedom of religion and other basic civil rights." Id. at
258.
23. See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding Of The Takings
Clause And The Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 836-37 (1995).
That is not a just government, nor is property secure under it, where arbi-
trary restrictions, exemptions, and monopolies deny to part of its citizens
that free use of their faculties, and free choice of their occupations, which
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Although Madison's reasons for authoring the Clause are clear,
his intent concerning its scope is an issue of debate. E" This debate
has been fueled considerably by the United States Supreme
Court's attempts to determine the Clause's scope when deciding
takings cases.25 The controversy surrounding the Clause lies in the
interpretation of its language and its application in takings cases.2 6
Despite its use in regulatory takings actions since the late 1800s,27
many questions remain unanswered.28
B. Judicial Scrutiny In Supreme Court Takings Cases
In 1922, the Supreme Court decided Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon,2 9 a case which arose because the Mahons owned the sur-
face rights to a plot of land above a coal deposit to which the Penn-
sylvania Coal Company ("Company") owned the subsurface
rights.3 ° When the Company sought to begin mining, the Mahons
sued claiming the mining of the coal violated the Kohler Act.31
The Company defended against the Mahon's suit by claiming that
the Kohler Act deprived it of its property rights without just com-
pensation and therefore constituted a regulatory taking.32
The Court agreed with the Company and held that the Kohler
Act, as applied to these facts, constituted a regulatory taking in
which just compensation was due.33 This decision invalidated a
land use regulation because, as Justice Holmes stated, it went "too
not only constitute their property in the general sense of the word; but are
the means of acquiring property strictly so called.
Id. at 838 (quoting James Madison, Property, NAT'L GAZETrE, Mar. 27, 1792, in 14
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266, 267 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983)).
24. See generally id. (discussing the debate over the intended scope of the Takings
Clause and posing the question whether it was Madison's intention to limit the
Clause's application to physical takings only, or to protect property rights from gov-
ernment regulations which limit property use.).
25. See id. at 782.
26. See Morosoff, supra note 12, at 832.
27. See Treanor, supra note 23, at 795-97.
28. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) ("[T]his
Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining
when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action be
compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated
on a few persons."). Id. at 124.
29. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
30. See id. at 412. This right was expressly granted in the deed conveying the
surface rights. See id.
31. See id. at 412-13. The Kohler Act forbade the removal of coal when such min-
ing would cause subsidence of structures such as homes. 1921 Pa. Laws 1198.
32. See id. at 395.
33. See id. at 415.
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far."'34 However, the question of when a regulation went "too far,"
and therefore constituted a regulatory taking, remained unclear for
decades because the Supreme Court failed to enact a bright line
test.
Sixty five years after Pennsylvania Coal, however, the Supreme
Court decided Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,36 and fi-
nally addressed the lingering questions surrounding the regulatory
takings issue. As required by California law, the Nollans applied
for a building permit with the California Coastal Commission
("Commission") to erect a three-story home on their beachfront
lot.37 The Commission granted the permit under the condition that
the Nollans grant an easement across a portion of their land for
public access between two public beaches.38  The Nollans chal-
lenged this condition on the grounds that it constituted a regula-
tory taking.39
34. See id. Justice Holmes states:
[W]e see no more authority for supplying the latter without compensation
than there was for taking the right of way in the first place and refusing to
pay for it because the public wanted it very much. The protection of private
property in the Fifth Amendment presupposes that it is wanted for public
use, but provides that it shall not be taken for such use without just compen-
sation .... The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated
to a certain extent, if the regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking.
Id.
35. See Morosoff, supra note 12, at 837 (describing the "ad hoc" process the re-
viewing court must engage in when deciding takings claims); see also id. at 842-43
nn.135-37 (explaining that, in several cases after Pennsylvania Coal, the Court either
rejected the takings claim because it did not deny the landowner all the use of the
property or it simply ignored the takings claim and decided the case on other
grounds).
36. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
37. See id. at 827. The Nollans owned a beachfront lot with a small bungalow on
it. When the bungalow fell into disrepair and was no longer worth fixing, the Nollans
decided to destroy it and build a three story beachfront home. The opinion states, "In
order to do so, under Cal. Pub. Res. Code Ann. §§ 30106, 30212, and 30600 (West
1986), they were required to obtain a coastal development permit from the California
Coastal Commission." Id. at 825.
38. See id. at 825.
39. See id. at 828-30. Upon challenging the imposition of the easement condition,
the Nollans were granted an evidentiary hearing in order to determine the validity of
the condition. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Commission reaffirmed the ease-
ment condition on the basis that the new home would create a "psychological" barrier
between the beach and the public, placing a burden on the public's right to use the
beach. See id. at 828-29. The Commission reasoned that the easement was justified
because it somewhat offset this burden. See id. The Nollans then filed a writ of ad-
ministrative mandamus with the California Superior Court and were successful in get-
ting the easement condition struck down. See id. at 829. The California Court of
Appeals then reversed, holding that the permit condition was valid because it was
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Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia stated that in order for a
government to legitimately regulate private property, there must
be an "essential nexus" between the imposed condition and the
harm sought to be prevented.4" Applying this new standard to the
facts of the case, the Court held that no such nexus existed,41 and
that the Commission would have to pay for an easement across the
Nollan's property under the Fifth Amendment.42
Despite clarifying some aspects of the takings issue, Nollan also
left some important questions unanswered. First, to what type of
government regulation was the "essential nexus" .standard sup-
posed to be applied,4 3 and was the standard limited to physical ded-
ications of property or could it also be applied to conditions like
impact fees? Second, and perhaps most importantly, the Court did
not decide the required degree of connection between the condi-
tion imposed and the projected impact of the development once
the "essential nexus" between the state purpose and the condition
was established.4
Seven years later, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Dolan
v. City of Tigard,45 to "resolve a question left open by [its] decision
in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n... of what is the required
sufficiently related to the impact of the Nollan's new home. See id. at 830. The Court
of Appeals stated that even if the home was not the sole reason for the need created
and the relationship between the two was only indirect, the condition was still consti-
tutionally valid. See id. The Nollans appealed to the Supreme Court, and were
granted certiorari. See id.
Justice Scalia began the Court's analysis by reciting the general rule that a land use
regulation is not a taking if it "substantially advances a legitimate state interest" and
does not "den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land(.)" See id. at 834
(quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). Scalia also accepted the Com-
mission's argument that protecting the public's ability to see the beach is a legitimate
state interest. Scalia states, "We assume, without deciding, that this is so...", refer-
ring to the Commission's argument that protecting the view of the beach is a legiti-
•mate state interest. See id. at 835.
40. See id. at 837.
41. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. The easement imposed on the Nollans, forcing the
Nollans to allow the public to use their land to get from one public beach to another,
in no way remedied the problem the Commission was citing, the obstruction of the
public's view of the beach.
42. See id. at 841-42. Unless the Commission compensated the Nollans, the ease-
ment imposed was "an out and out plan of extortion." Id.
43. See Mark W. Cordes, Discretionary Limits in Local-Land Use Control, Legal
Limits On Development Exactions: Responding to Nollan And Dolan, 15 N. ILL. U. L.
REv. 513, 528 (1995). "Because Nollan involved the unusual scenario where there is
no connection between an exaction and development impact, the full import of the
'essential nexus' standard was left undeveloped." Id. at 527.
44. See Murphy, supra note 2, at 236.
45. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
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degree of connection between the exactions imposed by the city
and the projected impacts of the proposed development. '4 6 In-
tending to expand her store, Ms. Dolan submitted a plan to the city
in which she proposed to knock down the existing store and build a
larger one with additional parking spaces. 47 Based on Tigard's new
Community Development Code ("CDC"),48 the city approved Ms.
Dolan's permit application but attached two conditions to the pro-
posal. First, she was to dedicate to the City of Tigard the portion of
her property lying in the 100-year floodplain of Fanno Creek.49
Second, Ms. Dolan was required to dedicate an additional fifteen
feet of land next to the floodplain. 0 In total, the dedications re-
quired by Tigard constituted approximately 7,000 square feet or
ten percent of Ms. Dolan's land."
Ms. Dolan contested the required dedications, asserting that
they constituted a taking of private property without just compen-
46. Id. at 377 (granting certiorari on Petitioner's challenging of the Oregon
Supreme Court which held that the City of Tigard could condition the granting of her
building permit on the condition that Ms. Dolan dedicate a portion of her property).
47. See id. Petitioner, Florence Dolan, owned a plumbing and electrical supply
store in Tigard, Oregon. The 9,700 square feet of store was situated on the east side
of a 1.67-acre parcel of land which also included a gravel parking lot. Fanno Creek
ran adjacent to the lot flowing through the land on the southwest corner. The first
phase of Ms. Dolan's proposal called for 17,600 square feet of store and a paved 39
space parking lot, the second phase called for an additional building and more park-
ing spaces. See id. at 379.
48. See id. at 378-80. Prior to Dolan's permit application, the state of Oregon
required all the cities and counties of Oregon to pass a land use plan consistent with
the state's planning goals. See id. Tigard's Community Development Code required
all landowners in the area zoned "Central Business District" to comply with a 15%
open space and landscaping requirement. See id.
49. See id. at 380-81. Tigard sought this land in order to improve the drainage
system along the creek. See id. A portion of Tigard's Community Development Code
addressed flooding problems with Fanno Creek. The plan established that an increase
in impervious surfaces (i.e., paved parking lots) would increase the flooding problems.
It also suggested a number of ways to decrease the flooding including channel excava-
tion next to Dolan's property and keeping the floodplain free of structures. See id. at
379-80. The plan concluded that the costs of remedying the flooding problem would
be shared with property owners. Owners along the creek would pay more because of
the direct benefit they would receive from the improvements. See id.
50. See id. at 380-81. This portion of land was to be used as a pedestrian/bicycle
pathway because a transportation study identified automobile congestion in the Cen-
tral Business District as a problem. See id. at 380-83. This pathway was intended to
give people an alternative to using their automobiles on short trips within the district.
See id. at 381-83. The Community Development Code required developers supply the
land for the pathway by dedicating land when beginning new developments. See id. at
379-80.
51. See Dolan, 512 U.S. 380-81.
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sation.52  The Court held that when the required "essential
nexus" 3 is found between the imposed condition and the state's
legitimate purpose, the state must then prove the existence of a
"rough proportionality" between the projected effects of the devel-
opment and the dedication required.54 Applying the two-prong
52. See id. at 381-83. Ms. Dolan took her claim to the Oregon Land Use Board of
Appeals (LUBA) asserting that Tigard's dedication conditions were not related to the
proposed development and therefore constituted a taking. See id. After evaluating
Ms. Dolan's claim, LUBA found a "reasonable relationship" between both conditions
imposed and the proposed development. Concerning the requirement to dedicate
land for the improved drainage system, LUBA found a "reasonable relationship" be-
cause the new building and parking lot would increase impervious surfaces, therefore
increasing the runoff into Fanno Creek. See id. Concerning the dedication for a path-
way, LUBA also found a "reasonable relationship" based on the conclusion that the
larger store would require more employees and attract more customers, therefore
increasing automobile congestion on the roads and in parking lots. See id.
The Oregon Court of Appeals and the Oregon Supreme Court, both affirmed
LUBA's ruling. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 832 P.2d 853 (Or. Ct. App. 1992) (re-
jecting Dolan's argument that the United States Supreme Court had adopted a
stricter standard then the "reasonable relationship" test, by adopting the "essential
nexus" test in Nollan), affd, 854 P.2d 437 (Or. 1993), rev'd, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). After
exhausting the state appellate remedies, Ms. Dolan appealed to the United States
Supreme Court.
53. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
54. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391. The opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
states, "No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some
sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in
nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development." Id. at 391-92.
Upon adding the "rough proportionality" standard as the second prong in deter-
mining regulatory takings cases, the Court analyzed three different state standards in
order to determine the level of scrutiny required in the test. See id. at 388-91 (discuss-
ing three separate state standards and the level of scrutiny required in each one). The
Court states, "Since state courts have been dealing with this question a good deal
longer then we have, we turn to representative decisions made by them." Id. at 389.
The standard requiring the lowest level of scrutiny is the "judicial deference" stan-
dard. See, e.g., Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay v. City of Walnut
Creek, 484 P.2d 606 (Cal. 1971) (holding that required exactions are justified on the
basis of general public need); Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 394 P.2d
182 (Mont. 1964); Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 218 N.E.2d 673 (N.Y. 1966). See
infra Part II.A. The Dolan Court felt this standard was too lax and did not adequately
protect the property owner's rights. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
The standard requiring the highest level of scrutiny was the "specifically and
uniquely attributable" test. See, e.g., McKain v. Toledo City Plan Comm'n, 270
N.E.2d 370 (Ohio Ct. App. 1971) (holding that the required exaction is permissable
only if it is specifically and uniquely attributable to the developer's activity); Ansuini,
Inc. v. City of Cranston, 264 A.2d 910 (R.I. 1970). See infra Part II.B. The Court felt
this standard was too exact a standard for municipalities to meet. See Dolan, 512 U.S.
at 391.
The majority determined that the intermediate standard, the "rational relationship"
standard, was the required level of scrutiny under the Fifth Amendment. See id. The
opinion states, "We think the 'reasonable relationship' test adopted by a majority of
the state courts is closer to the federal constitutional norm than either of those previ-
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test to the facts in Dolan, the Court held that an "essential nexus"
did exist between the conditions imposed and a legitimate state in-
terest. The Court, however, found that the city failed to meet the
"rough proportionality" standard, and thus the regulation
amounted to a taking.56
II. The State Standards of Review in Regulatory Takings Cases
The Supreme Court, in Dolan, analyzed three different state
standards before selecting the intermediate level of scrutiny used in
deciding the case. 7 The standards are similar in that all require
some degree of relationship between the exaction imposed and the
projected harm of the development.5 8 They differ, however, in the
level of scrutiny a court is required to use when analyzing a munici-
pality's exaction or dedication. 9 In light of the Court's precedent
in Dolan, it is important to understand the origins of the various
state standards.
ously discussed." Id. However, in order to prevent confusion with the term "rational
basis" used to describe the level of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, the
Court renamed the standard "rough proportionality." See id.
55. See id. at 383-84.
56. See id. at 391-97. As to the dedication of land along Fanno Creek, the majority
found that this dedication was based on "rather tentative findings" that Dolan's de-
velopment would increase storm water flow thereby increasing the city's need to man-
age the land for drainage purposes. See id. at 384. The majority also relied on the fact
that Ms. Dolan's loss of her right to exclude was disproportionate to the City's possi-
ble benefit of controlling floods. See id. at 391. Chief Justice Rehnquist states, "As
we have noted, this right to exclude others is 'one of the most essential sticks in the
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.'" Id. (quoting Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)). The dedication imposed for the
land to be used as a pedestrian/bicycle pathway also failed the "rough proportional-
ity" standard. See id. at 392-97. According to the Court, this dedication was not justi-
fied by the city's finding that the pathway "could" offset some of the projected
increase in traffic congestion. Id. at 397. ("[t]he findings of fact that the bicycle path-
way system 'could offset some of the traffic demand' is a far cry from a finding that
the bicycle pathway system will, or is likely to, offset some of the traffic demand.")
(quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437, 447 (Or. 1993), cert. granted, 510 U.S.
989 (1993), rev'd 512 U.S. 374 (1994)).
57. See id. at 384-91 (analyzing the state standards of review); see also supra note
54.
58. See John J. Delaney et al., Exactions: A Controversial New Source for Munici-
pal Funds: The Needs-Nexus Analysis: A Unified Test For Validating Subdivision Exac-
tions, User Impact Fees And Linkage, 50-WTR LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 147-56
(1987) (analyzing the various state standards in exaction cases).
59. See St. Jeanos, supra note 11, at 1888.
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A. The "Judicial Deference" Standard
The "judicial deference" standard requires the lowest level of ju-
dicial scrutiny.60 It requires only a general showing that the condi-
tion imposed may offset the potential harm of the development.6'
This standard requires the reviewing court to automatically accept
the legislative determination that a nexus exists.62 Therefore, the
exaction plan is automatically approved unless the developer can
show that the municipality's reasons for it are meritless. 63 This is
an extraordinarily heavy burden for the developer to meet. 64
In Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County,65 the Montana
Supreme Court applied the "judicial deference" standard in a case
where a developer's plan to subdivide a parcel of land was rejected
because it did not provide for the dedication of land to Yellow-
stone for parks and playgrounds.66 In reviewing the developer's
claim, the Billings Court held that a municipality's determination
that a proposed development may create a need for public land is
sufficient to render the exactions imposed constitutional.67 This
holding suggests that the determination of a nexus between the
condition and the projected harm is left solely to the municipality
60. See Morosoff, supra note 12, at 865.
61. See, e.g., Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay v. City of Walnut
Creek, 484 P.2d 606 (Cal. 1971) (holding general public need justifies the required
exaction); Billings Properties Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 394 P.2d 182 (Mont. 1964);
Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 218 N.E.2d 673 (N.Y. 1966).
62. See Billings, 394 P.2d at 185; see also infra note 64.
63. See Morosoff, supra note 12, at 865. "Under this judicial-deference standard,
exactions [sic] schemes are automatically approved whenever a local government
merely states that it found a connection between the exaction and some development-
created need. The burden is in effect placed upon the developer to show that the
scheme lacks the requisite nexus." Id.
64. See St. Jeanos, supra note 11, at 1889.
65. See Billings, 394 P.2d at 182; see also Jenad, 218 N.E.2d at 674 (deciding
whether it was constitutional to allow the Village Planning Board to require a devel-
oper to allot land or pay an impact fee as a condition precedent to the approval of the
proposed development). The Jenad Court held that the dedication of land or the
payment of an impact fee is constitutional if the evidence reasonably establishes that
the development creates the needs for such parks and playgrounds. 218 N.E.2d at 676
(citing Billings, 394 P.2d 182 (Mont. 1964)).
66. See id. at 184. The petitioner presented to the Planning Board of Yellowstone
County a plan to subdivide a parcel of land and requested the plan's approval. The
Planning Board denied petitioner's proposal because it did not include a dedication as
required by state law. See id. The developer sued claiming that the required dedica-
tion of land was a taking because it did not provide the developer with just compensa-
tion. See id.
67. See id. at 185. The opinion states, "An act of the legislature is presumed to be
valid ... [and] every intendment is in favor of upholding its constitutionality." (citing
Gas Products Co. v. Rankin, 207 P. 993, 999 (Mont. 1922)).
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imposing the condition.68 Because the developer did not prove
that his subdivision would not create a need for a park, the Court
held that the exactions did not constitute a regulatory taking. 69
B. The "Rational Nexus" Standard
Courts using the "rational nexus" standard do not simply assume
the validity of the municipality's determination that an exaction is
necessary. 70 Instead, the reviewing court will require the munici-
pality to demonstrate that the exaction bears some "rational
nexus" to the negative impact of the proposed development.7 1
In Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls,72 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court applied the "rational nexus" standard in a case
where the Village passed an ordinance requiring a subdivider to
dedicate a portion of his land or pay an impact fee in lieu of the
dedication.73 In reviewing the ordinance, the Jordan Court held
that for an exaction requirement to be constitutional, the munici-
pality must provide evidence which reasonably establishes that ap-
proving the subdivision would require the municipality to provide
more land for schools, parks, and playgrounds.74 Based on the evi-
dence presented, the Court upheld the Village ordinance.
68. See id. at 188 ("The question of whether or not the subdivision created the
need for a park or the parks is one that has already been answered by our
Legislature.").
69. Id. at 188.
In the instant case no evidence has been introduced to rebut such presump-
tion and mindful of the duty of this court to uphold enactments of the Legis-
lature if there is any rational basis on which they can be upheld, it is found
that the statute is not an unreasonable exercise of the police power.
Id.
70. See St. Jeanos, supra note 11, at 1891 ("Courts will not defer to unfounded
assertions offered by a municipality to demonstrate why the exactions is necessary to
offset the harm.").
71. See, e.g., Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606, 611 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983) (holding that "the local government must demonstrate a reasonable
connection, or rational nexus" between the municipalities need and the potential
impact).
72. 137 N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1965).
73. See id. at 443. The municipality reasoned that such dedications were required
in order to provide for schools, parks and recreational needs. See id. at 443-44. The
subdividers, with full knowledge of the ordinance, proceeded with the project after
paying a $5,000 impact fee. See id. at 444. They then brought suit to have the money
returned claiming the fee was an unconstitutional taking without just compensation.
See id. at 445.
74. See id. at 448. "The test of reasonableness is always applicable to any attempt
to exercise the police power." Id.
75. See id. at 448-49. The Court found that the Village's evidence showing a signif-
icant growth in population and in local school enrollment, as well as expert testimony
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The "rational nexus" test thus requires a stricter level of scrutiny
than the "judicial deference" standard. 6 Courts use this standard
because it does not unduly inhibit the ability of government to reg-
ulate land use or give undue deference to legislative determina-
tions.77 This test attempts to balance the needs of the community
with the property rights of the developer.78 After its use in Jordan,
many state courts adopted it when deciding regulatory takings
cases.
79
C. The "Specifically and Uniquely Attributable" Standard
In contrast to the "judicial deference" and "rational nexus" stan-
dards, the "specifically and uniquely attributable" test applies strict
scrutiny when evaluating land use regulations.80 This test requires
that the imposed exaction be in direct proportion to a specifically
created need and thereby limits required exactions to those specifi-
cally and uniquely attributable to the impact of the development.81
regarding a healthy environment for human habitation, was enough to establish the
rational nexus between the development and the exaction. See id. The expert testi-
fied that a minimum of 3,000 square feet should be dedicated for parks and schools
for each family in the area, in order to create a "good environment for human habita-
tion". See id.
76. See Morosoff, supra note 12, at 868. "Straddling the fence between the judi-
cial-deference and the 'specifically and uniquely attributable' tests is a position known
as the rational-nexus test." Id.
77. See Delaney, supra note 58, at 154. "[T]he more moderate rational nexus test
... 'allows the local authorities to implement future oriented comprehensive planning
without according undue deference to legislative judgments."' Id. (quoting Wald
Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 338 So. 2d 863 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)).
78. See id.
79. See, e.g., Wald Corp., 338 So. 2d at 868 (stating that the rational nexus ap-
proach provides a more feasible basis for analyzing dedication requirements and
thereby explicitly adopting the rational nexus approach used in Jordan); Simpson v.
City of North Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Neb. 1980) (holding that the exaction
requirement placed on the developer must have a reasonable relationship or nexus to
the use of the property, if no such nexus exists the requirement is invalid); Call v. City
of West Jordan, 614 P.2d 1257, 1258 (Utah 1980) (citing Jordan while applying the
rational nexus test).
80. See St. Jeanos, supra note 11, at 1890.
81. See id. "Several state courts require a precise correlation between the re-
quested exaction and the harms that would result from development. In jurisdictions
following this standard, the exaction must be found necessary to alleviate a harm that
will be caused specifically by the proposed development and is not attributable to
development in general." Id.
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The Illinois Supreme Court has championed this standard,82 and
other state courts have adopted it.83
82. The phrase "specifically and uniquely attributable" was first used in 1960 by
the Illinois Supreme Court in Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 167 N.E.2d 230 (Ill.
1960). The Court, in Rosen, held that a required dedication of land or the payment of
a fee, as a condition to development approval, must be specifically and uniquely at-
tributable to the developer's activities. See id. at 233. Furthermore, the planning
board's authority to regulate does not give them the power to require conditions in
order to solve all of the municipality's problems. See id. at 233-34. One year later, the
Illinois Supreme Court again applied this standard to another development exaction
imposed under the same state-enabling legislation relied upon in Rosen.
In Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799 (Ill.
1961), the plaintiff was a subdivider who submitted a plan to the Mount Prospect
Planning Commission for approval. See id. at 800-01 (the proposal included the subdi-
vision of a parcel of land and the building of 250 residential units). The plaintiff's
proposal met all of the Planning Commission's requirements under the ordinance ex-
cept for a required dedication of a percentage of the land being developed. See id.
Under the statute, the plaintiff would have been required to dedicate 6.7 acres of land
to the village. The 6.7 acres of land required was going to be used as the location for a
new elementary school and playground. See id. Upon the plaintiff's refusal to dedi-
cate the land, the Commission refused to approve the subdivision proposal. See id.
The plaintiff brought suit claiming that the section of the ordinance requiring the land
dedication amounted to a taking without just compensation.
In deciding this case, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that a municipality under
development must consider present and future needs for schools and recreational fa-
cilities. See id. at 802. The Court states:
Neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants in this case take the negative side of
the question as to the desirability either of education or recreation. The
question is not one of the desirability of education or recreation, nor of the
desirability to improve the public condition, but, rather, the question
presented here is one of determining who shall pay for such improvements.
Id.
The Court found, however, that the record did not establish that Mount Prospect's
need for such facilities was specifically and uniquely attributable to the plaintiff's de-
velopment. See id. at 802. The problem of overcrowded schools in Mount Prospect
was due to the development of the entire Mount Prospect community. See id.
The agreed statement of facts shows that the present school facilities of
Mount Prospect are near capacity. This is a result of the total development
of the community. If this whole community had not developed to such an
extent or if the existing school facilities were greater, the purported need
supposedly would not be present.
Id.
The plaintiff's proposal of an additional 250 homes did not create the problem, it
only added to a pre-existing municipal concern. The Court states, "Therefore, on the
record in this case the school problem which allegedly exists here is one which the
subdivider should not be obliged to pay the total cost of remedying, and to so con-
strue the statute would amount to an exercise of the power of eminent domain with-
out compensation." Id.
83. See McKain v. Toledo City Plan Comm'n, 270 N.E.2d 370 (Ohio 1971). The
Court of Appeals of Ohio applied the standard when evaluating a land dedication
requirement for an off-site road improvement. The Planning Commission sought a
strip of land in order to repair a road that was 700 feet from the development sight
and "totally unrelated to the proposed subdivision." See id. at 374. The plaintiff
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Most recently, the Illinois Supreme Court reaffirmed the use of
the "specifically and uniquely attributable" test in its first regula-
tory takings case since the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Dolan.84 In Northern Illinois Home Builders Ass'n Inc. v. The
County of Du Page,85 the Illinois Supreme Court applied this stan-
dard when analyzing two state-enabling statutes permitting coun-
ties to impose transportation impact fees on new developments.86
In deciding the case, the Northern Illinois Court used the first
prong of the Dolan test and established that an essential nexus ex-
isted between preventing further traffic congestion and improving
roads.87 When it applied the second prong of the analysis, how-
ever, the Court used a higher level of scrutiny in determining
whether the exaction imposed was related enough to the potential
impact of the new development. Instead of using Dolan's "rough
proportionality" standard, the Illinois Supreme Court used the
"specifically and uniquely attributable" test 8  and held that Du
owned a single parcel of land, 3.71 acres in size. See id. at 372. The city demanded a
30-foot strip along one side of the parcel in order to widen an existing roadway. See
id. at 373.
In deciding the takings issue in the case, the Court agreed that a municipality may
require a developer to dedicate land if the proposed development creates such a need.
See id. at 374. These needs however, must be specifically and uniquely attributable to
the developer's activities. See id. If this is not the case, the regulation is in "contra-
vention of constitutional prohibitions" and is therefore forbidden. See id. The Court
found that the need to repair a road 700 feet from the proposed development sight,
and completely unrelated to the subdivision, did not satisfy the "specifically and
uniquely attributable" standard. See id.; see also Ansuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston, 264
A.2d 910 (R.I. 1970) (holding that a city ordinance requiring a fixed percentage of the
developer's land will inevitably lead to inequities, and may not always meet the "spe-
cifically and uniquely attributable" test).
84. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
85. 649 N.E.2d 384 (I11. 1995).
86. See id. at 387. Although the state legislature had replaced the first enabling
statute with the second, DuPage had enacted local ordinances under both and there-
fore both statutes required review. See id. Under the first enabling act, DuPage
County passed an ordinance which called for the collection of impact fees in order
"[T]o ensure that the new development pays a fair share of the costs of transportation
improvements needed to serve new development." See id. at 388.
A year and a half later, the state legislature repealed the first enabling act and
passed the Road Improvement Impact Fee Law. (605 ILCS 5/5-901 et seq. (West
1992)) See id. This second enabling act included the language, "[a]n impact fee paya-
ble by a developer shall not exceed a proportionate share of costs incurred by a unit
of local government which are specifically and uniquely attributable to the new devel-
opment paying the fee." Id. DuPage County subsequently amended its impact fee
ordinances to reflect a number of changes. The new ordinances reflected changes in
the previous ordinance's impact fee schedules as well as in changes in fuel and prop-
erty taxes. See id.
87. See id. at 389.
88. See id. The opinion states:
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Page would impose impact fees only for road improvements made
necessary by the new development.8 9 Moreover, the new develop-
ment paying the fee must receive a "direct and material benefit"
from the improvements the fee had financed. 90
III. Where Do We Go from Here: A Resolution to the
Question of Judicial Scrutiny in Takings Law
While the Supreme Court has refined its approach to the takings
issue, state and lower courts continue to grapple with the question
of how and when to apply the Nollan/Dolan standard.91 It is time
courts adopt a unified interpretation.
A. Interpreting the Scope and Application of Nollan and
Dolan
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Nollan,92 estab-
lishing the "essential nexus" requirement,93 has had several effects
on the regulatory takings issue. First, the Supreme Court made it
clear that municipalities would no longer be permitted to trade de-
velopment rights for exactions that were unrelated to the projected
impact of the development, and thus courts would be forced to
look closely at the proffered reasons for the condition imposed.94
The appellate court correctly found, and the parties agree, that Pioneer Trust
sets forth the standard applicable in this case. Thus, "in order for the impact
fee to pass constitutional muster the need for road improvement impact fees
must be 'specifically and uniquely attributable' to the new development pay-
ing the fee."
Id. (quoting Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799,
802 (Ill. 1961)). In completing its analysis of this issue, the Court found that only the
second of the two enabling acts met the strict requirements of the "specifically and
uniquely attributable" standard. See id. at 389. The majority reasoned that because
this enabling act contained the phrase "specifically and uniquely attributable" it ex-
pressly mandated the required degree of connection between the exaction and the
development. See id. The Court also relied on the fact that the second enabling act
provided a clear definition of what "specifically and uniquely attributable" means.
See id. The act states in its definitional section:
Specifically and uniquely attributable means that a new development creates
the need, or an identifiable portion of the need, for additional capacity to be
provided by a road improvement. Each new development paying impact
fees used to fund a road improvement must receive a direct and material
benefit from the road improvement constructed with impact fees paid.
Id. at 389-90 (quoting the definitional section of 605 ILCS 5/5-903 (West 1992)).
89. See id. at 390.
90. See id.
91. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
92. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
93. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
94. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
590
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Nollan also was an indication that the Court was preparing to
reinvestigate the role of the Takings Clause in protecting private
property rights and limiting land use regulations.95
In Dolan,96 the Supreme Court added the "rough proportional-
ity" prong, and thus determined the required degree of connection
between the exactions imposed and the projected impacts of the
proposed development. 97 The Court did not, however, clarify the
scope of Dolan's application.98 It remains unclear whether the
"rough proportionality" standard should be applied only to regula-
tions that require a physical dedication of land, or if its scope is
broader.
The Dolan standard clearly applies to exactions that require
physical dedications of property because the Court's decision spe-
cifically relies on the fact that Tigard's restriction required a dedi-
cation of Dolan's property. 99 In Dolan, the Court also noted its
traditional concern for government actions that focus on individual
citizens as opposed to society as a whole.100 Moreover, most condi-
tions requiring physical dedications involve particular parcels of
land and individual landowners, and thus are almost always subject
to the Dolan test.
It is unclear, however, whether Dolan applies to the imposition
of impact fees. The day after the Dolan decision was announced,
the Supreme Court remanded a California Supreme Court case for
reconsideration in light of its decision in Dolan.1°1 The California
case, Ehrlich v. City of Culver,102 did not involve a physical dedica-
tion of land, but rather a landowner who was required to pay a
$280,000 impact fee in order to get his project approved. 3 The
Supreme Court's instruction to review the case under Dolan
strongly suggests that it intended the Dolan standard to apply to
impact fees as well as physical dedications when such conditions
were imposed on an individual basis.104
95. See DAVID A. SCHULTZ, PROPERTY, POWER, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
128 (Transactions Books eds., 1992).
96. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
97. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
98. See Cordes, supra note 43, at 538.
99. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385-86; see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
100. See Dolan 512 U.S. at 385-86.
101. See Murphy, supra note 2, at 246.
102. 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
103. See id. at 471.
104. See Murphy, supra note 2, at 248. ("By vacating this decision one day after
deciding Dolan, with instructions to the lower court to reconsider their holding specif-
ically in light of Dolan, the Supreme Court impliedly suggested that impact fees
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The Nollan/Dolan standard should be applied to impact fees be-
cause the Supreme Court, in both opinions, continually used the
phrase "permit condition" as opposed to "land exaction" or "physi-
cal dedication. '10 5 In both cases, however, the condition imposed
by the municipality required a physical dedication of land.106 If the
Court's intent was to limit the standards to only physical exactions,
it consistently would have referred to these types of conditions. In-
stead, the Court referred to the municipality's requirements as
"permit conditions,"'0 7 and therefore revealed its intent to apply
the Dolan standard to impact fees as well.
Moreover, Nollan and Dolan should apply to impact fees be-
cause the Supreme Court, in both opinions, demonstrated its com-
mitment to strengthen the proection of the Fifth Amendment's
Taking Clause and reassert the importance of protecting individual
property rights under the Clause. 08 A narrow reading of these
cases would unnecessarily weaken the Court's clear intent. 0 9
should be judicially evaluated by the same standards.") (footnote omitted); see also
R.S. Radford, Rent Control and Regulatory Takings, in Inverse Condemnation and
Related Government Liability 473 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study No. C997, 1995)
("By vacating and remanding for reconsideration under the Dolan analysis, the
Supreme Court eliminated any doubt that it intends the heightened standards of Nol-
lan and Dolan to apply to regulations not involving a physical interference with
land.").
105. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836 (1987). "The
Commission argues that a permit condition that serves the same legitimate police-
power purpose as a refusal to issue the permit should not be found to be a taking if
the refusal to issue the permit would not constitute a taking." Id. (emphasis added).
"We therefore find that the Commission's imposition of the permit condition cannot
be treated as an exercise of its land-use power for any of these purposes." Id. at 839
(emphasis added). See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386. "In evaluating petitioner's claim, we
must first determine whether the 'essential nexus' exists between the 'legitimate state
interest' and the permit condition exacted by the city." Id. (emphasis added). "The
second part of our analysis requires us to determine whether the degree of the exac-
tions demanded by the city's permit conditions bears the required relationship to the
projected impact of petitioner's proposed development." Id. at 388 (emphasis
added).
106. See supra notes 38, 49, 50 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
108. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841 ("We view the Fifth Amendment's Property Clause
to be more than a pleading requirement."); Dolan, 512 U.S. at 392 ("We see no reason
why the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as much a part of the Bill of Rights
as the First Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should be relegated to the status of a
poor relation in these comparable circumstances."); see also Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (holding land use regulation which deprives
owner of all economic value of land constitutes a taking); First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (holding that govern-
ment must pay compensation for temporary regulatory taking).
109. See Murphy, supra note 2, at 252 (footnote omitted).
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Whether Dolan applies to land use regulations based on broad
legislative decisions is also a matter of debate. Language in the
opinion suggests that the Dolan standard does not apply to such
broad legislative acts. 110 For example, zoning ordinances which re-
strict land use in a specific section of a city are not subject to the
Dolan standard because the burden of the state interest being ad-
vanced is placed on the community as a whole.' Dolan's two-
prong test should apply only when the cost of a benefit to society is
being disproportionately placed on an individual landowner, not to
broad legislative acts.
B. The Protection of Property Rights
Conditioning an individual's permit approval on the dedication
of land or the payment of a fee is a different exercise of power than
the government's power to pass regulations that effect society as a
whole. In Dolan the Supreme Court attempted to ensure that the
exercise of this power does not result in an unfair burden placed on
an individual.1 12 In deciding Dolan, however, the Supreme Court
adopted only an intermediate level of scrutiny,' 13 and thus failed to
resolve the confusion and potential for government abuse sur-
rounding the regulatory takings issue. Therefore, the Supreme
Court should adopt one bright line, strict scrutiny test, in order to
protect the private property rights of individuals singled out by the
government for regulatory takings.
1. The Ineffectiveness of the "Judicial Deference" Standard
The inherent shortcomings of the "judicial deference" standard
are clear because the municipality imposing the exaction is the
branch of government that determines the nexus between the exac-
tion and the projected harm. Therefore, under this standard, the
exactions imposed are constitutional if the municipality says they
are.1 4 Allowing the municipality to make these determinations
110. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384. In the opinion, the Court acknowledges the impor-
tance and necessity of allowing state and local governments to engage in land use
planning and points out the traditional power of governments to do so. See id.; see
also Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) ("Government hardly
could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished
without paying for every such change in the general law.").
111. See Cordes, supra note 43, at 538.
112. See infra note 125.
113. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 390.
114. See Jenad, 218 N.E.2d at 677. The dissent states, "The principle of decision in
this case would constitutionally allow municipal officers to prohibit real estate devel-
opment in cities, towns and villages unless the newcomers pay whatever sums of
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without a high level of judicial scrutiny creates the potential for
abuse of a municipality's police power. In jurisdictions using the
"judicial deference" standard, conditions imposed by municipali-
ties are almost always constitutional.' 15
2. The "Rational Nexus" Standard: Not Strict Enough
Despite its popularity in state courts, the "rational nexus" stan-
dard is simply not strict enough when used to analyze required ex-
actions, because a "reasonableness" standard does not require a
direct correlation between the alleged public need and the pro-
posed development.1 16 Instead, it allows a municipality to present
evidence to show that any one of a number of municipal concerns
exist and that the required exaction will help alleviate one of those
concerns.
11 7
For instance, concern for a growing population or overcrowded
schools is likely a concern for a municipality at all times. Why
should the developer pay to alleviate a pre-existing problem that
the local government has been concerned with all along? Courts
should force municipalities to prove that a new development spe-
cifically exacerbates a pre-existing problem, and hold the devel-
oper liable only for the cost of the aggravation and not the entire
problem.
If the developer dedicates land or pays a fee, then the people
who live in the immediate area or who will live in that develop-
ment should benefit from the exaction. The "rational nexus" stan-
dard does not guarantee that the specific harm cited will be
alleviated by the exaction because the standard does not require a
direct correlation between the harm cited and the exaction im-
posed. Thus, it is time for the judiciary to challenge the abuse of
development exactions in local government by increasing the level
of scrutiny applied in deciding land use cases.118
C. The "Specifically and Uniquely Attributable" Standard: A
Call for Strict Scrutiny
The use of the "specifically and uniquely attributable" standard
by the Illinois Supreme Court has been controversial since the
money the local public authorities may decide arbitrarily to impose upon them ...
without relation to special benefits or assessed valuation." Id.
115. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
116. See Morosoff, supra note 12, at 869.
117. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
118. See Murphy, supra note 2, at 254.
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United States Supreme Court decided Dolan.119 The reaffirmance
of this test is important not only to the builders in Illinois, but also
to private property owners nationwide. It exemplifies a judicial
movement to restore private property rights and level the playing
field on which developers and local governments interact.
1. Curbing Government Abuse of Power
In drafting the Fifth Amendment, one of Madison's intentions in
protecting private property was to ensure citizens a more extensive
domain of liberty. 120 Thus, property is not only a right, but also
performs the function of maintaining independence so that other
individual rights may be protected from the majority.121 When
property rights are threatened, the danger of losing other civil
rights exists because the sphere of protection that private property
provides is weakened.1 22 In a constitutional democracy, such as in
the United States, the right to property defines the areas in which
the majority must yield to the minority. 123 Therefore, such rights
need to be protected with nothing less than the judiciary's strictest
level of scrutiny.
Advocates of heightened scrutiny argue that only rigorous judi-
cial review will protect against the overreaching and abuse of gov-
ernment power. 124 Allowing municipalities to package the issuance
of permits with the conditions of exactions is an example of such an
abuse. When this bundling of permits and exactions is allowed to
119. See generally J. Linn Allen, Too high a price? Builders across US. contest im-
pact fees, CHI. TRIB., June 14, 1992, at 1. Local government officials argue that this
standard is simply to tough for them to meet and to easy for the developer's to over-
come when an exaction is imposed. See id. According to these officials, tax caps
make it extremely hard to finance the building of schools, parks, and roads in order to
accommodate community growth and impact fees and required land dedications are
the only way these municipalities can do so. They had hoped the Illinois Supreme
Court would abandon this standard for the two prong test used in Dolan. See id.
Builders and developers however, are obviously pleased with the reaffirming of this
standard. According to them, impact fees and land dedications make building unaf-
fordable and significantly raise the prices of affordable homes. It is this test, the devel-
opers claim, that levels an unbalanced playing field. See id.
120. See Barros, supra note 21, at 1858; see also supra note 22 and accompanying
text.
121. See Barros, supra note 21.
122. See id. at 1857-58.
123. See id.
124. See St. Jeanos, supra note 11, at 1903 (citing the Brief of the Institute for Jus-
tice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 11-12, Dolan (No. 93-518)).
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occur, developers are often forced to bear the burdens that the
Takings Clause was designed to eliminate. 25
As Northern Illinois Home Builders Ass'n Inc. v. County of
DuPage 1 6 exemplifies, the "specifically and uniquely attributable"
standard decreases the likelihood of such an injustice because it
requires that the new development specifically create the need for
which the exaction is imposed, 27 and assures that the development
receive a material benefit from the improvement that the fee fi-
nances.12 8 Local governments and municipalities, however, retain
the power to consider and regulate community growth under this
test. As long as the cost placed on the developer is specifically and
uniquely attributable to his/her activities, there is no violation of
the developer's property rights.
According to Professor Richard Epstein, "[e]rrors of overinclu-
sion occur when the regulation sweeps wider than necessary to
control the identified evil . ".. 19 In effect, these overinclusive
errors lead to individual land owners being forced to bear the costs
of society because the municipality is requiring more from the indi-
vidual than is needed to offset the individual's activities. The Nol-
lan/Dolan standard does not prevent such an injustice because it
does not guarantee that the development dedicating the land or
paying the fee is, in fact, the development that will receive the ma-
terial benefit from the required dedication. The "specifically and
uniquely attributable" standard, however, will strike down any reg-
ulation that requires more of an exaction than is needed to offset
the externalities of the proposed development.1 30
In guarding against the overreaching abuse of a local govern-
ment's police power,3 the "specifically and uniquely attributable"
standard also examines the municipality's incentive for using this
125. The United States Supreme Court has stated, "(o)ne of the principal purposes
of the Takings Clause is 'to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole."' Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (quoting Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
126. 649 N.E.2d 384 (Ill. 1995).
127. See id. at 389; see also supra note 88 and accompanying text.
128. See id. at 389-90; see also supra note 88 and accompanying text.
129. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EM-
INENT DOMAIN 127-28 (1985).
130. See Northern Illinois Home Builders Ass'n, 649 N.E.2d at 390-91; see also
supra note 88 and accompanying text.
131. See generally Midtown Properties, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 172 A.2d 40,
47 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961) ("The municipality, regardless of its good inten-




power. If a municipality's power to issue development permits
conditioned on exactions goes unchecked, the municipality has an
enormous incentive to solve all types of problems unrelated to the
development. 132 By requiring that the development be the specific
cause of the impact for which the exaction is imposed, the local
government no longer has such an incentive because local officials
would know that their actions would be analyzed under rigorous
judicial scrutiny. Therefore, under this standard, there is little
room for the government to abuse its power by unfairly taking land
and imposing impact fees.
2. Balancing the Unstable Political Process
Heightened scrutiny also is necessary because the political pro-
cess is directly connected to the problems surrounding the takings
issue. 33 Often, local politics create factions that discriminate
against outside developers or individuals who do not have voting
rights or political clout within the community.1 34 Upon entering
the community with a development proposal, these individuals
must face local land use regulations without the aid of the political
process.1 35
In addition, most land use regulations are not self-executing.1 36
Instead, a broad regulation is applied and enforced by local plan-
ning boards that are influenced by the municipality's officials and
insiders. 37 According to Professor Epstein, "[a]n enormous slip-
page thus occurs between the articulation of a general principle
and its concrete application.' 1 38 Therefore, what tends to happen
is that the actual application of the regulation becomes skewed by
the influence of local officials and protesters seeking to avoid the
development completely or to avoid the payment of just
compensation.
The "specifically and uniquely attributable" standard's strict
scrutiny is necessary to balance the unstable political process that
administers land use regulations. 139 By applying this test to re-
132. See St. Jeanos, supra note 11, at 1904 n.151 (citing the Brief of the Institute for
Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 20, Dolan (No. 93-518)).
133. See EPSTEIN, supra note 129, at 265.
134. See id. at 264.
135. See id. ("[W]hy should they be required to negotiate the hurdles of the local
zoning procedures in order to overcome obstacles to land development that never
should have been erected in the first instance?").
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See EPSTEIN, supra note 129, at 265.
139. See id.
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quired physical exactions and impact fees, the reviewing court will
be able to: 1) directly measure the impact of the regulation; 2) sort
through the political red-tape and examine the true motive of the
municipality imposing the exaction; and 3) if necessary, determine
the correct amount of compensation owed to the individual prop-
140erty owner.
3. The "Specifically and Uniquely Attributable" Standard Is Not
"Too Exacting"
Government officials and other opponents of heightened scru-
tiny believe that the "specifically and uniquely attributable" stan-
dard is too exacting."' They argue that this test requires a showing
of data and information about proposed projects that is practically
impossible to obtain, and that it rarely results in the finding of a
sufficient nexus between the need created and the exaction
imposed.1 42
This argument is flawed, however, because a municipality that
has the resources to meet the intermediate standard of review also
has the resources to show that the exaction is specifically and
uniquely attributable to the new development. Once this burden is
met, the development is guaranteed a direct and material benefit
from either the land given or the fee paid. The municipality can
make its necessary improvements, at the cost of the developer,
without unconstitutionally limiting the latter's right to private
property. Moreover, this increased burden on the municipality is
justified because an individual's property rights are at stake.
4. The "Specifically and Uniquely Attributable" Standard Does
Not Prohibit Government Land Use Regulations
Law and economics advocates also argue against the use of strict
scrutiny in land use regulation cases.143 They contend that the
trade of a permit for an exaction is an efficient transfer which
keeps the market competitive and thus benefits society as a
140. See id. at 266.
141. See Gerald P. Callaghan, Illinois High Court Reaffirms Strict Test For Develop-
ment Fees, 18 CHi. LAWYER 73 (May 1995). Many of the opponents use the same
reasoning as the United States Supreme Court did in Dolan, however the Court in
that case relied on the "nature of the interests at stake." See Dolan v. City of Tigard,
512 U.S. 374, 3889-90 (1994).
142. See Murphy, supra note 2, at 226 (citation omitted).
143. See St. Jeanos, supra note 11, at 1904 (noting that economists argue that the
swap of an exaction for a permit to develop is an efficient transfer).
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whole. 1" These opponents also argue that the "Lochner Era 145
established that courts have no authority to review governmental
economic decisions, such as the financing of public roads and
schools.146
While the economic argument presents legitimate concerns when
discussing the role of courts in a municipality's business decisions,
it is not persuasive when the constitutional right to property is at
stake. The "specifically and uniquely attributable" test does not
eliminate a municipality's right to regulate land use, a necessary
function in modern day society. 147 Instead, this standard allows
courts to protect landowners from municipal overreaching and
abuse of power without becoming improperly involved in the mu-
nicipality's decisions. Moreover, it removes the municipality's in-
centive to abuse its power to regulate land use. When the
municipality attempts to do so, the "specifically and uniquely at-
tributable" standard provides the courts with a bright line test to
use in order to protect an individual's property rights.
Conclusion
In the controversy surrounding land use exactions, the Fifth
Amendment should be interpreted to permit an individual to freely
develop property without bearing unfair costs imposed by a munic-
ipality. With the use of minimum or intermediate levels of review,
the protection afforded by the Takings Clause is improperly re-
duced. By requiring that land use exactions be specifically and
uniquely attributable to the projected impact of the new develop-
ment, individual private property rights will be restored.
144. See Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 544 (1991).
145. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 829-31 (3d ed. 1996).
The "Lochner-era" refers to the time period between 1905 and 1934 when the United
States Supreme Court used heightened judicial scrutiny, relying on the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to strike down approximately 200 economic
regulations. Id.
146. See St. Jeanos, supra note 11, at 1905.
147. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 1994) (noting that the power of
state and local governments to engage in land use regulation still exists).
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HARNESSING PAYNE: CONTROLLING THE
ADMISSION OF VICTIM IMPACT





It was just three days before Christmas when James Bernard
Campbell came into the Reverend Bosler's home and brutally mur-
dered the Reverend and critically injured his daughter Sue Zann.1
Sue Zann Bosler stood terrified and helpless as this total stranger
stabbed her father twenty-four times, and then stabbed her six
times, leaving them both for dead.2 Sue Zann's father died, but,
miraculously, she survived and now must live everyday with the
painful memories and physical scars of this gruesome crime.3
A jury convicted Campbell of murder in the first degree.4 At the
sentencing hearing, the judge informed the jury that the sentence
could be either death or life imprisonment. Sue Zann took the
stand to give a victim impact statement, as permitted by Florida
law, which would inform the jury about her own life and the life
her father lived.6 She gave "deep," "dramatic," and "emotionally
moving" testimony.7 In short, Sue Zann was the prosecution's
"blockbuster witness," who, through her wrenching testimony,
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 1999. B.A., English, Col-
lege of the Holy Cross, 1996. The author extends her sincere gratitude to Professor
Daniel Richman for his guidance, suggestions, and keen insight. She also would like
to thank her family and friends for their unconditional love, patience and support.
1. See 48 Hours: My Father's Killer (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 2, 1997) (not-






7. Id. With tears streaming down her face, she described the savage murder and
the pain she endured. See id. Between tears, she relayed to the jury how the stabbing
resulted in taking the side and part of her brain out of her skull. See id.
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helped secure the death penalty.8 Two courts, however, subse-
quently reversed the sentence on technicalities. 9
Meanwhile, over the past ten years, Sue Zann Bosler has be-
come the person most determined to keep Campbell alive."° At
the third sentencing hearing in ten years, Sue Zann again took the
stand, but under significantly different circumstances. 1' In a valiant
effort to uphold the beliefs of her father, who opposed the death
penalty, Sue Zann was determined to see peace prevail. 12 While
her prior testimony was "deep and eloquent," this time it was "as
unsympathetic and undramatic as possible."' 3 In response to the
prosecution's question about her livelihood, Sue Zann explained
that she has two jobs: one as a hairstylist and one as an advocate
8. Id.
9. See id.; see also Campbell v. State, 571 So.2d 415 (Fla. 1990) (vacating death
penalty and remanding for resentencing on grounds that the court should have con-
sidered in mitigation the fact that Campbell suffered from impaired capacity and had
a deprived and abusive childhood); Campbell v. State, 679 So.2d 720 (Fla. 1996) (re-
versing death sentence and remanding for third resentencing, holding that Campbell
was denied a fair penalty hearing because the prosecutor improperly discredited the
defense psychologist and made improper comments to the jury).
10. See 48 Hours, supra note 1. "Despite what has happened, she sees James
Campbell not as a monster, but as a human being." Id. In fact, Sue Zann has become
a leading voice in the movement against the death penalty, traveling nationwide with
a group called "Murder Victims' Families for Reconciliation," in an effort to enlist
support and encouragement for the movement, as well as Campbell. Id. "It has be-
come her cause, almost her obsession," to save not only Campbell, but every single
person on death row. Id.
11. See id.
12. See id. Sue Zann Bosler recalled how her father once had told her that if he
were to be murdered he still would not want the defendant to be put to death; for,
more than anything, he desired peace on earth. See id.
13. Id. No longer did she clutch a tissue and wipe her tears; rather, she remained
calm and collective. See id. She referred to the defendant as "James" or "the gen-
tleman," as she coldly and abruptly responded to the prosecution's questions about
the crime. Id. "It was deliberate - she had an agenda," noted the prosecutor, who
described Sue Zann's victim impact statement to be a different testimony entirely,
with a different Sue Zann." Id.
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against the death penalty. 14 In only three hours the jury returned a
sentence of life imprisonment.15
A comparison of Sue Zann's remarkably different testimonies
reveals the role emotions can play in capital sentencing, and how
significantly they can prejudice the defendant's constitutional
rights. When Sue Zann expressed pain and torment, Campbell re-
ceived the death penalty; however, upon manipulating her testi-
mony so as to maintain a calm and distant appearance, Campbell
received only life imprisonment. Unlike Sue Zann, however, most
victims support the death penalty.'6 In fact, in today's society, vic-
tims are often the driving force behind the prosecution's push for a
death sentence,' 7 and it is their tears and painful recollections that
14. See id. While Florida law does permit the use of victim impact statements in
capital sentencing hearings, the State has made clear the prohibition against any opin-
ions regarding the death penalty of life imprisonment. See id.; see also FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 921.141 (West Supp. 1997). Despite this restriction by the state, Sue Zann still
managed to find a loophole through which she could express her beliefs. But, when
she was called back to the stand by the defense, the judge was skeptical about letting
her proceed. See 48 Hours, supra note 1. He sent the jury out and ordered Sue Zann
to tell him what she planned to say. See id. In response, she asserted that she wanted
to forgive James. See id. Moreover, she commented, "I respect his life and value it
here on this earth, and I believe in life." Id. The judge ruled that such opinions have
no place in the courtroom and are not allowed under Florida law. See id. As such,
the defense found no room to call Sue Zann as a witness.
15. See id. Sue Zann's determination to save Campbell's life ended in victory, not
only for herself and Campbell, but also for the movement. In retrospect, she believes
this final sentencing gave her the closure she so desired and her own life a new begin-
ning. See id. But, while that is indeed heart-warming, that was not what our court-
rooms were designed for. The purpose of a criminal prosecution is not to heal the
wounds of the victim, but to punish the offender. Oftentimes the two may coincide,
but that cannot be the sole mission of justice.
16. See Tom Morganthau, Condemned to Life, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 7, 1995, at 19
(reporting that only 17% of those questioned in a random poll oppose the death pen-
alty in all cases). "Now more than ever, Americans support the death penalty by
striking majorities." Id. In a poll taken by Princeton Survey research associates, 79%
of the adults surveyed favored the death penalty for Timothy McVeigh. See id.; see
also David Wallechinsky, 'He Killed My Child, But I Don't Want Him To Die,'
PARADE MAGAZINE, Jan. 18, 998, at 4 (noting that recent surveys conclude that a
majority of Americans favor the death penalty).
17. See generally Editorial, Death and Delusion, 19 NAT'L L.J. 44, June 30, 1997, at
A14 (noting that "[plopular sentiment has long favored the death penalty"); Scott
Robinson, Editorial, Stacking the Deck Heart-Wrenching 'Victim Impact' Statements
Make it Virtually Impossible for Jurors to Set Emotion Aside, ROCKY MTN. NEWS,
June 8, 1997, at 1B (noting that in "modern-day death penalty trials" the "emphasis
has shifted to the personal human consequences of crime, paving the way for death
sentences based on moral outrage and retribution"); Brent Staples, Editorial, When
Grieving 'Victims' Can Sway the Courts, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 22, 1997, at A26 (stating
that "the Solemn activity of mourning has become a raucous and public blood sport").
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deeply touch the jury in a way that substantially prejudices the
defendant. 18
Victim impact evidence, as introduced by oral testimony and
statements that identify victims of the crime and the extent of their
suffering, presents a myriad of problems to the American court sys-
tem,19 especially with regard to the criminal defendant's right to a
fair trial. This Note traces the historical development of victim im-
pact statements ("VIS") through United States Supreme Court ju-
risprudence and state legislation, and analyzes their use in the
sentencing phase of capital trials. Part I explores the case and stat-
utory history of VIS during capital sentencing hearings. Part II ex-
amines the current use of VIS and the reality of their
consequences, by comparing the recent sentencings of Jesse Tim-
mendequas and Timothy McVeigh. Part III argues that the
Supreme Court's decision in Payne v. Tennessee20 has troublesome
implications in light of the capital defendant's constitutional rights,
the history of the death penalty, and traditional sentencing proce-
dures. This Note concludes by proposing guidelines that should be
expressed in an amendment to the United States Constitution to
compel all courts to uniformly regulate the use of VIS during capi-
tal sentencing hearings and to protect the constitutional rights of
defendants.
18. Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence recognizes how substantially emo-
tions can prejudice in holding that "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, con-
fusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EViD. 403. The
prejudice which Rule 403 refers to is "unfair prejudice." Ballou v. Henri Studios, 656
F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting that unfair prejudice is "an undue tendency to sug-
gest a decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional
one"). See e.g., Terry v. State, 491 S.W.2d 161 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (holding that
the autopsy pictures revealing severed parts of an infant's body "clearly served to
inflame the minds of the jury"); see also infra notes 80-87 and accompanying text
(detailing the pain and anguish jurors, reporters, and spectators endured as family
members of the victims of the Oklahoma bombing took the stand at Timothy Mc-
Veigh's sentencing hearing).
19. See United States v. McVeigh, 944 F. Supp. 1478, 1491 (D. Colo. 1996) (stating
that victim impact statements are the "most problematical of all the aggravating fac-
tors and may present the greatest difficulty in determining the nature and scope of the
'information' to be considered").
20. 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (holding that "the eighth amendment did not erect a per
se bar prohibiting a capital sentencing jury from considering victim impact
evidence").
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I. A Historical Perspective
A. Case Law
The constitutionality of victim impact evidence was first ad-
dressed by the Supreme Court in Booth v. Maryland.21 The Court
held, in a five-to-four decision, that the Eighth Amendment pro-
hibits a capital sentencing jury from considering VIS.22 The VIS,
prepared by the State of Maryland, provided the jury with a de-
scription of the personal characteristics of the victims and the emo-
tional impact of the crime on the survivors.23 They also contained
family members' detailed characterizations and opinions of both
the crime and the defendant.24 The Court found that the admission
of VIS "creates a constitutionally unacceptable risk that the jury




21. 482 U.S. 496 (1987). Booth was convicted of robbing and murdering an eld-
erly couple and a jury of his peers sentenced him to death, after considering a VIS.
See id. at 501-02.
22. See id. The Court reasoned that such information is entirely irrelevant to the
decision of imposing the death penalty. See id. at 503.
23. See id. at 499-500.
24. See id. The statement was formulated on the basis of interviews with the fami-
lies of both of the victims and described in great detail the emotional impact of the
crime, including personal problems that the survivors have since endured. See id. at
499. It also emphasized the victims' background and personalities, highlighting their
best qualities and stressing how much they would be missed. See id. In one section,
the daughter "concluded that she could not forgive the murderer, and that such a
person could '[n]ever be rehabilitated."' Id. at 500 (quoting App. 62). The son noted
that as a result of the crime he suffers from insomnia and depression, and is "fearful
for the first time in his life." Id. (quoting App. 61). Moreover, he asserted that his
parents were "butchered like animals." Id. "The VIS also noted that the grand-
daughter had received counseling for several months after the incident, but eventually
stopped because she concluded that 'no one could help her."' Id. (quoting App. 63).
The State Division of Parole and Prohibition official, who had conducted the inter-
views, concluded the VIS by writing: "It is doubtful they will ever be able to fully
recover from this tragedy and not be haunted by the memory of the brutal manner in
which their loved ones were murdered and taken from them." Id. (quoting App. 63-
64).
Defendant moved to suppress this emotionally laden VIS on the grounds that it was
"both irrelevant and unduly inflammatory, and that therefore its use in a capital case
violated the Eighth Amendment of the Federal Constitution." Id. at 500-501; see also
U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII (providing that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted").
25. Booth, 482 U.S. at 503. The Court in Booth was deeply concerned with preju-
dicial impact VIS can have on defendants, especially in light of their irrelevancy to the
blameworthiness of the defendant. See id. at 504. The Court reasoned that the de-
fendant most often does not know the victim and therefore can have no such knowl-
edge about his or her character and/or family. See id. (stating that studies have
revealed "defendants rarely select their victims based on whether the murder will
19981
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The Supreme Court subsequently held, in South Carolina v.
Gathers,26 that VIS given by a prosecutor also violate the Eighth
Amendment. 7 Relying on Booth, the Court held that the state-
have an effect on anyone other than the person murdered"). In addition, the Court
noted that "a defendant's level of culpability depends not on fortuitous circumstances
such as the composition of his victim's family, but on circumstances over which he has
no control." Id. at 505 n.7 (quoting People v. Levitt, 156 Cal.App.3d 500, 516-17
(1984)). As such, "[a]llowing the jury to rely on a VIS therefore could result in im-
posing the death sentence because of factors about which the defendant was unaware,
and that were irrelevant to the decision to kill." Id. at 505. Such evidence could
indeed be prejudicial in diverting the jury's attention away from the defendant's back-
ground, record, and circumstances of the crime, and placing it instead on the victim's
family and their suffering. See id. And, while "'[sluch bereavement is relevant to
damages in a civil action,... it has no relationship to the proper purposes of sentenc-
ing in a criminal case.'" Id. at 505 n.7 (quoting Levitt, 156 Cal.App.3d at 516-17).
The Court further noted that VIS could also be prejudicial in that not every victim
leaves behind a family, and not all families can articulate their feelings of grief
equally. See id. (noting that "[t]he fact that the imposition of the death sentence may
turn on such distinctions illustrates the danger of allowing juries to consider this infor-
mation"). The ability of a family to express its grief is a factor which must remain
irrelevant to determining something as grave as who should live or die. See id. Con-
sequently, some victims may be viewed as more valuable in the eyes of society than
others, and some defendants more deserving of punishment. See id. at 506. Our sys-
tem does not tolerate distinctions to be made which would render some defendants,
whose victims were assets to their community, more deserving of punishment, as op-
posed to those whose victims were not. See id. at 506 n.8.
A final threshold concern of the Court was the difficulty, if not impossibility, of a
fair rebuttal to VIS; for any cross-examination would surely have the effect of "shift-
ing the focus of the sentencing hearing away from the defendant" and consequently
create a "'mini-trial' on the victim's character." Id. at 506-507. Granting the state
permission to introduce evidence of the personal qualities of the victim would, in turn,
open the door to defendant to rebut such information. See id. (citing Gardner v.
Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977) (opinion of Stevens, J.) (due process requires that
defendant be given a chance to rebut presentence report)). Such a result "is more
than simply unappealing; it could well distract the sentencing jury from its constitu-
tionally required task - determining whether the death penalty is appropriate in light
of the background and record of the accused and the particular circumstances of the
crime." Id. at 507 (emphasis added & italic omitted). Moreover, the admission of the
family members' opinions and characterizations of the crime were held to "serve no
other purpose than to inflame the jury and divert it from deciding the case on relevant
evidence concerning the crime and the defendant." Id. at 508.
Accordingly, the Court ruled that a decision to impose the death penalty that might
turn on the aforementioned factors could never be justified. As such, the introduction
of a VIS at a capital sentencing hearing was held to violate the Eighth Amendment.
See id. at 509.
26. 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
27. See id. Defendant Demetrius Gathers was convicted of the murder of a self-
proclaimed minister and was sentenced to death. See id. at 806. The victim, Richard
Haynes, was about 31 years old and unemployed. See id. at 807. Evidence revealed
that Haynes had suffered some mental disturbances over the course of the two years
prior to his death and had consequently been in and out of a mental hospital three
times. See id. Despite his lack of formal religious training, he rendered himself a
preacher, referring to himself as "Reverend Minister." Moreover, he typically carried
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ments at issue concerned "personal characteristics of the victim"
which were irrelevant to the defendant's blameworthiness. 28 As
such, the Court deemed it unconstitutional to impose a sentence of
death based upon factors of which the defendant could not have
been aware.29
Only two years later, however, the Court, in Payne v. Tennesse,
overruled Booth and Gathers, in so far as they prohibited VIS.3°
The Payne Court's six-to-three decision opened the door to victim
impact evidence relating to the personal characteristics of the vic-
tim, the emotional impact of the crime on the victim's family, as
several bags containing such religious articles as rosary beads, two Bibles, olive oil,
plastic statues, and religious tracts. See id.
The prosecutor's closing remarks before the sentencing jury included reading at
length from a religious tract that the victim had been carrying at the time of the mur-
der and commenting on personal qualities inferred from the possession of such. See
id. at 808. The tract from which the prosecutor read was entitled "The Game Guy's
Prayer." It relied upon metaphors of football and boxing to extol the virtues of the
"good sport." See id. at 807. The prosecutor inferred from the fact that the victim
possessed this tract, as well as a voter registration card, that he was a religious man
who cared about his community. See id. at 809. The prosecutor remarked:
We know from the proof that Reverend Minister Haynes was a religious
person. He had his religious items out there .... Among the many cards
that Reverend Haynes had among his belongings was this card. It's in evi-
dence. Think about it when you go back there. He had ... religious items,
his beads. He had a plastic angel.
Id. at 808 (citing App. 41-43). In addition, the prosecutor read one of the victim's
prayers at length, and concluded: "Reverend Haynes believed in this community. He
took part. And he believed that in Charleston County, in the United States of
America, that in this country you could go to a public park and sit on a public bench
and not be attacked by the likes of Demetrius Gathers." Id.
28. Id. at 811 (noting that the statement by the prosecutor is "indistinguishable in
any relevant respect from that in Booth"). "As in Booth, '[a]llowing the jury to rely
on [this information] ... could result in imposing the death sentence because of fac-
tors about which the defendant was unaware, and that were irrelevant to the decision
to kill."' Id. (citing Booth, 482 U.S. at 505).
29. The Court relied on their prior holding in Booth, in which the Court held that
"such statements introduced factors that might be 'wholly unrelated to the blamewor-
thiness of a particular defendant."' Id. (citing Booth, 482 U.S. at 504). In conclusion,
the Gathers Court rendered the content of the victim's belongings, such as the reli-
gious tract from which the prosecutor read and his voter registration card, to have
been completely irrelevant to the circumstances of the crime. Id. at 812 (stating that
"[u]nder these circumstances, the content of the various papers the victim happened
to be carrying when he was attacked was purely fortuitous and cannot provide any
information relevant to the defendant's moral culpability"). The logic of this reason-
ing seems obvious when considering the flip side of the facts of the Gathers case. For
instance, the victim's bag could very well have contained porno magazines and a dime
bag of marijuana instead of religious artifacts.
30. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
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well as comments from the prosecutor.3' The Court reasoned that
the Booth decision "unfairly weighted the scales in a capital trial"
because the defendant has a right to introduce all mitigating evi-
dence that may inform the jury about his character, while the State
is barred from counteracting such evidence. Moreover, the Court
31. See id. (holding that "[t]he Eight Amendment erects no per se bar prohibiting
a capital sentencing jury from considering 'victim impact' evidence relating to the
victim's personal characteristics and the emotional impact of the murder on the vic-
tim's family, or precluding a prosecutor from arguing such evidence at a capital sen-
tencing hearing"). Payne was convicted of first-degree murder of a mother and her
two-year-old daughter, and first-degree assault with intent to murder a three-year-old
boy. See id. at 811. The jury sentenced Payne to death and Payne appealed, contend-
ing that the admission of testimony by the victim's grandmother, as well as the State's
closing argument, violated his Eighth Amendment rights under Booth. See id. at 816.
The grandmother's testimony described how her grandson Nicholas had been af-
fected by the murders of both his mother and sister. See id. at 814. She asserted:
He cries for his mom. He doesn't seem to understand why she doesn't come
home. And he cries for his sister Lacie. He comes to me many times during
the week and asks me, Grandmama, do you miss my Lacie. And I tell him
yes. He says, I'm worried about my Lacie.
Id. at 814-15 (citing App. 3).
During closing arguments, in an effort to persuade the jury to apply the death pen-
alty, the prosecutor commented:
There is obviously nothing you can do for Charisse and Lacie Jo. But there
is something you can do for Nicholas. Somewhere down the road Nicholas is
going to grow up, hopefully. He's going to want to know what happened to
his baby sister and his mother. He's going to want to know what type of
justice was done. He is going to want to know what happened. With your
verdict, you will provide the answer.
Id. at 815 (citing App. 12).
The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed both the sentence and the convic-
tion, rejecting the merit of Payne's assertions. See id. at 827 ("A state may legiti-
mately conclude that evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder
on the victim's family is relevant to the jury's decision as to whether or not the death
penalty should be imposed."). The Court grounded its reasoning on the assertion that
"the assessment of harm caused by the defendant as a result of the crime charged has
understandably been an important concern of the criminal law, both in determining
the elements of the offense and in determining the appropriate punishment. Id. at 819
(reasoning that "two equally blameworthy criminal defendants may be guilty of differ-
ent offenses solely because their acts cause differing amounts of harm"). The Court
illustrated that two defendants may each participate in a robbery, and each may act
with "reckless disregard for human life," but only one defendant may be subject to
the death penalty simply because his robbery resulted in the death of a victim, while
the other's did not. Id. (citing Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 148 (1987)).
32. See id. at 822. The Court reasoned:
while virtually no limits are placed on the relevant mitigating evidence a
capital defendant may introduce concerning his own circumstances, the State
is barred from either offering 'a quick glimpse of the life' which a defendant
'chose to extinguish,' or demonstrating the loss to the victim's family and to
society which has resulted from the defendant's homicide.
Id. (quoting Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting));
see also Booth, 482 U.S. at 517 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the State has a
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argued that VIS are not offered to provoke prejudicial and arbi-
trary determinations, but rather to show each victim's "uniqueness
as a human being. ' 33 Accordingly, the Payne Court concluded that
the specific harm caused by the defendant is essential to the jury's
meaningful assessment of the defendant's "moral culpability and
blameworthiness. "34
B. Victims' Rights Movement and the Legislative Response
Over the past three decades, a massive outpouring of support for
victims' rights has proliferated.35 Motivated by the same concerns
legitimate interest in counteracting the defendant's mitigating evidence "by reminding
the sentencer that just as the murderer should be considered as an individual, so too
the victim is an individual whose death represents a unique loss to society and in
particular to his family").
The Court deemed it an insult to all civilized members of society to welcome a
parade of witnesses who will testify on the defendant's behalf (i.e., with respect to
character, good deeds, troublesome background, upbringing, etc.), without granting
the victim an equal right of response. The Court found that to virtually place no limits
on the introduction of mitigating evidence by the defendant, but to bar the State
"from either offering 'a quick glimpse of the life' which a defendant 'chose to extin-
guish,' . . . or demonstrating the loss to the victim's family and to society which has
resulted from the defendant's homicide," is to unfairly weight the scales in a capital
trial. Id. at 822 (quoting Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting)). Thus, in a sincere effort to address such inequity and "keep the balance
true," the Court granted the victim a role in the prosecution. Id. at 826 (citing Snyder
v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934)). And, by rendering the heinousness of the
crime to be an inherent part of the defendant's blameworthiness, the Court removed
victims from the second-rate position they have for so long assumed, thereby tipping
the scales of justice back in the other direction.
33. Id. at 823 (dismissing the Booth Court's concern that VIS will encourage com-
parative judgments such as, "that defendants whose victims were assets to their com-
munity are more deserving of punishment than those whose victims are perceived to
be less worthy").
34. Id. at 825. However, in rendering VIS valid under the Eighth Amendment,
the Court did not mean to say that they were not troublesome. Justice O'Connor's
concurrence noted: "We do not hold today that victim impact evidence must be ad-
mitted, or even that it should be admitted. We hold merely that if a State decides to
permit consideration of this evidence, 'the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar.'"
Id. at 831. "If, in a particular case, a witness' testimony or a prosecutor's remark so
infects the sentencing proceeding as to render it fundamentally unfair, the defendant
may seek appropriate relief under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." Id.
35. See Carrie L. Mulholland, Note, Sentencing Criminals: The Constitutionality of
Victim Impact Statements, 60 Mo. L. REV. 731, 734 (1995) ("The rise of the victims'
rights movement started in the 1960's, in conjunction with the women's rights move-
ment's.claim that the criminal system mistreated rape victims").
Recent years have seen an outpouring of popular concern for what has be-
come known as 'victims' rights' - a phrase that describes what its propo-
nents feel is the failure of the courts of justice to take into account in their
sentencing decisions not only the factors mitigating the defendant's moral
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as the Payne Court, advocates of the victims' rights movement seek
to balance the rights of victims with those already granted to the
defendant by entitling them to a voice and a means of fair re-
dress. 36 They argue that the system ignores victims, thereby vic-
timizing them twice. 7 In an attempt to level the playing field, the
guilt, but also the amount of harm he has caused to innocent members of
society.
Booth, 482 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Kathryn E. Bartolo, Payne v.
Tennessee: The Future Role of Victim Statements of Opinion in Capital Sentencing Pro-
ceedings, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1217, 1218 (1992) (noting that "by 1991, there were over
7,000 victim assistance programs"); Carole Mansur, Comment, Payne v. Tennessee:
The Effect of Victim Harm at Capital Sentencing Trials and the Resurgence of Victim
Impact Statements, 27 NEW ENG. L. REV. 713, 715 (noting that the growing concern
for victims' rights "coincides with a period of rising crime and violence in our soci-
ety"); Michael Ita Oberlander, The Payne of Allowing Victim Impact Statements as
Capital Sentencing Hearings, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1621, 1623 (1992) ("The victims' rights
movement is a viable and active political force in American society today"). The
1960's witnessed a primary concern for "establishing compensation programs at the
state level and on expanding restitution as a sentencing alternative," while the 70's
made victim-witness assistance programs a central concern of the lobbyists. See id. at
1625-26 (noting that "[tfhe victim-witness assistance programs serve the purpose of
guiding the victim through the complicated maze of the criminal justice system and
minimizing the administrative inconveniences associated with participation in the pro-
gress"). More recently, advocates have exacted a system that responds more directly
to the needs of the victims (i.e., "one that assists rather than manages the victim"). Id.
at 1626. Victims are currently demanding the right to personally participate in the
criminal process, deeming victim services that fail to provide such an opportunity
meaningless. See id. Consequently, such activism has propagated many recent re-
sponses on behalf of the government. See infra notes 40-52 and accompanying text.
Cf. Jose Felipe Anderson, Will The Punishment Fit The Victims? The Case For Pre-
Trial Disclosure, and The Uncharted Future of Victim Impact Information in Capital
Jury Sentencing, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 367, 396 (1997) (noting that "[t]he movement has
not only resulted in increased victim participation in criminal cases by encouraging
states to adopt victim impact statements at sentencing, it has also spawned many re-
cent successful state efforts to ratify victim based constitutional amendments").
"Even federal law provides for victim participation in the sentencing process." Id. at
396-97 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(4)).
36. See Mulholland, supra note 35, at 734 (1995) ("Supporters of the movement
contended that the criminal justice system was entirely unsympathetic to victims by
denying them a formal role in the judicial system, exploiting them to prosecute the
criminal, and failing to provide rehabilitation or assistance after sentencing of the
criminal."). Essentially, supporters mandate that the law provide victims with a more
meaningful role in the criminal justice system. See id.; see also Diane Kiesel, Crime
and Punishment: Victim Rights Movement Presses Courts, Legislatures, 70 A.B.A. J.
25, 28 (Jan. 1984).
37. See Oberlander, supra note 35. Some victims feel as though the system ex-
cludes them from participating in the prosecution of the defendant, thereby victimiz-
ing them yet again. See id.; see also Thomas J. Phalen & Jane L. McClellan, Speaking
For The Dead At Death Sentencing: Victim Statements in Capital Cases - A Right of
Survivorship?, 31 ARIZ. Arr'v 12, 12 (Nov. 1994) (noting that one goal of the move-
ment is "to prevent victims from being victimized twice - once by the criminal and
once by the criminal justice system"). Essentially, the argument is that victims are too
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movement places primary emphasis on passing legislation, with an
ultimate goal of achieving a constitutional amendment. 38 Two con-
cerns seem to govern the movement: (1) the desire for the victim to
obtain closure and regain a sense of control over life, and (2) the
concern for retributive justice.39
often forgotten by the system, and deemed irrelevant to the administration of justice.
By means of the VIS, however, the jury is forced to view the victim as flesh and blood
and take into account the true extent of the defendant's actions. Without such evi-
dence, both the crime and the victim are otherwise marginalized.
38. See Kelly McMurry, Victims' Rights Movement Rises to Power, Ass'N OF TRIAL
LAW. OF AM., July 1, 1997 (stating that the "ultimate goal" of victims' rights advocates
is "to win passage and enactment of a proposed victims' rights amendment to the U.S.
Constitution" and further noting that this effort has already achieved "the endorse-
ment of President Clinton and won significant bipartisan support in Congress"). Sup-
porters of the amendment are motivated primarily by the hope that its passage would
"bring into balance a criminal justice system in which the scales are tipped in favor of
the accused." Id. (noting that "[a]n amendment would also ensure that crime victims'
rights are enumerated in much the same way the Bill of Rights outlines protections
for criminal defendants"). In its current form, as Senate Joint Resolution 6, the pro-
posed 28th Amendment provides victims of violence the following rights:
to be notified of and to attend all public proceedings relating to the crime; to
be heard and to submit impact statements at sentencing and parole hearings;
to be notified of an offender's release, parole, or escape; to a final disposi-
tion of the criminal proceedings without unreasonable delay; to an order of
restitution from the convicted offender; to have the safety of the victim con-
sidered in determining any offender's release from custody; and to be noti-
fied of these rights.
Id. (noting that "[w]hile advocates are quick to applaud ... federal and state meas-
ures, they contend that the legislation varies in scope and, when taken together, does
not go far enough to ensure that 'justice, fairness, and equity are extended to all inno-
cent victims of crimes, just as we properly do for those accused of crimes'"). In es-
sence, the above proposal combines the assurances of a number of federal and state
legislative acts into a constitutional amendment in an effort to ensure universal appli-
cation. See also Evan Gahr, Advocates Raise Wide Support for Victims-Rights Amend-
ment, INSIGHT MAG., March 10, 1997, at 42 (noting that the leaders of the grassroots
crime-victims movement are pushing for amendment because "[a]bsent federal action
... the justice system will continue to treat victims as second-class citizens"). The
overall consensus of the advocates is that there is a pressing need to enumerate such
rights; for without an amendment there is no way to guarantee that the rights of crime
victims will not be ignored. See id. The rights provided by the proposal are indeed
pertinent in ensuring a victims a greater degree of rights within the justice system;
however, the proposal ignores the effects on the defendant. My own proposal, in
contrast, addresses the rights of both victims and defendants, in an effort to attain a
true balance. See supra notes 145-155 & accompanying text. Rather than included
only general provisions that essentially reiterate current statutory rights, my amend-
ment proposal focuses primarily on controlling the prejudice which VIS have the
grave potential to create. See id.
39. Oberlander, supra note 35, at 1624 (citing Maureen McLeod, Victim Participa-
tion at Sentencing, 22 CRIM. L. BULL. 501, 504 (1986)). "A victim is often devastated
by the criminal act against her because of her resulting feeling of vulnerability and her
sense that she has lost control over her life. Consequently, some critics have viewed
the victims' rights movement merely as a self therapy for victims." Id. at 1624-25; see
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In response to innumerable proposals by victims' rights advo-
cates and out of a growing concern for the rights of victims, Con-
gress took a ground-breaking step in 1982 and enacted the Victim
and Witness Protection Act,40 which sought -to accord witnesses
and victims a greater degree of rights and protections in the crimi-
nal justice system.41 In 1990, Congress passed the federal Victims
Rights and Restitution Act,42 more commonly known as the Vic-
tims' Bill of Rights,43 granting victims the right to be notified of,
and present at, court proceedings and to be kept apprised of the
status of such factors as the defendant's conviction, sentencing, im-
prisonment, and release.44 The Victims' Bill of Rights mandated
that victims could not be excluded from the courtroom, unless their
also Mulholland, supra note 35, at 747, 735 (noting that victims' families seek "a
means of coping and closure," as well as "more effectively equate the criminal's pun-
ishment to the full extent of the harm caused").
40. Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, § 2(b)(1), 96
Stat. 1248 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § § 1512-1515, 3579-3850 (1988)). Public Law
Number 98-473, section 212, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987 (1984) amended § § 3579-80 and relo-
cated the sections to 18 U.S.C. § § 3663 and 3664.
41. See id.; see also Oberlander, supra note 35, 1626 n.28 (stating that the Act
"codified Congressional findings that recognized the importance of victims in the
criminal justice system"). The Victim and Witness Protection Act recognized the im-
portance of victims in the criminal justice system, declaring its purposes to be:
(1) to enhance and protect the necessary role of crime victims and witnesses
in the criminal justice process; (2) to ensure that the Federal Government
does all that is possible within limits of available resources to assist victims
and witnesses of crime without infringing on the constitutional rights of the
defendant; and (3) to provide a model for legislation for State and local
governments.
See Oberlander, supra note 35 at 1626 n.28 (citing 96 Stat. at 1249). In addition, the
Act "amended the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to require the inclusion of
victim impact as part of the presentence report submitted to the sentencing author-
ity." Mulholland, supra note 35, at 735.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 10606(b) (1995). A crime victim has the following rights:
(1) the right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim's
dignity and privacy; (2) the right to be reasonably protected from the ac-
cused offender; (3) the right to be notified of court proceedings; (4) the right
to be present at all public court proceedings related to the offense, unless the
court determines that testimony by the victim would be materially affected if
the victim heard other testimony at trial; (5) the right to confer with attorney
for the Government in the case; (6) the right to restitution; (7) the right to
information about the conviction, sentencing, imprisonment, and release of
the offender.
Id.
43. See McMurry, supra note 38.
44. See id. (citing Paul G. Cassel & Robert E. Hoyt, The Tale of Victims' Rights,
LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 23, 1996, at 32); see also 42 U.S.C. § 10606(b).
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presence at trial would materially alter their testimony at the
sentencing.4 5
This conditional language of the Victims' Bill of Rights was
tested, however, during the Timothy McVeigh trial,46 when Judge
Matsch ruled that if the victims of the crime were to testify at the
sentencing, then they could not be present at the trial.47 Conse-
quently, most victims of the Oklahoma bombing faced a Catch-22.
If they opted to testify at sentencing, then they would never see
justice play out. If they watched the trial, however, then they could
never personally tell the jury of their suffering.48 Frustrated and
angered by having to make such a painful choice, the victims
turned to Congress in hopes of redress, arguing that the defendant
had no legitimate basis for barring them from trial.49
In response to their cries, President Clinton endorsed the "Vic-
tim Rights Clarification Act"5 ("VRCA") on March 19, 1997,
overruling Matsch's order on the eve of the trial and mandating
that a crime victim be permitted to make VIS, as well as observe
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 10606(b)(4).
46. McVeigh was found guilty and sentenced to death for using an explosive-laden
truck to blow up the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, conse-
quently killing 168 people and injuring hundreds more. See John Gibeaut, The Last
Word: Jury Is Still Out On Effects Of Victim Impact Testimony, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1997,
at 42. Six months after McVeigh was sentenced to die, Terry Nichols was convicted of
conspiring with McVeigh and eight counts of involuntary manslaughter, but acquitted
of first degree murder and use of a truck bomb. See Jo Thomas, Death Penalty Ruled
Out As Nichols Jury Deadlocks in Oklahoma Bombing Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1998,
at Al. Nichols, however, escaped the death penalty, on January 7, 1998, when the
deeply divided jury failed to reach a unanimous decision. See id. (stating that after
deliberating for 13 hours, over the course of two days, the Federal jury "could not
decide just how active a role he played in the bombing"). Judge Matsch dismissed the
jury and will now impose sentencing himself. See id. But, under Federal law, only a
jury may impose a sentence of death; thus, Nichols will now get a life term, or possibly
a lesser sentence. See id. (noting that Nichols still could face the death penalty should
a grand jury in Oklahoma indite him and McVeigh in state murder charges).
47. See United States v. McVeigh, 958 F. Supp. 512, 514 (D. Colo. 1997) (excluding
potential penalty witnesses from the courtroom under Rule 615 of the Federal Rules
of civil Procedure); see also McMurry, supra note 38 (stating that Judge Matsch's con-
cern was "[t]hat what they heard and saw in the courtroom could prejudice their
testimony").
48. See McMurry, supra note 38.
49. See id.; see also 143 CONG. REC. S2507-01, S2507 (March 19, 1997) (noting that
the Victim Rights and Restitution Act serves to clarify the Victims' Bill of Rights "so
it is indisputable that district courts cannot deny victims and surviving family mem-
bers the opportunity to watch the trial merely because they will provide information
during the sentencing phase of the proceedings"); Judge Gives Bomb Survivors OK to
Attend McVeigh Trial, S. F. EXAMINER, March 26, 1997, at All.
50. 18 U.S.C. § 3510 (1997).
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the trial itself.51 The Act's goal is to treat victims with a greater
degree of respect by demanding that they be granted not only a
voice by which to express their pain, but also a wider latitude of
participation.5 2
II. The Reality of Victim Impact Statements in the Courtrooms
of Capital Sentencing Hearings Today
The VRCA and the Payne decision provide the groundwork for
the law today with respect to VIS, despite their failure to specify
any limitations or guidelines regarding the scope of admissible
statements.5 3 Thus, while forty-nine states presently allow the sen-
tencing jury to consider VIS in non-capital cases,54 the extent of
their use varies distinctly from court to court, and state to state.
Many jurisdictions mirror the Payne Court's decision, broadly al-
lowing statements from the families of victims about the impact of
51. See id. The statute, which is currently in effect, enacted a new provision that
allows victims of crime in capital cases to observe the trial "of a defendant accused of
that offense because such victim may, during the sentencing hearing, testify as to the
effect of the offense on the victim and the victim's family .... ." See McVeigh, 958 F.
Supp. at 514 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3510(b)). The title is short for Public Law 105-6,
which the President signed. See id.; see also 143 CONG. REC. at S2508 ("This bill will
ensure that victims of crimes have an opportunity to alleviate some of their suffering
through witnessing the operation of the criminal justice system."); Editorial,
Oklahoma Trial Ruling Fallout, CHI. SUN-TIMES, March 27, 1997, at 29.
52. See 143 CONG. REC. at S2507 (noting that "this is an important piece of bipar-
tisan legislation that will clarify the intent of Congress with respect to a victim's right
to attend and observe a trial and participate at sentencing"). One speaker, Mr.
Leahy, a senator from Vermont, further noted the importance of victims both having
access to the courtroom and being heard, recalling:
many times when the person being sentenced had suddenly gotten religion,
had suddenly become a model person, usually dressed in a better suit and tie
than I wore as a prosecutor and was able to cry copious tears seeking for-
giveness and saying how it was all a mistake, sometimes reality came to the
courtroom only when the victim would speak.
Id. at S2507-$2508. Mr. Leahy continued: "I remember one such victim had very little
to say, with heavy scars on her face that would probably never heal. That said more
than she might." Id. at S2508 (noting the statute's probable influence on state courts
as well).
53. See Gibeaut, supra note 46, at 43. "'There is simply no clear guidance [from
Payne] as to where the line between appropriate ... victim impact testimony ends and
an appeal to passion - the human reactions, emotive reactions of revenge, rage [and]
empathy, all of those things - beings,' Matsch told the lawyers before the sentencing
phase began." Id.
54. See Mulholland, supra note 35, at 742.
55. See id. at 743; see also Oberlander, supra note 35, at 1627 (noting that "[w]hile
almost all states allow for some form of victim impact at some stage in the judicial
process, the extent of that involvement varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction").
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the death on the family.56 Other states, however, have imposed
more stringent limitations on their use.57 For example, some states,
56. See Mulholland, supra note 35, at 743 & n.74. The following state statutes spe-
cifically provide for victim impact evidence from the victim's family in some form or
another: ALASKA CODE § 12.55.022 (1997); ARZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702 (Supp.
1997); ARK. CODE ANN. § § 5-65-102, 5-65-109 (Michie Supp. 1997); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1191.1 (West Supp. 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § § 24-4.1-302, 24-4.1-
302.5 (Supp. 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-220 (West 1994); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 4331 (Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-103 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.143 (West Supp. 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (Supp. 1996); IDAHO CODE
§ 19-5306(1)(b)(3) (Supp. 1994); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120/6 (West Supp. 1997);
IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9 (Supp. 1996); IOWA CODE ANN. § 901.3 (West Supp. 1994);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1019 (Supp. 1994); Ky. REV. STAT. § § 421.500, 421.520 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1994); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 875(B) (West Supp.
1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 6101, tit. 17A § 1257 (West Supp. 1994); MD.
ANN. CODE of 1957 art.41, § 4-609 (1993); MAss. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 258B, § 3(p) (West
Supp. 1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § § 780.752, 780.791 (West Supp. 1994); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § § 611A.01, 611A.037 (West Supp. 1994); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-151,
et seq. (Supp. 1994) (bound); Mo. REV. STAT. § 217.762 (1994); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 46-18-112 (Supp. 1993); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-2521 (1995); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 651:4-a (Supp. 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-6 (West Supp. 1995); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § § 31-26-3, 31-26-4 (Michie Supp. 1994); N.Y. CRIM. PRO. § 390.30(3)(b)
(McKinney Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-825 (Supp. 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ § 12.1-34-01, 12.1-34-02(14) (1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § § 2947.051, 2929.12
(Anderson Supp. 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § § 982, 984 (West Supp. 1996);
OR. REV. STAT. § § 137.530(3), 144.790(3) (1996); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, P.S. 180-9.3
(Supp. 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-28-3 (1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1150 (Law
Co-op. 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23 A-28C-1 (Supp. 1997); TENN. CODE
ANN. § § 40-35-207, 40-38-203 (1994); TEX. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN. § 56.03 (West
Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 (Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § § 19.2-
264.5, 19.2-299.1 (Michie 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7006 (Supp. 1993); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § § 7.69.020, 7.69.030 (West Supp. 1994); W. VA. CODE § § 61-11A-
2, 61-11A-3 (1995); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 950.04 (West 1994); Wyo. STAT. § § 7-21-101,
7-13-303 (1994). But see id. at n.77 (noting that Hawaii does not have any statute or
case law addressing the constitutionality of VIS); see also ALA. R. CRIM. P. 26.3
(1993); NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.145 (Supp. 1993). "The Alabama and Nevada victim
impact statutes do not provide for victim impact statutes taken from the victim's fam-
ily;" however, they do allow statements from the victim. Mulholland, supra note 35,
at 743 & n.77.
57. See Mulholland, supra note 35, at 743. For example, some states impose vari-
ous requirements such as:
(1) the statements must be general and cannot delve into the victim's charac-
ter and worth; (2) the statements must be read by the prosecutor, and not on
the form of testimony from family members; (3) the statements cannot be
unduly prejudicial to the defendant; (4) the statements must adhere to victim
impact statement forms; and (5) the statements can only be used when a
judge, instead of a jury, is sentencing the defendant.
Id. Cf. TEX. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN. § 56.03 (West Supp. 1995) (requiring VIS to
comply with victim impact forms);.State v. Wise, 879 S.W.2d 494, 516 (Mo. 1994) (re-
quiring that statements be general and not delve into the victim's character); State v.
Sumpter, 438 N.W.2d 6, 9 (Iowa 1989) (requiring victim impact evidence to comply
with victim impact forms).
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such as Idaho and Georgia, limit VIS to non-capital cases,58 while
Pennsylvania, Kansas, and New Hampshire allow VIS only when a
judge, and not a jury, is sentencing the defendant. 9 Currently,
twelve of the thirty-eight states that impose the death penalty have
permitted consideration of victim impact statements during capital
sentencing hearings.60
A. New Jersey's Approach
New Jersey is one of the states that has permitted VIS in capital
cases after Payne, but has been particularly stern with respect to
their use. On June 19, 1995, Governor Whitman signed a "victim
impact statute '61 into law, which essentially provides that the pros-
ecution may admit evidence of the victim's character and the im-
pact of the death on the victim's survivors, but not until the
defendant has placed his own character at issue.62 Moreover, the
58. See, e.g., Sermons v. State, 417 S.E.2d 144 (Ga. 1992) (following Muckle v.
State, 211 S.E.2d 361 (Ga. 1974)); State v. Wersland, 873 P.2d 144, 146 (Idaho 1994)
(holding VIS statements from the victim's parents to be admissible in a non-capital
case); State v. Bivens, 803 P.2d 1025, 1026 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991) (noting that in the
absence of the death penalty, the court may consider VIS during sentencing)..
59. See Mulholland, supra note 35, at 743 n.76; see also, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 651:4-a (Supp. 1993); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, P.S. § 180-9.3 (Supp. 1994); State
v. Hill, 799 P.2d 997, 999 (Kan. 1990).
60. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-602 (Michie Supp. 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 16-11-103 (West Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West Supp. 1997); LA.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.2 (West Supp. 1997); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.030
(West 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-302 (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West
1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10(c) (West Supp. 1996); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 163.150 (Supp. 1996); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (West Supp. 1997-98); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 23 A-27A-2(2) (Michie Supp. 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207
(Supp. 1996); see also Gibeaut, supra note 46.
61. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(6) (1995).
62. See id. "Unlike the open-ended federal law and many state statutes, New
Jersey's only allows victim impact evidence if the defendant first presents evidence on
his or her own character." Gibeaut, supra note 46, at 43. The law provides that:
When a defendant at a sentencing proceeding presents evidence of the de-
fendant's character or record pursuant to subparagraph (h) of paragraph (5)
of this subsection, the State may present evidence of the murder victim's
character and background and of the impact of the murder on the victim's
survivors. If the jury finds that the State has proven at least one aggravating
factor beyond a reasonable doubt and the jury finds the existence of a miti-
gating factor pursuant to subparagraph (h) of paragraph (5) of this subsec-
tion, the jury may consider the victim and survivor evidence presented by
the State pursuant to this paragraph in determining the proper weight to
give mitigating evidence presented pursuant to subparagraph (h) of para-
graph (5) of this subsection.
State v. Muhammad, 678 A.2d 164, 169 (N.J. 1996) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(6)).
The statute was enacted by the New Jersey Legislature in response to the Supreme
Court's decision in Payne, as well as the constitutional authority granted by the New
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Supreme Court of New Jersey has noted that despite the statute's
constitutional authority under Payne, it "'provides an additional
and, where appropriate, more expansive source of protections
against the arbitrary ... imposition of the death penalty.' "
63
New Jersey allows the use of VIS only in limited circumstances,
and in a way that the jury will not likely become "overwhelmed
and confused. ' 64 The Supreme Court of New Jersey refuses to ad-
mit statements by the family members that either make characteri-
zations or elicit personal opinions about the defendant, the crime,
or the appropriate sentence. 65 Any statement that is "grossly in-
flammatory, unduly prejudicial, or extremely likely to divert the
jury from its focus on the aggravating and mitigating factors" like-
wise is excluded. 66 Accordingly, the New Jersey courts have lim-
ited victim impact evidence to "statements designed to show the
Jersey Victim Right's Amendment, which "explicitly authorized the Legislature to
provide victims with 'those rights and remedies' that are deemed appropriate to effec-
tuate the purposes of that Amendment." Id. at 170. The Victim's Rights Amendment
provides:
A victim of a crime shall be treated with the fairness, compassion and re-
spect by the criminal justice system. A victim of a crime shall not be denied
the right to be present at public judicial proceedings except when, prior to
completing testimony as a witness, the victim is properly sequestered in ac-
cordance with the laws of the Rules Governing the Courts of the State of
New Jersey. A victim of a crime shall be Entitled to those rights provided by
the Legislature....
Id. at 169.
63. Muhammad, 678 A.2d at 173 (quoting State v. Koedatich, 548 A.2d 939 (1988),
quoting State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188 (1987)).
64. Id. at 175. The Muhammad Court held that a brief statement by the victim's
family, as to how the murder impacted their lives, would not tend to inflame the jury
anymore than would a brief statement by the defendant. See id. at 175 (citing State v.
Zola, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022 (1989) (holding that a brief
statement by-the defendant "would not inject fatal emotionalism into the jury's delib-
erations")). However, the Muhammad Court noted limitations on the use of such
evidence, holding that if offered to rebut the defendant's presentation of mitigating
evidence, the VIS must be both "relevant and reliable." Id. at 176. Moreover, the
admission of such evidence demands a balancing test as whether its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a risk of prejudice to the defendant or confusion to the
jury. Id. The Court noted that "in each case there is a traditional guard against the
inflammatory risk, in the trial judge's authority and responsibility to control the pro-
ceedings consistently with due process, on which grounds the defendant may object."
Id. (quoting Payne, 501 U.S. at 836 (Souter, J., concurring)). In addition, the evalua-
tion of specific victim impact evidence's admission should ultimately be left to the
discretion of the trial court, unless such evidence is on its face clearly inadmissible.
See id. at 176.
65. See id.
66. Id. (citing State v. Williams, 550 A.2d 1172 (N.J. 1988)). "Allowing such testi-
mony could render a defendant's trial fundamentally unfair and could lead to the
arbitrary imposition of the death penalty." Id. at 176-77.
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impact of the crime on the victim's family and to statements that
demonstrate that the victim was not a faceless stranger," conclud-
ing that "[t]here is no place in a capital trial for unduly inflam-
matory commentary. "67
The New Jersey Legislature also has taken steps to reduce the
chance that the jury will misuse victim impact evidence. 68 For in-
stance, the jury may consider victim impact evidence only if the
jury finds that the State has proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, at
least one aggravating factor, and the jury finds the existence of a
mitigating factor.69 Moreover, even if such requirements are met,
the VIS can be used only to determine how much weight the jury
will attach to the catch-all mitigating factor.7 ° In contrast to other
state legislatures, the New Jersey Legislature adamantly opposes
the use of victim impact evidence as a general aggravating factor,
in a sincere effort to shield the sentencing phase from prejudice.71
As such, the Legislature has adopted a number of safeguards to
ensure that such evidence "will not be admitted in a manner that
would allow the arbitrary and unconstitutional imposition of the
death penalty. 7 T2
67. Id. at 177. The Muhammad Court concluded that "in conjunction with the
Victim's Rights Amendment, it is obvious that the electorate of New Jersey wants the
State to align itself with the weight of authority that has recognized the relevance of
victim impact evidence." Id. at 178.
68. See id. at 179 (noting that "the admission of victim impact evidence is limited
to a clearly delineated course").
69. See id.
70. See id. "Essentially, section 5(h) is a catch-all factor of defendant's mitigating
evidence not encompassed in the other defining factors." Id. at 170. The victim im-
pact statute mandates that such evidence can be introduced for one purpose and one
purpose only - to give the jury proper assistance in determining the appropriate
weight to give the catch-all mitigating factor. Id. at 179. "Victim impact testimony
may not be used as a general aggravating factor or as a means of weighing the worth
of the victim." Id. "[O]ur law does not regard a crime committed against a particu-
larly virtuous person as more heinous than one committed against a victim whose
moral qualities are perhaps less noteworthy or apparent." Id. (quoting Williams, 550
A.2d at 1202).
71. See id. ai 179. Some state legislatures have enacted statutes that essentially
allow victim impact evidence to be admitted for any purpose whatsoever, as opposed
to New Jersey's more stringent limitations. See id, (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-
602(4) (Michie 1993)); see also ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 38, para. 1406 (1989). Moreover,
it is apparent that the New Jersey Legislature relied upon previous state opinions
which recognized the necessity of allowing capital sentencing juries to "reach a verdict
and impose a penalty without inordinate exposure to unduly prejudicial, inflam-
matory commentary." Muhammad, 678 A.2d at 179 (citing Williams, 550 A.2d at
1204).
72. Id. The New Jersey victim impact statute does not automatically grant the
victim's family the right to testify during the sentencing hearing. See id. "'[R]ather,
the prosecutor is to determine what evidence, if any, should be submitted' to the
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B. Recent Capital Sentencing Hearings
All of the precautions constructed by the New Jersey Supreme
Court 73 were taken into account in the sentencing of Jesse Tim-
mendequas, the repeat sex offender who was convicted of the rape
and murder of seven-year-old Megan Kanka in 1994.74 In response
jury." Id. (citing Senate Judiciary Committee, Statement to Senate Bill No. 1728, at 1
(March 20, 1995)).
The limitations that we have placed on the admission of victim impact evi-
dence are not designed to restrict any of the rights afforded to victims by
either the Victim's Rights Amendment or the victim impact statute. Rather,
these controls are necessary to minimize the possibility that victim impact
statements made during the penalty phase of a capital trial will inflame the
jury and prevent it from deciding the proper punishment on the basis of
relevant evidence.
Id. at 180. For instance, prior to commencement of the sentencing hearing the de-
fendant must be warned that if he or she chooses to assert the catch-all factor, then
the State has the freedom to introduce victim impact evidence. See id. Moreover, the
State must provide the defendant with a list of names of all witnesses that it plans to
call so that defense counsel will have a full and fair opportunity to interview such
witnesses prior to their testimony. See id.
Recognizing the significant possibility that such evidence will prejudice the defend-
ant, the State has also expressed that, absent any exceptional circumstances, one sur-
vivor's account will suffice to provide the jury with "a glimpse of each victim's
uniqueness as a human being and to help the jurors make an informed assessment of
the defendant's moral culpability and blameworthiness." Id. (noting that "[t]he
greater the number of survivors who are permitted to present victim impact evidence,
the greater the potential for victim impact evidence to unduly prejudice the jury
against the defendant"). Emotions are to be kept under complete control, and the
court will not hear any testimony concerning "the victim's family member's character-
izations and opinions about the defendant, the crime, or the appropriate sentence."
Id. The State has further held that the testimony of minors should be permitted "ex-
cept under circumstances where there are no suitable adult survivors." Id.
In addition, the New Jersey judge ordinarily conducts a Rule 104 hearing before the
sentencing hearing begins as to the statement's admissibility. See id. The testimony
must be reduced to writing and can provide a general factual profile of the victim's
character, as well as describe the impact of the death on the family. See id. The
statement must be free of any "inflammatory comments or references" and must be
factual, not emotional. Id. Moreover, the probative value of the proffered testimony
cannot be substantially outweighed by the risk of prejudice to the defendant. See id.
("Determining the relevance of the proffered testimony is particularly important be-
cause of the potential for prejudice and improper influence that is inherent in the
presentation of victim impact evidence."). However, the court notes that in making
the determination of relevance, there is ordinarily a strong presumption that the vic-
tim impact evidence will be admissible if it demonstrates that the victim was a unique
human being. See id. Finally, the prosecutor is put on notice that any comments
about victim impact evidence during closing arguments must be limited to that al-
ready stated by the witness, in his or her pre-approved testimony. See id.
73. See supra notes 61-72 and accompanying text.
74. See Dale Russakoff & Blaine Harden, Megan's Murderer is Sentenced To
Death; Jury Finds Repeat Sex Offender's Childhood Suffering Did Not Lessen Respon-
sibility, WASH. POST, June 21, 1997, at A3, available in 1997 WL 11162193. Jesse Tim-
mendequas, the repeat sex offender, was convicted of the rape and murder of 7-year-
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to defense counsel's pleas for compassion, Megan's father, Richard
Kanka, took the stand for the prosecution. 75 He read from a pre-
approved, three-page victim impact statement,76 portraying his
daughter as a tomboy who enjoyed playing with toy trucks in the
mud, and also as a girl, who adored having tea parties with her
dolls.77 Mr. Kanka also mentioned that Megan's brother, who was
eighteen months older, always considered himself her protector,
and has been found screaming in his closet in the middle of the
night in the three years since his sister's rape.78
As required by law, Mr. Kanka maintained his composure
throughout, and kept his "emotion at bay."' 79 While his statement
gave the jury a glimpse into the character of Megan Kanka and the
pain which her death has caused to those who loved her, it neither
capitalized upon such emotions, nor made inflammatory or preju-
dicial comments. By adhering to the procedural safeguards man-
dated by the New Jersey Supreme Court, Mr. Kanka's statement
balanced the sentencing hearing in the most controlled manner
possible.
In the recent trial of Timothy McVeigh,8" however, the VIS were
not as strictly regulated, and the emphasis shifted dramatically
from a small peek into the life of the victim to wrenching tales of
the horrifically personal and emotional consequences of McVeigh's
crime. The VIS permitted by the trial judge during the sentencing
hearing were drenched with pain, torment, despair, and anguish.8
old Megan Kanka and was sentenced to death by a jury in Trenton, New Jersey, on
July 21, 1997. See id. During the penalty phase, Timmendequas' lawyers pled for
mercy, insisting that his intent was never to kill Megan. See id. They characterized
him as borderline mentally retarded, perhaps due to his mother's alcoholism, a
pedophile, and a victim of sexual abuse by his own father. See id.
75. See Gibeaut, supra note 46, at 43.
76. See id.
77. See Russakoff & Harden, supra note 74. He noted that her favorite color was
pink and her favorite flavor of ice cream was mint chocolate chip. See id. "Megan
was our little community newsletter," he said, "with live broadcasts nearly every day
at dinner time." Id. Mr. Kanka also stated: "The only peace we have as parents are
the moments during sleep when we don't have to deal with the harsh realities of our
everyday lives." Gibeaut supra, note 46, at 43.
78. See Fate of Megan's Killer Argued; Death Penalty Begins In Case That Led To
Molester Notification Laws, MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL, June 19, 1997, at 6, available
in 1997 WL 4808789.
79. Id.
80. See supra note 46.
81. See Peter Gorner, Empathy vs. Impartiality In The Courtroom; Victims Leave
Lasting Impact On The System, CI. TRIB., June 15, 1997, at 1, available in WL
3558785 (noting that "[w]ithin minutes, six of the jurors had begun to weep").
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They consumed two full days of testimony, as a parade of witnesses
described in extensive detail the crime's gruesome aftermath.82
One police officer gave an account of "life ebbing from the hand
of a dying woman trapped by concrete rubble, whose gurgling
blood was mistaken for running water."83 Another heart-wrench-
ing story described to the jury three-year-old Brendan Denny
clenching a green block in his hand, with a brick embedded in his
forehead.' And, Kathleen Treanor told the jury how she kissed
her four-year-old daughter Ashley goodbye, never to see her alive
again. The parade of grief-stricken witnesses actually evoked
82. See Gibeaut, supra note 46, at 42. "[J]urors, spectators and even the judge
wept as family members, rescue workers and others took the stand for two days." Id.
at 43. U.S. District Judge Matsch's goal was to keep the sentencing hearing from
turning into some kind of public "lynching;" however, his efforts were apparently not
enough. See Richard A. Serrano, Judge Restricts McVeigh Penalty Case Testimony,
L.A. TIMEs, June 4, 1997, at Al, available in 1997 WL 2216846 (noting that the pen-
alty phase "cannot become a matter of such emotional testimony which would in-
flame or incite the passions of the jury ... as to whether the defendant should be put
to death"). Matsch told piosecutors that he would allow relatives and survivors to
take the stand, but their testimony could not address a desire for revenge nor mention
the funerals of loved ones who has died as a result of the bombing. See id. Matsch
further barred from evidence any pictures of the victims or their family members at
weddings, Christmas celebrations, or other joyous occasions. See id. Matsch also de-
nied the government's request to admit certain videotapes of victims, including a
home-made film of a typical day at a credit union prior to the bombing. See id.; see
also Michael Fleeman, Judge in Oklahoma Bombing Vows to Avoid 'Lynching,' Pares
Back Hearing, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 3, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4869060 (not-
ing that Judge Matsch also barred a poem by a victim's father). Despite such efforts,
however, grief, sorrow, and devastation took a toll on jurors and spectators alike. See
generally Gibeaut, supra note 46.
83. See Robinson, supra note 17. The use of VIS by witnesses such as police of-
ficers and coroners is obviously problematic given that bystanders are by definition
not victims. Thus, to introduce such testimony serves only to capitalize upon the ju-
rors' emotions, thereby running the impermissible risk that the death penalty will be
imposed arbitrarily and capriciously. See also infra text accompanying notes 126-128.
84. See Robinson, supra note 17 (questioning how any juror could respond dispas-
sionately to such an event).
85. Eric Pooley et al., Death or Life? McVeigh Could Be The Best Argument For
Executions, But His Case Highlights The Problems That Arise When Death Sentences
Are Churned Out In Huge Numbers, TIME MAO., June 16, 1997, at 31, available in
1997 WL 10902240. Treanor explained how after unspeakable days of waiting, she
"recovered her daughter's body from the rubble, buried the little girl, and trudged
on." Id. She said she received a call from the medical examiner's office several
months later. See id.
He said, 'We have recovered a portion of Ashley's Hand,' Treanor testified
in a trembling voice that Rose as she fought to get through each sentence,
'and we wanted to know if you wanted that buried in the mass grave or if
you would like to have it.' And I said, 'Of course, I want it. It's a part of
her.'
Id. That was about the extent of Treanor's testimony; for that was about all she could
physically and emotionally handle. See id. "Treanor dissolved, her body racked by
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such a "mass outpouring of empathy from those in attendance that
at least one newspaper offered to provide counseling for its report-
ers covering the case."'8 6 In fact, the government ultimately cut its
presentation short because of its dramatic effect. 7
Both McVeigh and Timmendequas were forced to pay for their
heinous crimes with their own lives. Their sentencing hearings dif-
fered drastically, however, with respect to the use of VIS. 8 A
comparison of the two hearings reveals the inconsistency that
plagues capital sentencing proceedings in America. What is per-
haps most troubling, however, is the grave potential for abuse in
situations where the evidence against the defendant is not so over-
whelming. In a case where the crime is not as atrocious, and the
guilt not as obvious, the emotional impact of the VIS certainly
could be the defining line between life and death.
sobs, and almost everyone in the courtroom dissolved with her. Jurors went openly,
survivors wailed, reporters groped for hankies and sodden bits of tissue." Id.
("Through it all sat McVeigh, cold and silent as stone."). It was at this very moment
that "it seemed unconceivable that the jury could do anything but sentence him to
death - and that anything but simple vengeance would be the reason why." Id.
"When the day's testimony was over, even [Judge Richard] Matsch looked shaken.
'You're human, and I'm human too,' he told the jury. '[But] we are not here to seek
revenge against Timothy McVeigh."' Id. But, his words appeared to have gone in
vain; for no type of limiting instruction could make those jurors forget the wrenching
testimony they had heard.
Other witnesses to take the stand included a ten-year-old boy, who told jurors
about the loss of his mother, a woman who had volunteered to work a hotline to
counsel victims, and a citizen who was moved to buy savings bonds for family mem-
bers of the deceased. See Serrano, supra note 82. A rescue worker also testified to
holding a hand in the burning rubble "only to feel the pulse stop." Fleeman, supra
note 82. Matsch also permitted testimony with respect to the notion that some of the
victims did not die instantaneously, but rather "died painfully as gravel and other
debris from the falling nine-story structure filled their lungs." Serrano, supra note 82.
In addition, Matsch allowed "photos of maimed survivors, pictures of victims being
wheeled into hospitals and testimony from the coroner about the various causes of
death." Fleeman, supra note 82.
86. Gorner, supra note 81.
87. See id. "They could see we were all physically and mentally exhausted," re-
marked one reporter. "Every one of the jurors cried. Reporters found themselves
hugging each other for solace, sobbing, saying they couldn't take it any more." Id.
(quoting Maurice Possley of the Chicago Tribune). "We were barely able to compre-
hend it. We couldn't wrap our minds around it. We were getting snapshots of a few
people, but we knew that for every one of them up there on the stand, there was a
score of them who weren't there." Id.
88. See Gibeaut, supra note 46, at 42.
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III. Evaluating the Prejudicial Impact of Victim Impact
Statements in Light of the History of the Death Penalty
and the Constitutional Rights of the
Capital Defendant
VIS primarily are supported on grounds of fairness to the vic-
tim.89 It repeatedly has been argued that because a defendant may
introduce mitigating evidence to inform the jury about his or her
character, the State must likewise be granted the right of fair re-
sponse. 9° VIS, by their nature, grant victims a new voice in the
criminal justice system which can remind the capital sentencer that
they also are individuals whose deaths touched the lives of many.
Accordingly, victims claim that VIS rectify the imbalance pervad-
ing criminal courtroom proceedings by allowing them to partici-
pate in the prosecution of the defendant.91 Advocates further
contend that VIS allow the victim a means of coping, closure, and
recovery,92 as well as encourage cooperation between the prosecu-
tor and the victim. 93
VIS, however, have not escaped constitutional challenge and de-
bate, especially with respect to their potential violation of the con-
stitutional rights of the capital defendant.94 VIS primarily are
criticized because they replace the rational process of imposing a
death sentence with arbitrary and capricious jury discretion.95
Many opponents argue not only that the emotional nature of VIS
89. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. But see Payne v. Tennessee, 501
U.S. 808, 859 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("This argument is a classic non sequitur:
The victim is not on trial; her character, whether good or bad, cannot therefore consti-
tute either an aggravating or a mitigating circumstance.").
91. See Phalen & McClellan, supra note 37, at 12 (stating that the movement also
"seeks to provide victims with a greater role in the criminal justice process"); see also
Oberlander, supra note 35, at 1625.
92. See supra note 39.
93. See McLeod, supra note 39, at 504-07 (noting that VIS help victims regain
control over their lives, enhance system efficiency by encouraging cooperation of wit-
nesses, and also fulfill the victim's desire for retributive justice).
94. See supra note 25; see also infra note 95.
95. See William Hauptman, Note, Lethal Reflection: New York's New Death Pen-
alty and Victim Impact Statements, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 439, 475-76 (1997)
(noting that "[t]he most commonly voiced objection to victim impact statements is the
inherent possibility that they violate a defendant's right to equal protection"). "When
our society is choosing which heinous murderers to kill and which to spare, its gaze
ought to be carefully fixed on the harm they have caused and their moral culpability
for that harm, not on irrelevant factors such as the social position, articulateness, and
race of their victims and their victims families." Id.; see also Mulholland, supra note
35, at 746 ("Arguably, victim impact statements inject an arbitrary factor in deciding
whether to impose the death penalty").
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"impermissibly inflame and prejudice the jury, '9 6 but that the relia-
bility of VIS is suspect because they "are difficult to verify and im-
possible for the defendant to rebut. '97 Others hold that VIS are
unfair because they value some lives more than others and uncon-
stitutionally punish defendants for things which they could never
have foreseen. 9 It also has been argued that their appeal to juror's
emotions undermines the Supreme Court's command that the deci-
sion to impose the death penalty should be reasoned and morally
sound, not discretionary and wanton.99 Finally, it is fair to contend
that courtrooms are not designed for the coping of the victim, and
that the trial and conviction of the defendant is, in and of itself, an
adequate vindication of the victim's rights.
A. The Payne Decision Reconsidered
Despite criticism and dissent, the victims' rights movement has
gained momentum and nationwide support. 100 A majority of juris-
dictions now permit VIS, 10 and Congress has codified Payne's ba-
sic legal tenets.0 2 Moreover, popular sentiment favors the death
96. Mulholland, supra note 35, at 747.
97. Id. ("A defendant's sentence should solely be based on the severity of the
crime and the defendant's record, not on the emotional impact of the victim's
family.").
98. See generally Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987); Snyder v. Massachu-
setts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934); State v. Muhammad, 678 A.2d 164, 175 (N.J. 1996).
99. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (following the holding of
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1971) that "where discretion is afforded a sentenc-
ing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be
taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to mini-
mize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action"). The Court further noted
that the punishment "must not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain," and "must not be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime." Id. at
173; see also Gibeaut, supra note 46, at 42; infra notes 110-115 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 35.
101. See Mulholland, supra note 35, at 742 (noting that "[miost jurisdictions, includ-
ing ... the District of Columbia and the federal court system, are closely aligned with
the United States Supreme Court decision in Payne and permit victim impact state-
ments from the victim's family regarding the impact of the victim's death on the
family").
102. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2)(D); see also supra notes 40-52 and accompany-
ing text; Mulholland, supra note 35, at 735 n.29 (citing UNIF. R. EVID. 404 (a)(2)
(amended 1986) (emphasis added)). The Uniform Rules of Evidence, which are more
restrictive than the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, also provide:
(E)vidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim offered by an ac-
cused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character
trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide
case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor (is admissible
for the purpose of providing that the victim acted in conformity with his
character on a particular occasion).
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penalty,1"3 and victims' rights advocates have proposed a victims'
rights amendment to the Constitution. 104 If VIS are going to be an
intrinsic part of the criminal justice system, however, then it must
be determined how they will be used, so as to minimize any risk of
prejudice to the capital defendant.
While the Payne Court did hold that VIS were not an Eighth
Amendment violation, the Court did "not hold.., that victim im-
pact evidence must be admitted, or even that it should be admit-
ted."'01 5 In fact, the Court noted that VIS could be inflammatory in
certain instances and thereby unduly prejudice the defendant.'0 6
What the Court failed to consider, however, is where to draw the
line between the admissible and the inflammatory and in what
manner the courts may draw it. Although the Court apparently
was confident that this was a detail best left to the discretion of the
trial judge on a case-by-case basis,0 7 the blatant inconsistencies
and troublesome discrepancies between the McVeigh and Tim-
UNIF. R. EvID. 404(a)(2) (amended 1986). Moreover, "(a)s crime has increased it is
not illogical to believe that the trends for a more active role of the victims will in-
crease." Anderson, supra note 35, at 402 (noting that "[p]olitical pressure on judges,
prosecutors, and other elected officials to recognize the need for victims to participate
in the punishing of the offender will continue to have a profound effect on all aspects
of the criminal justice system").
103. See supra notes 16-17.
104. See supra note 38.
105. Payne, 501 U.S. at 831 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
106. Justice O'Connor notes:
The possibility that this evidence may in some cases be unduly inflammatory
does not justify a prophylactic, constitutionally based rule that this evidence
may never be admitted .... If, in a particular case, a witness' testimony or a
prosecutor's remark so infects the sentencing proceeding so as to render it
fundamentally unfair, the defendant may seek appropriate relief under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. Moreover, O'Connor states that "[tihat line was not crossed in this case," yet fails
to define what exactly that line is. Id.
107. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 827 (holding that "[a] State may legitimately conclude
that evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim's
family is relevant to the jury's decision as to whether or not the death penalty is
imposed"). But, in ruling that such evidence should be treated no "differently than
other relevant evidence is treated" the Court seems to leave the door of admittance
open to the discretion of the particular trial judge. Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion lends further support to this notion. See id. at 831 (noting that "[tirial courts
routinely exclude evidence that is unduly inflammatory"). In other words, if the judge
chooses to admit the VIS, the Eighth Amendment will not render it unconstitutional;
however, if the evidence is found to be so unduly inflammatory that its admittance
would prejudice the jury against the defendant, then the judge has the option of ex-
cluding it. See id. And, in the event that the trial is rendered "fundamentally unfair,"
as a result of admitting prejudicial victim impact evidence, then the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment can provide a means of relief. See id. at 825.
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mendequas sentencing hearings reveal the inherent danger of such
ambiguity.1 °8 Accordingly, if the use of VIS is to continue, it must
be strictly regulated.'0 9
1. Comparing Payne to Prior Supreme Court Death
Penalty Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court consistently has held that "the penalty of
death may not be ordered automatically, arbitrarily, irregularly,
randomly, capriciously, wantonly, freakishly, disproportionately or
under any procedure that permits discrimination by race, religion,
wealth, social position or economic class."' 0 For the application of
the death penalty to be constitutionally valid, the procedure must
carefully protect against passion or prejudice."' Thus, in an effort
to shield the capital sentencing proceeding from the foregoing
prejudices, "the Supreme Court has mandated that the sentencer
be given specific guidelines which will direct and limit the sen-
tencer's discretion.""' The sentencer must weigh the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances in making a reasoned determina-
tion.1 3 Moreover, the death penalty process must ensure individu-
108. See supra notes 74-88 and accompanying text.
109. The Court seems to deny the fact that VIS significantly alter traditional sen-
tencing procedures, in stating that "[v]ictim impact evidence is simply another form or
method of informing the sentencing authority about the specific harm caused by the
crime in question, evidence of a general type long considered by sentencing authori-
ties." Payne, 501 U.S. at 825. In this respect, the Court is rather disingenuous.
110. See United States v. McVeigh, 944 F. Supp. 1478, 1487 (D. Colo. 1996) (noting
that "(flour separate opinions were filed in support of the judgment in Gregg v. Geor-
gia ... that a sentence to death for murder under a new sentencing scheme adopted
by the Georgia legislature was not an unconstitutional punishment"). While the
Supreme Court has accepted the death penalty as constitutional, individual justices
continue to struggle with an exact articulation of the their views "about the impera-
tives of a valid procedure in the many subsequent decisions approving and disapprov-
ing variations in state laws governing the extreme punishment of death." Id. "They
have been more clear in stating what is prohibited than what is required." Id.; see also
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (holding that the death sentence must be
"suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capri-
cious action"); accord South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 810 (1989). Cf. En-
mund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII & XIV.
111. See McVeigh, 944 F. Supp. at 1487.
112. Thomas G. Myrum, State v. Paz: Adoption of the Harmless-Error Standard of
Review for Capital-Sentencing Errors, 27 IDAHO L. REV. 375, 376 (1990/1991).
113. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (1995). At the sentencing hearing, any information
relevant to the sentence may be admitted, including any mitigating or aggravating
factor considered under § 3592. See id. The defendant may present any information
relevant to a mitigating factor, and the government may present information relevant
to a mitigating factor, for which notice has been provided for under 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3593(a). See id. While there is some degree of variation with respect to how states
qualify such "aggravating" circumstances, the aggravating factors must be "objectively
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alized consideration of each defendant and allow the jury to
consider both the circumstances of the crime, as well as the defend-
ant's character.114 Accordingly, when making the very serious de-
provable and rationally related to the criminal conduct in the offenses proven at
trial." McVeigh, 944 F. Supp. at 1487. "The aggravating factors function to focus the
jury's attention on the particular facts and circumstances pertinent to each defendant
found guilty of an offense punishable by death in the context of mitigating factors
unique to him as an individual human being." Id. at 1488. In essence, they serve to
aid the jury in distinguishing "those who deserve capital punishment from those who
do not ...." Id. (citing Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 474 (1993)); see also U.S.C.
§ 3593(a)(2) (1995) (setting forth the aggravating factors that the government, if the
defendant is convicted, proposes to prove as justifying a death sentence).
The factors for which notice is provided under this subsection may include
factors concerning the effect of the offense on the victim and the victim's
family, and may.include oral testimony, a victim impact statement that iden-
tifies the victim of the offense and the extent and scope of the injury and loss
suffered by the victim and the victim's family, and any other relevant
information.
18 U.S.C. § 3593. Aggravating circumstances often include such factors as the murder
of a public official or a law-enforcement officer, murder for hire, or an especially cruel
or heinous felony murder. See Rich Henson, 3 Men, 3 Convictions; What Happened?,
SEATTLE TIMES, June 15, 1997, at A3, available in 1997 WL 3238466 (noting that legal
experts say that aggravating circumstances usually must be proven beyond a reason-
able doubt, as opposed to mitigating circumstances, which need only be proven by a
preponderance of the evidence). If no aggravating factor is found to exist, then "the
court shall impose a sentence other than death authorized by law." 18 U.S.C.
§ 3593(d) (noting that "[a] finding with respect to any aggravating factor must be
unanimous").
With respect to "mitigating" circumstances, the Supreme Court has mandated that
the defendant has the constitutional right to present all relevant mitigating factors
that could support a sentence less than death. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1392(a) (West 1997)
(listing all mitigating factors which the finder of fact shall consider in determining
whether a sentence of death is justified). Such factors include: "impaired capacity;"
"duress;" "minor participation;" "equally culpable defendants;" "no prior criminal
record;" "disturbance;" "victim's consent;" and, "other factors in defendant's back-
ground, record, or character or any other circumstance of the offense that might miti-
gate imposition of the death sentence." Id. at §§ (a)(1)-(8); see also, 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3593(c) (mandating that "the burden of establishing the existence of any mitigating
factor is on the defendant, and is not satisfied unless the existence of such a factor is
established by a preponderance of the information"); McVeigh, 944 U.S. at 1487 (stat-
ing that "[t]here can be no limitation on the ability of individualized jurors to consider
mitigating factors"); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 (1982).
114. See Myrum, supra, note 112, at 376-77; see also Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862,
879 (1983) (stating that a jury must make an "individualized determination" as to
whether the defendant should be sentenced to death, based on "the character of the
individual and the circumstances of the crime"); Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801; Woodson
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 281 (1976) (noting that "[t]he respect for human
dignity underlying the Eighth Amendment ... requires consideration of aspects of the
character of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as
a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of imposing the ultimate punish-
ment of death").
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termination whether to execute the defendant, the jury must "focus
on the defendant as a 'uniquely individual human bein[g].' 9M 5
Before the Payne Court's ruling, the decision to impose the
death penalty was applied universally and dispassionately. 16 Any
evidence that did not inform the jury about the character of the
crime or the character of the defendant was automatically disre-
garded."7 Under the confines of such a controlled standard, each
defendant was equal in the eyes of the sentencer 118 The Payne
decision, however, marked a deviation from traditional procedures,
in an eager attempt to grant the victim a higher degree of equality.
This effort to balance the rights of the victim with those of the
defendant, however, comes with a hefty price. Although the "uni-
queness" of the victim, his or her character and reputation, the vic-
tim's family, and the emotional impact of the crime are presented
to the'jury, there is a grave risk that some victims' lives will be
valued more than others.119 Moreover, the victim impact evidence
creates a "'tactical' 'dilemma' for the defendant because it allows
the possibility that the jury will be so distracted by prejudicial and
irrelevant considerations that it will base its life-or-death decision
on whim or caprice. "120
2. The Payne Decision's Troublesome Implications
VIS, by their nature, focus on the victim's uniqueness-a notion
that represents a complete departure from the traditional focus on
the defendant. Although this departure may be warranted, both by
society and the ideals of justice, 2' it is gravely important not to
violate the constitutional confines of rational and moral sentencing
115. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 504 (1987) (quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. at
304 (1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)). "[I]t is the func-
tion of the sentencing jury to 'express the conscience of the community on the ulti-
mate question of life or death."' Id. (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510,
519 (1968)).
116. See Staples, supra note 17, at A26 ("In the interest of equal justice, the same,
dispassionate standard was to be applied to every crime and to every defendant,
whether rich or poor, criminal or upstanding, loved or despised.").
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 866 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (as-
serting that "[t]he fact that each of us is unique is a proposition so obvious it requires
no evidentiary support"). In fact, "[s]uch proof risks decisions based on the same
invidious motives as a prosecutor's decision to seek the death penalty if a victim is
white but to accept a plea bargain if the victim is black." Id.
120. Payne, 501 U.S. at 864 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Booth, 428 U.S. at 506-
507).
121. See generally supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
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procedures in doing so. The justice system simply cannot allow ar-
bitrary and prejudicial factors to constitute the means of VIS, re-
gardless of the importance of the ends of protecting victims' rights.
It is untenable to permit a decision as grave as the death penalty to
"turn on the perception that the victim was a sterling member of
the community rather than someone of questionable character.' '1
22
The Supreme Court merely danced around this issue in Payne,
stating that victim impact evidence "is not offered to encourage
comparative judgments of this kind," but rather to reveal "each
victim's 'uniqueness as an individual human being,' whatever the
jury might think the loss to the community resulting from his death
might be."'21 3 This argument ignores the vulnerability of human
emotions. Thus, the Court failed to address the troublesome impli-
cation of allowing emotionally laden factors, such as the circum-
stances of the victim's death, the community's recollections of the
victim's benevolence, or the degree of emotional distress suffered
by the family, to be included in the VIS. 124
Recall the emotional roller coaster of the McVeigh sentencing. 25
The sobering tales and gruesome memories of the victims were
painful enough for any juror to hear, but when coupled with the
graphic and horrific details recalled by rescue workers, police, and
coroners, the grief became simply too much for any human to han-
dle. 126 Certainly no juror could have been expected to set emo-
tions aside and make a decision based on reason alone. The
alleged purpose of VIS is to grant victims a voice, by which those
victims may cope and obtain closure. 27 At no point throughout
the entire course of the victims' rights movement, however, has
anyone advocated the need to grant bystanders a voice. Thus, the
testimony admitted by Judge Matsch from witnesses, such as the
police and coroners, was completely unwarranted and provided an
122. Booth, 482 U.S. at 506 & n.8 (stating that "[w]e are troubled by the implication
that defendants whose victims were assets to the community are more deserving of
punishment than those whose victims are perceived to be less worthy").
123. Payne, 501 U.S. at 823.
124. Perhaps the Court overlooks the fact that we, as human beings, are by nature
all unique individuals, no matter what our position in society may be. Certainly any
member of the jury can well recognize such a notion without the aid of detailed de-
scription by the victim's family. "What is not obvious, however, is the way in which
character or reputation in one case may differ from that of possible victims," and
where evidence that dwells on a victim's social status is admitted to prove such differ-
ences, some victims are consequently rendered more deserving of protection and life
than others. Payne, 501 U.S. at 866 (Souter, J., dissenting).
125. See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text; see generally id.
127. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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even greater imbalance to the capital sentencing hearing. 128 To
open the door to testimony by professionals who have chosen to
routinely interact with crisis situations serves only to unduly preju-
dice a jury that has already heard the testimony of the victims
themselves. Accordingly, Judge Matsch's lack of control over the
sentencing hearing completely undermined McVeigh's constitu-
tional protections and rendered the jury's decision to impose the
death penalty both arbitrary and capricious.
In McVeigh's case, the heinousness of his crime made the out-
come fairly predictable, but in countless other cases VIS could be
the defining line between life and death.129 Without a more con-
trolled and uniform employment of VIS, their use becomes troub-
lesome and highly prejudicial. This result was not expected by the
Payne Court, and does not constitute a reasoned and moral appli-
cation of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.130
3. Proposals to Limit Payne
To permit anything less than controlled and uniform procedures
for admitting VIS is potentially to open a "'Pandora's box' of pos-
sibilities for a prosecutor seeking the death penalty."'1 31 Consider
the ramifications of a sentencing hearing that permits evidence,
such as the victim's resume, diary, funeral eulogy, poetry, art work,
pictures, and trophies, as well as tales by the victim's family of their
loved one's goals, dreams, and aspirations. Moreover, imagine the
admission of testimony from people that the victim assisted emo-
tionally and economically as a result of volunteer work, or patients
of the victim's medical practice who would testify to the victim's
ability to save lives, or even fellow parishioners of the victim's
church who would recall the victim's regular attendance and heart-
felt generosity. Absent more narrowly defined guidelines or crite-
128. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 18.
130. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (dictating that "cruel and unusual punishments"
should not be inflicted); see also supra notes 110-112 and accompanying text; Payne
501 U.S. at 824 (noting that "[w]here the State imposes the death penalty for a partic-
ular crime, we have held that the Eighth Amendment imposes special limitations
upon that process").
131. Anderson, supra note 35, at 405. Imagine just how far the line could be
pushed. See id. (noting that the prosecutor might attempt to submit "work perform-
ance evaluations, recorded testimonials, funeral eulogies, or even a high school report
card, in an effort to demonstrate the loss to the family and community"). It doesn't
take much of an imagination to fathom what the future might hold if the reigns of
admittance are not tightened severely. McVeigh's sentencing might only have been
the beginning, rather than the extreme.
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ria from the Supreme Court, Congress, or state legislatures, there
exists too grave a potential that the Payne holding will be improp-
erly interpreted.132
Although proponents of VIS put forth a number of "compelling
arguments, ' 133 the fundamental concern underlying the movement
for victim participation is human emotions.13 1 Most victims may be
132. See Lee v. State, 942 S.W.2d 231, 236 (Ark. 1997) (allowing VIS by the victim's
sister describing the painful experience of selecting the victim's wig for the funeral);
Hicks v. State, 940 S.W.2d 855, 857 (Ark. 1997) (Brown, J., concurring) (permitting
into evidence a 14 minute silent videotape, accompanied by a family member's tearful
narration, that contained approximately 160 photographs spanning the entire life of
the victim). While more than 60 of the photos depicted stages of the victim's life from
when he was a toddler up to his marriage and birth of two children, another 70 or so
were dedicated to the lives of his two sons, tracing their growth from infancy to adult-
hood, and the remaining pictures ranged from "family events, such as Thanksgiving
dinner, to the victim's involvement with various aspects of the carnival business." Id.
But see Ledbetter v. State, 933 P.2d 880, 890 (Okl.Cr. 1997) (finding error in admitting
portions of a VIS that "described the murder as a 'selfish act;' related one child's
opinion that his mother was 'butchered like an animal,' and recalled one child's mem-
ory that Appellant had threatened to kill the victim and 'somehow I knew in my heart
he meant it'"). Despite such a ruling, however, the Ledbetter court held that the
survivor's opinion that the death penalty was an appropriate sentence was not im-
proper. See Ledbetter, 933 P.2d at 891. Cf. Conover v. State, 933 P.2d 904, 920 (Okl.
Cr. 1997) (holding that the admitted VIS tipped the scales too far in favor of the
prosecution). The court rendered statements such as the victim was "butchered like
an animal," that the defendant was a "parasite" and "murderous animal" failed to
"shed any light on the victim's life or the impact of the loss of the victim to his fam-
ily." Conover, 933 P.2d at 920-21 (stating that "such statements are inflammatory
descriptions designed to invoke an emotional response by the jury"). Moreover, the
court found that the VIS which described the victim as a baby, his childhood, and his
parent's dreams and hopes for his future "in no way provide insight into the contem-
poraneous and prospective circumstances surrounding his death; nor do they show
how the circumstances surrounding his death have . . .impacted a member of the
victim's immediate family." Id. at 921. As such, the commentary was deemed to have
been more prejudicial than probative and thus outside of the permissible scope of
victim impact evidence. See id. at 920. The case was remanded for resentencing be-
cause of the trial court's failure to provide the defendant with his right of confronta-
tion; thus, the actual effect of having improperly admitted such prejudicial victim
impact evidence was addressed only in dicta. See id. See also State v. Tucker, 478
S.E.2d 260, 267 (1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1561(1997) (admitting photographs dur-
ing sentencing hearing so as to depict "shots to Victim's head and that they were fired
at close range," as well as color photos "to show the difference between the blood
Victim coughed up and the blood from her wound"). In addition, the sentencing
judge admitted photos of "Victim at different places on vacation, Christmas decora-
tions in Victim's yard, Victim holding her godchild, and Victim fishing." Tucker, 478
S.E.2d at 27 (holding that such victim impact evidence was admissible to show the
victim's uniqueness and that nothing shown by the photographs would render the trial
fundamentally unfair).
133. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text; see also supra text accompany-
ing notes 89-93.
134. Anderson, supra note 35, at 399 (noting that "[e]motional considerations and
recognition of the victim's personal suffering play a major role ... ").
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motivated to tell their story out of a sincere desire to attain closure.
However, what if the victim instead is motivated by spite? 135 It is
often difficult to tell exactly where the victims' motivations lie, and
the judicial process should not be jeopardized by allowing
America's courtrooms to become a dwelling place for bloodthirsty
revenge. 136 The death penalty cannot bring back the dead, nor is
its purpose to serve in the interest of vengeance. 37 Wounds that
cut as deep as these never will be healed by the death of another. 138
135. One commentator noted that "[t]here is also a calculated judgment that the
sentencer who hears from the victim or the victim's family will find the victims suffer-
ing more reason to hold the defendant responsible and thus will sentence more strin-
gently." Id. at 400 (citing Martha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L. REV.
1411, 1416 (1993)). Others asserted that opening the door to VIS "marks the resur-
gence of vengeance by victims and families through the criminal justice system since
direct participation in the courtroom provides an alternative to vigilante justice." Id.
136. The pain and suffering which victims' families endure as a result of their loss is
no doubt extreme, but America's courtrooms are not a place for emotional outbursts
and inflammatory comments. As one observer noted:
Until quite recently, bereavement brought a period of reflection. But over
the last decade, the solemn activity of mourning has become a raucous and
public blood sport. In the television age anguish only seems real when
broadcast over the airwaves .... The bereaved now hold regular press con-
ferences, as did Ronald Goldman's father almost every day of the O.J. Simp-
son trial. Elsewhere, family members leave the courtroom with high fives
and fists in the air as though sentencing someone to death were no more
serious than a football game. I understand the depth of the pain and the
desperate quest for relief. But the judicial system and courtroom were
meant for a different purpose entirely.
Staples, supra note 17.
137. See Hauptman, supra note 95, at 479 (noting that "vengeance is an inappropri-
ate rationale for allowing the use of victim impact statements"). "Vengeance is pure
anger manifested by uncontrollable, prejudicial outbursts. This leads to dispropor-
tionate sentencing which hinges on the eloquence (or mere presence) of family mem-
bers." Id.
138. See Wallechinsky, supra note 16 (article exploring why a minority of victims'
families actually oppose the death penalty for the very people who murdered their
loved ones). Bud Welch's daughter, Julie Marie, was a victim of the Oklahoma bomb-
ing. See id. He recalls a conversation he had once shared with his daughter about the
death penalty and their mutual opposition to it. See id. He admits wavering, how-
ever, after Julie's death because he was consumed by rage and hate. See id. (stating
that "[tihe first half year after the bombing, had I known that McVeigh was guilty, I
would have been for his execution"). As time passed, however, Welch's outlook al-
tered. He recalled:
[A]fter time, I was able to examine my conscience, and I realized that if he is
put to death, it won't help me in the healing process. People talk about
execution bringing 'closure.' To hell with 'closure.' My little girl is not com-
ing back, and that's for the rest of my life.
Id. Celeste Dixon is another victim who opposes the death penalty. See id. (noting
that she started to feel sorry for the man who killed her mother). She comments:
There's a tendency in victims' support groups and within prosecuting attor-
neys' offices to make people feel that they are being disloyal to the person
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That is simply not the nature of the healing process, and it is not
the purpose or the intent of the criminal justice system. 139 The law
is not a form of therapy, but rather, a means of justice.
The Eighth Amendment dictates that reason, morals, and preci-
sion must reign supreme.140 Thus, a means must be developed for
granting the victim a voice that does not capitalize on inflam-
matory and emotional factors or unduly sway the jury with wrench-
ing tales of sorrow and pain. Under proper guidelines, VIS should
contain no more than a general description of the victim. Any
statements dealing with social status, religion, and political beliefs
should be prohibited because they serve no more than to capitalize
upon the jury's emotions and preconceived ideals. Moreover, com-
mentary about the victim's funeral and gory, distasteful details or
characterizations of the crime itself should be exempt on the
grounds that such statements open the door to passion and preju-
dice.141 In addition, any opinions regarding the death penalty, ap-
propriate' sentencing, or the defendant must be barred on the
grounds that they are irrelevant to the decision of whether or not
to impose the death penalty, as well as prompt irrational and emo-
tionally charged decision-making.
B. Minimizing the Prejudice of Payne by Imposing a Set of
Stringent and Uniform Guidelines
The Payne Court's ambiguity regarding the proper procedures
for admitting victim impact evidence during a capital sentencing
trial is troublesome. While the interests of the victim are impor-
who died if they don't want the murderer to die. They're led to expect that
the murderer's death is going to help them heal. It doesn't. All it does is
make them focus on anger and hatred. After the execution, the object of
their hatred is gone, and they still haven't dealt with their grief.
Id., at 4-5.
139. "Sentencing in criminal cases is said to serve all or part of four purposes:
(1)retribution; (2)deterrence; (3)incapacitation; and (4)rehabilitation." Hauptman,
supra note 95, at 478.
140. See supra note 110-112 and accompanying text; see also U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII (mandating against the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments"); supra
note 99.
141. One need not be a "bleeding-heart liberal to be wary of injecting too much
emotionalism into death penalty cases." Cathy Young, Let's Keep the Focus on the
Perpetrator of Crime, DET. NEWS, June 24, 1997, at A7, available in 1997 WL 5590501.
While the suffering of those affected by the heinous crime is indeed something we
should consider, it is crucial to remember that "we differentiate degrees of homicide
not according to the victim's pain or the survivor's grief, but according to the intent
and the moral culpability of the perpetrator, and that's where the focus should re-
main." Id.
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tant, a death sentence free from passion or prejudice must remain
the primary concern. When the decision whether to execute a per-
son is based on arbitrary factors, inflammatory comments, or an
appeal to juror emotions, the death penalty is no longer being ap-
plied objectively or reasonably. It thus follows that VIS demand
the most .stringent, controlled, and narrowly defined means of reg-
ulation possible given their potential to render a capital defend-
ant's trial fundamentally unfair. Assuming, therefore, that a
majority of courts will continue to use VIS, it is necessary to deter-
mine how courts can apply them in a manner which least prejudices
the defendant's right to a trial free from passion and prejudice.
1. Proposed Procedural Safeguards
In order to prevent a decision as grave as sentencing a human to
death from resting on arbitrary, subjective, and capricious factors,
a test no less restrictive than strict scrutiny is demanded.14 z From a
constitutional perspective this is crucial because fundamental rights
mandate the highest judicial scrutiny.143 And, the right to a capital
sentencing hearing free from passion and prejudice is fundamental
because the Eighth Amendment has consistently been interpreted
to guarantee such a right.1 4 4 Accordingly, the means employed to
achieve this kind of justice must be directly related to the state's
compelling interest in ensuring that right.145
Improperly employed VIS can violate a defendant's fundamental
rights. Thus, their use must adhere to a very stringent set of guide-
lines that should be expressed in a constitutional amendment,146
142. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that "all
racial classifications, imposed by federal, state, or local government actor, must be
analyzed by strict scrutiny"). The same analysis would apply to capital sentencing
hearings; for rights at risk here are equally fundamental. In fact, no right could be
more fundamental than the right to life. As such, nothing short of strict scrutiny
should apply. "The strict scrutiny standard analysis requires that the legislative pur-
pose be so compelling as to justify the means utilized." 20 N.Y. JUR. 2d Constitutional
Law § 356 (1982). In other words, the ends must be narrowly tailored to the ends.
143. See id. (noting that "classifications affecting fundamental interests... are sub-
ject to the strict scrutiny test").
144. See supra notes 110-115 and accompanying text; see also ); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 228 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976); Robin-
son v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962); United States v. McVeigh, 944 U.S. 1478,
1487 (D. Colo. 1996) (noting that "the procedure must protect against a decision mo-
tivated by passion and prejudice").
145. See supra note 142; see also 16A AM. JUR. 2d Constitutional Law § 750 (1979)
("Statutes affecting fundamental constitutional rights must be drawn with precision
and must be tailored to serve their legitimate objectives . . ").
146. The process of achieving an amendment is not an easy one. Under Article V
of the Constitution, the process does not even begin unless "two-thirds of both
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thereby ensuring that the law will be applied fairly and consist-
ently. By incorporating victims' rights into the "supreme law of the
land," '147 all judges and courts will be compelled to comply with
minimum requirements. Moreover, the procedure of admittance
should be clear and unambiguous, leaving no room for abuse of
discretion, thereby reducing the costs of frivolous appeals.
The procedural safeguards outlined by the New Jersey Supreme
Court provide the best starting point for establishing a universal set
of guidelines because they address the needs of the victim, while, at
the same time, protect the defendant's constitutional rights. 48 In
fact, the sentencing of Jesse Timmendequas was a perfect example
of how such safeguards effectively can control passion and preju-
dice. 49 Timmendequas' gruesome crime certainly had the makings
for a wrenching sentencing hearing.1 50 Forced to comply with the
state's requirements, however, Mr. Kanka controlled his emotions,
and his testimony granted the jury only a small peek into the life
that was destroyed.151 The VIS did not capitalize on the suffering
of the victims, but still reminded the jury that they were dealing
with human beings. Moreover, despite the court's limitations, it
was inevitably clear that the defendant's actions caused an inno-
cent family incredible suffering. Mr. Kanka's testimony thus ac-
complished all that was ever desired by victims' rights advocates,
without jeopardizing the defendant's right to a sentencing free of
arbitrary and capricious factors.
Houses propose an amendment, or if the legislatures of two-thirds of the states call
for a constitutional convention." GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
75 (3d ed. 1996). Furthermore, in order for the amendment to be adopted, it must be
ratified by three-fourths of the states. See id. It should be noted that this amendment
may also be used as a template for state statutes. Nonetheless, I am proposing a
constitutional amendment because that is the direction things are heading. See Mc-
Murry, supra note 38 (setting forth the contents of the current proposal). For the sake
of administrative convenience, it seems most logical to adhere to this current trend,
given that if passed, the law would apply universally to all states, as opposed to pro-
posing that all fifty states adopt identical statutes.
147. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803) (holding that "the particular phra-
seology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle
... that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other
departments, are bound by that instrument").
148. See supra notes 61-72 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 74.
151. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
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2. Proposal for a Constitutional Amendment
The following proposal for an amendment to the United States
Constitution establishes guidelines and procedural safeguards to
effectively minimize the risk of prejudicing the jury against the cap-
ital defendant. 15 2
The trial judge, because of her familiarity with the case, knowl-
edge of and respect for the law, and inherent authority to control
and provide a fair courtroom, is in the best position to undertake
the balancing test outlined by the following guidelines:
Section 1. The victim impact statement first must be written out
and submitted to the judge for approval. The testimony may
relate to the impact of the victim's death on his or her immediate
family. It may also contain general commentary about the vic-
tim, such as education, age, employment, and family.'53 More-
over, the VIS must adhere to the following standards:1 54
[1] It can be no more than 2 pages, double-spaced.
[2] It can make absolutely no reference to or opinions about
the death penalty or appropriate sentence.
[3] It can express no feelings or opinions about the defendant.
[4] It must refrain from making any characterizations about
the circumstances of the crime.
[5] It must not assert any comment about the victim's moral
views or religious affiliation.
[6] It must be void of overtly emotional or inflammatory
comments.
[7] It must avoid all commentary that touches upon the vic-
tim's social status or political beliefs.
152. The proposed amendment relies heavily upon many of the concerns of the
New Jersey Supreme Court. See supra notes 61-72 and accompanying text.
153. This prong closely adheres to the language of Payne. The Payne Court held
that "evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim's
family is relevant to the jury's decision as to whether or not the death penalty should
be imposed." Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).
154. With respect to subsections [2] and [3], however, the Payne Court refrained
from deciding the constitutionality of such commentary. See id. at 832-33 (O'Connor,
concurring). But see Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 508 (1987) (holding that such
information "can serve no other purpose than to inflame the jury and divert it from
deciding the case on the relevant evidence concerning the crime and the defendant").
Moreover, the Booth Court noted that the admission of such "emotionally charged
opinions ... is inconsistent with the reasoned decisionmaking we require in capital
cases." Id. at 508-09; see supra note 25.
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Section 2. The probative value of the victim impact evidence
must not be substantially outweighed by its risk of undue preju-
dice to the capital defendant or confusion to the jury.' 55
Section 3. If admissible under Sections 1 and 2, only one
spokesperson may speak to the jury on behalf of all victims.
That person must be over the age of eighteen, unless no other
survivors are available to testify. In such an event, admissibility
will then be left to the discretion of the trial judge. The testi-
mony shall take the form of reading from the pre-approved
statement, and the designated reader shall refrain from crying or
showing any overt signs of emotion. The judge will warn the
designated reader of this requirement beforehand. If there is a
problem controlling emotions, the prosecutor will be appointed
to read the statement.
Section 4. The VIS shall be read only if the defendant opens the
door to character evidence by introducing mitigating evidence at
the sentencing.
Section 5. The defendant shall be forewarned that if he or she
chooses to introduce mitigating evidence, then the government
will likewise have the opportunity to introduce evidence about
the character of the victim by way of VIS.
Section 6. Defense counsel shall be given timely notice of the
government's intentions to present victim impact evidence and
the name of the victim who will testify. Defense counsel may
interview the witness beforehand and cross-examine the witness
at the sentencing hearing.156
Section 7. Any comments by the prosecution during summa-
tion, with respect to the victim impact evidence, should be
strictly limited to the previously heard testimony.
Section 8. In response to the reading of the VIS, the judge shall
give the jury a limiting instruction. The jury shall be ordered to
155. This prong essentially mirrors the language of Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, which holds: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EvID. 403.
156. The prospect of cross-examining a witness is not appealing. Consider the
ramifications of attacking the character of the grieving widow or the reputation of the
suffering parent. The mere possibility of causing the witness more pain and anguish
seems to render cross-examination a far too risky endeavor for the defense attorney,
especially given the likely response of the jury. Nevertheless, as a matter of due pro-
cess, the defendant is entitled to a rebuttal of the evidence offered against him or her.
See Booth, 482 U.S. at 507 (citing Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977) (opin-
ion of Stevens, J.) (due process requires that defendant be given a chance to rebut
presentence report)).
19981 637
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXV
make a reasoned and moral judgment, and not be swayed by
emotions or sympathy. The judge shall remind the jury that
while emotions are indeed powerful, a death sentence cannot be
motivated by vengeance, and emotions cannot be a factor in de-
termining a sentence. In addition, the judge shall note that VIS
are designed to give the jury a small glimpse into the life of the
victim and the suffering that his or her death imposed on the
survivors. However, the full extent to which the victim's survi-
vors have suffered cannot be the grounds for determining the
defendant's moral culpability. The jury shall concentrate on the
circumstances of the crime and the defendant's record in making
a sentencing determination.
3. Discussion of Amendment
The above guidelines do not require the jury to first find evi-
dence of one aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt before
considering the VIS, as the New Jersey Supreme Court does, be-
cause such mental gymnastics are well beyond the comprehension
of a lay juror.157 Thus, if the defendant opens the door to such
evidence, the jury may consider it. In addition, the above proposal
strictly limits the victim impact testimony to one survivor, while the
New Jersey Supreme Court leaves the door open to "special cir-
cumstances." '158 Given the high potential of undue prejudice that
can result from days of heart-wrenching testimony, there can be no
room for discretion on the part of the sentencing judge to allow
157. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text. By invoking such a limitation,
New Jersey seeks to prevent VIS from becoming "a means of weighing the worth of
the defendant against the worth of the victim." State v. Muhammad, 678 A.2d 164,
179 (N.J. 1996). And, in essence, that is exactly what this Constitutional Amendment
is trying to prevent. However, New Jersey's means of achieving this goal is somewhat
thwarted; for once the jurors hear the VIS, it will be virtually impossible for them to
forget what was said should they not unanimously find the existence of an aggravating
factor. See id. While the Muhammad Court maintains that "[t]he entire structure of
the penalty phase of capital cases is premised on the belief that jurors will use evi-
dence only for its proper purpose," it is unlikely that emotionally laden testimony of
this nature could ever be completely ignored, especially given the weakness of human
emotions. See id. Perhaps the New Jersey Supreme Court overlooked the fact that
juries are not typically comprised of trained legal professionals, but rather lay persons
whose knowledge of and experience with the law is minimal. The risk that the jurors
will misuse the VIS is significant; thus, any effort to impose such complex rules is in
vain. Given the likelihood that the other narrowly defined guidelines will counter any
risk of prejudice, the VIS may therefore be considered whenever the defendant opens
the door to such evidence.
158. See Muhammad, 678 A.2d at 180. The Court fails to specify what such circum-
stances may be; however, the mere possibility of an exception to the rule creates the
inherent danger of a slippery slope.
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statements from more than one survivor. Finally, at the conclusion
of the victim impact testimony, the judge also will be required to
give a limiting instruction as to the extent of the testimony's use in
order to temper the effect of human emotions. The instructions are
to remind jurors of the goals of sentencing and the higher ideals of
the justice system, in order to prevent them from reaching a deci-
sion based on fleeting emotions.
These guidelines are not inconsistent with the Payne decision.
They merely clarify its ambiguities and ensure that VIS are prop-
erly employed. The Payne Court noted that "(t)here is no reason
to treat such evidence differently than other evidence is treated,
159
and thus, VIS, like all other evidence, must be susceptible to tests
of relevance, reliability, and prejudice. Although the traditional
focus on the defendant may have shifted, the Payne Court did not
rule that VIS are exempt from the traditional admissibility stan-
dards for evidence. 6 °
Conclusion
In many cases, VIS have the potential to make a marked differ-
ence between life and death. Faced with the inconsistent state of
the law after Payne, efforts must now be directed towards control-
ling the prejudicial impact of VIS, in order to avoid unduly preju-
dicing defendants in capital sentencing hearings. An amendment
to the United States Constitution is the most adequate protection
against the influence of passion and prejudice. The gravity of the
sentence demands such uniformly stringent control, and the rights
already defined by the Constitution compel nothing less. By apply-
ing the safeguards set forth by these guidelines, courts throughout
the United States can avoid inconsistent, capricious, and arbitrary
decisions. To permit otherwise would be to run the impermissible
risk of tipping the scales of justice, thereby denying the possibility
of equality in the courtroom.
159. Payne, 501 U.S. at 826.
160. See id.; see also supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.
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WALKING A TIGHTROPE: REDRAWING
CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT LINES AFTER
SHAW V. RENO AND ITS PROGENY
Donovan L. Wickline*
Introduction
For over thirty years, the Voting Rights Act ("VRA")1 has qui-
etly revolutionized2 minority voting rights and power in the United
States. Congress enacted the VRA in 1965 as a response to the
array of discriminatory devices that southern jurisdictions used to
deny Blacks political participation after the passage of the Fif-
teenth Amendment.3 Today, some commentators consider the
VRA to be the most effective civil rights statute ever.4 The most
dramatic example of the immediate effectiveness of the VRA oc-
cured in Mississippi, where the Black registration rate soared from
6.7% to 59.4% within three years of the statute's passage.5 More-
over, the number of Black elected officials increased in the seven
originally targeted southern states from fewer than 100 in 1965 to
3265 in 1989.6
The quiet era of the VRA, however, has ended. In recent years,
the statute has gained center stage in the debate over the constitu-
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 1998; A.B., Columbia
University, 1995. The author wishes to thank Professor Terry Smith, Fordham Uni-
versity School of Law, for his insightful comments and guidance.
1. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1998).
2. See generally QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACt OF THE VOT-
ING RIGHTS AcT, 1965-1990 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994)
(showing how the VRA "quietly" enfranchised Black voters in the South during its
first twenty-five years) [hereinafter QUIET REVOLUTION].
3. The Fifteenth Amendment states in pertinent part: "The right of citizens of the
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S. CONST.
amend. XV, § 1.
4. See Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman, The Voting Rights Act and the
Second Reconstruction, in QUIET REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 386.
5. See James E. Alt, The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on Black and White
Voter Registration in the South, in QUIET REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 374 tbl.12.1.
6. See Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in CONTRO-
VERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS Acr IN PERSPECTIVE 7, 43 (Ber-
nard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992) [hereinafter CONTROVERSIES]. The
seven originally targeted states were Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South
Carolina, Virginia, and 40 counties in North Carolina. Id. at 19.
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tionality of a variety of race-conscious public policies.7 In voting
rights cases, the dispute has focused on a remedy to certain viola-
tions of the VRA: the creation of majority-minority election dis-
tricts8 where voting is otherwise polarized along racial lines.
In Shaw v. Reno ("Shaw I")9 and its progeny, 10 the United States
Supreme Court invalidated majority-minority congressional dis-
tricts in North Carolina, Georgia, and Texas using strict scrutiny
analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause ("EPC").11 By requiring that majority-minority congres-
sional districts be redrawn, however, the Supreme Court has in-
7. Although the continued necessity for affirmative action programs has domi-
nated this debate, the constitutional arguments and analyses, regarding the legality of
affirmative action and the constitutionality of majority-minority voting districts, are
substantially parallel. Compare Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
(1995) (ruling that strict scrutiny must be applied to federal affirmative action pro-
grams) and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (striking down
a city minority set-aside program after applying strict scrutiny) with Miller v. Johnson,
515 U.S. 900 (1995) (striking down a majority-minority voting district after applying
strict scrutiny) and Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (ruling that strict scrutiny must
be applied to a majority-minority voting district that was so bizarre in shape that only
unconstitutional racial gerrymandering could provide the explanation).
8. Majority-minority election districts are geographic areas where voting-age mi-
norities constitute an electoral majority. See United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 739
(1995).
9. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
10. Abrams v. Johnson, 117 S. Ct. 1925 (1997); Shaw v. Hunt ("Shaw H"), 116 S.
Ct. 1894 (1996); Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900
(1995).
11. The Fourteenth Amendment states in pertinent part: "No State shall ... deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
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vited litigation under Sections 212 and 513 of the VRA.14 As a
result of the Court's decisions, state legislatures face a Catch-22. If
they use race as a predominant factor in drawing congressional dis-
tricts, they are subject to strict scrutiny under the EPC. If they fail
to draw majority-minority districts, however, they are subject to lit-
igation under Sections 2 and 5 of the VRA.
This Note explores the tension between the Supreme Court's
recognition of a new cause of action under the EPC and the estab-
lished requirements of the VRA. Part I explains how the EPC
originally was interpreted to protect voting rights and how Con-
gress, in an effort to provide further protection, enacted the VRA.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1998). Section 2 provides:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice,
or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivi-
sion in a manner which results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color ....
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on
the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the political processes lead-
ing to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not
equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by
subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than
other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to
elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a pro-
tected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is
one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this
section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in
numbers equal to their proportion in the population.
Id.
13. Id. at § 1973c. Section 5 is intended to identify and eliminate any new state
voting requirements or procedures, in those jurisdictions found to have histories of
systemic racial discrimination, that have the purpose or effect of "denying or abridg-
ing the right to vote on account of race or color." Id.; see also Beer v. United States,
425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976) ("[T]he purpose of Section 5 has always been to insure that
no voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to a retrogression in the
position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral
franchise."). The Justice Department's long-standing interpretation of section 5 in-
corporates the "results" standard of section 2. See Heather K. Way, Note, A Shield or
a Sword? Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and the Argument for the Incorporation of
Section 2, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1439, 1439 (1996). But see Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd.,
117 S. Ct. 1491, 1501 (1997) (holding that preclearance under section 5 may not be
denied solely because a covered jurisdiction's new voting "standard, practice, or pro-
cedure" violates section 2).
14. See Johnson v. Miller ("Johnson III"), 922 F. Supp. 1556 (S.D. Ga. 1995), affd
sub nom. Abrams v. Johnson, 117 S. Ct. 1925 (1997). As a result of the Supreme
Court's decision in Miller, the Southern District of Georgia ordered a remedial con-
gressional districting plan that reduced the number of majority-Black districts from
three to one. See Johnson III, 922 F. Supp. at 1561. Thereafter, the minority groups
in Abrams challenged this court-ordered plan as retrogressive and a dilution of Black
voting strength in violation of sections 2 and 5 of the VRA. See Brief for Appellants
at *i, Abrams (No. 95-1425), available in 1996 WL 416713; see also infra Part II.C.2.
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Part II reviews the Supreme Court decisions in Shaw I and its prog-
eny and examines the tension created by application of the VRA
and EPC. Part III argues that the VRA and EPC can coexist in
harmony if the Court holds that compliance with the statute is a
compelling state interest, and that a majority-minority district
drawn to remedy a Section 2 violation is narrowly tailored by vir-
tue of what the plaintiffs must show to establish the violation in the
first instance. The Note concludes that the Court should clarify the
meaning and role of "compactness '15 in redistricting and provide
some guideposts for the legislators, litigants, and courts involved in
the reapportionment process.
I. Background
A. The EPC Protects Voting Rights
In the United States, voting is a fundamental political right.16
Over 100 years ago, the Fifteenth Amendment 7 was ratified, con-
stitutionally guaranteeing the right to vote for minorities.' 8 The
need for the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment 9 in the
voting rights context became clear, however, because states at-
tempted to deny Blacks their right of suffrage through discrimina-
tory devices such as poll taxes, literacy tests, and racial
15. "Compactness" in redistricting may refer to the shape of the district or the
dispersion of the population within the district, but the Supreme Court has never
provided clear guidance for determining what "compact" means or how the analysis
regarding whether a district's shape is compact should interrelate with the inquiry that
focuses on population. See infra Parts II.C.1 and III.B.2.
16. See Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966)
("[W]ealth or fee paying has, in our view, no relation to voting qualifications; the right
to vote is too precious, too fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned."); Reyn-
olds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964) ("Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a
fundamental matter in a free and democratic society."); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 370 (1886) (referring to "the political franchise of voting" as a "fundamental
political right, because preservative of all rights"); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-10, at 1460-61 (2d ed. 1988) (stating that the
right at stake in cases involving voting rights is one to equal participation in govern-
mental and societal decision-making).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
18. The Fifteenth Amendment states in pertinent part: "The right of citizens of the
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." Id. § 1.
19. The Fourteenth Amendment states in pertinent part: "No State shall ... deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
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gerrymandering of voting districts.20 Some states even created at-
large election schemes. These plans diluted the potential voting
strength of minorities because the larger White population would
vote cohesively for its preferred candidates. 21 Other states gerry-
mandered districts22 so that minorities were either excluded from
important voting districts23 or scattered among various districts, en-
suring that they could never constitute a majority of votes in any
district. 24 Therefore, both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments are necessary to constitutionally guarantee the right to vote
and to protect the right of a citizen to have his or her vote count.
The EPC of the Fourteenth Amendment 25 requires that a citizen
not only be allowed to vote, but also possess voting power that is
weighted equally to that of other citizens.26 In equal protection
20. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 310-13 (1966) (discussing
the history of discriminatory voting procedures designed specifically to prevent Black
citizens from exercising their right to vote).
21. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616 (1982) (striking down the use of
an at-large electoral system and upholding the lower court's order that the state adopt
single-member districts). At-large or multimember district electoral plans dilute mi-
nority voting strength when the majority group votes cohesively for the candidates of
their choice, effectively barring the minority group from electing any of the candidates
of their choice. Id. at 616-17. At-large election schemes disfranchised Blacks by indi-
rection because White officials would abolish districts entirely and place Black voters
in majority-White multimember districts. See Davidson, supra note 6, at 24.
In City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), the Supreme Court made it sub-
stantially more difficult for minority plaintiffs to challenge at-large or multimember
districts when it held that they had to prove intent to discriminate on the basis of race
if they were to successfully bring a claim of vote dilution under section 2 of the VRA.
Id. at 66. In 1982, however, Congress amended section 2 effectively overruling the
Court's holding in Bolden by prohibiting any voting practice, regardless of its! pur-
pose, that results in discrimination. See supra note 12.
22. The term gerrymander, named after Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry,
became popular in 1812 after then-governor Gerry approved a salamander-shaped
district drawn by the state legislature to benefit his Democratic party. See Kristin
Silverberg, Note, The Illegitimacy of the Incumbent Gerrymander, 74 TEX. L. REV.
913, 922-23 (1996).
23. See, e.g., Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 53-56 (1964) (upholding a New
York congressional apportionment statute excluding African American and Puerto
Rican citizens from one district and placing them in other districts because the plain-
tiffs failed to prove discriminatory intent); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340
(1960) (ruling that an Alabama law was unconstitutional if petitioners could show that
the all-White Alabama legislature redrew Tuskegee's municipal boundaries to exclude
all but four or five of the city's 500 Black voters, but none of its White ones).
24. See Davidson, supra note 6, at 24, which discusses how redistricting processes
dominated by Whites resulted in gerrymandering to disfranchise Blacks by indirection
so that they would not make up a majority of the voters in any district.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
26. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560-61 (1964) ("[T]he fundamental princi-
ple of representative government in this country is one of equal representation for
equal numbers of people ....").
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cases, the Supreme Court applies strict scrutiny to legislative ac-
tions when a plaintiff proves that the government possessed a ra-
cially discriminatory intent or purpose.27 When a plaintiff shows
such intent, the Court requires the defendant to show that the leg-
islature narrowly tailored its law to satisfy a compelling govern-
mental interest.28
To prove discriminatory intent, a plaintiff must show either that
a law clearly, or on its face, discriminates on the basis of race,29 or
that in its application a clear pattern emerges that is "unexplain-
able on grounds other than race." 3° If the plaintiff proves that dis-
criminatory purpose is one motivating factor in the decision to
enact the legislation, then strict scrutiny must be applied.3'
27. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 912 (1995) ("[S]tatutes are subject to strict
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause not just when they contain express racial
classifications, but also when, though race neutral on their face, they are motivated by
a racial purpose or object.").
28. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) ("[Racial]
classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that fur-
ther compelling governmental interests."). Moreover, in City of Richmond v. Croson,
the Court stated:
Indeed, the purpose of strict scrutiny is to "smoke out" illegitimate uses of
race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important
enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool. The test also assures that the
means chosen "fit" this compelling goal so closely that there is little or no
possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial preju-
dice or stereotype.
488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). This strict scrutiny test is difficult to overcome. See Bush v.
Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1978 (1996) (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, J.J.,
dissenting ) ("[W]e apply 'strict scrutiny' more to describe the likelihood of success
than the character of the test to be applied."). But see Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 219-20 (1944) (upholding the use of internment camps, during World
War II, for persons of Japanese ancestry after applying strict scrutiny).
29. See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 477-78 (striking down a city program that set-
aside contracts for minority businesses).
30. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
266 (1977). The Arlington Heights Court stated that "[a]bsent a pattern as stark as
that in Gomillion or Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative," and the Court must
look to direct and circumstantial evidence of discriminatory purpose. Id. In Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), the Court held a facially race-neutral city ordinance
to be unconstitutional under the EPC because the plaintiffs showed that it was admin-
istered exclusively against Chinese immigrants. Id. at 374. In Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U.S. 339 (1960), the Court held that if the petitioners proved their allegations that
an Alabama law created a racially gerrymandered district, the statute infringed on the
right of Blacks to vote in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. Id. at 341-42.
31. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-66. In Arlington Heights, the plaintiff, a
nonprofit real estate developer, alleged that the city violated minorities' equal protec-
tion rights by refusing to rezone a fifteen-acre parcel so as to permit the construction
of low- and moderate-income housing. Id. at 252. The Court held that the plaintiff
failed to prove that racially discriminatory intent or purpose was a motivating factor
in the zoning decision, thus ending the constitutional inquiry. Id. at 270.
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The Supreme Court has used the EPC to create principles gov-
erning the mapping of voting districts. Applying strict scrutiny
analysis, the Court has struck down redistricting plans that used at-
large electoral schemes because they classified citizens on the basis
of race.3z Moreover, it held that a state legislature that was not
apportioned on a population basis violated the EPC because it un-
constitutionally diluted voter strength.33 Almost as soon as states
were forbidden from using various discriminatory voting devices,
however, they created new practices to prevent Black citizens from
voting.34 Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to remedy
the problem,35 but state and local governments continued to deny
minority citizens their right to vote.36
B. The Voting Rights Act
Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act in 1965 to enforce the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution.37 The
VRA contained broad provisions38 that sought not only to provide
Blacks access to the voting booth, but also to force states to end all
discriminatory voting practices, 39 including literacy tests and poll
32. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616-17 (1982); see also supra note 21 and
accompanying text.
33. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 576-77 (1964) (establishing the one-person,
one-vote principle by holding that every voting district in a state must be constructed
as nearly of equal population as practicable); see also infra text accompanying notes
47-49.
34. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 310-13 (1966) (listing
various practices designed to deprive Black citizens of the vote); Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341-42 (1960) (forbidding racial gerrymandering of districts);
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (declaring White primaries unconstitutional);
Guinn and Beal v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (invalidating grandfather
clauses); see also supra note 20 and accompanying text.
35. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1971
(1998)).
36. See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 314 ("Even when favorable decisions have finally
been obtained, some of the States affected have merely switched to discriminatory
devices not covered by the federal decrees or have enacted difficult new tests
designed to prolong the existing disparity between white and Negro registration.").
37. H.R. REP. No. 89-439, at 6 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437.
38. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 315-16 (outlining the stringent remedies the VRA
aimed at voting discrimination). "After enduring nearly a century of widespread
resistance to the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress has marshalled an array of potent
weapons against the evil, with authority in the Attorney General to employ them
effectively." Id. at 337.
39. According to Sen. Jacob Javits, the VRA's purpose was "not only to correct an
active history of discrimination, the denying to Negroes of the right to register and
vote, but also to deal with the accumulation of discrimination.... The bill would
attempt to do something about accumulated wrongs and the continuance of the
wrongs." S. REP. No. 97-417, at 5 (1982) (quoting 111 CONG. REC. 8295 (1965)).
1998]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXV
taxes.4" In addition, the VRA required that jurisdictions with a his-
tory of discrimination which depressed political participation re-
ceive federal preclearance before adopting any new voting
requirement or procedure.41
Although Congress ensured that Black citizens had the right to
register and cast a ballot, many jurisdictions adopted discrimina-
tory measures designed to circumvent the empowerment of minor-
ity voters.42 As a result, the courts and executive branch had to
address the issue of vote dilution to ensure that Black citizens were
provided effective political power.43 Challenges to such state vot-
ing procedures occur under Sections 2 and 5 of the VRA, as well as
under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.44
Section 2 authorizes claims by private citizens against a state for
unlawful vote dilution.45 In Reynolds v. Sims, 46 decided the year
before the VRA was passed, the Supreme Court held for the first
time that "the* right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or
dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by
wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise. ' 47 Five years
later, in Allen v. State Board of Elections,48 the Court relied on the
Reynolds one-person, one-vote decision to conclude that diluting
the voting strength of racial minorities violated the VRA.49
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965). Section 2 originally provided that "[n]o voting quali-
fication or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed
or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color." Id.
41. Id. at § 1973c; see supra note 13.
42. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (creating at-large vot-
ing system for county officeholders); see also supra notes 20-21 and accompanying
text.
43. See Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Com-
pactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 184
(1989).
44. See Bernard Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have Been Right if He Had
Said: "When it Comes to Redistricting, Race isn't Everything it's the Only Thing?", 14
CARDOZO L. REV. 1237, 1239 (1993).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1998). See supra note 21 for examples of vote dilution.
46. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
47. Id. at 555; see supra note 33 and accompanying text.
48. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
49. See id. at 565-66, 569. The Allen Court stated that:
The right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting power as well as
by an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot .... Voters who are members
of a racial minority might well be in the majority in one district, but in a
decided minority in the county as a whole. This type of change could there-
fore nullify their ability to elect the candidate of their choice just as would




In 1980, however, the Supreme Court abruptly changed the land-
scape of vote dilution litigation with its decision in City of Mobile v.
Bolden.50 In Bolden, the Court held that plaintiffs in vote dilution
cases must prove that the challenged system was enacted or main-
tained in order to deprive Blacks of political power. 51 By requiring
plaintiffs to prove intent, litigation challenging discriminatory vot-
ing practices under the Constitution and Section 2 of the VRA
dried up.52
In response to Bolden, Congress added an important amend-
ment to Section 2 in 1982, eliminating the requirement of discrimi-
natory intent and providing that any voting procedure that lessens
the opportunity of minority voters to elect the candidates of their
choice violates Section 2 of the VRA.53 In Thornburg v. Gingles,54
however, the Supreme Court established three preconditions5
plaintiffs challenging an apportionment plan under Section 2 must
prove: (1) that the minority group "is sufficiently large and geo-
graphically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member
district; '56 (2) that it is "politically cohesive;" 57 and (3) that "the
white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it... usually to
defeat the minority's preferred candidate."58 If plaintiffs show that
50. 446 U.S. 55 (1980); see supra note 21 and accompanying text.
51. See id. at 66.
52. Laughlin McDonald, The 1982 Amendments of Section 2 and Minority Repre-
sentation, in CONTROVERSIES, supra note 6, at 67 ("Because of the plaintiff's onerous
new burden of proof, litigation challenging discriminatory voting practices under the
Constitution and section 2 dried up.").
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1998).
54. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
55. Also referred to as the "Gingles factors."
56. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50.
57. Id. at 51.
58. Id. The legislative history of section 2, particularly the Senate Report, indi-
cates that a "variety of factors, depending upon the kind of rule, practice, or proce-
dure called into question," are relevant in determining if a plan "results" in
discrimination. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
206-07. Typical factors include:
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or polit-
ical subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group
to register, to vote, or otherwise participate in the democratic process;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdi-
vision is racially polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually
large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provi-
sions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportu-
nity for discrimination against the minority group;
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the mi-
nority group have been denied access to that process;
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"racial and ethnic cleavages ... necessitate majority-minority dis-
tricts to ensure equal political and electoral opportunity," the rem-
edy is race-conscious districting.5 9
Under Section 5 of the VRA, covered jurisdictions must submit
their election plans for preclearance to the Department of Justice
or the District Court for the District of Columbia to illustrate that
they neither abridge the minority vote nor dilute minority voting
power in violation of Section 2.60 To obtain preclearance, the De-
partment of Justice encourages states to "maximize" minority vot-
ing power by creating majority-minority districts.61 The purpose of
Section 5, according to the Supreme Court's interpretation in Beer
v. United States,62 is to ensure that no changes in voting laws "lead
to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to
their effective exercise of the electoral franchise. '63
II. Redistricting under the VRA and Tension with the EPC
The Supreme Court initially deferred to states when analyzing
the creation of majority-minority voting districts.64 The Court
found no injury, under the EPC, to plaintiffs who alleged that race
was used for its own sake in drawing a majority-minority voting
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or polit-
ical subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education,
employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively
in the political process;
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle
racial appeals;
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected
to public office in the jurisdiction.
Id. This list is referred to as the "Senate Factors," and is relied on by courts applying
the "totality of the circumstances" test set forth in section 2 of the VRA. Gingles, 478
U.S. at 37; see supra note 12.
59. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994).
60. Section 5 requires that covered jurisdictions submit redistricting plans to the
Attorney General for preclearance before they can enforce the plans. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973c. If the Attorney General denies preclearance, states may attempt to obtain a
declaratory judgment granting preclearance from the federal district court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, or they may petition that court before requesting preclearance from
the Attorney General. Id. Section 5 requirements apply to "any voting qualification
or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting
." 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, as amended.
61. See, e.g., Johnson v. Miller ("Johnson I"), 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1361 (S.D. Ga.
1994) (stating that the Department of Justice encouraged states to maximize the
number of majority-Black districts); Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1345 (S.D.
Tex. 1994).
62. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
63. Id. at 141; see supra note 13.
64. See, e.g., United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
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district.65 In Shaw v. Reno and its progeny, however, the Court has
transformed voting rights litigation by applying strict scrutiny anal-
ysis to majority-minority voting districts and then striking them
down on equal protection grounds.66
A. Initial Deference to the VRA
In deciding whether to approve reapportionment plans, the De-
partment of Justice67 interpreted the Beer nondilution requirement
as imposing an affirmative duty on states to maximize minority vot-
ing strength and to create majority-minority districts. 6  The
Supreme Court implicitly approved such actions in United Jewish
Organizations v. Carey (" UJO")69 when it upheld New York's in-
tentional use of race to enhance minority representation in the
state legislature. Three of the eight participating justices in UJO
found that the intentional use of race was not unconstitutional if
the state neither intended nor accomplished vote dilution v.7  More-
over, the UJO plurality held that a state could consider race when
districting to satisfy the requirements of the VRA. 71 As a result,
65. Id. at 154 n.14 (stating that petitioners argue "that the history of the area dem-
onstrates that there could be-and in fact was-no reason other than race to divide
the community at this time.").
66. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (explaining that states may obtain
preclearance of their redistricting plan from the Attorney General rather than a fed-
eral court).
68. See, e.g., Johnson 1, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1393 (S.D. Ga. 1994). See supra note 61
and accompanying text.
69. 430 U.S. 144 (1977). In UJO, a New York redistricting plan was submitted to
the Attorney General, pursuant to section 5, who objected to it because the plan
appeared to dilute the vote of minorities, specifically Blacks and Puerto Ricans. See
id. at 148-50. State officials responded to this objection by redrawing the district lines,
whereby the percentage of minority voters in districts where minorities already consti-
tuted a majority increased substantially. See id. at 151. The Attorney General did not
object to the new plan, but a group of Hasidic Jews sued, alleging that their vote had
been diluted by the new plan. See id. at 152. Moreover, they alleged that there was
"no reason other than race" that the community was divided at the time. Id. at 154
n.14; see supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
70. Id. at 165 (opinion of Justice White, joined by then-Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tice Stevens) (finding that the plan, by deliberately drawing nonWhite districts, did
not minimize or unfairly cancel out White voting strength, because under the con-
tested redistricting plan, Whites continued to be fairly represented relative to their
share of the population).
71. UJO, 430 U.S. at 155-65 (opinion of Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan,
Blackmun, and Stevens). As Justice White observed, "[w]here it occurs, voting for or
against a candidate because of his race is an unfortunate practice. But it is not rare
.... It does not follow, however, that the State is powerless to minimize the conse-
quences of racial discrimination by voters when it is regularly practiced at the polls."
Id. at 166-67.
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the UJO Court created a highly deferential standard under which
plaintiffs would have difficulty proving that a state redistricting
plan, approved by the Department of Justice as consistent with the
requirements of the VRA, violated the Fourteenth Amendment.72
B. Shaw v. Reno and its Progeny
1. Shaw I: The Supreme Court Applies Strict Scrutiny to a
Majority-Minority Redistricting Plan
Although some commentators consider the Voting Rights Act to
be the most important and successful civil rights bill ever passed,73
criticism of the statute has increased dramatically in recent years. 4
Critics of the VRA allege that the race-conscious remedies in vote
dilution litigation75 violate the notion that the Constitution is color-
blind.76
The Supreme Court appeared to agree with these critics in Shaw
177 when it departed from the lenient standard it created in UJO
and created a new cause of action under the EPC.78 In a five-to-
four decision, the Shaw I Court stated that, regardless of motiva-
tion, where a legislative redistricting plan is "so extremely irregular
on its face that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort to seg-
regate the races for purposes of voting," it must undergo the same
72. Id.
73. See Davidson & Grofman, supra note 4, at 386.
74. See Grofman, supra note 44, at 1247 ("But there can be little doubt that, since
the mid-1980s, there has been a backlash against the Voting Rights Act.").
75. See id. at 1248. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 42-61 (1986) (not-
ing that states must consider race because they must ensure that their redistricting
plan does not scatter minorities among majority-white districts, thus diluting minority
voting power); UJO, 430 U.S. at 167-68 (permitting the consideration of race when
redrawing the lines of voting districts).
76. Grofman, supra note 44, at 1248. The concept of a color-blind Constitution
first arose in Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896)
("Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citi-
zens.") (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993) ("Racial
gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial
factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political system in which
race no longer matters-a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments em-
body, and to which the Nation continues to aspire."). In some cases, however, the
Court has been willing to accept race-conscious remedies. See, e.g., United States v.
Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 185-86 (1987) (affirming court-ordered quota imposed to rem-
edy public employer's past discrimination); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S.
275 (1986) (noting that a public employer may voluntarily use a race-conscious plan to
remedy past racial discrimination by that public employer).
77. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
78. UJO was substantially narrowed by the Court's decision in Shaw I. See infra
notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
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strict scrutiny applied when other state laws classify citizens by
race.
79
The Shaw I Court stated that bizarrely shaped districts lack
traditional districting principles and therefore raise an inference of
unconstitutional racial discrimination.80 Moreover, the Court dis-
tinguished UJO as a vote dilution case 81 and emphasized that redis-
tricting legislation that classifies citizens on the basis of race
involves a different, "special" type of injury, which eliminates the
need for the plaintiffs to establish vote dilution or deprivation. 82
The Court found that "a racial gerrymander may exacerbate the
very patterns of racial bloc voting that majority-minority districting
is sometimes said to counteract. 83
Although the majority expressed no view as to whether the in-
tentional creation of majority-minority districts would always give
rise to an equal protection cause of action,84 it nonetheless in-
structed that, once plaintiffs successfully prove that a state legisla-
ture racially gerrymandered its congressional redistricting plan,
courts should review the plan with "close judicial scrutiny."85 This
strict scrutiny standard requires that a state offer sufficient proof
79. Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 641-47. The Shaw I case arose when the North Carolina
legislature developed a redistricting plan which created new congressional voting dis-
tricts to reflect population increases indicated in the 1990 census. See id. at 633-34.
The Attorney General objected to the plan, pursuant to section 5, noting that the
addition of another majority-minority district would prevent dilution of the minority
vote, and that the drawing of such a district was feasible. See id. at 634-35. The legis-
lature thus created a new plan, adding a second majority-minority district, which
gained the approval of the Attorney General, but also generated much controversy.
See id. at 635-36.
80. Id. at 646-47. Traditional districting principles include "compactness, contigu-
ity, and respect for political subdivisions." Id. at 647. "We emphasize that these crite-
ria are important not because they are constitutionally required-they are not-but
because they are objective factors that may serve to defeat a claim that a district has
been gerrymandered on racial lines." Id. at 646 (citations omitted).
81. Id. at 652. But see UJO, 430 U.S. 144, 154 n.14 (1977) (alleging that there was
"no reason other than race" that the community was divided at the time, a Shaw I-
type equal protection challenge).
82. Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 649-50 ("Classifying citizens by race, as we have said,
threatens special harms that are not present in our vote-dilution cases.").
83. Id. at 648.
84. See id. at 649. Similarly, the Court expressed no view whether the creation of
majority-minority districts to comply with the VRA is a compelling state interest be-
cause, in this case, the statute did not require such a district to be drawn. See id. at
653-54.
85. Id. at 657. For a discussion of the two-step analysis that courts must apply
when examining state actions under the EPC, see supra notes 27-31 and accompany-
ing text.
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that it narrowly tailored its redistricting plan to satisfy a compelling
governmental interest. 86
2. Miller v. Johnson: The Supreme Court Expands its Holding in
Shaw I
After Shaw I, courts split widely when interpreting what consti-
tutes a compelling governmental interest and how a state could
narrowly tailor a redistricting plan to achieve that interest.8 7
Courts also disagreed when interpreting the plaintiffs' burden of
proof in cases alleging that race-conscious redistricting plans vio-
lated the EPC. In particular, the courts disagreed on the degree of
race consciousness that would trigger strict scrutiny.88
In Miller v. Johnson,89 the Supreme Court attempted to resolve
the uncertainty created by Shaw L It held that if the plaintiff could
establish, through either direct or circumstantial evidence, 90 that
"race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature's deci-
sion to place a significant number of voters within or without a
86. See Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 658; see also supra note 28 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1339-41 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (holding
that the legislature did not narrowly tailor the districts to achieve a compelling inter-
est because there was evidence of oddly-shaped boundaries); Johnson 1, 864 F. Supp.
1354, 1393 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (finding that compliance with the VRA might be compel-
ling, but holding that the state's redistricting plan was not "reasonably necessary" to
achieve compliance, because it exceeded the requirements of the Act); Shaw v. Hunt,
861 F. Supp. 408, 476 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (holding that compliance with the VRA consti-
tuted a sufficiently compelling interest that justified racially gerrymandering the vot-
ing districts); Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188, 1209 n.67 (W.D. La. 1993)
(holding that a plan creating additional majority-minority districts would be reason-
ably necessary only if a state needed to add another majority-minority district to pre-
vent a reduction of minority voting strength).
88. See, e.g., DeWitt v. Wilson, 856 F. Supp. 1409, 1413 (E.D. Cal. 1994) ("[I]n
redistricting, consciousness of race does not give rise to an [EPC] claim of racial ger-
rymandering ...."); Johnson 1, 864 F. Supp. at 1372 (holding that race must be the
"overriding, predominant force determining the lines of the district" to prove racial
gerrymandering); Vera, 861 F. Supp. at 1338 (explaining that race must be a "primary
consideration"); Hays, 839 F. Supp. at 1195 (interpreting Shaw I to require that race
need only be a tangible factor to invoke strict scrutiny). Cf Bridgeport Coalition for
Fair Representation v. City of Bridgeport, 26 F.3d 271, 278 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying
Shaw I to a city council redistricting plan, and holding that it did not trigger strict
scrutiny because race was not the city's sole motivation when designing the plan).
89. 515 U.S. 900 (1995). In Miller, the Court confronted the constitutionality of
Georgia's Eleventh Congressional District, and struck it down by yet another five-to-
four decision.
90. The Miller Court stated that "[s]hape is relevant not because bizarreness is a
necessary element of the constitutional wrong or a threshold requirement of proof,
but because it may be persuasive circumstantial evidence that race for its own sake,
and not other districting principles, was the legislature's dominant and controlling
rationale in drawing its district lines." Id. at 913.
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particular district," then the districting plan would be subject to
strict scrutiny. 9' The Miller Court stated, however, that a majority-
minority redistricting plan created to comply with the VRA could
withstand strict scrutiny, but only where there was "convincing evi-
dence" that remedial action was reasonably necessary to satisfy the
requirements of the statute. 92
Agreeing with the district court that race was the predominant
factor motivating the state legislature's drawing of Georgia's Elev-
enth Congressional District, the Miller Court addressed the re-
quirements of strict scrutiny.93 The Miller Court concluded that
the majority-minority district was not required "under a correct
reading of the [VRA]" 94 because it was part of an ameliorative ap-
portionment plan. Therefore, an additional majority-minority dis-
trict could not be compelled by Section 5 because that provision
only prohibits retrogression of minority voting rights or power.95
The Miller Court added that the Justice Department's interpreta-
tion of Section 5 as authorizing it to preclear only those reappor-
tionment plans that maximized majority-minority districts created
constitutional difficulties for Section 5 and brought the VRA "into
tension with the Fourteenth Amendment. 96
91. Id. at 916. "[A] plaintiff must prove that the legislature subordinated tradi-
tional race-neutral districting principles, including but not limited to compactness,
contiguity, respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared
interests, to racial considerations." Id.
92. Id. at 920-21.
93. See id. at 916-17.
94. Id. at 921. The Miller Court stated:
Whether or not in some cases compliance with the Voting Rights Act,
standing alone, can provide a compelling interest independent of any inter-
est in remedying past discrimination, it cannot do so here. As we suggested
in Shaw [I], compliance with federal antidiscrimination laws cannot justify
race-based districting where the challenged district was not reasonably nec-
essary under a constitutional reading and application of those laws.
Id. The Court noted, however, that a compelling state interest existed when a state
attempted to "eradicat[e] the effects of past racial discrimination." Id. at 920 (citing
Shaw 1, 113 S. Ct. at 2831). But in this case, the defendants did not argue "that it
created the [majority-minority] district to remedy past discrimination ...." Id.
95. See id. at 923; see also supra note 63 and accompanying text.
96. Id. at 927. Moreover, the Court stated that "[t]here is no indication Congress
intended such a far-reaching application of § 5, so we reject the Justice Department's
interpretation of the statute and avoid the constitutional problems that interpretation
raises." Id.; see supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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3. Muddy Waters: The Supreme Court Decisions in Shaw II and
Bush v. Vera
The Miller Court did not decide whether compliance with the
Voting Rights Act constituted a compelling governmental interest.
Moreover, it did not specify in which instances a state may draw
majority-minority districts to remedy potential or adjudicated vio-
lations of Section 2 of the VRA. In its 1995 Term, the Supreme
Court struck down majority-minority congressional districts in
North Carolina97 and Texas.98 The Court, however, did not specify
the constitutional parameters of drawing boundaries to improve
representation for minorities who have been historically shut out.
In Shaw II, North Carolina sought to prove three compelling
state interests to sustain its contested minority-controlled congres-
sional district: (1) to eradicate the effects of past and present dis-
crimination; (2) to comply with Section 5 of the VRA; and (3) to
comply with Section 2 of the VRA.99 Although the Court recog-
nized that a state's interest in remedying the effects of past or pres-
ent racial discrimination may justify a government's use of racial
distinctions, it pointed out that for the interest to rise to a compel-
ling level it must be specifically identified. 100
As in Miller, the Shaw II Court did not reach the question of
whether compliance with the VRA, standing alone, was a compel-
ling interest. It found that an additional majority-minority con-
gressional district was not necessary under a correct reading of the
statute, and thus it was not a narrowly tailored remedy. 10 In re-
jecting North Carolina's Section 5 defense, the Court noted that
the same Justice Department policy of maximizing the number of
majority-Black districts that was rejected in Miller was present in
this case. 0 2 With respect to the state's Section 2 defense, the Court
held that the majority-minority district could not remedy any po-
tential Section 2 violation because "no one .. .could reasonably
suggest that the district contains a 'geographically compact' popu-
lation of any race."' 03
97. Shaw v. Hunt ("Shaw II"), 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996).
98. Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996).
99. See Shaw 11, 116 S. Ct. at 1902.
100. See id. at 1902-03 ("[A]n effort to alleviate the effects of societal discrimina-
tion is not a compelling interest.").
101. See id.
102. See id. at 1904 (citations omitted); see also supra note 96 and accompanying
text.
103. Id. at 1906 (citations omitted); see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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In Shaw HI's companion case, Bush v. Vera, Justice O'Connor
delivered a plurality opinion for the Court which applied strict
scrutiny to three newly-created majority-minority districts in
Texas.1 0 4 With utter disregard for traditional redistricting princi-
ples, the state formed these districts, whose contours were unex-
plainable in terms other than race.105 In rejecting the state's
defense that it drew the minority-controlled districts to comply
with VRA requirements, the Court "assume[d] without deciding
that compliance with the results test [of Section 2] can be a compel-
ling state interest,"' 6 but found that the districts' bizarre shape and
lack of compactness defeated any claim that they were narrowly
tailored. 10 7
Justice O'Connor also filed a significant concurring opinion,
however, to express her view that the state interest in avoiding lia-
bility under Section 2 of the VRA is compelling.10 8 Moreover, she
would have held that "[i]f a state has a strong basis in evidence for
concluding that the Gingles factors are present," and creates a ma-
jority-minority "district that 'substantially addresses' the potential
liability ... and does not deviate substantially from a hypothetical
court-drawn § 2 district for predominantly racial reasons, . . . its
districting plan will be deemed narrowly tailored."109
Although Justice O'Connor concluded that Section 2 does not
require a non-compact majority-minority district," 0 Justice Ken-
nedy observed in his concurrence, "neither does [Section.2] forbid
it, provided that the rationale for creating it is proper in the first
instance.""' Justice Kennedy also noted that "[d]istricts not drawn
104. See Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1958-60
105. See id.
106. Id. at 1960.
107. See id. at 1960-61. The Court noted, however, that "[a] § 2 district that is rea-
sonably compact and regular, taking into account traditional districting principles
such as maintaining communities of interest and traditional boundaries, may pass
strict scrutiny without having to defeat rival compact districts ... in endless 'beauty
contests."' Id. at 1960 (emphasis in original).
108. See id. at 1968 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also id. at 1989 (Stevens, J.,
joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting); id. at 2007 (Souter, J., joined by Gins-
burg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
109. Id. at 1970.
110. See id. ("[D]istricts that are bizarrely shaped and non-compact, and that other-
wise neglect traditional districting principles and deviate substantially from the hypo-
thetical court-drawn district, for predominantly racial reasons, are unconstitutional.").
111. Id. at 1972 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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for impermissible reasons or according to impermissible criteria
may take any shape, even a bizarre one. ' 112
C. Lower Court Reactions to Miller, Shaw II, and Bush
As a result of the Supreme Court's decisions in Miller, Shaw II,
and Bush, lower courts have applied strict scrutiny to strike down
majority-minority districts after finding that race was the predomi-
nant factor in drawing the district's boundaries. 113 District courts
also have rejected new challenges to majority-minority voting dis-
tricts while attempting to conform their decisions with the analyti-
cal framework established in Shaw I and its progeny." 4 In what
may be an unanticipated consequence, however, some courts have
required plaintiffs in Section 2 vote dilution cases to show that
112. Id. Justice Kennedy also observed, that "[t]he first Gingles condition refers to
the compactness of the minority population, not the compactness of the contested
district." Id. at 1971.
113. See, e.g., Diaz v. Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96, 117 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (declaring the
mostly Hispanic Twelfth Congressional District in New York unconstitutional, after
applying strict scrutiny, because race and ethnicity were the dominant factors used to
draw it); Moon v. Meadows, 952 F. Supp. 1141, 1151 (E.D. Va. 1997) (striking down a
majority-minority congressional district as unconstitutional racial gerrymander be-
cause the state subordinated traditional districting principles to accomplish its goal of
a safe Black district); Smith v. Beasley, 946 F. Supp. 1174, 1210-11 (D.S.C. 1996)
(striking down, on equal protection grounds, majority-minority state legislative dis-
tricts because state failed to prove that districts at issue were specifically drawn to
achieve a compelling state interest in remedying effects of past or present discrimina-
tion, and the districts were not narrowly tailored to remedy any potential section 2
violation or to avoid retrogression as prohibited by section 5); Hays v. Louisiana, 936
F. Supp. 360 (W.D. La. 1996) (holding Miller to be commanding precedent, and strik-
ing down a majority-minority district as a racial gerrymander that could not be
demonstrated to be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest).
114. See, e.g., Theriot v. Parish of Jefferson, 966 F. Supp. 1435, 1449-50 (E.D. La.
1997) (holding that strict scrutiny was not warranted because changes in district con-
figuration were driven primarily by politics); King v. State Bd. of Elections ("King I"),
979 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. I11. 1996), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 429 (1996). In King I, a three-
member panel of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held
Illinois' Chicago-based Fourth Congressional District, the first Hispanic-majority con-
gressional district in the Midwest, to be constitutional, despite its "extraordinary"
shape, because it was justified under the VRA. 979 F. Supp. at 616-17. The Supreme
Court, however, set aside the King I opinion and ordered the Federal District Court
in Chicago to reconsider its decision in light of the Court's rulings in Shaw H and
Bush. 117 S. Ct. 429 (1996); see also Linda Greenhouse, Setback for Hispanic Con-
gressional District, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1996, at A4. On remand, a three-judge panel
held that the Fourth Congressional District was narrowly tailored to remedying a po-
tential violation of or achieving compliance with the VRA and, therefore did not vio-




their districting plan comports with Shaw I and its progeny in order
to satisfy the first Gingles precondition.115
1. What Compactness is Required?
Some post-Miller/Bush courts have dismissed Section 2 claims
because the plaintiffs could not show that the majority-minority
district they would create was compact enough to survive an equal
protection challenge. 116 Other courts have opined that it is a mis-
take to conflate the Gingles threshold requirement of a geographi-
cally compact minority population with the principle of
compactness of district shape which is used to assess whether racial
gerrymandering has occurred."17 The latter courts have noted that
the first Gingles factor, which requires that a minority group be
sufficiently compact to constitute a majority in a single member
district,118 is an inquiry into causation that necessarily classifies vot-
ers by their race. 119 In Miller, however, compactness was merely
one of many factors whose presence bore on the ultimate question
of whether race was the predominant factor motivating the draw-
115. See, e.g., Milwaukee Branch of the N.A.A.C.P. v. Thompson, 935 F. Supp.
1419, 1424-25 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (finding that a proposed remedy under section 2 that
departs from traditional redistricting principles solely to create a majority-Black dis-
trict is impermissible under the Gingles standard), aftd, 116 F.3d 1194 (7th Cir. 1997),
petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3338 (U.S. Oct 31, 1997) (No. 97-753); Reed v.
Town of Babylon, 914 F. Supp. 843, 871 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that a plaintiff seek-
ing to meet its burden of showing compactness under the first Gingles precondition
should not be permitted to rely on a plan that would have no chance of being found to
be narrowly tailored to redress the violation).
116. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., Clark v. Calhoun County, 88 F.3d 1393, 1406 (5th Cir. 1996); King I,
979 F. Supp. at 614. For example, in King I, the panel noted that the question raised
by Gingles is whether the minority population (and not the district drawn to accom-
modate that population) is geographically compact and sufficiently numerous to con-
stitute a majority in a single member district. See 979 F. Supp. at 614. By contrast, the
King I court determined that there is a second measure of compactness (i.e., a tradi-
tional race-neutral districting principle) that concerns whether a district drawn to
remedy a section 2 violation satisfies the requirements of the EPC, and to conflate the
two into a single measurement confuses the liability with the damages analysis, and
represents an unwarranted extension of Shaw L See id. Similarly, the Clark court
found that Bush and Shaw II support the conclusion that Miller's emphasis on pur-
pose does not apply to the first Gingles factor because in neither case did the Court
suggest that a district drawn for predominantly racial reasons would necessarily fail
the Gingles test. See Clark, 88 F.3d at 1406-07.
118. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
119. See, e.g., Clark, 88 F.3d at 1406-07. Moreover, the Clark court ruled that to the
extent that the plaintiffs' proposed remedy to the Section 2 violation may have to
survive an equal protection challenge, and show that race was not used at the expense
of traditional political concerns any more than reasonably necessary, that remedy was
not ripe for review at the liability stage. See id. at 1407-08.
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ing of particular district lines.12 ° Moreover, the Supreme Court has
never provided clear guidance for determing what "compact"
means or how the analysis regarding district shape should interre-
late with the inquiry that focuses on population.
2. The Plot Thickens: A Redistricting Plan, Compelled by Miller,
That Reduces the Number of Majority-Minority Districts
is Challenged under the VRA
In Miller, the Supreme Court declared Georgia's Eleventh Con-
gressional District unconstitutional.' 21 As a result of this decision,
the Miller plaintiffs also successfully challenged Georgia's Second
Congressional District, based on proof that the majority-minority
district contravened the EPC because it was drawn to segregate
voters according to their race.1 22 As to the remedy, the Georgia
district court initially deferred to the Georgia legislature, allowing
it an opportunity to draw a new congressional map. 2 3 When the
legislature was unable to redraw the map and adjourned, however,
it effectively left the task to the district court.124
The district court devised a plan that reduced Georgia's major-
ity-minority congressional districts from three to one.'25 Although
the district court considered the possibility of creating a second
majority-minority district, it concluded that to do so would
subordinate Georgia's traditional districting policies by considering
race predominantly.126 Moreover, the district court found that Sec-
tion 2 did not require it to create a second majority-minority dis-
trict in Georgia because of the "geographic dispersion of its
minority population and lack of any significant vote
polarization."127
In a five-to-four decision, the United States Supreme Court af-
firmed the Georgia district court's plan.128 One of the questions
presented to the Court was whether a court-ordered plan that frag-
ments the African-American population in two majority-Black dis-
tricts and disperses it throughout the state, thereby reducing the
number of majority-Black districts from three to one, is retrogres-
120. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
122. See Johnson v. Miller ("Johnson II"), 922 F. Supp. 1552 (S.D. Ga. 1995).
. 123. See Johnson III, 922 F. Supp. 1556, 1559 (S.D. Ga. 1995).
124. See id.
125. See id. at 1561.
126. See id. at 1566.
127. Id.
128. Abrams v. Johnson, 117 S. Ct. 1925 (1997).
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sive and dilutes Black voting strength in violation of Sections 2 and
5 of the VRA. 129
In holding that the district court's remedial redistricting plan did
not violate Section 2 of the VRA, the Abrams Court found that
none of the Gingles preconditions, 3 ° which set out the basic frame-
work for establishing a vote dilution claim, were met.13 1  The
Abrams Court also rejected the appellants' contention that the dis-
trict court plan violated Section 5 of the VRA. Specifically, it
found that the appellants' proposed benchmarks (the Georgia leg-
islature's 1991 and 1992 redistricting plans) for measuring retro-
gression were impermissible because they were never in effect and
constitutionally defective. 32
129. See Brief for Appellants at *i, Abrams v. Johnson, 116 S. Ct. 1823 (Nos. 95-
1425, 95-1460), 1996 WL 416713 (1996). The Abrams appellants argued that the
court-ordered plan violated section 2 because the alternative remedial plans submit-
ted to the district court showed that it was clearly possible to draw two reasonably
compact majority-Black congressional districts in Georgia. See id. at *43. The De-
partment of Justice submitted a proposed majority-minority district that was roughly
pear-shaped, while Abrams offered two proposals for minority-controlled districts
that were roughly wine bottle-shaped. See Paul L. McKaskle, In the U.S. Supreme
Court: The Voting Rights Act and the Scope of Shaw v. Reno, 12-9-96 WLN 13086. In
all of the appellants' proposals, however, the Black population was not contiguous,
and counties were split up, contrary to traditional districting principles in Georgia.
See id. Appellants also argued that the totality of the circumstances, including evi-
dence of past discrimination and its continuing effects, strongly supported a finding
that the court's plan would result in discrimination in violation of section 2. See Brief
for Appellants at *44 (citing Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1018 (1994)).
130. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
131. See Abrams, 117 S. Ct. at 1936 ("In fact, none of the three Gingles factors, the
threshold findings for a vote dilution claim, were established here.") (citing Bush v.
Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1959-1961 (1996)). Specifically, the Abrams Court found that
the district court did not commit a clear error when it determined that the Black
population was not sufficiently compact for a second majority-Black district and, thus,
the first Gingles factor was not satisfied. See id. Moreover, the Abrams Court found
that the district court did not clearly err in finding insufficient racial polarization,
given the evidence of significant White crossover voting, to meet the second and third
Gingles factors. See id. at 1936-37. The Court particularly noted the results of the
1996 general elections in which all three Black incumbents won elections under the
court plan, two in majority-White districts running against White candidates. See id.
at 1937.
132. See id. at 1938-39. The Abrams Court, in fact, agreed with the district court
that the 1982 plan, in effect for a decade, was the appropriate benchmark, and found
that the appellants did not show that Black voters suffered a retrogression in their
voting strength under the court plan measured against the 1982 plan. See id. at 1939.
Moreover, the Court rejected appellants' assertion that, even using the 1982 plan as a
benchmark, the district court's plan was retrogressive because under the 1982 plan
one of the ten districts was majority-Black, while under the district court's plan one of
eleven districts was majority-Black. See id. ("Under that logic, each time a State with
a majority-minority district was allowed to add one new district because of population
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The dissent in Abrams primarily complained that the majority
decision departed dramatically from the Georgia legislature's pref-
erence for two majority-minority districts, which the district court
was not free to disregard. 133 The Abrams dissenters also disagreed
with the majority's conclusion that Sections 2 and 5 of the VRA
did not require a second majority-minority district in Georgia.13 4
Finally, the Abrams dissent argued that the majority decision exac-
erbated the concern that Shaw I and its progeny-particularly, the
"predominant racial motive" test135-improperly would shift redis-
tricting authority from legislatures to courts and prevent the legiti-
mate use of race as a redistricting factor.136
III. Erecting a Safety Net for Redistricting's
"Tightrope Walkers"
The Supreme Court should clarify the relationship between its
new equal protection cause of action and the requirements of the
Voting Rights Act because they are in tension, sending conflicting
messages to legislators, litigants, and courts involved in the redis-
tricting process.
growth, it would have to be majority-minority. This the Voting Rights Act does not
require.").
133. See Abrams, 117 S. Ct. at 1943 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (citing Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 43 (1982)). In
Upham, the Supreme Court ruled that a district court drawing congressional districts
is "not free to disregard the political program of the ... Legislature." 456 U.S. at 43.
134. See id. at 1946. Specifically, the Abrams dissent suggested that the district
court improperly analyzed the "compactness" of the proposed majority-minority dis-
tricts by conflating Shaw I and its progeny compactness, which concerns the shape or
boundaries of a district, with section 2 compactness, which concerns a minority groups
compactness. Id. at 1947. For a discussion of the confusion among the lower courts
regarding the proper "compactness" analysis, see supra Part II.C.1. The dissenters
also found Georgia's discriminatory history and the fact that African-American repre-
sentatives have come almost exclusively from majority-minority districts strongly sup-
port the existence of racially polarized voting, despite the fact that the African-
American incumbents were reelected in the 1996 general elections. See Abrams, 117
S. Ct. at 1947 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
Moreover, the dissent argued that the question of whether the evidence showed that
the failure to create a second majority-minority would violate section 2 of the VRA
never needed to be answered because the proper question is "whether the evidence is
strong enough to justify a legislature's reasonable belief that that was so." Id. at 1948
("A legal rule that permits legislatures to take account of race only when § 2 really
requires them to do so is a rule that shifts the power to redistrict from legislatures to
federal courts (for only the latter can say what § 2 really requires).").
135. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 917 (1995); see supra note 92 and accompany-
ing text.
136. Abrams, 117 S. Ct. at 1949 ("Thus, given today's suit, a legislator might reason-
ably wonder whether he can ever knowingly place racial minorities in a district .... ").
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A. Tension Between the Shaw Equal Protection Analysis and
the Requirements of the VRA
Congress created the Voting Rights Act to enforce the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments by eradicating the continued
discrimination against minority groups in the voting process and
ensuring that minorities were not denied their constitutional right
to vote. 137 For three decades after the VRA, the Supreme Court's
principal concern with respect to the role of race in representation
was vote dilution, resulting in great deference to the VRA. 138 With
the recent decisions in Shaw I and its progeny, however, the Court
has developed a new, analytically distinct, approach to race and
representation that analyzes majority-minority congressional dis-
tricts with strict scrutiny, under the Equal Protection Clause, if
traditional districting principles are subordinated to race.139
The two approaches are in tension because, while the remedy to
Section 2 vote dilution is the adoption of majority-minority dis-
tricts,140 racially motivated districting is subject to strict scrutiny by
the Supreme Court.14' The Court, however, makes assumptions
about the place of race in politics that are at odds with the neces-
sary precondition of vote dilution litigation: that voting is racially
polarized. 4 2 Unfortunately, the Court's laudable goal of removing
race from politics conflicts with the finding in many vote dilution
cases that race plays a significant role in politics through the deci-
137. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1996) ("The Voting
Rights Act of 1965 reflects Congress' firm intention to rid the country of racial dis-
crimination in voting."). See supra Part I.B.
138. See Richard Briffault, Race and Representation After Miller v. Johnson, 1995
U. CHi. LEGAL F. 23, 23 (1995); see also supra Part II.A.
139. See supra Part II.B. For an interesting and original article positing the creation
of majority-minority United States Senate districts, see Terry Smith, Rediscovering the
Sovereignty of the People: The Case for Senate Districts, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1, 60 (1996)
("Whatever may be the effects of Shaw and its progeny on majority-minority House
districts, these precedents do not preclude the creation of majority-minority or minor-
ity enhanced Senate districts, for such districts can be drawn in accordance with tradi-
tional districting criteria."); see also Jeanmarie K. Grubert, Note, The Rehnquist
Court's Changed Reading of the Equal Protection Clause in the Context of Voting
Rights, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1819, 1821 (1997) (arguing that racial classifications that
benefit a racial minority are constitutionally permissible under the EPC).
140. See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1019-20 (1994); see also supra note 59
and accompanying text.
141. See supra Part II.B.
142. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51; see also supra notes 54-58 and
accompanying text.
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sions of voters. 43 Thus, the Court's new approach forces govern-
ments to be color-blind when voters are not.
1. Redistricting's Catch-22
By considering racially motivated actions that increase the repre-
sentation of racial minorities to be as problematic as actions that
decrease minority political strength, the Supreme Court presents
state legislatures with a Catch-22. When states create majority-mi-
nority districts to satisfy Sections 2 and 5 of the VRA, which re-
quire that the legislature consider minority voters when drawing
district lines,' their redistricting plan is vulnerable to constitu-
tional attack on equal protection grounds. How states can comply
with the VRA and avoid violating the EPC remains unclear, as
race almost always predominates when states reapportion their
electoral districts to comply with the federal statute.
2. The Supreme Court's Implicit Challenge of Vote
Dilution Doctrine
Shaw v. Reno and its progeny do not directly challenge the vote
dilution doctrine. The Supreme Court still permits the use of race
to eradicate the effects of past racial discrimination, and allows ju-
risdictions to use race to comply with the VRA.145 Regardless of
the merits of the Court's new approach to redistricting in cases
where the plaintiffs do not allege vote dilution, to the extent that
Shaw I and its progeny compel strict scrutiny of electoral districts
drawn pursuant to Section 2 of the VRA, the Court unnecessarily
intrudes on the vote dilution doctrine pronounced in Thornburg v.
Gingles.1
46
In Gingles, the Supreme Court established a comprehensive
framework for analyzing vote dilution claims. An essential re-
quirement under the Gingles analysis is that a minority group be
able to show that it is "sufficiently large and geographically com-
143. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616-17 (1982); see also KEITH REEVES,
VOTING HOPES OR FEARS? 100 (1997) ("In the entire checkered history of this coun-
try, only nine blacks have ever won election to the U.S. Congress from districts where
whites were overwhelmingly in the majority."); supra note 21 and accompanying text.
144. See supra Part I.B for a discussion of VRA requirements under sections 2 and
5.
145. See, e.g., Shaw II, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 1902-03 (1996); Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941,
1960-61 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920-21 (1995); Shaw 1, 509 U.S. 630,
653-56 (1993); see supra Part II.B.
146. 478 U.S. 30 (1986); see supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
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pact to constitute a majority in a single-member district. '147 In
Shaw I and its progeny, a district's lack of compactness has been a
major factor for the Court, in deciding both whether to apply strict
scrutiny and whether the majority-minority district can survive
heightened judicial review.148 If a minority group has established a
vote dilution claim under Gingles, however, a court should not in-
quire further into the compactness of a district's shape, and the
motivations behind it, because the group already has shown its
numerosity and geographic compactness.
Moreover, a finding of a Section 2 violation under Gingles is
causally related to the fact that the minority group is geographi-
cally compact and constitutes a politically cohesive unit, though the
White majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to defeat the minority's
preferred candidate.1 49 A finding of vote dilution under Gingles
also is causally related to racially adverse social and historical con-
ditions, including the history of an electoral system's past discrimi-
nation.1 50  Therefore, once a plaintiff establishes a Section 2
violation under the Gingles framework, the Court's equal protec-
tion concerns, regarding the constitutionality of a majority-minor-
ity district drawn with race as the predominant motive, are
satisfied. Thus, a Shaw I-type strict scrutiny review of that district
represents an implicit challenge of the vote dilution doctrine.
B. Abrams v. Johnson: A Missed Opportunity for the Supreme
Court to Resolve Tension and Permit the EPC and
VRA to Coexist in Harmony
To resolve the tension between its equal protection analysis in
Shaw v. Reno and its progeny, and the requirements of the VRA,
the Supreme Court should have used Abrams v. Johnson151 to clar-
ify both the contours of vote dilution claims, and how majority-
minority districts (as remedies to violations of Section 2 of the
VRA) can survive strict scrutiny. By failing to explain the scope
and limits of Shaw I and its progeny, the Court has delayed the
resolution of important issues, leaving state legislatures and private
147. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50; see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
148. See supra Part II.B.
149. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51; see also supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
150. The history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision affect-
ing the minority group's ability to participate in the democratic process is part of the
"totality of the circumstances" analysis courts use to determine if a section 2 violation
exists once the Gingles preconditions are established. See supra note 58.
151. 117 S. Ct. 1925 (1997). See supra Part II.C.2 for a discussiofi of the Abrams
litigation.
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litigants to question whether the creation of majority-minority vot-
ing districts, pursuant to the VRA, are constitutional under the
EPC.
1. Majority-Minority Districts, Drawn to Comply with the VRA,
Can Survive Strict Scrutiny
One of the most significant issues the Abrams Court should have
resolved is whether compliance with Section 2 of the VRA consti-
tutes a compelling state interest permitting the creation of minor-
ity-controlled districts. The outcome of this question likely
depends on Justice O'Connor, who represents the swing vote in the
Shaw v. Reno line of cases.
In Bush v. Vera, Justice O'Connor, the author of the plurality
opinion, also wrote a very important separate concurring opinion,
where she expressed her view that compliance with the results test
of Section 2 is a compelling state interest. 152 Because the four
Bush dissenters also determined that a majority-minority congres-
sional district, drawn to avoid liability under the VRA, serves a
compelling interest, 53 Justice O'Connor could have provided the
determinative vote for a holding that a second minority-controlled
district in Georgia was compelled by the VRA, and thus was con-
stitutional regardless of racial motivation.
Logic supports such a result. Strict scrutiny should not outlaw a
race-based remedy to a violation of the VRA, because the statute
compels race-based districting when there is a violation of Section
2.151 If the Supreme Court will not recognize race-conscious dis-
tricting as constitutional under the EPC, then it must be prepared
to strike down the VRA itself as unconstitutional. However, con-
sidering congressional intent,'55 for. the Court to find that the VRA
152. 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1968 (1996) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see supra note 108 and
accompanying text.
153. See id. at 1989 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting); see
also id. at 2007 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting); supra note
107 and accompanying text.
154. See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994). "[A]dherence to Gingles
to remedy violations of Section 2 necessarily implicates race" because of the showing
minority groups must make in the first instance to establish the violations. Sanchez v.
Colorado, 97 F.3d 1303, 1327 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1820 (1997); see
also Clark v. Calhoun County, 88 F.3d 1393, 1408 (5th Cir. 1996) ("Redistricting to
remedy found violations of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act by definition employs race.");
supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
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violates the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee
would be "cruelly ironic.' '1 56
2. The Meaning and Role of Compactness in Redistricting
For a majority of the Supreme Court to find that compliance
with Section 2 permits a majority-minority district drawn with race
as the predominant motive, the Justices will have to be satisfied
that the Gingles preconditions are met. Specifically, a majority of
the Court must be convinced that a majority-minority district has a
"sufficiently large and geographically compact" Black population,
and that racially polarized voting exists in the district. 57 Although
the Abrams appellants' proposals for a second majority-minority
district were roughly pear or wine bottle shaped,158 this should not
have prevented the Court from finding that a second "reasonably
compact" minority-controlled congressional district could be cre-
ated in Georgia.
In her concurrence in Bush, Justice O'Connor stated that dis-
tricts that are bizarrely-shaped and non-compact for predominantly
racial reasons are unconstitutional. 159 If Justice O'Connor meant
that an oddly shaped majority-minority district, drawn to remedy a
Section 2 violation, is presumptively unconstitutional, then her
statement reflects a mistaken view of the compactness required
under Section 2.160 Justice Kennedy asserted correctly in his con-
currence in Bush that the first Gingles factor refers to the compact-
ness of the minority population, not the contested district, and that
Section 2 does not forbid a non-compact majority-minority
district. 161
156. Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 2007 (Souter, J., dissenting).
157. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 129.
159. See Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1970 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also supra note 110
and accompanying text.
160. Such a definition of compactness is also substantially more stringent than the
lower courts' interpretation of the Gingles compactness requirement. See Bernard
Grofman, Expert Witness Testimony and the Evolution of Voting Rights Case Law, in
COrROVERSIES, supra note 6, at 218-19 (stating that lower courts generally interpret
the compactness requirement loosely to mean only that the minority population must
be "sufficiently geographically concentrated so that a district could be created in
which the minority is a majority").
161. See Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1971-72 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also supra notes
111-12 and accompanying text. The Abrams dissent also asserted that it is a mistake
to conflate Shaw I and its progeny compactness, which concerns district shape or
boundaries, with section 2 compactness, which concerns a minority group's compact-
ness. See Abrams v. Johnson, 117 S. Ct. 1925, 1947 (1997) (Breyer, J., joined by Ste-
vens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting); see also supra note 132.
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Justice Kennedy holds the legally principled position because it
conforms with the Supreme Court's prior decision in Gingles. Jus-
tice Kennedy's assertion also adheres to the Court's previous dec-
laration in Reynolds v. Sims that public officials "represent people,
not trees or acres. ' 162 The Court, therefore, should direct the
lower federal courts that the Section 2 compactness inquiry applies
to the geographical compactness of the minority population, while
the EPC compactness question asks whether the district drawn sub-
ordinates traditional race-neutral principles (i.e., compactness of
district shape) more than is "reasonably necessary" to satisfy the
VRA.163
Ironically, if the Court requires majority-minority districts to
have a particular shape, these districts may actually stand out in
contrast to majority-White districts that do not face such restric-
tions. 164 Moreover, the Court's recent decisions have essentially
triple-counted geographic compactness by using it to (1) decide
whether plaintiffs have shown that racial considerations
predominated, thus triggering strict scrutiny;165 (2) decide whether
minority voters could have made a prima facie showing of liability
under Section 2 of the VRA, thus establishing a potential compel-
ling interest for the challenged plan;166 and (3) decide whether the
challenged districts are narrowly tailored in that they avoid unduly
subordinating traditional districting principles, including
compactness. 67
Although the distinction between compactness of district shape,
a traditional districting principle, versus compactness of minority
population, a necessary Gingles precondition, may seem to be arti-
162. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964); see also id. at 580 ("Citizens, not
history or economic interests, cast votes. Considerations of area alone provide an
insufficient justification for deviations from the equal-population principle. Again,
people, not land or trees or pastures, vote.").
163. See supra notes 117-120 and accompanying text.
164. See Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1990 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Pamela S. Karlan,
Still Hazy After All These Years: Voting Rights in the Post-Shaw Era, 26 CUMB. L.
REV. 287, 309 (1995-96)). Moreover, topography (mountain ranges, rivers, bays),
lines of communication and transportation, local government boundaries and the
"one person, one vote" requirement justify the departure from districts that are
nearly square in shape. See Paul L. McKaskle, The Voting Rights Act and the "Consci-
entious Redistricter", 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 64 (1995).
165. See, e.g., Shaw 1, 509 U.S. 630, 641-47 (1993); see supra note 79 and accompa-
nying text.
166. See e.g., Shaw II, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 1906 (1996); see supra note 103 and accompa-
nying text.
167. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1960-61 (1996); see supra note 107 and
accompanying text.
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ficial because a geographically compact population should produce
a compact district, it already has split the lower federal courts ad-
dressing Section 2 claims (which were not even triggered by a Shaw
redistricting decision). 68 Some courts have conflated the two is-
sues of compactness and unfairly rejected Section 2 liability be-
cause the plaintiffs' proposed remedy either departed from
traditional redistricting principles or had no chance of surviving
strict scrutiny. 169 Other courts correctly have kept separate the is-
sue of Section 2 liability from the analysis of whether the proposed
remedy satisfies the requirements of the EPC.170 It is important to
keep separate the equal protection analysis of a majority-minority
district drawn to remedy a Section 2 violation from the Gingles
analysis of whether there is a violation of Section 2 in the first in-
stance, because a district drawn to avoid liability under the VRA
may be able to survive strict scrutiny even if traditional districting
principles were subordinated to race.
3. Guideposts for the Legislators, Litigants, and Courts Walking
Redistricting's Tightrope
Because the Supreme Court decided Abrams without resolving
whether majority-minority voting districts are constitutional race-
based remedies for violations of Section 2, and without clarifying
the meaning and role of compactness, it failed to relieve the ten-
sion between its equal protection analysis, under Shaw I and its
progeny, and its vote dilution doctrine. At a minimum, therefore,
the Court should provide some guideposts to future legislators and
vote dilution litigants seeking to create majority-minority districts.
For example, the Supreme Court could instruct lower courts that
majority-minority districts, drawn with race as the predominant
factor, can survive strict scrutiny if two conditions are met: (1) the
district is necessary to cure a VRA violation; and (2) the legislature
uses race as the predominant factor only after trying in good faith
to cure the violation without subordinating race to traditional dis-
tricting principles. 17 ' Although such a holding would not com-
pletely resolve the tension between the VRA and EPC, the Court
would at least demonstrate its continued commitment to the .VRA,
168. See supra Part II.C.1.
169. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 117-120 and accompanying text.
171. Cf. Dillard v. City of Greensboro, 946 F. Supp. 946, 955 (M.D. Ala. 1996)
(allowing a Special Master to use race as a predominant factor only after attempting
to draw a majority-minority district without subordinating traditional race-neutral dis-
tricting principles).
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as well as to the enforcement of its race-conscious remedies where
necessary to achieve its goals of protecting minority voting rights
and power. 172
The Supreme Court also could read a heightened compactness
requirement into its Gingles analysis, prohibiting majority-minority
districts that are non-compact in shape because they cannot survive
narrow tailoring scrutiny under equal protection analysis. 173 This
approach is inappropriate, however, because the creation of a mi-
nority-controlled district, pursuant to the VRA, is meant to estab-
lish a normal, color-blind state of affairs in a place where racially
polarized voting has subsumed minority voting rights and power.
Indeed, the compactness inquiry should be reduced where past ra-
cial discrimination is shown, because the breadth of the remedy
ought to fit the injury proven. 74
Critics of the VRA may argue that the statute already has
achieved its goals, given that all the minority candidates in districts
that were redrawn as a result of Shaw I and its progeny were re-
elected to Congress in 1996.175 One election, however, is not dis-
positive proof that minority groups are able to elect representatives
of their choice in predominantly White districts. 76 Moreover, the
success of these minority candidates in the 1996 election may more
accurately bespeak the power of incumbency.1 77 The real test of
whether majority-minority districts are still necessary will come
172. See supra Part I.B.
173. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
174. Congress has made clear that, in fashioning a remedy to a section 2 violation, a
"court should exercise its traditional equitable powers to fashion relief so that it com-
pletely remedies the prior dilution of minority voting strength and fully provides
equal opportunity for minority citizens to partcipate and elect candidates of their
choice." S. REP. No. 97-417, at 31 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 208.
175. Kevin Sack, Victory of 5 Redistricted Blacks Recasts Gerrymandering Dispute,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1996, at Al.
176. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 74-76 (1986). Indeed, the open racism
revealed in the release of the "Texaco tapes" clearly shows that discriminatory prac-
tices by the White majority in this country are still a significant problem that requires
the redress of remedial statutes. See Kurt Eichenwald, Texaco Executives, On Tape,
Discussed Impeding a Bias Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1996, at Al. Texaco executives,
recorded on tape, referred to plaintiffs in an impending employment discrimination
suit as "Black jelly beans" upset about being "glued to the bottom of the bag." Id. at
D4. Moreover, the problem of minority representation is acutely felt in the Black
community as fourteen percent of a total voting age population of 10.4 million Black
men nationwide are currently or permanently barred from voting either because they
are in prison or have been convicted of a felony. See Fox Butterfield, Many Black
Men Barred From Voting, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1997, at A12; see also supra note 143
and accompanying text.
177. See Cynthia A. McKinney, A Product of the Voting Rights Act, WASH. POST,
Nov. 26, 1996, at A15 ("[W]ithout the ability to represent the old [majority-minority]
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from the minority candidates who vie for seats after the incum-
bents from former majority-minority districts leave office.
Conclusion
In Shaw v. Reno and its progeny, the Supreme Court has rede-
fined the voting rights debate, subjecting majority-minority dis-
tricts, drawn to comply with the VRA, to strict scrutiny under the
EPC. To resolve the conflicting demands that legislators, litigants,
and courts now face when attempting to redraw congressional dis-
trict lines, the Court should hold that creating a majority-minority
district to remedy a Section 2 violation is a compelling state inter-
est that is narrowly tailored.
Moreover, the Supreme Court should instruct the lower courts
to keep the analysis of compactness for Section 2 liability separate
from the equal protection analysis of the proposed remedy. With-
out these clarifications, legitimate vote dilution claims may be re-
jected unfairly, and congressional redistricting will remain akin to a
tightrope walk without a safety net.
district and develop a political profile, I would have been largely unknown to voters in
the new ... district, and unlikely to win election.").
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